m  **.- 


c 


LI  BRARY 

OF   THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


Received 
Accessions  No 


i89/. 
Shelf  No. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  REALISM 


•  » 


WILLIAM   ICRIN  GILL,  A.M. 
i\ 

AUTHOR  OF  "EVOLUTION  AMD  PROGRESS"  AMD  "ANALYTICAL 
PROCESSES  " 


feOSTON 

tNDEX  ASSOCIATION,  44  BOYLSTON  STREET 
1886 


CONTENTS. 


PREFACE, ix 

I. 

EVOLUTION,  OBJECTIVE  AND  SUBJECTIVE. 

Grandeur  of  Objective  Evolution, 1 

Its  Defective  Psychology, 2 

All  Phenomena  and  therefore  all  Evolution  Subjective,  2 

Nature  of  the  Supposed  Material  World, 4 

This  View  is  only  a  Metaphysical  Theory, 6 

II. 

NO   SUPERSENSJ^LE^MATTER. 

Experience  our  Base,  and  all  Postulates  discarded,  .    .  8 

The  World  known  to  Different  Men  is  a  Different  World ,  9 

Self-consciousness  no  Proof  of  Non-ego, 9 

If  Matter  is  Supersensible,  our  Real  Organism  is  Un- 
known,    9 

That  makes  our  Real  Bodies  Non-ego  and  Dual,     ...  10 

It  gives  a  Double  twice  over  to  All  Things, 11 

Its  False  Etiology, 11 

Its  Various  Inconsistency, 13 

Its  Intrinsic  Improbability, 15 

Supposed  Possibility  as  an  Argument, 15 

Dualistic  Vacillation, 16 

Sundry  Logical  Points, 18 

III. 
SCIENTIFIC  PHILOSOPHY. 

Relation  of  Nominalism  to  Modern  Subjectivism,     .    .  22 

Substitution  of  Relations  for  Universals, 26 

Subjective  Relations, 27 


IV  CONTENTS 

Identity  and  Difference  of  Method  in  Science  and  Phi- 
losophy,      28 

Scope  of  Science  and  Philosophy 31 

IV. 
THE  BLACK  HOLE  —  SOLIPSISM. 

Involuntary  Action, 35 

Alleged  Necessary  Belief, 36 

Spencer's  Negative  Proof  of  Transfigured  Realism,  .    .  36 

Spencer's  Positive  Proof  of  Transfigured  Realism,    .    .  37 

The  Subjective  World  a  Real  World, 40 

Nature  and  Evolution  shut  us  up  in  the  Ego,     ....  42 

V. 

REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  SITUATION. 

Individualism  of  All  Evolution, 47 

The  Pre-animal  World  a  Sentient  World, 49 

This  Sentient  Being  or  World  is  a  Force, 53 

This  Sentient  Being  or  World  is  One  with  the  Alleged 

Great  Unknown, 54 

Both  the  Known  and  Unknown  of  this  Universe  are 

One  with  the  Ego, 55 

Sublime  Representation  of  Man, 56 

Relation  of  Ego  to  Organism  and  Environment,    ...      57 

Relation  between  Thought  and  Brain,    . 58 

Relation   between    Organic   and   Extra-organic   Phe- 
nomena,      59 

VI. 

SUPERFICIAL  EXPOSITIONS  OF  OBJECTIVE  REALITY. 

VII. 
THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE. 

Mephistopheles  on  Verbalism, 72 

Verbalism  on  Substance  and  Noumena, 73 

Its  Generation  of  an  Impossible  Absolute, 75 

An  Erroneous  Notion  of  Relativity, 77 

Source  of  this  Error,— Fossil  Metaphysics  on  Matter 

and  Mind, 78 

Confusion  of  Identity  and  Similarity, 83 

Cause  of  Relative  Sensitive  Variation, 84 

NO  Unknowable  Absolute,  .    ,    , •    , 86 


CONTENTS  V 

VIII. 
THE  EGO. 

What  is  Ego,  and  its  Proof? 87 

Personality  and  Individuality, 89 

Alleged  Obscurity  of  this  Doctrine, 90 

Whence  the  Apparent  Clearness  of  the  Vulgar  Notion?  91 

Two  Exclusive  Conceptions  of  the  Ego, 91 

Mutual  Destruction  of  the  Organicists, 93 

Superior  Clearness  of  Extra-organicism, 93 

Unrecognized  Prevalence  of  Extra-organicism,     ...  94 

Ultimacy  of  our  Doctrine, 95 

Environment  of  Organism  not  Environment  of  Ego,     .  96 

Argument  of  Comicality, 97 

IX. 
PERMANENCE  AND  SIMPLICITY  OF  THE  EGO. 

The  Constant  and  Perduring  Ego, 99 

Its  Immortality, 100 

The  Aggregated  Monadism  of  Leibnitz, 105 

Organic  Atomism, 107 

Dichotomy 110 

Trichotomy, 112 

Logical  Difficulties  of  all  forms  of  Pluralism,    ....  113 
The  Ego  of  Philosophical  Realism  a  Pure  and  Simple 

Unity, 114 

X. 

THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  LOCAL  EGO. 

The  Absolute  Ego, 117 

The  Local  Ego, 120 

The  Local  Ego  denned  as  Transphenomenal  and  all 

Phenomena  as  Non-ego, 120 

The  Local  Ego  conceived  as  Supersensible  and  Sensible 

Phenomena  as  iS^on-ego, 123 

The  Local  Ego  denned  as  Organic,  which  gives  the 

Physiological  Ego, 125 

The  Panheisenist  Ego, 131 

XI. 

INDUCTIVE  METHOD  OF  TRANSCENDING  THE  EGO. 

Fichte's  Effort  to  transcend  the  Ego, 133 

Sematism  the  Base  of  Induction, 138 


VI  CONTENTS 

Sematism  on  the  Relations  of  the  Several  Senses,      .    .  142 
Sematism  between  the  Senses  and  their  Common  Sub- 
ject,    142 

Sematism  between  the  Ego  and  its  Organism,  ....  143 

Sematism  between  our  Organism  and  Other  Organisms,  144 

XII. 

PSYCHE-MORPHISM. 

Problem  of  Permanence  and  Change  in  Causation,    .    .  148 

Probable  Pre-existence  in  other  Forms, 150 

Pre-existence  in  Human  Form, 152 

Number  and  Duration  of  Psyche-morphisms,     ....  153 

A  Method  of  Evading  Psyche-morphism, 155 

Objections  to  this  Method, 156 

Limitation  of  Psyche-m orpine  Changes, 160 

Dignity  and  Significance  of  the  Lower  Animals,    .    .    .  160 

Reality  and  Thoroughness  of  Subjective  Evolution,  .    .  161 

Universality  of  Evolution, 162 

XIII. 
HUMAN  INTERCOURSE. 

Collateral  Testimony, 168 

Conditions  of  Intercourse, 170 

Demand  for  a  Method  or  Medium  of  Intercourse,      .    .  171 

Method  not  explained  by  Sematology, 171 

No  Medium  in  Non-egoistic  Matter, 172 

Nor  in  the  Forms  of  Sensible  Matter, 173 

An  Impassable  Gulf  between  Different  Minds,  ....  173 

A  Supernatural  Appointment  to  be  inferred,     ....  173 

Pre-established  Harmony, 174 

XIV. 

THEOLOGY  DEMANDS  A  PHILOSOPHY. 

Theism  and  Agnostic  Deism, 175 

God's  Existence  to  be  proved,  not  postulated,  ....    176 
Penumbral  Metaphysics  no  Refuge  for  Theology,      .    .    177 

XV. 

METHOD  OF  CONCEIVING  AND  PROVING  CREATION. 

Conception  of  Deity, 179 

On  Conceiving  Creation, 183 


CONTENTS  Vi 

Logical  Methods  and  Demands  in  Proof  of  Deity,    .    .  193 
The  Positive  Method  must  supersede  the  Old  Meta- 
physical Method, 195 

XVI. 
ORIGIN  OF  MAN. 

Not  Known  Directly, 199 

Our  Alleged  Parents  not  our  Authors, 200 

Knowable  Nature  not  our  Author, 203 

Universal  Symbolism  of  Successive  Changes,     ....  203 

Creation  at  the  Lowest  Point  (if  at  all), 204 

Proofs  of  Creation  summed  up, 208 

Our  Creation  in  the  Preorganic  State, 209 

Creation  and  Evolution  distinguished, 213 

Man  an  Intrinsic  Force,  Individualistic, 214 

Divine  Immanence  in  Nature, 214 

Immanence  in  Nature  is  Immanence  in  the  Ego,    ...  216 

Creation  Instantaneous,  not  Continous, 216 

The  Soul  evolves  its  own  Organism, 216 

The  Soul's  Transcendence  of  the  Material  Universe,      .  217 

XVII. 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  ETIOLOGY. 

Designing  and  Undesigning  Causes, 218 

Causes  in  Science  and  in  Philosophy, 218 

Etiology  Relative  to  Matter  and  Force, 219 

Alleged  Forcelessness  of  all  Creation, 220 

Paralogism  of  the  Old  Metaphysical  Principle  of  Cau- 
sality   222 

XVIII. 
ETIOLOGY  AND  OBJECTIVE  EVOLUTION. 

Nature's  Panheisenism, 225 

Immutability  of  Gravity, 227 

Dissipation  and  Equilibration  of  Heat, 228 

Autonomy  and  Eternity  of  Gravity, 230 

Doctrine  of  Chances, 231 

XIX. 

ETIOLOGY  AND  SUBJECTIVE  EVOLUTION. 

Subjective  and  Objective  Autonomy  of  the  Universe,  .  233 

Relation  of  Science  to  Supernaturalism, 235 


Vlll  CONTENTS 

Unity  of  God, 23G 

Unceasing  Creation, 236 

Importance  of  the  Supernatural, 236 

Importance  and  Moral  Need  of  its  Manifestations,    .    .  237 

XX. 

PRESUPPOSITIONS  OF  TELEOLOGY. 

Relation  of  Teleology  to  Etiology, 239 

Design  no  Proof  of  Creation, 240 

Design  no  Proof  of  Supernatural  Agency, 240 

Design  not  certainly  Manifest  in  Nature, 241 

Nature  a  Designless,  Unconscious  Combining  Force,    .  243 

Designless, 244 

Variableness  of  Volition, 245 

Adaptations,  Good  and  Evil, 247 

XXI. 

SPHERE  OF  TELEOLOGY. 

Foundation  of  Teleology, 249 

Teleology  Relative  to  other  Men  and  Animals, ....  251 

Teleology  Relative  to  Nature  and  God, 252 

Exalted  Place  of  Design  in  Philosophical  Realism,    .    .253 

Limitations  of  Teleology, 255 

XXII. 

ASSIMILATION  OP  SCIENCE. 

Tests  of  a  True  Philosophy, 257 

Assimilation  of  Kosmogeny, 257 

Assimilation  of  Phylogeny, 263 

Assimilation  of  Ontogeny, 265 

Useless  Organs, 267 

Prefossil  Phenomena, 268 

XXIII. 

SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION. 

The  World  as  Sensation, 272 

Its  Cause  or  Origin, 273 

How  to  transcend  the  Ego, 274 

Theistic  Conclusion, 274 

Prospective  Working  of  this  Theory, 277 


PR 


IN  his  Analytical  Processes,  the  author  made 
some  liberal  promises  for  which  this  book  is  only 
an  apology,  because  the  public  cares  little  for  the 
fulfilment  of  the  promises  of  metaphysicians. 
This  miniature  of  a  larger  labor  indicates  a  line 
of  thought  which,  it  is  hoped,  may  be  found  of 
some  value  as  a  distinct  contribution  to  philosophy, 
which  is  now  at  a  stand-still.  The  prolonged  cry, 
maintained  in  some  quarters,  of  "  Back  to  Kant !  " 
is  a  confession  of  hopeless  defeat  and  confusion ; 
while  the  weaker  sort  of  minds,  wearing  the  airs 
of  mental  omnipotence,  resortr  to  physics  for  the 
solution  of  metaphysical  problems.  Never  was 
there  greater  need  of  something  to  reanimate  the 
despairing  spirit  of  Philosophy.  Her  votaries, 
therefore,  may  possibly  be  induced,  some  of  them, 
to  look  into  even  this  small  and  unattractive 
volume,  to  see  if,  perchance,  they  may  find  an  atom 
of  comfort  and  support. 

Philosophical  Realism,  here  briefly  expounded, 
has  no  affinity  with  scepticism.  It  eschews  nega- 
tions, and  abhors  abstractions  substituted  for  con- 
cretes. It  is  positive  and  constructive  in  its 
method  and  object  and  conclusion.  It  believes  in 
the  attainability  of  philosophic  truth,  which  is  a 


X  PREFACE 

unity  of  thought  concordant  with  and  expressive 
of  the  unity  of  all  possible  experiences  and  their 
causes  and  relations.  Nothing  can  go  further  than 
this,  and  nothing  can  be  more  comprehensive. 
Besides,  in  all  experiences  and  all  thought,  Phil- 
osophical Realism  finds  substance  and  essence  and 
reality,  so  that  the  unity  which  is  here  discovered 
in  the  manifold  is  an  ultimate  and  all-embracing 
unity.  At  least,  this  is  the  author's  aim  and  his 
notion  of  his  work. 

Philosophy,  not  theology  and  religion,  is  the 
writer's  quest ;  and  an  argument  on  God  and  crea- 
tion is  introduced  only  for  the  sake  of  philosophy, 
which  required  it  as  a  condition  of  intellectual 
continuity  and  final  unity  of  conception. 

As  it  is  a  beautiful  custom  for  authors  in  their 
preface  to  designate  the  sources  and  lines  of  light 
whence  their  own  radiance,  which  might  not  else 
be  clearly  seen  in  some  cases,  the  present  writer 
wishes  to  say  that  he  is  indebted  to  all  thinkers 
who  have  gone  before  him,  both  the  known  and 
the  (to  him)  great  unknown ;  and  he  sincerely 
thanks  them  for  their  inestimable  benefactions,  of 
the  value  of  which  to  him,  as  indicated  in  this 
volume,  he  invites  the  philosophic  public  to  judge, 
if  it  can  find  time,  now  or  in  the  future. 

Copernicus,  it  has  been  said,  changed  for  man 
the  front  of  the  universe.  Before  his  time,  our 
earth  had  been  conceived  as  the  front,  with  sun, 
stars,  and  planets  in  the  background, —  we  the 
centre,  they  our  satellites.  This  order  being  re- 
versed by  Columbus,  the  dignity  and  importance 
of  man  seemed  to  be  relatively  depressed ;  but,  on 


further .  thought  and  knowledge,  we  see  that  this 
elevates  man  by  showing  him  as  the  known  con- 
scious constituent  of  a  far  grander  universe,  every 
part  of  which  becomes  his  servitor.  The  doctrine 
of  evolution  operates  in  a  similar  way.  Its  first 
effect  is,  apparently,  to  belittle  man,  by  showing 
him  to  have  a  very  humble  ancestry,  though  a  very 
ancient  one.  Where  is  the  dignity  of  a  race  born 
of  an  ascidian?  But,  as  we  study  the  subject  more 
thoroughly,  we  begin  to  see  a  fresh  light.  We  see 
that  the  law  of  evolution  exalts  man,  and  crowns 
him  with  peculiar  glory  as  earth's  proper  king 
and  lord,  the  evident  final  cause  of  the  world,  the 
great  grand  end  toward  which  all  things  have  been 
always  tending  in  all  their  combinations,  and  that 
beyond  man  our  kosmic  forces  can  never  go ;  that 
in  man  they  have  achieved  their  highest  physical 
result ;  and  that  henceforth  it  is  their  function  to 
develop  man's  spiritual  nature,  and  thus  appar- 
ently fit  him  for  a  higher  sphere  when  he  shuffles 
off  this  mortal  coil. 

The  doctrine  of  Philosophical  Realism  ex- 
pounded in  the  following  pages  presents  man 
and  the  universe  in  a  still  grander  aspect.  It 
exalts  the  universe  by  making  it  spiritual, —  the 
lower  and  preliminary  modes  of  a  being  capable 
of  evolving  the  highest  spiritual  agency.  The 
universe  is  the  lower  part  of  man  ;  and  he,  as  a 
spiritual  being,  is  its  all  and  in  all, —  not  merely  its 
end,  but  its  intrinsic  nature,  substance,  and  force. 
Not  from  the  sun  derives  he  his  nourishment  and 
existence.  The  sun  and  all  the  stars  and  their 
satellites  are  but  the  fainter  gleams  of  his  bright- 


Xll  PREFACE 

ness,  for  of  him  and  for  him  are  all  things  knowable. 
Nay,  they  are  he  himself,  modes  of  his  action  and 
expressions  of  his  nature;  and  they  are  only  the 
lower  parts  of  his  ways,  which  in  the  change  which 
we  call  death  give  place  to  a  higher  universe,  a 
higher  order  of  psycho-sensible  experiences,  the 
present  universe  being  the  correlate  of  the  succeed- 
ing universe,  one  ceasing  that  the  other  may 
begin. 

While  arguing  in  one  chapter  in  favor  of  extra- 
organic  spirit  agency,  the  author  is  not  responsible 
for  more  than  he  affirms. 

The  unity  which  Hegel  makes  such  monstrous 
efforts  to  attain  is  the  natural  heritage  of  Philo- 
sophical Realism.  Conceive  the  problem  aright 
and  stick  to  the  declared  meaning  of  its  terms, 
then  the  solution  follows  as  surely  and  readily  as 
steam  rises  from  heated  water,  just  as  the  Chi- 
nese puzzle  appears  simple  enough  when  we  have 
got  the  key.  The  author's  primary  principle  is 
simply,  "  Cover  all  facts,  and  be  consistent/'  Our 
little  scheme  may  be  wrong,  though  self-consistent ; 
but,  if  not  self-consistent,  it  is  no  system  at  all,  but 
only  an  aggregation,  and  is  certainly  wrong  some- 
where. Facts  are  always  necessarily  consistent  be- 
cause existent.  We  have  only  to  take  account  of 
them  and  of  their  relations  and  logical  implications. 
It  is  here  only  where  inconsistency  is  possible,  aris- 
ing from  the  omission  or  misinterpretation  of  some 
of  the  facts  or  of  their  relations  and  logical  implica- 
tions. If  on  any  of  these  points  we  are  wrong,  we 
shall  probably  somewhere  be  involved  in  inconsis- 
tencies. On  the  other  hand,  if  we  have  all  the  facts 


PREFACE  Xlll 

and  nothing  but  the  facts, —  that  is,  no  inventions 
and  fantasies, —  and  these  facts  and  their  relations 
rightly  conceived,  there  cannot  possibly  be  any 
self-contradiction,  total  or  partial,  real  or  apparent ; 
and  our  theory  is  then  certainly  true. 

The  task  of  philosophy  has  been  magnified  by 
a  confusion  of  opposition  with.contradiction  or  by 
the  inclusion  of  them  under  the  same  category,  as 
requiring  the  same  treatment.  Nearly  all  the  Ger- 
man philosophers  have  been  guilty  of  this  in  some 
degree,  and  with  more  or  less  of  conscious  articu- 
lateness.  Hegel,  for  the  first  time  in  the  history 
of  philosophy,  did  it  deliberately,  and  made  it  one 
of  the  corner-stones  of  his  theoretic  fabric.  Opposi- 
tion is  of  forces  :  contradiction  is  of  conceptions. 
Opposing  forces  are  all  equally  real,  and  proposi- 
tions affirming  them  are  all  perfectly  true.  Oppos- 
ing conceptions  are  equally  real  as  conceptions,  as 
conceptual  forces  ;  but  they  cannot  all  be  true.  So 
far  as  any  one  is  affirmed,  the  others  are  by  implica- 
tion denied ;  and,  so  far  as  any  proposition  is  true, 
all  opposing  propositions  are  false.  If  we  allow 
that  there  is  an  ultimate  unity  in  the  opposing  forces 
of  nature,  that  does  not  justify  or  in  any  wise 
connect  with  the  inference  or  assumption  that 
there  is  an  ultimate  unity  of  contradictory  proposi- 
tions. The  latter  is  an  ultimate  self-contradiction, 
and  so  destructive  of  the  alleged  unity.  Nothing 
but  fundamental  error  somewhere  could  ever  make 
this  seem  necessary  or  justifiable. 

Another  difficulty  has  arisen  from  the  identi- 
fication of  the  abstract  and  concrete.  Pure  being, 
from  which  all  quality  is  abstracted,  is  nothing,  as 


XIV  PREFACE 

Hegel  truly  says.  But,  because  it  is  nothing,  it  is 
not  being  at  all,  but  simply  no  being  and  no  thing, 
—  no  think,  the  negation  of  thought  and  reality. 
If  we  choose  perversely  to  call  this  a  thing  or  be- 
ing, then  it  will  be  perversely  consistent  in  us  to  say 
that  thing  and  being  are  equal  to  nothing  and  no 
being.  But  that  is  only  a  wretched  play  on  words  ; 
and,  if  that  is  put  forth  and  received  as  the  pro- 
foundest  thought  in  the  very  centre  of  philosophy, 
philosophy  then  wears,  to  the  normal  vision,  the 
most  sardonic  aspect  ever  presented  to  the  eye. 
The  real  being  or  thing,  that  which  all  men  mean 
when  they  use  the  word,  includes  quality,  a  con- 
crete reality,  which  is  not  equal  to  nothing,  or, 
rather,  to  which  nothing  is  not  equal.  Surely,  a 
philosophy  whose  foundations  consist  in  such  iden- 
tification of  the  concrete  and  abstract  can  never 
be  accepted  as  a  whole,  however  powerful  and 
helpful  it  may  be  in  parts,  as  the  result  of  a  his- 
toric crisis  in  the  history  of  human  thought. 
Hence,  the  author's  justification  of  his  attempt 
to  expound  Philosophical  Realism.  Philosophical 
progress  and  intellectual  unity  are  not  to  be  attained 
by  confounding  things  which  differ,  but  by  con- 
ceiving them  in  their  true  logical  distinctions  and 
relations. 

A  corresponding  error  has  been  perpetrated  in 
the  confusion  of  logical  correlatives.  While  these 
are  necessarily  thought  together,  they  are  concept- 
ually contradistinguished  from  each  other,  as  not 
only  different,  but  as  opposites  and  incompatibles. 
Each  term  is  conceived  as  excluding  absolutely 
the  other  term  from  its  sphere.  Finite  cannot  be 


conceived  except  as  excluding  infinite,  and  vice 
versa.  So  of  being  and  non-being.  This  is  a  per- 
fect description  of  all  contradictory  and  many 
contrary  correlatives.  The  law  of  non-contradiction 
is  thus  absolutely  unmodifiable  ;  and  Philosophical 
Realism  feels  that  its  command  is  not  grievous, 
but  rather  conceives  it  is  the  electric  light  of  the 
universe,  which  it  is  always  safe  to  follow,  and  by 
which  it  can  ultimately  explore  all  things  to  the 
very  centre. 

The  much-mooted  ultimate  unity  which  philos- 
ophy properly  seeks  is  not  to  be  confounded  with 
simplicity.  Here  Hegel  has  done  valuable  service 
in  opposing  the  pure  substance  of  Kant  and  other 
philosophers,  and  the  pure  absolute  of  Schelling, 
by  showing  that  the  ultimate  unity  is  a  plurality ; 
though  he  is  himself  very  unfortunate  in  his  at- 
tempt to  limit  the  plural  modes  to  three  and  in 
his  definition  of  these  three,  whether  as  being,  non- 
being,  and  becoming,  or  as  being,  essence,  and 
notion,  which  is  artificial  and  constrained. 

Neither  is  the  unity  which  philosophy  rightly 
seeks  an  individual  or  numerical  oneness,  as  op- 
posed to  a  duality  of  individuals.  We  have  no 
right  to  start  with  the  assumption  that  all  existing 
forces  are  ultimately  modes  of  one  individual  real- 
ity, whether,  with  Spinoza  and  others,  we  call  it 
substance,  or  whether,  with  Hegel,  we  call  it  spirit. 
There  may  be  many  ultimate  substances  or  spirits 
for  aught  we  know  or  have  a  right  to  say  till  we 
have  found  it  out  by  a  philosophic  investigation, 
and  the  interaction  of  these  may  be  the  causes  of 
the  phenomenal  universe.  To  assume  either  this 


or  the  contrary  at  the  outset,  and  then  on  such 
assumption  to  go  about  deducing  explanations  of 
opposing  phenomena  and  self-contradictory  notions 
as  the  chief  end  of  philosophy,  is  surely  a  method 
which  ought  to  have  a  short  life. 

Philosophical  Realism  assumes  nothing  on  this 
question  or  any  other,  but  it  easily  proves  the 
unity  of  the  known  universe  by  holding  steadily 
to  the  oft  admitted  and  expounded  doctrine  that 
all  known  phenomena  are  subjective  states.  They 
have  thus  very  clearly  their  unity  in  the  ego,  which 
is  a  unity  of  spirit,  and  includes  a  variety  of  vast 
and  indefinitely  progressive  extent. 

The  author  attaches  great  importance  to  a  rigid 
adherence  to  a  correct  method.  Eclecticism  is 
not  philosophy.  We  are  not  to  pick  and  choose 
according  to  our  predilections,  but  to  prosecute 
undeviatingly  a  scientific  method,  and  take  what 
comes  of  it.  This  is  the  spirit  of  the  author's 
work,  and  his  excuse  for  presenting  what  seems  so 
far  a  departure  in  some  points  from  common  sense, 
which  has  a  province,  but  not  in  philosophy. 

Philosophy  may  not  say  that  all  interest  is  in 
the  pursuit,  indifferent  to  results,  or,  with  the  old 
theology,  Believe  or  be  damned,  indifferent  to 
rational  proofs.  Both  are  paradoxes,  and  they  are 
related  to  the  truth  as  the  poles  to  the  equator  and 
as  the  horizons  to  the  zenith.  Philosophy  cannot 
be  indifferent  to  results,  else  the  alleged  pursuit  is 
only  a  pretence.  Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  can  it  be 
indifferent  to  the  method  of  pursuit,  whether  it  be 
rational  and  logical,  else  we  can  have  no  guarantee 
that  the  results  are  rational,  as  this  can  often  be 


PREFACE  XV11 

seen  only  in  the  light  of  its  connections  and  sup- 
ports, or  the  method  by  which  the  results  are 
attained,  so  that  we  have  no  evidence  whatever, 
unless  this  method  is  self-justified.  A  correct 
method  is,  therefore,  essential  in  philosophy. 

As  the  means  are  always  subservient  to  the  ends 
they  seek,  there  is  an  aspect  in  which  results  are 
supreme,  and  the  method  of  comparative  insignifi- 
cance. This  is  true  in  all  purely  practical  matters. 
It  is  very  important  that  a  man  finds  out  what 
diet  and  regimen  are  healthful  for  him,  but 
of  no  consequence  how  he  attains  it.  A  good 
medicine  is  none  the  less  valuable  to  those  who 
know  it,  whether  they  can  give  a  scientific  account 
of  it  or  not.  Truth  and  virtue  are  of  practical 
value,  even  though  they  are  advocated  by  a  false 
method. 

In  theoretic  pursuits  and  in  all  pure  science  and 
philosophy,  the  case  is  entirely  altered.  Here  the 
method  is  everything,  because  it  includes  and 
guarantees  the  end  ;  and,  if  we  fail  to  appreciate 
here  the  supremacy  of  the  method,  we  shall  be 
likely  to  fail  in  regard  to  the  end.  We  shall  be 
tempted  impatiently  and  blindly  to  adopt  agreeable 
results,  in  opposition  to  rational  evidences  of  their 
untruth.  I  regard  this  state  of  mind  as  so  very 
strong  and  prevalent  even  now  as  to  constitute  the 
great  philosophical  misery  and  degradation  of  our 
times.  I  regard  this  as  the  only,  or  chief,  source 
of  the  monstrous  inconsistencies  everywhere  man- 
ifest in  speculative  thought,  the  parent  of  "the 
riddle  of  body  and  mind,"  and  the  blind  clashing 
and  revolting  of  materialism,  dualism,  and  half- 


fledged  idealism  against  the  results  of  a  consist- 
ent procedure  in  psychological  and  metaphysical 
studies.  Hence,  the  lofty  though  partial  jealousy 
of  Plato  concerning  the  practical  uses  of  geometry. 
He  saw,  as  all  ages  have  seen,  men  interested  in 
geometry  and  in  all  intellectual  pursuits  only  for 
certain  practical,  material,  and  social  results  which 
they  may  be  made  to  yield ;  and  he  knew  that  the 
higher  advances  of  the  mind  could  not  be  made 
in  that  spirit.  He,  however,  was,  no  doubt,  a  little 
narrow  at  the  bottom,  too  little  in  sympathy  with 
the  necessities  of  inferior  minds  and  with  the  idea 
now  dominant,  that  scientific  truth  should  be 
made  to  yield  practical  fruit, —  a  demand  which 
was  emphasized  by  Bacon,  till  he  came  near  merg- 
ing science  into  an  art,  as  merely  the  mistress  of 
artisans,  as  a  large  portion  of  moderns  have  done. 

Philosophy  cares  for  results,  not  as  practical 
forces,  which  is  only  art,  nor  as  beautiful  com- 
binations, which  is  only  poetry,  nor  as  promisingly 
helpful  to  the  spiritual  life,  which  is  morals  and 
religion,  but  simply  as  logical  consequences  of  a 
rational  and  scientific  method.  It  cares  supremely 
for  correct  processes,  for  rational  methods,  because 
these  justify  themselves,  and  they  constitute  the 
true  guarantee  of  correct  results.  Philosophy  has 
no  thesis  primarily  to  maintain,  but  only  a  rational 
course  to  pursue,  confident  that  that,  and  that 
only,  can  assure  us  that  we  shall  reach  the  right 
point  all  along  the  endless  route.  Hence,  philoso- 
phy acknowledges  no  other  obligation  than  the 
honest  prosecution  of  such  a  method. 

This    is    the   only   obligation    the    author  has 


PREFACE  XIX 

recognized.  The  result  is  therefore  not  the  echo 
to  a  popular  call,  but  the  evolution  of  a  philosophi- 
cal product,  which  at  first  sight  is  always  pro- 
nounced a  monster,  and  by  propagation  it  becomes 
normal.  This  will  doubtless  be  the  first  fate  of 
Philosophical  Realism,  and  after  that  it  is  believed 
it  will  have  an  authentic  history.  « 

The  various  schools  of  mental  healing  will  see 
that  Philosophical  Realism  is  the  common  founda- 
tion of  all  their  theories,  and  an  argument  in  their 
favor ;  and  here  "  Christian  Science "  especially 
will  see  its  corner-stone. 


Evolution   Objective   and   Subjective, 


Grandeur  of  Objective  Evolution. 

The  theory  of  Evolution  is  the  grandest  and  prom- 
ises to  be  one  of  the  most  enduring  monuments  of  the 
human  intellect.  It  has  opened  up  a  field  of  thought 
and  research  which  is  literally  boundless.  It  has 
fused  the  universe  into  a  clear,  intelligible  unity,  here 
meeting  the  utmost  hope  and  want  of  science  and 
philosophy,  and  with  more  thoroughness  and  appar- 
ently with  closer  approximation  to  ultimacy  tfcan 
they  had  ever  anticipated.  It  avails  itself  to  the  ufr» 
most  of  the  methods  and  results  of  physical  science ; 
and  thence  in  a  marvellous  way,  which  cannot  be  con- 
troverted, it  identifies  matter  and  mind.  It  furnishes 
a  scope  for  inductive  reasoning  never  before  known 
or  conceived  in  connection  with  the  pursuit  of  an  ul- 
timate and  all-comprehending  philosophy,  and  it  is 
all  along  giving  increasingly  admirable  exemplifica- 
tions of  the  inductive  method  and  spirit.  By  this 
method,  it  has  made  an  utter  end  of  the  old,  disjointed, 
science-repelling  dualism,  so  that  the  only  possible, 
effective  enemy  which  remains  to  contest  the  su- 
premacy of  evolution  is  some  form  of  idealism;  and 
that  cannot  do  it,  for,  to  be  true  and  effective,  that 
must  be  evolution  and  make  evolution  paramount. 

Evolution  gives  us  a  philosophical  history  of  the 
universe,  with  the  causes  and  connections  of  its  suc- 
cessive changes.  In  all  this  wide  field,  it  has  the 
merit  which  belongs  to  physical  science,  the  ability 
to  unite  many  minds  in  the  harmonious  though  emu- 
lous pursuit  of  the  same  end.  As  a  consequence,  it 
has  already  become  the  source  of  more  positive  Intel- 


2  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

lectual  wealth  than  accrued  from  all  the  labors  and 
acquisitions  of  the  world  before  it  began  its  course. 

Its  Defective  Psychology. 

There  is  one  department  of  research  in  its  all-em- 
bracing field  in  which  it  is  less  ac|vanced  than  the 
rest.  That  department  is  the  psychological,  the  most 
important  of  all.  Before  the  work  of  evolution  is 
complete,  all  psychological  phenomena  must  be  duly 
registered,  and  their  relation  to  each  other  and  to  the 
external  world  as  a  whole  exhibited,  and  the  perfect 
egoistic  unity  of  the  inner  and  outer  worlds  must  be 
philosophically  expounded.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  Mr. 
Spencer  has  done  much;  and  his  Principles  of  Psy- 
chology is  his  ablest  work.  But,  as  this  department  is 
the  most  difficult  and  profound,  it  should  be  expected 
to  lag  behind. 

All  Phenomena  and  therefore  all  Involution  sub- 
jective. 

Growing  out  of  this,  the  great  defect  of  evolution  in 
Its  present  stage  of  development  consists  in  its  being 
too  exclusively  objective  in  its  course  and  character. 
While  evolution  is  objective,  it  is  also  subjective;  and 
the  question  concerning  their  respeccive  spheres  has 
yet  to  be  considered.  A  proper  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion, I  believe,  will  give  to  evolution  all  it  has  ever 
claimed,  and  much  more,  and  all  more  philosophi- 
cally expounded  and  scientifically  classified;  will 
therefore  make  evolution  more  thorough  and  com- 
prehensive as  a  theory,  and  may  radically  change  its 
religious  aspect  without  calling  in  question  a  single 
fact  or  principle  or  process  which  has  been  verified. 

When  the  advocates  of  objective  evolution  begin  to 
carry  their  researches  into  psychology,  to  study  ex- 
ternal phenomena  in  regard  to  their  ulterior  nature 
and  origin  and  their  relation  to  their  subject,  and 
then  to  analyze  them  to  the  utmost,  they  find  (with  all 
psychologists  of  modern  times)  that  all  the  external 
world  known  or  knowable,  in  every  form,  is  purely 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  3 

subjective,  a  congeries  of  experiences,  feelings,  or 
modes  of  consciousness.  These  feelings  imply  a  sub- 
ject, whatever  that  may  be  and  whatever  its  powers 
or  origin,  if  origin  it  had.  We  know  it  as  the  power 
to  have  all  these  experiences,  and  we  name  it  self 
or  ego  or  me;  and,  relative  to  it,  we  say  or  it  says, 
"I,"  or  "I  feel,"  "I  think,"  "I  will."  This  ego  is  the 
subject  of  all  known  phenomena,  which  is  to  say, 
simply,  that  they  are  phenomena  or  modes  of  the  ego. 
The  ego  thus  spreads  itself  over  all  the  known  uni- 
verse, and  says  of  every  form  and  object  or  motion, 
"It  is  I,  a  mode  of  myself."  Once  clearly  under- 
stood, this  fact  will  give  a  sudden  metamorphosis  to 
evolution,  making  it  dominantly  subjective. 

Relative  to  its  subjective  aspect,  the  new  exposition 
will  be  generally  designated  by  the  objectionable,  be- 
cause partial  and  much  ridiculed  term,  idealism,  since 
it  resolves  all  known  and  knowable  things  into  ideas, 
using  that  term  in  the  old  meaning  in  which  it  was 
employed  by  Descartes,  Locke,  Berkeley,  and  other  of 
the  earlier  writers.  Mr.  Spencer  considers  idealism 
and  evolution  as  antagonistic  to  each  other;  and,  on 
this  ground,  he  makes  very  elaborate  efforts  to  refute 
idealism,  and  to  establish  a  dualism  of  the  ego  as  un- 
known and  some  sort  of  an  unknown  external  world. 
This  betrays  an  incomprehension  of  both  theories. 
Nothing  can  antagonize  evolution,  because  evolution 
is  a  fact  of  indubitable  experience;  and,  for  the  same 
reason,  nothing  can  philosophically  antagonize  ideal- 
ism as  an  assertion  of  the  subjective  nature  of  all 
phenomena.  Evolution  is  as  extensive  as  Mr.  Spen- 
cer conceives  it,  and  I  think  indefinitely  more  so;  but 
it  is  always  a  subjective  process,  even  where  it  is  ex- 
ternal to  the  organism.  No  one  has  ever  attempted 
to  carry  evolution  beyond  the  knowable  universe; 
but  all  that  universe  is  never  more  than  the  modes  of 
one  individual,  ego.  I  allow  that  in  all  that  universe 
the  law  of  evolution  reigns.  But  subjective  evolution 
multiplies  universes  and  all  their  evolutionary  proc- 


4  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

esses  by  the  number  of  souls  or  subjects,  and  thus 
makes  evolution,  so  to  speak,  infinitely  more  exten- 
sive and  multifarious.  Subjective  evolution  includes 
objective  evolution,  as  the  greater  the  less,  as  the  tem- 
ple includes  all  its  parts,  the  grand  fa9ade,  the  lofty 
tower  and  pinnacle,  the  majestic  dome,  the  pillared 
arches  and  every  angle  and  curve  and  sculptured  form 
in  the  great  building. 

What  is  called  my  organism  is  only  an  infinitesimal 
fraction  of  the  sensible  phenomena  of  which  I  am  the 
subject.  Of  known  and  knowable  objects  beyond  my 
organism,  there  is  almost  an  infinite  number.  They 
are  not  a  part  or  mode  or  product  of  my  organism. 
They  are  not  even  objects  of  my  organism,  as  sensible 
phenomena  or  organic  precepts.  My  organism  does 
not  perceive  them,  for  it  perceives  nothing.  I  per- 
ceive it,  and  so  it  is  a  mode  of  me.  All  extraorganic 
objects  are  modes  of  the  ego,  but  not  of  the  organism. 
They  transcend  the  organism,  but  ,not  the  ego.  It  is 
logically  possible  for  these  to  exist  without  the  organ- 
ism, or  for  the  organism  to  exist  without  them.  But, 
in  point  of  fact,  they  begin  and  run  their  course  to- 
gether. On  the  other  hand,  it  is  a  logical  necessity 
that  the  ego  exist  as  a  condition  of  the  existence  of 
any  phenomena,  organic  or  extraorganic  or  superor- 
ganic,  because  these  in  all  cases  are  6170,  and  nothing 
else.  It  is  clearly  possible  that  the  ego,  the  essential 
being  we  now  so  designate,  may  exist  before  any  of 
the  phenomena  of  which  we  speak,  and  may  then 
evolve  phenomena  in  and  of  itself,  according  to  laws 
which  we  may  discover.  That  this  possibility  is  the 
fact,  all  experience,  informed  by  the  light  of  modern 
psychological  analysis,  conspires  to  say  and  prove. 
The  doctrine  of  the  subjective  nature  of  all  phenom- 
ena logically  necessitates  this  conclusion,  as  we  shall 

see. 

Nature  of  Supposed  material  World. 

That  all  phenomena  are  subjective,  that  all  the  sen- 
sible realities  of  heaven  and  earth  are  ego,  I  shall 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  5 

assume  as  having  been  sufficiently  proved  and  gener- 
ally accepted.  Hence,  if  there  is  any  non-egoistic 
material  world,  it  is  a  thing  which  transcends  all  sen- 
sible experience  and  all  direct  knowledge.  Nearly 
all  German  philosophers  have  affirmed  the  existence 
of  such  a  world,  admitting  that  the  non  ego  can  be 
known  only  indirectly.  But  they  are  singularly  illog- 
ical. They  offer  no  proof  of  its  existence,  deeming 
the  fact  that  it  can  be  known  mediately  only  to  be 
sufficient  proof.  That  is  no  proof  or  argument  at  all. 
Whoever  thought  that  the  mere  fact  that  we  cannot 
know  Caesar  or  Mohammed  directly  is  proof  of  their 
existence  ?  It  is  that  fact  which  makes  proof  neces- 
sary as  a  condition  of  a  rational  affirmation.  That 
proof  is  therefore  called  for.  Can  it  be  furnished  ? 

The  English-speaking  mind,  from  its  more  scientific 
habit,  is  more  exacting  concerning  proof  than  the 
German  mind.  Here,  it  recognizes  the  need  of  proof, 
and  that  it  needs  to  be  good  and  strong,  and  endeav- 
ors to  furnish  it.  We  should  have  a  good,  if  not  suffi- 
cient, proof,  if  it  were  shown  that  such  a  world  would 
be  very  useful,  still  more  if  it  were  really  a  necessary 
condition  of  experiences  of  which  we  are  the  subject; 
and  this  is  supposed  to  be  exhibited.  Mr.  Spencer 
says:  "Not  a  step  can  be  taken  toward  the  truth  that 
our  states  of  consciousness  are  the  only  things  we 
can  know,  without  tacitly  or  avowedly  postulating  an 
unknown  something  beyond  consciousness.  The 
proposition  that  whatever  we  feel  has  an  existence 
which  is  relative  to  ourselves  only  cannot  be  proved, 
nay,  cannot  be  intelligently  expressed,  without  assert- 
ing, directly  or  by  implication,  an  external  existence 
which  is  not  relative  to  ourselves."  What  is  logically 
implied  in  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  cannot 
surely  be  justly  described  as  (tnot  relative  to  ourselves." 
It  may  not  be  ourselves,  but  it  is  relative  to  ourselves 
always.  Whether  it  is  true  that  the  proof  of  egoistic 
phenomena  is  impossible  without  implying  a  non  ego, 
we  shall  consider  in  its  place. 


6  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

In  the  mean  while,  let  us  make  very  clear  to  our- 
selves our  acknowledged  position  and  what  must  be 
the  external  world  which  would  thus  be  proved.  If  all 
phenomena  "are  ego,  then  the  non  ego,  called  the  mate- 
rial world,  if  it  were  thus  proved,  is  supersensible  and 
transphenomenal.  Sometimes  such  a  thing  is  boldly 
affirmed,  and  called  the  material  world.  This  super- 
sensible world  is  supposed,  in  some  inconceivable 
way,  to  answer  to  sensible  phenomena,  and  is  explan- 
atory of  them  as  their  cause.  Judging  from  sensible 
phenomena,  it  is  supposed  to  operate  with  lexical 
regularity,  and  thus  reveals  its  existence  and  action 
and  nature  in  its  effects.  Thus,  while  the  visible  sun 
is  only  a  mode  of  mind,  it  is  an  effect  and  sign  of  a 
non-egoistic,  material  sun,  which  is  invisible,  inaudi- 
ble, intangible,  and  every  way  supersensible.  Simi- 
larly of  all  other  sensible  objects.  All  are  ego,  and 
all  are  effects  and  proofs  of  supersensible,  non-egoistic, 
material  causes  variously  differing  from  each  other  in 
correspondence  with  the  phenomena. 

This  View  is  Only  a  Metaphysical  Theory. 

This  is  a  view  (if  we  may  speak  of  a  view  of  the 
viewless)  of  the  material  world  which  at  every  point 
is  utterly  at  variance  with  both  the  popular  and  sci- 
entific notion.  All  men  engaged  in  the  pursuit  of 
physical  science  assume  that  the  realities  of  the  world 
are  sensible;  and  it  is  only  the  sensible  forms,  motions, 
and  forces  of  the  universe  that  they  ever  contemplate, 
and  they  never  think  of  any  other  universe  than  this 
same  sensible  universe.  Never  do  they  conceive  the 
material  universe,  whose  laws  they  are  supposed  to 
study,  to  be  utterly  beyond  their  senses  and  all  direct 
knowledge,  and  so  void  of  all  qualitative  differentia- 
tion as  to  be  also  entirely  inconceivable.  Whatever 
assent  they  give  to  the  psychologist's  assertion  that 
all  phenomena  are  ego,  they  none  the  less  always 
speak  and  think  of  the  sensible  universe  as  the  real 
material  universe.  They  are  inconsistent  and  super- 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  7 

ficial ;  but  they  are  right  in  assuming  that  the  sensible 
world  is  the  material  world,  and  the  only  material 
world  of  interest  to  science  or  practical  life.  Of  the 
material  world  of  the  metaphysician  they  never  think 
or  feel  the  need,  thus  contradicting  Spencer's  alleged 
intellectual  necessity  for  it  in  conceiving  phenomena. 
If  the  material  world  of  the  metaphysician  has  an 
existence,  it  follows  that  either  there  are  two  material 
worlds — the  sensible  and  the  supersensible — or  that 
the  sensible  world  is  not  material,  neither  of  which 
accords  with  any  accepted  notion  of  the  material 
world  or  is  likely  to  find  any  acceptance  among  the 
living  convictions  of  mankind.  At  the  best,  they 
can  only  be  like  Hume's  philosophical  scepticism, 
effective  in  the  study,  but  not  in  the  saloon,  the  draw- 
ing-room, or  the  place  of  business.  The  theory  of 
the  two  worlds,  one  of  which— and  that  the  real  one 
and  the  effective  one — is  absolutely  unknown  and  un- 
imaginable, will  surely  require  much  in  the  way  of 
exposition  and  argument  to  make  it  intelligible,  and 
to  prove  that  it  is  neither  an  empty  verbalism  in  part 
nor  a  false  because  a  needlessly  cumbersome  compli- 
cation, like  the  old  Ptolemaic  system  of  astronomy. 
The  alternative,  which  denies  the  sensible  world  to 
be  the  material  world  and  affirms  that  the  real  mate- 
rial world  is  wholly  supersensible,  contradicts  all 
human  thought  and  expression.  It  says  that  material 
science  never  is  material  science;  that  of  all  its  ob- 
jects, from  nebulse,  comets,  and  globes  to  whales, 
animalculse,  and  atoms,  not  one  is  material.  But, 
while  the  ultimate  nature  and  distinction  of  mind 
and  matter  are  not  yet  agreed  on,  one  thing  is  univer- 
sally agreed  on, —  to  call  the  sensible  the  material, 
whatever  be  the  immaterial,  or  whether  there  be  any- 
thing immaterial.  The  position,  then,  of  our  objective 
evolutionists  is  itself  very  unenviable,  and  of  a  kind 
which  will  be  very  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  de- 
fend against  an  enemy. 


II. 


NO  SUPERSENSIBLE  MATTER. 


Experience  our  Base,  and  All  Postulates  dis- 
carded. 

Perhaps  it  will  prevent  some  misapprehension  if  I 
pause  here  to  say  that  I  make  no  assumptions  or  post- 
ulates, only  that  science  has  already  clearly  and  abun- 
dantly proved  that  all  sensible  phenomena  are  sub- 
jective states.  If  this  has  not  been  done,  my  founda- 
tion is  imperfect;  but  I  can  make  it  good,  if  necessary. 
I  resort  to  no  transcendental  metaphysical  principles 
to  start  with  or  to  cover  my  track  anywhere.  Experi- 
ence, and  the  logical  implications  of  experience,  are 
the  beginning,  middle,  and  end  of  my  philosophy; 
and  the  experience  must  be  scientifically  sifted  and 
rectified.  We  are  told  that  "it  is  the  favorite  postu- 
late of  the  idealist  that  matter — the  external  universe 
— is  an  illusion,  a  subjective  creation  of  the  mind:  it 
possesses  no  objective  reality."  As  a  description  of 
my  method,  this  would  be  very  erroneous.  I  hold 
that  the  material  universe  is  egoistic;  but  I  do  not 
postulate  that,  but  verify  it  scientifically  as  an  experi- 
ence, or  assume  that  it  has  been  done  by  others.  I  do 
not,  however,  affirm  that  this  universe  is  an  illusion, 
without  objective  reality,— just  the  contrary.  /  know 
it  as  real,  because  I  know  it  as  an  experienced  fact, 
and  an  objective  reality,  because  external  to  my  or- 
ganism and  an  object  of  knowledge  or  experience; 
and,  if  ever  we  are  the  subjects  of  illusion,  that  is  only 
through  a  false  inference  from  a  real  experience. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

The  World  known  to  Different  JVIeit  is  a  Differ- 
ent  World. 

As  a  subjective  state,  however  real  and  objective  as 
well  as  subjective,  the  same  thing,  whether  it  be  a 
mouse  or  a  world,  can  never  be  known  to  more  than 
one  person, —  its  affected  or  experiencing  subject. 
Hence  there  must  be  as  many  worlds  of  the  same 
kind  as  there  are  world -sensations  and  subjects 
thereof  of  the  same  kind,  and  it  is  utterly  erroneous 
to  say  that  "the  appearance  is  essentially  identical  to 
different  persons."  That  is  one  of  the  certain  impos- 
sibilities, because  it  is  self-contradictory.  The  ap- 
pearances to  different  persons  may  be  alike  or  similar, 
but  even  that  we  can  never  directly  know.  We  can 
only  infer  it,  as  we  do  on  the  basis  of  a  natural  and 
spontaneous  system  of  symbolism,  which  I  propose 
hereafter  to  explain. 

Self-consciousness  110  Proof  of  non-Ego. 

I  call  attention  to  an  important  distinction  often 
overlooked,  that  between  conception  and  experience. 
On  this  confusion,  we  are  often  told  that  self  implies 
a  not-self,  and  that  neither  can  be  known  without  the 
other.  I  allow  that  neither  can  be  conceived  without 
the  other,  because  they  are  logical  counterparts.  But 
that  proves  nothing  concerning  experience  and  non- 
egoistic  reality.  That  we  can  or  must  conceive  a 
thing  is  no  proof  of  experience  or  reality.  Such  a 
supposition  would  prove  too  much  by  involving  us  in 
endless  absurdities.  Therefore,  self -consciousness 
and  the  conception  of  a  non-ego  are  no  proof  of  the 
existence  of  the  non-ego.  We  must  find  some  other 
proof  than  this. 

If  ITlatter  is  Supersensible,  our  Real  Organism  is 
Unknown. 

As  all  sensible  things  are  egoistic,  it  follows,  of 
course,  that,  if  there  is  any  non-egoistic  matter,  it  must 
be  supersensible.  Some  objections  to  the  unrecognized 


10  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

yet  tacitly  prevailing  theory,  that  matter  and  all  the 
material  universe  are  supersensible,  I  propose  now  to 
mention.  In  stating  the  theory,  I  am  impressed  with 
its  intellectual  repulsiveness  as  a  whole ;  but  this  im- 
pression will  become  deeper  and  more  distinct  in  pro- 
portion as  it  is  contemplated  in  detail.  If  we  look  at 
it  relative,  for  instance,  to  our  organism,  it  becomes 
ludicrous.  It  implies  that  my  own  body  is  always 
entirely  unknown  to  me.  As  there  is  a  sensible  world 
external  to  my  organism  and  its  supersensible  coun- 
terpart, so  there  is  a  sensible  object  called  my  body, 
which  is  not  my  body,  but  my  mind;  and  it  has  its 
supersensible  counterpart,  which  is  my  real  body,  and 
which  is  unknown  and  inconceivable,  except  as  a 
thing  conjectured  or  inferred  as  being  someway  the 
cause  of  the  sensations  which  constitute  my  phantom 
body.  Here,  as  everywhere,  the  theory  makes  the 
experiential  to  be  the  unreal  and  the  metempirical  to 
be  the  real,  and  makes  the  material  to  be'  supersen- 
sible and  the  immaterial  to  be  sensible,  contrary  to  all 
the  wonted  judgments  of  mankind,  popular  or  philo- 
sophical. 

That  makes  our  Real  Bodies  non-Ego  and  J>ual. 

As  the  sensible  world  is  ego  and  the  supersensible 
world  non-ego,  so  my  sensible  organism  is  ego,  and  the 
real  organism  which  it  represents  is  non-ego. 

Every  man  not  blind  has  two  sensible  organisms, 
— the  visible  and  the  tangible, — which  have  no  unity 
except  in  the  conscious  subject,  of  which  they  are 
simply  two  complex  sensations  utterly  unlike  each 
other.  According  to  the  theory  in  question,  each  of 
these  organisms  must  be  the  representative  of  a  dis- 
tinct supersensible,  non-egoistic  organism.  There 
may  be  dualists  who  may  be  pleased  with  even  this, 
as  there  never  was  an  unfortunate  intellectual  waif 
found  adrift  upon  the  world  but  some  one  was  ready 
to  give  it  a  hospitable  reception. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  11 

It  gives  a  Double  twice  over  to  All  Things* 

It  follows  that  every  sensible  object  is  of  two  sensi- 
ble forms  to  all  men  who  are  not  blind ;  and  that,  cor- 
responding to  each  of  these,  there  is  a  supersensible 
body.  This  pen,  this  paper,  this  flowing  ink,  as  seen  and 
as  felt,  are  each  dual;  and  each  has  two  supersensible 
counterparts,  which  are  the  real  pens,  the  real  papers, 
and  the  real  inks.  Thus,  all  things  are  quadruple, — 
double  as  sensible,  and  again  double  as  supersensible. 
Such  a  philosophy  reminds  us  of  Tarn  O'Shanter's 
vain  attempt  to  count  the  horns  of  the  moon,  as  he 
could  not  be  sure  whether  they  were  six  or  seven. 

Its  False  Hetiology. 

Such  a  theory  refutes  itself  as  soon  as  it  is  stated 
with  any  degree  of  clearness  and  fulness,  so  that  an 
adequate  conception  of  its  import  is  proximately  at- 
tained. And,  as  it  is  constructed  of  opposing  ele- 
ments, it  can  make  but  a  poor  showing  in  the  forma- 
tion and  support  of  its  outward  defences.  When  we 
demand  the  evidence  of  the  existence  of  this  super- 
sensible matter,  and  inquire  as  to  what  necessary 
purpose  it  serves',  it  gives  us  a  verbal  answer  which 
is  a  mental  blank.  To  the  apparently  intelligible  plea 
that  it  must  be  inferred  as  the  necessary  cause  and 
explanation  of  sensible  phenomena,  there  are  several 
answers. 

In  the  first  place,  the  plea  is  based  on  a  method 
which  is  not  justified  by  what  in  these  days  has  re- 
ceived the  name  of  "science."  All  strict  science  of 
modern  times  treats  only  of  phenomenal  causes  and 
effects,  antecedent  and  subsequent  phenomena  lexi- 
cally related  to  each  other.  It  is  purely  by  this 
method  that  all  the  sciences,  from  physics  to  psy- 
chics, have  made  all  their  conquests.  And  it  will  be 
so  forever.  We  can  never  investigate  and  discuss  the 
un phenomenal,  because  it  is  without  any  qualitative 
marks,  and  all  our  terms  are  void  of  meaning;  and 
the  alleged  supersensible  world  in  question  is  of  this 
class. 


12  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

If  we  attempt  to  rise  from  science  to  philosophy, 
and  seek  an  explanation  of  phenomena  in  a  cause 
which  lies  back  of  them,  the  right  to  this  may  be  con- 
ceded ;  but  we  must  see  to  it  that  it  accord  with  sci- 
ence and  that  the  mental  process  be  a  real  one,  and 
not  merely  verbal,  which  is  the  character  of  the  proc- 
ess in  question.  According  to  all  objective  evolu- 
tionists, sensible  experience  is  the  source  of  all  real 
mental  forms,  and  all  are  traceable  back  to  sensi- 
ble experience.  But  that  is  clearly  impossible  con- 
cerning supersensible  matter.  It  is  not  only  unsup- 
ported by  experience,  but  it  is  opposed  to  experience, 
since  all  experience  is  phenomenal,  conscious;  while 
that  is  neither,  and  never  can  be.  The  final  reply  of 
the  objective  evolutionist  is  that  this  inference  is  an 
intellectual  necessity,  that  all  experience  leads  up 
through  a  narrow  gateway  to  a  transcendent  reality 
which  is  knowable  and  conceivable  only  as  cause  and 
fount  of  the  known.  This  example,  of  course,  is  not 
that  which  alone  is  recognized  in  science,  an  experi- 
ential antecedent.  It  is  a  cause  which  was  precedent 
of  all  experience,  and  is  now  concomitant  with  all. 
Thus,  it  is  always  the  same  infinite  causation,  with- 
out change  even  in  mode;  for  it  has  no  modes,  modes 
belonging  only  to  its  effects.  And  so  there  is  no  con- 
ceivable reason  for  the  variety  of  its  causal  action, 
that  reason  being  found  in  its  effects  in  the  uniform 
antecedent  of  other  phenomena.  It  ultiuaates  in 
self-contradiction  and  the  abdication  of  ultimate  phi- 
losophy in  the  attempt  to  establish  such  a  philosophy. 
Its  agnosticism  is  here  sufficiently  obvious. 

But  that  is  not  all.  The  theory  cannot  be  permitted 
the  poor  privilege  of  creeping  mortally  wounded 
within  the  veil  of  ultimate  mystery,  the  last  refuge  of 
all  craft  and  mental  impotence.  This  ultimate  refuge 
of  the  unknowable  is  absolutely  one  and  un various, 
without  any  possible  distinctions  of  mode  or  form  or 
condition.  But  this  is  utterly  inapplicable  to  the 
question  at  issue.  Here,  we  are  criticising  a  theory 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  13 

of  supersensible  matter,  matter  which  is  alleged  to 
exist  in  countless  various  forms  or  modes  answering 
to  the  infinitely  multifarious  forms  of  the  sensible 
world;  and  these  supersensible  material  forms  are 
supposed  to  be  temporal,  and  their  duration  commen- 
surate with  their  sensible  representatives.  These  are 
not  therefore  to  be  identified  with  the  great  only  One, 
the  absolute  undifferentiated  unknowable;  and  from 
this  they  can  find  no  countenance  or  explanation. 
They  have  no  support  from  either  science  or  philoso- 
phy. They  are  metempirical,  intrinsically  inconceiv- 
able, and  utterly  incapable  of  explaining  the  phenom- 
ena of  sense;  while  their  alleged  existence  and  action 
furnish  new  elements  and  a  new  complication  (ver- 
bally, at  least),  which  demand  further  explanation  as 
to  whence  they  came  and  what  is  the  law  of  their 
operation,  and  their  relation  to  the  One  unknown  and 
the  known  many  or  sensible  things,  and  they  can  ex- 
plain nothing. 

Its   Various  Inconsistency. 

By  way  of  carrying  this  theory  still  nearer  to  an  ul- 
timate and  all-sided  analysis,  I  would  now  ask  its 
abettors  whether  they  consider  their  supersensible 
matter  to  be  spacial  or  non-spacial.  I  see  not  how  it 
can  be  spacial  or  extended,  since  it  has  no  points  of 
difference  or  distinction,  being  unphenomenal;  yet  it 
were  a  singular  matter  that  were  unextended,  since 
extension  has  always  been  considered  its  most  char- 
acteristic quality.  On  the  other  hand,  since  it  is  sup- 
posed to  be  specially  related  in  its  parts  and  forms  to 
the  parts  and  forms  of  the  sensible  world,  it  must  be 
supposed  to  be  extended.  Hence,  we  have  two  classes 
of  extended  things  or  matter  (besides  pure  space 
itself),  the  sensible  and  supersensible;  and  they  are 
supposed  to  be  coextensive.  The  theory  affirms  that, 
wherever  there  is  an  external  or  sensible  phenomenon 
"there,"  there  is  a  supersensible  material  thing  as  its 
cause  and  explanation,  and  of  which  it  is  the  repre- 


14  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

sentation.  But  this  again  is  nullified  by  the  doc- 
trine in  which  all  parties  agree,  though  blindly,  that 
all  phenomena  are  ego.  For,  according  to  that  doctrine, 
"here"  and  "there"  and  all  local  or  spacial  designa- 
tions in  the  known  universe  are  of  the  ego  and  within 
the  ego.  Hence,  it  makes  all  the  forms  of  this  same 
supersensible  matter,  though  non-egoistic,  to  be  en- 
tirely within  the  bounds  of  the  ego,  so  that  it  is  con- 
ceived of  as  existing  only  where  the  ego  is,  and  it  is  in- 
discriminable  from  the  ego,  and  we  are  logically  com- 
pelled to  identify  it  with  the  ego;  and,  as  all  spacial 
discriminations  are  of  the  ego,  to  apply  these  discrimi- 
nations to  it  is  to  make  it  sensible  and  to  identify  it 
with  the  sensible.  Thus,  the  theory  is  again  self-de- 
stroyed, and  its  verbal  dualism  is  metamorphosed 
into  a  pure  senseism,  or  into  Philosophical  Realism 
which  makes  the  permanent  cause  and  substantive 
base  and  background  of  all  phenomena  to  be  the 
known  ego,  which  is  known  in  consciousness  as  both 
sensible  and  supersensible.  This  subjective  ground 
and  cause  is  complete,  consistent,  and  self-sufficient. 
It  leaves  no  unexplored  or  unexplained  remainder, 
no  relation  which  it  does  not  so  far  find  in  itself  in  the 
comparative  forces  and  distinctions  of  its  own  quali- 
ties. 

This  leads  me  to  observe  that,  if  force  is  demanded 
as  the  correlate  of  these  phenomena,  that  force  need 
not  be  non-egoistic  force,  and  ought  not  to  be.  As  all 
being  is  force,  the  ego  is  force.  It  is  this  force  which 
evolves  all  the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  and  it 
constitutes  their  ultimate  and  all-sufficient  explana- 
tion. On  this  score,  therefore,  we  are  prohibited  from 
passing  beyond  self.  Thus  far,  we  have  come  by 
clear  logical  necessity;  and  here  at  the  same  time  ends 
the  possibility  of  further  progress  and  the  intellectual 
motive  to  attempt  it,  because  here  all  logical  avenues 
are  now  closed  up  and  every  logical  question  is  logi- 
cally answered. 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  15 

Its  Intrinsic   Improbability. 

Another  aspect  of  the  doctrine  of  supersensible 
matter  impresses  us  with  a  sense  of  its  intrinsic  im- 
probability, if  not  absurdity.  In  affirming  that  the 
sensible  world  is  only  a  seeming  world  and  that  the 
real  material  world  is  supersensible,  it  implies  that 
the  real  light  and  colors  are  dark  and  invisible,  that 
the  real  heat  and  cold  are  neither  one  nor  the  other, 
that  the  real  odors  are  odorless,  that  all  real  tastes  are 
tasteless,  that  all  the  real  hardness  and  softness  and 
other  allied  qualities  are  utterly  other  and  different 
from  what  they  are  described  and  designated,  and 
that  even  the  real  extension  is  unextended.  Thus,  all 
our  language,  with  all  the  thinking  it  implies,  is  en- 
tirely false.  We  have  a  system  of  simulacra  which 
are  the  opposite  of  the  things  they  simulate.  The 
lamp  and  its  light,  so  called,  it  is  allowed  are  simply 
sensations ;  but  it  is  said  there  are  a  real  lamp  and 
light,  which  are  dark  and  invisible,  and  the  cause  of 
the  phenomenal  lamp  and  light.  Of  this,  science 
knows  nothing;  for  its  causes  of  the  known  light  and 
lamp  are  other  phenomenal  antecedents,  all  of  which 
are  modes  of  the  ego  or  sensations,  and  philosophy 
can  find  a  possibly  sufficient  cause  of  phenomena  in 
their  subject,  so  that  to  go  further  is  inadmissible,  be- 
cause so  much  is  necessary  and  no  more. 

Supposed   Possibility  as  an  Argument. 

'Tis  said  a  drowning  man  will  catch  at  straws;  and 
the  baffled  dualist,  persistent  in  his  faith,  catches  at  a 
supposed  possibility,  and  on  this  he  suspends  his  ma- 
terial worlds.  He  asks,  as  if  that  were  enough  for  his 
faith,  whether  it  is  not  possible  for  the  sensible  and 
supersensible  to  coexist  in  such  relation  to  each  other, 
and  yet  be  numerically  different.  Allowing  the  pos- 
sibility, that  is  no  proof  whatever  to  a  logical  or  sci- 
entific mind.  It  is  possible  for  the  story  of  Blue- 
beard to  be  true,  and  no  one  can  prove  the  abstract 
impossibility  of  the  existence  of  centaurs,  hippogriffs, 


16  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

and  flying  dragons;  and,  on  this  ground,  these  fanta- 
sies and  the  old  dualism  are  worthy  of  equal  credit 
with  the  theory  in  question. 

But  the  possibility  of  the  truth  of  such  a  theory 
cannot  be  allowed,  because  of  its  intrinsic  inconsist- 
encies. On  the  theory  of  a  non-egoistic  matter  and 
space,  sensible  or  supersensible,  there  can  never  be  a 
notion  of  motion  or  rest,  or  here  or  there,  a  whole  or 
part  or  division  which  does  not  involve  insoluble 
contradictions.  It  is  impossible  for  any  theory  to  be 
true  which  does  not  reconcile  all  facts  in  a  logical 
unity  of  conception.  This  unity,  the  simplest  possi- 
ble, is  found  in  Philosophical  Realism,  which  drops 
the  supersensible  matter  as  unsupported  by  experi- 
ence and  contradicted  by  logic,  and  explains  known 
phenomena  by  referring  them  solely  to  the  known  ego 
as  their  subject,  substance,  and  cause.  This  is  a  logi- 
cal possibility  and  necessity,  and  neither  can  be  said 
of  any  form  of  dualism  yet  invented. 
]>ualistic  Vacillation. 

Philosophical  progress  is  not  to  be  effected  by  deny- 
ing or  evading  well-ascertained  facts,  the  results  of 
long  and  laborious  research  and  reflection.  One  of 
these  facts  is  the  egoism  of  all  the  known.  By  this 
and  on  this,  we  must  stand  and  advance.  All  our 
thinking  must  be  made  to  square  with  it,  because  it  is 
indubitably  true;  and,  therefore,  whatever  conflicts 
with  it  must  be  false.  Here  is  the  great  failure  of  ob- 
jective evolution.  While  it  affirms  or  admits  the  sub- 
jectivity of  all  phenomena,  and  makes  them  at  most 
to  be  symbols  of  an  unknown  force,  it  perpetually 
confounds  the  symbol  with  the  thing  symbolized, 
and  talks  as  if  the  sensible  kosmos  were  something 
more  than  a  complexus  of  subjective  states,  as  if  the 
known  external  worlds  of  the  heavens  and  earth  were 
non-ego  and  the  preorganic  source  whence  our  con- 
scious individuality  was  evolved.  Then,  with  a  vague, 
uneasy  consciousness,  its  advocates  endeavor  to  cover 
their  track  by  saying  that,  when  they  speak  of  kosmic 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  17 

evolution,  they  say  they  mean  supersensible  proc- 
esses. This  is  the  confession  of  a  fatal  error.  They 
ought  to  mean  sensible  processes.  Without  question, 
it  is  the  sensible  world  and  its  processes  which  con- 
cern our  inquiries  in  all  the  physical  sciences,  as,  for 
example,  astronomy,  geology,  physiology,  anatomy, 
histology,  etc. 

There  is,  indeed,  a  supersensible  which  is  super- 
physical,  and  which,  relative  to  physical  science,  is 
superscieiitific.  This  is  exemplified  in  all  abstract 
thought  and  all  moral  feeling  and  conviction.  These 
cannot  be  the  object  of  any  of  the  senses.  Now,  the 
supersensible  pertaining  to  the  physical  sciences  is 
not  of  this  character.  What  is  supersensible  to  one 
sense  is  phenomenal  to  another  sense.  Not  one  of  the 
senses  is  cognizant  of  what  is  the  real  and  proper 
object  of  any  other  sense.  So,  also,  what  is  super- 
sensible to  one  man  is  sensible  to  another,  who  has 
better  trained  and  more  fully  developed  faculties. 

Yet  the  same  physical  properties  or  processes,  which 
are  known  by  the  one  man  and  unknown  by  the  other, 
are  equally  and  wholly  either  ego  or  non-ego.  So, 
also,  the  invisible  forms  and  the  alleged  pre-visible 
motions  of  the  light,  before  it  shivers  the  ether  on  the 
eye,  are  both  equally  egoistic  or  non-egoistic;  and,  as 
it  is  agreed  that  the  visible  forms  are  all  subjective 
states,  the  same  must  be  allowed  of  the  other,  though 
this  other  may  not  have  entered  the  sphere  of  con- 
sciousness. 

It  is  true  that  no  small  proportion  of  what  is  in- 
cluded in  the  compass  of  physical  science  is  not 
directly  known  by  the  senses;  but,  in  all  cases,  it  is 
conceived  that  that  is  only  because  of  the  limitation 
in  the  degree  of  the  power  of  our  sensitive  faculty, 
not  because  the  objects  are  qualitatively  foreign  to 
that  faculty;  and  that,  if  this  faculty  were  exalted, 
intensified,  or  enlarged,  it  would  bring  within  its  im- 
mediate range  as  sensible  phenomena  a  vast  area  of 
what  is  now  only  inference.  It  is,  therefore,  a  poor 


18  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

evasion  to  say  that,  by  kosmic  evolution  and  the  evo- 
lution of  the  senses,  they  mean  those  unknown  events 
or  processes  which  are  symbolized  by  the  known. 
According  to  this,  the  real  evolution  is  unknown  ; 
and  the  evolution,  so  called,  which  is  known  to  us,  is 
only  apparent,  phantasmic,  symbolical  of  the  un- 
known real.  They  have  now  entered  a  tenebrious 
region,  which  they  do  not  much  enjoy, and  which  to 
the  unmetaphysical  minds  to  which  they  chiefly 
appeal  appears  unreal  and  ghostly  ;  and  so  they  hie 
away  again  with  unphilosophical  haste,  and  they 
refer  to  this  region  again  only  with  the  dubious  and 
solemn  brevity  with  which  the  ancients  spoke  of 
their  visit  to  the  shades  of  Proserpine.  They  ought 
now  to  tell  us  what  is  the  mutual  relation  of  these 
two  sets  of  evolution,  and  how  they  know  the  un- 
known, and  on  what  ground  they  affirm  that  the 
known  is  symbolic  of  the  unknown. 

Sundry  Logical  Points. 

Allowing  that  there  is  an  unknown  which  is  mani- 
fested by  the  known,  we  ought  not  without  special 
reasons  of  insuperable  force  to  affirm  that  it  is  non-ego- 
And  no  such  reason  has  ever  been  assigned  or  is  as- 
signable, as  far  as  I  can  see  ;  while  there  are  very 
cogent  reasons  for  referring  it  to  the  ego.  It  ought  to 
be  considered  as  egoistic,  because  the  ego  we  know  as 
a  conscious  subject ;  and  we  know  nothing  else,  so 
that  any  other  reference  of  it  is  a  blind  action.  It 
ought  to  be  so  considered,  because  we  ought  not  to 
multiply  entities  without  necessity  ;  and  here  there  is 
no  necessity,  either  logical  or  experiential,  for  more 
than  one.  It  ought  to  be  so  referred,  because  there  is, 
it  is  assumed,  a  lexical  connection  of  natural  cause 
and  effect  between  it  and  the  known  ego  ;  and,  as  this 
causal  connection  is  one  of  evolution  (not  creation), 
the  known  and  unknown  are  but  different  modes  in 
which  exists  the  same  one  being.  We  thus  reach  the 
conclusion  that  all  evolution  and  evolving  force  and 
being  known  or  unknown  is  purely  subjective  or  ego- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  19 

istic,  and  all  evolution  is  limited  in  its  operation  to 
the  one  subject.  We  are  as  yet,  therefore,  absolutely 
confined  within  the  bounds  of  self;  and  no  avenue  of 
egress  opens  up  to  us.  On  the  other  hand,  against  the 
theory  of  supersensible  matter,  in. addition  to  what 
has  been  already  said,  we  are  obliged  to  make  the 
following]  points:— 

1.  We  have  no  proof  of  its  existence. 

2.  We  have  no  conception  of  it.    It  answers  to  noth- 
ing that  has  ever  come  within  the  range  of  experi- 
ence. 

3.  We  can  explain  all  material  phenomena  without 
having  recourse  to  this  hypothesis,  and  by  an  infinitely 
simpler  hypothesis,— that  they  are  all  the  necessary 
product  of  the  inherent  force  (created  or  not)  of  the 
ego ;  and  the  ego  is  known  in  consciousness. 

4.  This  hypothesis  is  therefore  also  utterly  useless 
as  well  as  proofless.    Neither  logic  nor  practical  life 
makes  any  demand  for  it. 

5.  None  but  theorists  care  anything  about  it.    It  is 
only  the  sensible  world  men  care  for,  or  that  they  con- 
tend for,  when  they  affirm  the  existence  of  matter. 

6.  The   vacillation   of    philosophers    between    the 
known  and  unknown  is  the  cause  of  all  the  trouble. 
It  is  under  the  illusion  of  the  known  that  they  fight 
for  the  unknown.    Their  zeal  would  rapidly  abate 
and  their  following  would  rapidly  diminish,  were  it 
always  clearly  and  distinctly  kept  in  view  that  it  is 
not  the  known  world  they  contend  for,  but  a  world 
which  is  unknown,  unknowable,  indescribable,  and 
inconceivable. 

7.  Therefore,  I  think  it  is  equal    philosophy  and 
modesty  not  to  assert,  and  to  deny  the  right  of  any 
one  to  assert,  its  existence. 

Dualists  often  tell  us  that  the  idealist  must  "show 
that  the  affirmation  of  things,  in  the  common  sense 
of  the  term,  is  not  only  not  necessary,  but  is  incon- 
sistent, or  that  the  so-called  world  is  seen,  upon  re- 
flection and  analysis,  to  be  incapable  of  existence. 


20  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

apart  from  thought."  This  has  already  been  abun- 
dantly shown  concerning  "the  affirmation  of  things,  in 
the  common  sense  of  the  term";  for  all  these  things  are 
nothing  else  than  thought  (and  feeling),  and  it  is  there- 
fore a  contradiction  to  suppose  these  can  exist  except 
as  thought  and  feeling.  This  has  indeed  been  long 
settled  among  the  first  thinkers;  and  the  only  point 
of  controversy  now  remaining  concerns  the  existence 
of  a  transphenomenal  world. 

Since  an  able  contributor  to  The  Index  has  already 
shown  that  I  am  very  likely  to  be  misapprehended,  I 
must  endeavor  to  be  perspicuous,  though  at  the  ex- 
pense of  terseness.  I  will  therefore  adopt  the  lan- 
guage of  my  critic:  "Every  act  of  consciousness  is  as 
truly  objective  as  subjective.  The  external  universe 
...  is  therefore  known  to  us  as  directly  and  immedi- 
ately as  the  workings  of  our  own  minds."  In  this 
passage,  the  author  inserts  the  phrase  "the  non-ego," 
as  in  apposition  with  "the  external  universe."  That 
is  his  mistake,  the  head  and  front  of  his  offending; 
and,  in  that,  he  differs  from  Spencer,  Lewes,  Huxley, 
Hamilton,  and  Mansel,  and  all  the  great  host  of  mod- 
ern psychologists,  beginning  with  Descartes.  The 
known  external  universe,  all  the  ensemble  of  sensi- 
ble things,  is  known  as  directly  and  immediately  as 
the  working  of  our  own  minds,  because  they  are 
known  as  being  the  working  of  our  minds  solely  and 
simply.  If  this  is  true,  it  is  surely  very  important 
that  it  be  fully  understood  and  its  logical  implica- 
tions traced  out,  as  that  would  form  the  true  and 
philosophical  realism. 

Because  I  thus  identify  the  known  universe  with 
the  ego,  and  yet  make  it  evolve  from  the  ego,  I  am 
charged  with  the  self-contradiction  of  creating  my- 
self. If  so,  I  only  logically  follow  out  the  modern 
psychological  doctrine  affirming  the  egoistic  nature 
of  all  phenomena.  But  my  position  involves  no  such 
absurdity.  Evolution  is  not  creation.  Every  one 
knows  or  believes  that  thoughts  are  evolved  from  the 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  21 

ego  and  are  modes  of  the  ego.  What  is  thus  unques- 
tioned concerning  our  inner  modes  or  phenomena  I 
affirm  concerning  all  the  phenomena  of  the  external 
world,  that  they  are  modes  of  the  mind  involuntarily 
and  lexically  evolved  from  the  mind. 

I  wish  my  readers  to  remember  that,  when  I  call 
any  party  materialist,  I  use  the  word  in  a  meaning 
worthy  of  the  modern  conception  of  matter.  This  I 
indicated  seven  years  ago  in  my  Evolution  and  Prog- 
ress. By  "material  monist,"  I  mean  those  who  hold 
that  there  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  no  evidence  of  more 
than  one  substance,  which  through  the  external, 
material  world  generates  all  forms  of  conscious 
beings. 


III. 
SCIENTIFIC  PHILOSOPHY. 


A  boulder  has  just  been  rolled  onto  my  track,  and 
I  must  halt  a  little  while  to  blast  it.  All  over  the 
world,  men  are  seeking  a  rational  escape  from  the 
toils  of  solipsism.  The  British  quarterly  review, 
Mind,  for  October,  1882,  has  two  articles  seeking 
this  result.  One  of  these  is  too  abstract  and  obscure 
to  need  much  refutation.  The  other  is  clear  and 
able,  well  suffused  with  the  spirit  of  modern  phys- 
ical science,  and  its  learning  is  quite  imposing.  Its 
first  title  is  "Scientific  Philosophy,"  which  it  ex- 
pounds under  the  designation  of  "Relationism," 
which  is  the  ancient  and  mediaeval  realism  improved, 
which  refutes  nominalism,  now  dominant,  and  its 
alleged  consequent,  idealism,  and  makes  philosophy 
scientific  by  confounding  it  with  science.  As  this 
coincides  with  a  strong  tendency  of  the  age  an  with 
a  style  of  thinking  prevalent  always,  it  is  likely  to 
find  adherents  among  a  class  of  desultory  psycholo- 
gists who  are  ardent  theorizers.  It  therefore  demands 
attention. 

Relation  of  Nominalism  to  Modern  Subjectivism. 

The  first  step  in  the  process  by  which  this  is  accom- 
plished is  to  show  that  modern  psychological  subjec- 
tivism is  only  a  more  subtle  and  comprehensive  form 
of  the  old  nominalism,  and  is  therefore  the  child 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  23 

of  mediaeval  scholasticism.  This  is  certainly  fresh 
enough  to  be  interesting.  Whether  it  is  true,  we  will 
proceed  to  inquire. 

A  genus  comprises  such,  and  only  such,  qualities  as 
are  common  to  all  the  individuals  of  the  genus.  If 
the  genus  is  an  objective  reality,  and  therefore  a 
single  individual,  it  cannot  be  of  any  particular  color, 
form,  odor,  weight,  taste,  or  subjective  states  peculiar 
to  any  one;  for,  then,  it  would  exclude  every  other, 
and  every  individual  would  be  a  genus,  which  is  con- 
trary to  the  hypothesis.  And  it  is  a  contradiction  in 
terms  to  say  that  it  objectively  exists  and  yet  is  void 
of  all  particular  and  distinct  quality,  as  that  were  to 
be  void  of  all  quality.  Hence,  real  genera  and  spe- 
cies are  an  impossibility.  They  are  only  mental  and 
verbal  expedients  and  symbolical  designations  for 
scientific  convenience.  Such  are,  in  brief,  the  doc- 
trine and  proof  of  nominalism. 

This  does  not,  as  alleged,  logically  involve  ideal- 
ism, nor  the  invention  of  noumena  as  the  unknown 
real  in  distinction  from  phenomena  as  subjective 
states,  nor  the  denial  of  relations  or  the  knowledge 
of  relations;  and  it  leaves  entirely  untouched  the 
whole  question  of  egoism  and  altruism.  It  is  there- 
fore utterly  erroneous  to  assert  that  all  our  modern 
psychological  subjectivism  is  derived  from  the  ac- 
ceptance of  nominalism.  Modern  philosophy  holds 
to  nominalism,  because  it  is  a  logical  necessity  from 
the  very  notion  ot  a  genus  and  an  individual,  because 
thus  only  can  it  escape  self-contradiction.  Not  one  of 
its  adherents  has  ever  in  any  wise  connected  it  with 
his  subjective  psychology.  Surely,  if  there  were  a 
vital  and  universal  connection  between  nominalism 
and  subjectivism,  some,  if  not  all,  of  the  great  sub- 
jectivists  would  have  seen  and  announced  it  and 
drawn  additional  support  from  it,  which  none  of 
them  has  ever  done,  so  far  as  I  am  aware. 

The  irrelevance  of  nominalism  as  either  reason  or 
cause  for  psychological  subjectivism  is  further  seen 


24  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

from  the  fact  that  it  is  held  by  those  who  are  not 
purely,  subjectivists.  Bishop  Berkeley  is  of  this  class. 
Though  he  held  to  a  species  of  idealism,  it  is  a  serious 
historical  error  to  number  him  among  pure  psycho- 
logical subjectivists.  He  had  in  his  composition  ex- 
ceedingly little  of  subjectivism.  In  his  theory,  the 
objective  and  the  non-ego  were  conspicuous  and  para- 
mount. With  him,  everything  sensible  was  objective 
and  non-ego,  and  no  objectivism,  it  would  seem,  could 
go  beyond  that;  though  I  believe  that  of  Berkeley 
did,  by  making  even  our  reflective  mental  processes 
to  be  non-egoistic  objects.  Yet  he  was  one  of  the 
most  ardent  and  iconoclastic  of  nominalists.  Berke- 
ley reminds  us  of  what  the  most  cursory  student  of 
philosophy  should  understand,  that  there  is  an  objec- 
tive as  well  as  a  subjective  idealism,  and  that  the 
former,  which  had  its  most'conspicuous  development 
in  India,  is  far  the  older  of  the  two,  and  still  survives 
in  the  East  as  well  as  in  the  followers  of  Berkeley  in 
the  West,  of  whom  in  England  some  command  a 
respectable  hearing.  This  double  form  of  idealism 
is  of  itself  a  disproof  of  the  alleged  idealistic  influ- 
ence of  nominalism,  especially  as  the  objective  ideal- 
ism of  India  was  matured  before  nominalism  was 
formulated  or  before  the  intellect  of  Greece  had  en- 
tered on  its  highest  course.  All  the  prominent  Scotch 
philosophers  —  Reid,  Stewart,  Brown,  Hamilton  — 
were  objectivists  more  or  less;  and  all  were  decided 
nominalists  or  conceptual ists,  which  are  logically 
one,  as  the  names  must  have  some  meaning. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  also  a  class  of  realists 
which  is  not  only  idealistic,  but,  in  the  main,  objec- 
tively idealistic.  One  of  the  most  pronounced  of 
these  is  the  amiable  and  eloquent  author  of  Recherche 
de  la  Verit^.  In  this  work,  Malebranche  makes  a  dis- 
tinction between  sentiments  and  ideas.  Sentiments, 
he  says,  are  egoistic,  modes  of  mind,  and  that  the 
ideas  are  not,  but  primary  necessary  forms  which 
cannot  exist  in  us  nor  subsist  of  themselves,  and 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  25 

therefore  must  exist  in  God.  In  God,  we  see  them. 
And  this  species  of  idealism  he  connects  with  the 
old  realism.  Besides  these  ideas  and  sentiments,  he 
holds  that  there  is  an  unknown  world  whose  un- 
known action  is  made  the  occasion  of  God's  present- 
ing these  ideas  to  us  in  their  order,  whence  follow 
those  sentiments,  or  mental  modifications,  in  the 
order  in  which  they  occur.  In  these  views,  Male- 
branche  is  followed  by  Fenelon,  Bossuet,  and  even  by 
the  great  Leibnitz. 

Further,  and  finally  on  this  point,  there  is  a  long 
line  of  antagonism  between  an  allied  realism  and 
subjective  idealism  (total  or  partial)  on  the  one  side, 
and  an  allied  nominalism  and  objective  sensism  on 
the  other  side.  Plato  was  the  Greek  originator  of  the 
realism  of  generals,  and  he  is  sympathetic  with  the 
Eleatic  sceptics,  or  idealists.  He  treats  the  sensible 
world  with  much  contempt;  and,  because  of  the 
evanescence  and  instability  of  its  forms,  he  almost 
denies  it  existence.  The  Academics,  who  claimed 
him  as  their  master,  were  realists,  and  yet  very  scep- 
tical concerning  the  sensible  world,  and  tended  to 
the  reduction  of  its  forms  to  subjective  states  or  im- 
pressions, as  Hume  did,  who  called  himself  an  Aca- 
demic, though  he  was  a  broader  sceptic  than  they, 
as  they,  like  good  realists,  held  to  the  stability  and 
supersensible  origin  of  the  higher  intellectual  world. 
Aristotle  and  his  adherents  took  a  different  and 
rather  antagonizing  position  on  both  these  points; 
and  the  two  parties  fought  a  languid  battle  till  in  the 
Middle  Ages  (through  Porphyry)  the  question  took  no 
a  new  form,  and  Aristotle's  own  disciples  were 
divided  into  hostile  camps,  and  for  some  four  centu- 
ries the  fiercest  of  all  intellectual  contests  raged 
throughout  Europe.  The  realists  were  always  the 
orthodox  and  the  high  and  a  priori  metaphysicians, 
who  made  much  of  the  inner  consciousness  and  little 
of  sense;  while  the  nominalists  were  just  the  oppo- 
site. Hence,  M.  Cousin,  who  is  one  of  the  best  in- 


2  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

formed  historians  on  this  subject,  says  that  the  con- 
test was  virtually  a  contest  between  sensism  and 
idealism,  nominalism  being  the  sensist  party  and 
realism  the  idealistic  party.  He  tells  us  that  Duns 
Scotus  was  for  that  age  a  great  student  of  the  mate- 
rial world,  and  held  to  an  immediate  knowledge  of 
it  as  non-ego,  and  that  Occam  inherited  his  views  and 
tastes.* 

M.  Cousin  is  himself  a  striking  illustration  of  the 
point  I  am  endeavoring  to  make,  that  nominalism  is 
not  the  father  of  modern  subjectivism.  Cousin  is  a 
strenuous  realist;  and  from  this  he  forges  weapons 
against  sensism,  and  maintains  that  by  none  of  the 
senses  can  we  transcend  the  ego,  and  that  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  non-ego  is  attainable  only  through  the 
medium  of  a  principle  of  causality  which  can  be  ex- 
plained and  vindicated  only  on  the  theory  of  realism, 
just  such  a  realism  as  this  which  affirms  that  univer- 
sals  cannot  subsist  of  themselvei,  but  in  connection 
with  all  the  individuals,  finite  and  infinite. 

Substitution  of  Relations  for  Universal*. 

The  theory  in  question  is  not,  as  its  author  supposes, 
inconsistent  with  nominalism.  It  expressly  identi- 
fies relations  with  universals,  and  then  substitutes  the 
former  term  for  the  latter,  and  then  proceeds  to  show 
the  serviceableness  and  objective  character  of  rela- 
tions as  therefore  reals  and  universals  (pp.  476-478). 
This  is  all  erroneous, — an  unconscious  intellectual 
jugglery.  Relations  and  universals  are  not  the  same. 
Relations  of  external  objects  are  objective,  inhere  in 
objects  as  members  of  a  group,  and  are  the  special 
and  variable  modes  of  the  members  of  said  groups; 
and  because  they  are  variable,  indefinitely,  they  are  not 
universals.  Some  relations  always  exist,  but  not  the  same 
relations.  The  real  and  active  objective  relations  are 
therefore  not  universal.  Indeed,  they  are  not  at  all 

*  See  his  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  vol.  ii.,  Lect.  ix. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  Z< 

the  expression  of  genera  and  species,  and  have  no 
manner  of  connection  with  the  question  of  nominal- 
ism and  realism  on  that  subject;  and  so  the  existence 
of  these  relations  is  nothing  against  nominalism. 
Nominalism  admits  and  assimilates  them  with  so 
much  ease  and  comfort  as  not  to  know  that  it  has  any 
digestion.  As  a  nominalist,  I  accept  them  as  indubi- 
tably true.  Thus,  nominalism  is  the  maelstrom 
which  swallows  up  the  great  new  theory  of  relation- 
ism,  instead  of  being  logically  extinguished  by  it. 

Subjectire   Relations. 

We  must  here  call  attention  to  an  important  fact, 
which  has  been  overlooked,  that  there  are  subjective  as 
well  as  objective  realities  and  relations.  There  are  logi- 
cal relations,  very  many:  relations  innumerable  in  the 
field  of  abstract  or  pure  mathematics  in  all  its  many 
branches;  relations  between  all  the  sensations,  be- 
tween other  feelings,  and  all  the  moral  conceptions, 
and  between  all  these  classes.  These  relations  of  the 
subjective  world  involve  an  infinity  of  possible  de- 
tail and  modification.  Now,  these  relations  are  cer- 
tainly not  "reals"  in  the  sense  of  external  and 
non-egoistic,  which  is  the  kind  of  real  and  universal 
we  are  discussing.  They  are  real  facts,  and  real  rela- 
tions as  subjective  states,  and  nothing  more.  Neither 
are  these  relations  universals.  We  can  classify  them; 
but  the  result  is  only  so  many  classes  of  particular 
experiences,  which  are  so  much  alike  in  each  class  that 
they  are  put  together,  and  so  separated  as  a  class  from 
others  because  of  their  relative  unjlkeness.  Myriads 
of  sensations  related  to  each  other  are  brought  under 
five  different  classes  or  senses;  but  there  is  no  general 
sensation  which  combines  or  concentrates  or  repre- 
sents or  constitutes  the  generic  class  sensation,  or  the 
specific  class  of  each  sense  and  including  all  special 
experiences  of  that  sense.  Relations  we  have  in 
abundance,  but  no  general  or  universal  reals;  and  re- 
lations cannot  be  substituted  for  universals,  as  if  they 
were  the  same. 


28  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 


Identity  and  Difference  of  Ulethod  in  Science  and 
Philosophy. 

A  striking  contrast  is  drawn  between  the  success- 
ful method  of  science  and  the  barren  method  of  phi- 
losophy, as  the  latter  is  represented  by  Kant's  meta- 
physics. Science,  it  is  said,  teaches  that  cognition 
conforms  to  things,  not  things  to  cognition,  and  meta- 
physics just  the  opposite.  But  this  is  an  inadequate 
representation  of  modern  philosophy.  When  Kant 
speaks  of  making  the  objects  conform  to  cognition,  he 
confessedly  designs  to  speak  under  the  limitations  of 
science  and  in  conformity  with  the  method  of  sci- 
ence; and  he  mentions  a  great  scientific  fact  and  name 
in  illustration  of  his  object,  Copernicus  and  his  pro- 
cedure. It  was  experience,  the  experience  of  sensi- 
ble disharmony  and  mental  confliction,  which  led 
Copernicus  to  transfer  his  theoretic  stand-point  of  ob- 
servation from  our  planet  to  the  sun.  In  like  man- 
ner, it  was  a  corresponding  disharmony  of  experience, 
outer  and  inner,  which  led  Kant  to  change  conversely 
his  theoretic  stand-point.  Copernicus  endeavored 
(successfully)  to  give  a  theoretical  unity  to  the  known 
facts  or  objects  of  the  material  universe  by  supposing 
that  we  revolve  around  the  sun  and  not  the  sun 
around  us.  Kant  endeavored  to  furnish  a  theoretical 
unity  to  the  known  facts  or  objects  of  the  psychological 
world,  inner  and  outer,  by  supposing  that  our  faculty 
of  cognition  shapes  the  outer  world  instead  of  being 
shaped  by  it.  This  is  inadequate  and  partially  erro- 
neous, but  it  is  not  contrary  to  the  method  of  science. 
It  does  not  ignore  or  depreciate  sensible  objects  or 
experience,  any  more  than  Copernicus  did.  Kant  is 
wrong  in  his  whole  system,  nearly, — wrong  in  his 
method  of  deducing  the  categories  and  in  the  result 
on  the  list  of  categories,  wrong  in  his  assertion  of  the 
need  or  the  existence  of  synthetical  propositions  a 
priori,  wrong  in  his  doctrine  of  a  priori  regulative 
principles  as  of  only  subjective  authority,  wrong  in 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  29 

his  doctrine  of  a  supersensible  material  world,  wrong 
in  his  doctrine  of  incognizable  noumena  numerically 
different  from  phenomena;  but  he  is  not  opposed  on 
the  point  in  question  to  the  accepted  method  of  sci- 
ence. He  commences  with  experience  and  even  with 
sensible  experience,  and  then  analyzes  it  and  deter- 
mines its  contents  and  their  relations  to  each  other 
by  what  he  supposes  to  be  the  most  rigorous  scientific 
method.  Further,  when  rightly  understood,  the  anti- 
thetic phrases,  *  'conformity  of  cognition  to  objects" 
and  "the  conformity  of  objects  to  cognition,"  are  not 
opposites,  but  equivalents.  Phenomena  are  the  same, 
whether  we  speak  from  the  Ptolemaic  or  the  Coper- 
nican  stand-point;  and  they  are  the  same,  whether  we 
speak  from  the  subjective  or  objective  stand-point. 
If  cognition  is  in  conformity  with  objects,  objects  are 
in  conformity  with  cognition.  Still,  it  is  an  unfortu- 
nate formula  which  was  here  adopted  by  Kant,  though 
not  more  unfortunate  than  its  older  counterpart, 
whence  by  the  law  of  antithesis  he  derived  his.  For 
objects  do  not  wholly  shape  cognition,  any  more  than 
cognition  wholly  shapes  objects.  They  are  insepara- 
ble, and  together  they  form  an  active  causal  and  cog- 
nized unity.  There  is  always  an  interaction  in  which 
action  and  reaction  are  equal  between  the  organism 
and  its  environment;  and  there  is  strictly  no  object 
before  cognition,  and  no  cognition  before  there  is  an 
object.  They  necessarily  originate  together.  They 
invariably  conform  to  each  other,  therefore;  and  the 
distinction  between  the  antithetic  phrases  used  by 
Kant  should  never  have  been  made,  except  to  observe 
their  logical  and  experiential  unity. 

Hence,  I  accept  as  entirely  true  Mr.  Abbot's  descrip- 
tion of  the  process  and  method  of  cognition  according 
to  the  theory  of  scientific  philosophy,— "that  knowl- 
edge is  a  dynamic  correlation  of  object  and  subject, 
and  has  two  ultimate  origins,  the  cosmos  and  the  mind; 
that  these  origins  unite,  inseparably  yet  distinguisha- 
bly  in  experience,  i.e.,  the  perpetual  action  of  the 


30  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

cosmos  on  the  mind,  plus  the  perpetual  reaction  of 
the  mind  on  the  cosmos  and  on  itself  as  affected  by 
it;  ...  that  experience  has  both  an  objective  and 
subjective  side,  and  that  these  two  sides  are  mu- 
tually dependent  and  equally  necessary":  only  I  add, 
by  way  of  further  analysis  and  explanation,  that  the 
kosmos,  or  the  objective  world,  is  the  mind  just  as 
much  as  that  which  he  so  designates.  The  interaction 
here  described  is  between  the  kosmos  and  the  organ- 
ism, and  these  are  two  great  classes  of  the  complex 
modes  of  "the  mind."  All  motion,  action,  and  inter- 
action are  changes  in  the  modes  of  the  mind. 

This  exposition  discloses  the  false  basis  of  most  of 
the  objections  to  idealism.  They  all  assume  that  the 
ego  is  confined  to  the  organism,  within  which  there- 
fore our  knowledge  is  confined,  if  it  is  confined  within 
the  ego.  Hence,  they  may  speak  with  just  but  irrele- 
vant contempt  of  the  limitation  of  our  "capacity  to 
realize  only  what  is  contained  within  the  narrow 
shell  of  our  physical  organism,  and  all  the  universe 
outside  relegated  to  the  realms  of  the  unknown  and 
uncognizable."  All  that  universe  is  as  much  ego  as 
the  organism  itself,  and  just  as  much  known.  While 
subject  and  object  are  equally  necessary  to  conscious- 
ness and  equally  known  in  consciousness,  the  object 
is  always  as  much  ego  as  the  subject,  two  phases  of  the 
one  reality.  It  is  entirely  true  that  all  cognition  is 
relative,  and  involves  two  terms  whose  reciprocal  ao- 
tion  constitute  the  relation,  and  it  is  therefore  irra- 
tional to  confine  cognition  to  one  of  these  terms;  and 
I  do  not  do  that.  I  extend  it  to  all  such  terms,  but  I 
affirm  that  they  are  all  and  always  ego.  So  neither  do 
I  affirm  "a  subject  without  an  object."  That  is  ab- 
surd, as  it  implies  "a  thinker  without  a  thought";  but 
I  affirm  that  the  thought  and  the  sensible  object  are 
both  and  equally  ego.  I  do  not  deny  extension  to  the 
ego.  I  give  to  it  all  knowable  extension,  and  duration 
too.  Such  is  one  ultimate  logical  result  of  our  modern 
psychological  analysis,  from  which  there  is  no  longer 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  31 

any  dissentient  worth  the  name.  Let  not  philosophers 
or  scientists  disparage  their  own  record  by  starting 
back  in  alarm  from  a  statement  which  is  new  only 
in  its  greater  logical  thoroughness  and  completeness. 

Scope  of  Science  and  Philosophy. 

Science  seeks  laws  and  lexical  connections.  Indi- 
vidual phenomena  are  sought  only  as  exemplifying 
law.  But,  for  this  purpose,  individuals  are  necessary. 
In  them  only,  laws  exist.  Law  has  no  separate  entity ; 
and  it  not  only  exists  in  individuals,  but  it  is  the  in- 
dividuals, and  not  a  genus,  except  as  it  subjectively 
exists  in  us  as  an  abstract  or  tropical  conception. 
Hereupon,  we  are  told  that  subjectivism,  by  limiting 
our  knowledge  to  one  individual  ego,  renders  science 
impossible,  because  science  implies  a  multiplicity  of 
objects  acting  in  conformity  to  general  laws  (p.  487). 
This  is  erroneous.  It  discloses  an  unfortunate  incom- 
prehension of  subjectivism,  which  admits  and  in- 
cludes just  the  same,  and  the  same  number  of,  objects 
and  laws,  as  objectivism.  It  includes  all  the  sensible 
and  knowable  universe  (and  much  more),  and  object- 
ivism never  claimed  more  than  that  for  the  sphere  of 
science.  If  there  is  but  one  individual  known,  that 
individual  includes  all  the  universe  of  the  objectivist, 
with  all  its  multitudinous  phenomena  and  changes; 
and  these,  in  all  their  relations,  subjectivism  is  quite 
as  competent  to  investigate  as  objectivism,  for  sub- 
jectivism includes  all  objects,  all  phenomena,  all  mu- 
tations, their  causes  and  connections  and  logical  im- 
plications. While  it  identifies  relations  with  objects, 
it  identifies  objects  with  the  ego,  which  is  more  than 
subject;  and  thus  it  absorbs  relationism  as  a  very  lit- 
tle thing  in  its  vast  and  measureless  womb  of  a  bound- 
less universe. 

Philosophy  is  scientific  in  its  basis  and  procedure; 
but  it  is  not  science,  and  it  is  more  than  scientific  in 
its  comprehensiveness  and  in  the  results  it  seeks, 
whether  it  attains  them  or  not.  It  is  utterly  errone- 


32  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

ous  to  suppose  that  the  great  problem  of  the  age  is 
"how  to  identify  science  and  philosophy."  That  is  a 
problem  only  for  those  who  have  no  proper  concep- 
tion of  philosophy  and  who  desire  only  that  philoso- 
phy shall  voluntarily  abdicate  existence,  and  bequeath 
to  science  its  name.  Philosophy  seeks  the  ultimate 
analysis  and  resynthesis  in  a  logical  unity"  of  all  ex- 
periences and  conceptions,  all  phenomena  inner  and 
outer,  the  ultimate  actual  and  logical  relation  of  sub- 
stance and  quality  or  attribute  and  cause, — cause  as 
the  intrinsic  force  of  phenomena  as  well  as  lexical 
antecedents,  and  ultimately  explanatory  of  such  phe- 
nomena, and  also  of  illexical  phenomena,  if  any  such 
are  found.  To  this  great  object,  all  the  sciences  are 
ancillary;  and  all  scientific  methods  and  results  are 
respected  and  utilized  by  philosophy.  Philosophy 
stands  at  the  supreme  and  ultimate  centre  of  the  uni- 
verse, of  which  she  is  the  light  and  glory;  and,  from 
every  part,  she  seizes  all  scientific  lights,  and  blends 
and  combines  them  into  one  glowing  orb  of  pure 
white  illumination,  which  discloses  the  intellectual 
harmony  of  all  worlds  and  all  their  parts,  their  high 
significance,  their  origin  and  destiny,  and  the  neces- 
sary methods  of  working  out  that  destiny.  The 
humblest  forces  contribute  to  the  greatest  results;  and, 
therefore,  I  labor  for  the  promotion  of  this  great  end. 


IV. 


THE  BLACK  HOLE -SOLIPSISM. 


I  have  so  far  proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  the 
reader  would  understand  what  I  mean  by  objective 
evolution;  but  perhaps  it  would  have  been  better,  had 
I  denned  myself,  and  I  will  do  it  now.  By  objective 
evolution,  I  mean  substantially  that  system  of  phi- 
losophy which  has  been  concurrently  expounded  by 
Herbert  Spencer,  George  Lewes,  John  Fiske,  and 
others,  and  which  has  been  called  the  cosmic  philoso- 
phy, the  synthetic  philosophy,  and  simply  evolution 
and  agnosticism.  It  affirms  that  all  the  phenomena 
of  mind  and  matter  appear  to  be  manifestations  and 
symbols  t)f  one  only  ultimate  and  inscrutable  power 
and  reality;  that  the  known  world  external  to  our 
organism  is  the  immediate  source  whence  have  been 
evolved  all  the  organic  world  of  plants  and  animals 
and  human  consciousness,  beginning  with  the  low- 
est forms  and  advancing  to  the  present  time  and  to 
man  as  the  most  recent  and  the  highest  known 
form  of  the  evolved  force;  that  the  organism  and  the 
individual,  conscious  ego  have  the  same  source  and 
cause,  and  originate  at  the  same  time  and  appear  to 
be  ultimately  one,  furnishing  two  great  classes  of 
phenomena,  the  organic  forms  and  processes,  and  the 
conscious  processes  or  the  feelings,  including  thought 
and  volition,— which  are  feeling,  but  not  wholly  feel- 
ing, even  as  the  sensations  are  not  wholly  feeling. 
It  is  very  remarkable  that  objective  evolutionists 


34  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

are  exceedingly  anxious  to  find  an  external  world  as 
object  and  non-ego,  which  they  deem  necessary  to  their 
theory;  and  they  thus  confound  themselves  on  this 
point  with  the  old  dualists,  whom  they  affect  to  de- 
spise. This  introduces  connection  and  consequent 
obscurity  into  the  theory.  Its  advocates  are  not 
aware  that  there  is  no  real  call  for  such  an  external 
world  either  in  their  theory  of  evolution  or  in  any- 
thing established  by  modern  science  or  philosophy. 
They  are  in  reality  animated  only  by  an  old  preju- 
dice, an  idol  or  "phantom  of  the  tribe,"  born  of  pre- 
scientific  impressions.  To  accomplish  this  impossible 
task,  they  resort  to  the  most  flimsy  special  pleading, 
which,  in  any  other  connection,  they  would  justly 
despise.  They  are  also  wrong  in  their  objects  as  well 
as  in  their  argumentation;  for,  as  they  aim  to  prove 
only  an  unknowable  world,  some  inconceivable  thing 
which  is  void  of  all  sensible  quality  and  of  every- 
thing that  can  be  presented  either  to  thought  or  im- 
agination, such  a  pursuit  must  be  futile  in  its  results 
relative  to  evolution.  For,  if  such  a  world  were 
proved,  it  could  not  be  discriminated  from  the  great 
Unknowable,  the  One  ultimate  Force  inasifest  in  all 
phenomena;  and  so  nothing  would  be  gained  by  it, 
and  for  it  the  theory  of  evolution  has  no  distinctive 
place.  The  proof  of  such  a  world  would  also  be 
futile  relative  to  the  popular  feeling.  The  world  in 
popular  demand  is  a  sensible  world,  and  that  world 
has  never  been  brought  in  question  by  any  school  of 
philosophers  whatever.  One  and  all  affirm  its  exist- 
ence, and  describe  it  in  much  the  same  way.  Like  the 
rest  of  mankind  who  are  unwarped  by  speculative 
theories,  I  am  not  concerned  about  the  existence  and 
proof  of  a  supersensible  world  of  matter,  as  I  hold  it 
to  be  practically  and  speculatively  useless,  and  con- 
ceptually nil,  so  that  the  assertion  of  its  existence 
is  a  mere  verbalism,  as  no  meaning  can  possibly  be 
attached  to  the  words.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  argu- 
ments for  such  a  world  will  be  as  empty  and  obscure 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  35 

as  the  object  sought.    Some  of  these  arguments  we 
will  now  notice. 

Involuntary  Action. 

The  familiar  argument  that  such  a  non  -  egoistic 
force  is  to  be  inferred  as  the  cause  of  those  organic 
experiences  which  are  independent  of  our  will  and 
opposed  to  our  will  has  always  appeared  to  me  quite 
puerile,  though  it  is  urged  by  some  of  the  great  minds 
of  the  world.  It  proves  too  much, — that  the  extra- 
volitional  cause  of  every  experience  is  non-ego ;  for 
this  is  its  major  premise,  and  it  is  utterly  inadmissi- 
ble. Within  ourselves  there  is  a  variety  of  non- voli- 
tional causes,  whose  operation  we  long  and  vainly 
antagonize  with  all  the  energy  of  our  will.  There  are 
natural  organic  appetites  which  operate  with  great 
force  irrespective  of  our  volition,  and  often  against 
its  sustained  and  strenuous  endeavors,  such  as  hun- 
ger, thirst,  the  sexual  feeling,  and  certain  acquired 
appetites  for  things  which  are  confessedly  injurious, 
as  alcohol,  opium,  tobacco,  and  other  narcotics.  All 
bodily  diseases  exemplify  the  same  principle.  They 
are  the  effect  of  forces  which  begin  their  operation 
without  our  consent  and  continue  in  spite  of  our  op- 
position, and  are  yet  wholly  subjective.  All  physio- 
logical functions  operate  irrespective  of  volition,  and 
are  pre-conditionally  necessary  to  its  action. 

I  do  not  forget  that  all  organic  appetites  and  all 
physiological  functions  would  soon  perish  but  for  a 
force  assimilated  by  the  organism  from  without.  But 
neither  do  we  forget  that  all  known  extra-organic  force 
and  phenomena  are  egoistic;  so  that  their  causative 
relation  to  the  organism  is  nothing  against  my  posi- 
tion, no  proof  of  a  non-egoistic  cause  of  our  organic 
experiences.  There  is  not  in  all  the  universe  a  single 
known  example  of  a  non-egoistic  cause,  though  non- 
volitionary  causes  are  innumerable,  including  all  the 
sensible  universe.  The  known  ego  is  the  known 
source  of  all  known  experiences  on  earth  or  in  thQ 


36  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

heavens.  To  infer  any  other  cause  is  equally  unsci- 
entific and  illogical,  except  on  the  theory  that  the  ego 
is  confined  to  the  organism.  If  the  ego  is  conceived 
as  confined  to  the  organism,  the  causes  of  its  experi- 
ences are  found  in  the  external  world;  but  these 
causes  are  not  inferred  and  unknown,  but  they  are 
experiential ly  verified.  This,  however,  is  confessedly 
erroneous.  The  known  external  world,  equally  with 
the  organism,  is  admitted  to  be  a  series  of  subjective 
states.  If  we  infer  a  cause  of  all  this,  we  reach  either 
the  Deity  of  theism  or  the  "Great  Unknown"  of  ag- 
nosticism, which  is  not  the  material  world  contended 
for.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the  ego,  or  subject,  has 
the  causes  of  its  own  non-volitionary  experiences 
within  itself;  and,  until  we  have  the  impossible  proof 
that  all  non-volitional  causes  are  non-ego,  we  shall 
have  no  ground  for  the  inference  that  there  is  a  non- 
egoistic  material  world.  We  know  ourselves  as  the 
subject  and  source  of  an  immense  and  infinitely  vari- 
ous non- volitional  causation,  which  dispenses  with 
the  need  of  any  such  world. 

Alleged  Necessary  Belief. 

To  say  that  we  cannot  help  thinking  and  believing 
that  there  is  such  a  non-ego  called  matter,  or  the  ma- 
terial world,  is  false  as  a  universal  proposition. 
Some  men  may  feel  so;  but  all  do  not,  else  this  debate 
had  never  been.  For  one,  I  am  unable  to  do  other 
than  disbelieve  it,  because  it  stultifies  my  intelli- 
gence. "The  universal  postulate"  does  not  apply 
here  for  want  of  the  universal  conviction. 

Spencer's  Negative  Proof  of  Transfigured   Real- 
ism. 

While  I  regard  Mr.  Spencer's  Principles  of  Psychol- 
ogy as  a  very  able  production,  yet  I  know  nothing  in 
the  whole  range  of  philosophical  literature  weaker 
than  his  nineteenth  chapter,  styled  "General  Analy- 
sis," in  advocacy  of  his  "Transfigured  Realism." 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  37 

After  refuting  the  "assumptions  of  metaphysicians," 
the  "words  of  metaphysicians,"  and  the  "reasonings 
of  metaphysicians,"  he  presents  a  "negative  justifica- 
tion of  realism,"  which  consists  in  "an  argument  from 
priority,"  an  "argument  from  simplicity,"  an  "argu- 
ment from  distinctness,"  and  two  or  three  other  argu- 
ments less  definite  and  quotable.  It  is  quite  a  start- 
ling novelty  for  a  man  to  claim  "priority"  for  the 
most  recent  invention  or  discovery,  and  it  is  surely 
richer  in  comic  than  in  logical  force.  The  "argument 
from  priority"  is  futile,  unless  it  covers  his  own  pecu- 
liarity; and  this  peculiarity  is  set  forth  as  an  original 
conception.  Equally  striking,  and  for  a  similar  rea- 
son, is  the  claim  of  superior  distinctness  in  favor  of 
a  world  which  is  void  of  every  definite  element  and 
distinctive  quality,  so  that  it  cannot  be  either  known 
or  conceived.  The  "simplicity"  of  such  arguments, 
it  must  be  allowed,  is  quite  manifest. 

Spencer's     Positive     Proof    of     Transfigured 
Realism. 

Mr.  Spencer  next  furnishes  a  positive  justification  of 
transfigured  realism  in  five  chapters.  Here  I  agree  to 
all  he  says  (though  not  to  all  he  means)  on  the  subject 
under  discussion.  He  says  (Principles  of  Psychology.  § 
442),  "If  the  states  of  consciousness  are  adequate  to 
frame  a  disproof  of  the  non-ego,  they  must  be  held  ade- 
quate to  frame  a  proof."  This  is  true,  but  it  is  irrele- 
vant. No  one  affirms  a  positive  disproof  of  the  non-ego 
from  the  phenomena  of  consciousness.  That  would  in- 
dicate a  blind  temerity  of  which  idealists  are  never 
guilty.  They  only  say  that  consciousness  furnishes  no 
proof  of  a  material  non-ego,  which  is  a  very  different 
statement.  We  say  that  all  we  know  is  ego  or  subjec- 
tive states,  and  that  from  the  existence  of  this  known 
fact  there  is  no  logical  or  psychological  warrant  for 
the  assumption  of  the  non-ego  in  question.  We  thus 
virtually  say  that  consciousness  cannot  furnish  a  posi- 
tive disproof,  still  less  a  positive  proof  of  a  material 
non-ego. 


38  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

But,  when,  we  advance  from  psychology  as  a  study 
of  the  phenomena  and  conditions  of  consciousness  to 
an  analysis  of  the  conception  and  logical  implications 
of  dualism  of  every  form,  then  we  become  more 
positive.  We  see  that  the  conception  is  unreal,  be- 
cause it  has  no  logical  unity,  its  self-contradictions 
being  obvious  and  manifold.  Mr.  Spencer  acknowl- 
edges this  confliction,  and  consoles  himself  by  saying 
that  this  is  always  inevitable  whenever,  from  any 
point  or  in  any  direction,  we  attempt  an  ultimate 
analysis,  whence  he  is  called,  with  his  own  consent, 
an  agnostic.  But  subjective  evolution  escapes  these 
contradictions,  carry  analysis  as  far  as  you  may;  and 
on  this  account  it  is  to  be  preferred.  And  it  only  is  en- 
titled to  the  name  of  philosophy,  because  of  its  ulti- 
inacy  and  completeness. 

Mr.  Spencer  (Principles  of  Psychology,  §  443)  next  ar- 
gues as  follows:  "Realism,  then,  is  positively  justified, 
if  it  is  shown  to  be  a  dictum  of  consciousness  working 
after  its  proper  laws.  When  normal  acts  of  thought, 
like  those  which  establish  truths  we  hold  most  certain, 
are  proved  to  be  acts  of  thought  which  yield  the  an- 
tithesis of  subject  and  object,  no  further  demonstra- 
tion need  be  asked."  To  all  this,  those  whom  he  desig- 
nates as  anti-realists  thoroughly  assent.  They  hold 
rigidly  that  all  the  normal  acts  of  thought  yield  the 
antithesis  of  subject  and  object.  But  they  never  for- 
get (like  Mr.  Spencer)  that  object  and  subject  are 
always  equally  egoistic  or  subjective  states.  We 
therefore  need  go  no  further  with  him  in  this  discus- 
sion, because  we  agree  to  all  he  proposes  to  prove, 
the  existence  of  the  subjective  states  of  subject  and 
object  in  all  the  normal  acts  of  thought.  In  all  his 
discussion  of  this  subject,  Mr.  Spencer  strangely  as- 
sumes that  the  sensible  object  in  antithesis  with  the 
conscious  subject  is  non-ego,  and  that,  therefore,  in 
proving  the  existence  of  such  object  (which  no  one 
ever  questioned),  he  proves  his  transfigured  realism. 

In  further  proof  that  I  have  not  misconceived  him  on 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  39 

this  point,  I  will  adduce  two  other  passages.  He  says 
(Principles  of  Psychology,  §  404):  "The  postulate  with 
which  metaphysical  reasoning  sets  out  is  that  we  are 
primarily  conscious  only  of  our  sensations,  that  we  cer- 
tainly know  that  we  have  these,  and  that,  if  there  be 
anything  beyond  these,  serving  as  cause  for  them,  it 
can  be  known  only  by  inference  from  them.  I  shall 
give  much  surprise  to  the  metaphysical  reader,  if  I  call 
in  question  this  postulate;  and  the  surprise  will  rise 
into  astonishment,  if  I  distinctly  deny  it.  Yet  I  must 
do  this.  Limiting  the  proposition  to  those  epiperiphe- 
ral  feelings  produced  in  us  by  external  objects  (for 
these  are  alone  in  question),  I  see  no  alternative  but  to 
affirm  that  the  thing  primarily  known  is  not  that  a  sen- 
sation has  been  experienced,  but  that  there  exists  an  outer 
object."  He  occupies  nearly  six  octavo  pages  in  the 
illustration  of  this  singular  statement,  that  an  outer 
object  is  not  a  sensation,  and  that,  in  affirming  an 
outer  object  as  the  primary  phenomenon  in  sensible 
action,  he  contradicts  "the  primary  postulate  of  met- 
aphysicians." How  does  it  come  to  pass  that  his 
wonted  penetration  here  so  utterly  fails  him  that  "he 
is  unable  to  discern  that  this  outer  object"  is  ana- 
lyzed by  all  psychologists,  himself  included,  into  a 
sensation  simply  and  solely  ?  There  is  but  one  ex- 
planation. He  pays  the  penalty  which  is  exacted 
from  all  its  votaries  by  dualism,  which  can  be  served 
only  by  the  blind;  and,  hence,  the  ablest  minds  lose 
their  usual  perspicacity  as  soon  as  they  become  its 
advocates. 

Elsewhere  (Principles  of  Psychology,  §  438),  Mr.  Spen- 
cer says:  "Now  let  him  contemplate  an  object,  this 
book,  for  instance.  Resolutely  refraining  from  theor- 
izing, let  him  say  what  he  finds.  He  finds  that  he  is 
conscious  of  the  book  as  existing  apart  from  himself. 
Does  there  exist  in  his  consciousness  any  notion  about 
sensations  ?"  Here,  it  is  obvious  that  the  writer  identi- 
fies the  sensible  object,  the  book,  with  the  non-ego,  con- 
trary to  the  united  utterance  of  modern  psychology. 


40  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

He  confessedly  makes  an  appeal  from  scientific  analy- 
sis to  spontaneous  impression,  and  this  crude  im- 
pression he  substitutes  for  his  own  better  intelligence. 
Perhaps  it  will  be  well  here  to  remind  the  reader 
afresh  that,  in  denying  the  right  to  affirm  the  existence 
of  an  unknowable  material  world,  I  raise  no  question 
concerning  the  existence  of  the  known  material 
world.  A  known  and  indubitable  world  as  a  fact  of 
experience  there  is.  It  constitutes  the  visible  heavens 
and  earth  and  all  tangible  things.  The  existence  and 
reality  of  this  world  I  never  doubt,  nor  does  any 
other  man;  and  no  philosopher  ever  pretended  to 
doubt  it.  It  cannot  be  doubted,  for  the  doubt  implies 
it  as  a  subjective  state.  Nor  can  it  be  intelligently 
mentioned  except  as  the  object,  the  "outer  object,"  of 
sense,  and  as  such  existing  constant  and  uniform, 
fixed  and  stable,  so  far  as  any  experience  testifies. 
But  this  is  the  extent  of  our  experiential  knowledge. 
What  remains  for  us  now  to  do  is  to  analyze  these 
sensible  phenomena,  and  determine  what  they  are  and 
what  are  their  psychological  connections  and  their 
logical  implications.  This  task  has  in  the  psychologi- 
cal aspect  been  well  performed,  and  has  resulted  in 
the  doctrine  of  the  egoism  of  all  phenomena  as  the 
general  scientific  verdict.  Here,  I  take  my  stand,  and 
refuse  to  obscure  my  position  by  throwing  over  it  the 
dark  pall  of  the  unknowable  and  inconceivable.  The 
logical  implications  of  these  phenomena  have  not 
been  so  fully  explored  as  the  psychological,  and  this 
is  our  task. 

The  Subjective  World  a  Real  World. 

The  subjective  character  of  the  world  does  not  ren- 
der it  any  less  real  than  if  it  were  non-ego.  Surely, 
the  ego  is  at  least  as  real  as  the  non-ego.  We  know  the 
ego  to  be  real.  But  we  do  not  certainly  as  yet  know 
anything  beyond  the  ego.  This  is  the  point  of  debate. 
The  egoistic  theory  of  the  material  world  is  therefore 
a  genuine  realism  quite  as  much  as  any  theory  which 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  41 

has  appropriated  the  name  ;  and  it  is  not  properly 
designated,  because  not  defined  by  the  term  idealism. 
It  is  pre-eminently  philosophical,  because  it  is  the 
simplest  possible  theory,  and  comprehends  in  purity 
all  the  facts  of  the  case,  and  discards  all  needless  con- 
jectural and  obscuring  additions.  Hence,  Philosophi- 
cal Realism  is  its  proper  designation.  The  term  real- 
ism is  in  these  days  very  popular.  Everybody,  even 
a  metaphysician  or  an  evolutionist,  feels  bound  to  be 
apparently  real ;  and  so  his  theory  shall  be  called  real- 
ism, however  unreal  it  may  be.  And  nothing  that 
was  ever  in  the  brain  of  lunatic  or  philosopher  or  poet 
could  be  so  thoroughly  unreal  as  the  material  world 
of  our  metaphysical  dualists,  including  the  objective 
evolutionist.  It  has  less  reality  than  the  purest  phan- 
tasm, because  it  presents  no  form  to  the  imagination, 
nor  any  concept  to  the  intellect.  Yet  this  supra-phan- 
tasmic  world,  with  the  help  of  obscure  and  inconsist- 
ent special  pleadings,  and  buttressed  by  various  sup- 
posed characteristic  adjectives,  has  repeatedly  and 
too  successfully  endeavored  to  get  itself  accepted  as 
realism,  pure,  proper,  and  sole.  With  Sir  Wm.  Ham- 
ilton, the  distinguishing  epithet  is  "Natural,"  with 
George  Lewes  it  is  "Reasoned,"  and  with  Mr.  Spencer 
it  is  "Transfigured."  I  therefore  follow  in  the  wake 
of  illustrious  predecessors  in  sticking  to  the  word 
"Realism."  I  cannot  call  my  theory  natural  realism, 
because,  though  infinitely  more  natural  than  that  of 
Hamilton,  it  can  appear  natural  only  to  philosophic 
minds  ;  and  I  prefer  not  to  call  it  reasoned  realism, 
because  it  may  be  elaborately  reasoned  without  being 
proved  or  provable,  and  least  of  all  would  I  be  will- 
ing to  call  it  transfigured  realism.  We  want  a  real- 
ism which  is  not  transmuted  either  in  figure  or  any 
other  way,  and  a  realism  which  is  not  only  reasoned, 
but  reasonably  proved,  and  which  will  seem  natural 
in  the  judgment  of  competent  minds  who  have  given 
to  it  due  attention.  Such  a  theory  will  be  justly  des- 
ignated as  philosophical  realism  ;  and  philosophy 


42  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

will  seek  this  till  it  is  attained,  however  prolonged 
the  search  may  have  to  be. 

Nature  and   Evolution   shut  us  up  in  the  Ego. 

By  this  time,  it  is  surely  growing  quite  clear  that 
along  no  recognized  route  can  we  find  any  philosophi- 
cal exit  from  the  vast  cavernous  enclosure  of  the  ego. 
And,  if  we  could,  it  would  bring  no  advantage  to  the 
main  thesis  of  objective  evolution,  which  affirms 
the  ultimate  unity  of  subject  and  object,  of  conse- 
quent and  antecedent,  of  effect  and  cause,  of  all  di- 
versity in  One  ultimate  Source.  Hence,  the  method 
of  reaching  the  non-ego  by  reasoning  from  subject  to 
object,  from  effect  to  cause,  would  destroy  evolution 
by  destroying  the  unity  of  the  universe  in  the  per- 
sistence of  force,  or  the  identity  and  continuity  of  all 
force  as  that  which  is  the  same  under  all  changes  and 
in  all  forms.  In  short,  a  non-ego  thus  reached  would 
not  be  the  natural  cause  of  known  phenomena ;  and 
the  process  by  which  these  are  generated  would  not 
then  be  one  of  evolution,  but  of  creation.  A  creative 
power  is  not  one  with  the  created.  An  evolving  force 
is  always  one  with  all  the  forms  evolved.  Therefore, 
by  the  law  of  evolution,  we  can  never  transcend  the 
ego.  We  stultify  ourselves  in  the  effort.  Let  the 
evolutionist  heed  the  ancient  oracle,  "Know  thyself," 
and  he  will  labor  no  longer  in  this  direction.  Wher- 
ever evolution  holds,  there  is  unity  and  identity  of  es- 
sential being  or  force. 

There  is  indeed  a  common  method  of  transcending 
the  ego  by  an  arbitrary  and  artificial  invention,  the 
easy  and  not  infrequent  method  of  defining  terms  to 
meet  the  wishes  of  the  definers.  We  easily  transcend 
the  ego,  if  we  define  it  as  limited  in  space  (and  time)  to 
the  organism,  which  is  tacitly  done  very  generally, 
though  it  contradicts  the  united  testimony  of  modern 
psychology  (at  least  in  its  implications,  not  in  its  ar- 
ticulate utterances) ;  and  that  testimony  I  consider  a 
sufficient  refutation,  and  so  leave  it. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  43 

Objective  evolution  is  the  half-way  house  of  scien- 
tific exposition  and  analysis.  A  more  profound  and 
thorough  study  shows  that  all  that  is  included  in 
that  theory,  combined  with  its  forced  confession  of 
the  subjective  nature  of  all  sensible  phenomena,  is 
justly  described  by  the  repulsive  term,  solipsism, 
since  ultimately  its  universe  is  wholly  subjective  and 
egoistic,  beyond  which  it  knows  nothing.  In  what- 
ever direction  we  turn,  we  turn  only  toward  ourselves; 
and  never  by  any  possible  method  can  we  directly 
know  or  experience  anything  but  ourselves.  For- 
ever and  ever,  each  man  constitutes  all  the  universe 
directly  knowable  to  him.  All  the  so-called  men  and 
animals,  land  and  water,  and  all  the  celestial  bodies 
are  myself,  affections  and  modes  of  my  own  all-per- 
vading and  perduring  individuality.  Hence,  too,  all 
that  unknown  and  unknowable,  whence  the  known  is 
evolved,  being  one  with  the  known,  is  one  with  the 
ego ;  and  thus  so  far  an  absolute  solipsism  is  the  logi- 
cal result  of  our  investigations,  whether  as  subjective 
or  objective  evolutionists.  Since  we  directly  and  in- 
disputably know  ourselves  as  conscious  subjects  and 
agents,  and  thus  know  ourselves  as  a  force  and  real- 
ity, it  follows  that  wherever  we  go,  by  the  law  of  evo- 
lution and  persistence  of  force,  we  only  go  from  some 
to  other  modes  of  the  same  one  force,  which  is  our 
own  conscious  being,  and  which  we  call  ego.  Evolu- 
tion and  solipsism  are  therefore  terms  of  coincident 
meaning,  and  from  opposite  poles  Fichte  and  Spencer 
meet  in  an  immortal  embrace  :  only,  Fichte  under- 
stood his  logical  position  better  than  Spencer  seems 
to  understand  his. 

From  this  view  of  the  ego,  it  will  follow  that  I  must 
speak  of  it  very  variously,  because  it  is  modally  vari- 
ous and  multifarious,  and  yet  ever  essentially  the 
same.  There  is  but  One,  and  that  One  existing 
through  all  times  and  in  all  knowable  spaces,  under 
an  infinity  of  different  phenomenal  forms  and  aspects, 
contemporaneous  and  successive  ;  and  in  reference  to 


44  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

any  class  or  to  all  classes  of  these  phenomena  or  to 
the  transphenomenal  source  and  subject  of  them  all, 
we  may  speak  of  the  e^ro.  To  thus  change  the  stand- 
point of  observation  and  contemplation  is  not  indica- 
tive of  any  vacillation  of  mind  ;  nor  does  it  imply  any 
obscurity  or  ambiguity  of  thought,  nor  can  it  becloud 
or  befog  any  reader  who  has  once  grasped  the  concep- 
tion of  the  universal  ego. 

This  solipsism,  it  will  be  agreed,  is  theoretically  un- 
endurable and  practically  impossible  as  the  final  re- 
sult. But  let  us  be  patient  and  consistent,  which  in 
the  present  situation,  and  in  any  situation,  will  best 
prove  our  philosophical  spirit.  Above  all  things,  let 
us  stand  firmly  and  fairly  by  what  we  have  clearly 
and  unitedly  determined,— that  all  the  knowable  is 
ego,  and  that  within  all  that  realm  evolution  reigns. 
Neither  of  these  two  cardinal  discoveries  of  modern 
philosophy  and  science  must  be  discarded  or  muti- 
lated or  overlooked.  All  further  procedure  must  be 
in  accord  with  these,  if  not  based  on  these.  It  must, 
therefore,  be  henceforth  an  unquestioned,  because 
proved,  postulate  that  solipsism  is  true  to  this  ex- 
tent,—  that  every  individuality  includes  the  whole 
knowable  universe,  and  universes  are  just  as  numer- 
ous as  such  beings ;  that  every  being  is  hence  abso- 
lutely alone  ;  that  no  being  or  universe  can  ever 
overlap  or  interact.  Each  is  forever  without  any 
knowable  boundary,  just  because  the  object  and  sub- 
ject of  consciousness  are  one,  so  that  the  knower  can 
never  transcend  himself,  though  he  travel  forever 
swifter  than  the  light.  His  latest  stepping-stone  and 
object  of  knowledge  will  always  be  himself.  All 
other  beings  are  removed  from  him  by  the  diameter 
of  his  boundless  universe,  on  the  outer  verge  of 
which  he  can  never  even  stand  to  hail  a  brother  from 
afar. 

A  distinguished  writer  has  kindly  suggested  (pri- 
vately) that  perhaps  I  might  more  fully  utilize  M. 
Comte  in  the  prosecution  of  my  task.  I  will  there- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  45 

fore  say  that  the  essential  spirit  of  Positivism  (liber- 
ally constructed)  presides  over  my  work.  I  hold  to  the 
succession  of  the  three  methods  of  thinking  and  in- 
quiry—the theological,  the  metaphysical,  and  the 
positive— in  the  development  of  the  human  mind. 
And  it  is  the  metaphysical  method  which  now  stands 
in  our  way,  opposing  the  progress  of  psychological 
science  in  regard  to  the  theory  of  sense-perception. 

Positivism  cannot  limit  its  inquiries  to  external  phe- 
nomena, nor  even  to  sensible  phenomena;  for,  then, 
it  would  not  entertain  its  own  expressed  ultimate 
object  in  the  region  of  sociology  and  morals,  which 
involve  supersensible  feelings,  thoughts,  and  voli- 
tions. And  it  would  have  to  exclude  all  the  pure 
mathematics,  the  first  in  the  order  of  its  hierarchy  of 
the  sciences,  whence  all  science  would  be  impossible  ; 
for  this  science  deals  only  in  conceptions,  pever  in 
actual  experiences,  except  so  far  as  the  conception  is 
one  form  of  experience, —  thought-experience. 

Positivism  cannot  justify  mathematics,  cannot 
therefore  justify  itself  nor  take  its  first  step  in  the 
philosophy  of  sciences  until  it  has  vitally  connected 
this  pure  abstract  science  of  mathematics  with  sensi- 
ble experience,  its  base  of  supplies.  This  it  has  not 
done,  nor  intelligently  attempted,  nor  even  recog- 
nized its  obligation,  so  that  here  it  discloses  a  fatal 
deficiency.  This  deficiency  is  supplied  in  the  phi- 
losophy of  mathematics  given  in  my  Analytical  Proc- 
esses. Pure  mathematics  is  a  science  of  pure  and 
abstract  conceptions  ;  and,  from  beginning  to  end, 
its  procedure  is  analytical,  the  conclusion  being  but 
the  explicit  affirmation  of  the  implicit  contents  of 
the  premises,— a  part  designated  as  contained  in  a 
larger  whole.  But  the  premise  must  have  its  base, 
not  only  in  experience,  but  in  sensible  experience, — 
in  the  experience  of  extension,  whether  by  touch  or 
sight,  because  conceptual  extension  is  the  staple  of 
geometry.  The  conception  of  extension  is  the  intel- 
lectual light  of  the  experience  of  sensation,  and  con- 


46  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

ception  and  experience  are  inseparable.  And,  in  the 
conceptions  involved  in  all  sensible  experience,  all 
pure  mathematics  are  contained,  and  thence  analyti- 
cally evolved. 

It  would  be  too  much  to  expect  that  one  man,  in 
originating  and  expounding  a  great  system,  would  be 
able  to  do  it  justice  at  all  points,  though  Comte  him- 
self thought  he  did.  There  are  several  errors  and 
deficiencies  which  the  spirit  of  Positivism,  in  its 
further  development,  will  correct  or  supply.  The 
subjective  study  of  psychology  is  one  of  these.  This 
is  a  region  of  experience,  and  implied  in  all  other  ex- 
periences, and  their  ultimate  light  and  guarantee. 
While,  therefore,  I  attempt  to  work  in  this  region  a 
little,  I  claim  to  be  strictly  within  the  legitimate  field 
of  Positivism. 


V. 

REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  SITUATION. 


The  conclusion  to  which  we  are  driven  by  modern 
psychology  will,  to  many  minds,  be  very  unwelcome. 
But,  instead  of  wasting  our  strength  in  vain  lamenta- 
tion or  in  a  passionate  and  credulous  adherence  to  an 
old,  exploded  conceit,  let  us  proceed  to  take  a  calm 
and  thoughtful  survey  of  the  new  situation,  that  we 
may  discover  how  best  to  endure  and  judiciously  im- 
prove the  inevitable. 

Individualism  of  all  Involution. 

From  the  foregoing  exposition,  we  see  more  clearly 
and  correctly  into  the  nature  of  evolution.  We  dis- 
cover that,  in  making  it  co-extensive  with  the  known 
universe,  we  only  make  it  co-extensive  with  the 
changing  modes  of  our  own  individuality.  Hence, 
evolution  is  never  the  beginning  and  ending  of  suc- 
cessive individuals  and  races,  each  surpassing  its 
predecessor  in  extent  and  variety  and  rank  of  faculty. 
It  is  always  exclusively  a  change  in  the  mode  of  the 
existence  of  the  same  one  individual.  The  known 
evolving  universe  is  the  evolution  of  myself  only. 
Its  successive  phases  are  myself  in  those  forms  and 
processes.  Hence,  the  so-called  known  past  is  always 
the  present.  It  is  that  which  exists  as  known,  and  is 
known  as  thus  existing  ;  and  it  is  always  a  mode  of 
myself.  Even  the  fossil  and  pre-fossil  world,  back  to 
the  primordial  chaos  (to  speak  accommodatingly),  is 


48  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

known  as  only  a  present  phenomenon  or  subjective 
state.  It  has  been  said  that  the  present  has  no  exist- 
ence, being  always  coming  and  going,  but  never  here. 
We  reverse  this  proposition.  It  is  the  present,  and 
the  present  only,  that  does  exist  or  can.  This  is  true 
logically  as  well  as  psychologically,  for  its  converse 
is  self-contradictory.  The  very  notion  of  past  and 
future  existence  is  that  of  non-existence  now,  and 
nothing  can  more  perfectly  contradict  itself  than  to 
say  these  only  exist.  The  past  and  future,  then,  we 
never  reach,  never  directly  know.  When  we  have 
overtaken  what  was  future,  it  is  future  no  more. 
When  we  recede  to  what  we  call  the  past,  we  have 
only  imposed  upon  ourselves,  if  we  believe  it  to  be 
the  past.  It  can  never  be  more  than  a  symbol  of  the 
past.  This  is  the  avowed  character  of  all  monuments ; 
but  it  is  equally  the  character  of  all  phenomena  what- 
ever, as  all  have  their  lexical  antecedents,  which, 
according  to  the  proximate  perfection  of  our  knowl- 
edge of  nature's  laws,  may  be  known  from  the  known 
phenomena.  This  is  the  process  of  all  branches  of 
paleontology,  and  by  this  method  we  trace  back  the 
history  of  the  universe  to  its  most  incipient  condi- 
tion ;  and,  as  the  known  and  knowable  universe  is 
ego,  we  thus  in  that  process  trace  back  its  own  his- 
tory and  show  the  route  of  its  upward  development 
and  its  successive  stages  where  the  ego  has  remained 
for  a  period  comparatively  stationary  between  the 
greater  changes  before  and  after.  Thus,  some  modes 
of  myself  are  vita-scripts  of  my  successive  states  and 
experience  and  action.  From  them,  I  infer  that  I 
myself  once  existed  in  a  state  below  that  of  man  or 
monkey  or  any  animal  or  vegetable,  and  that  I  have 
risen  by  successive  changes  through  all  the  forms  of 
existence  up  to  my  present  condition,  and  that,  hence, 
all  inferior  things  are  preliminary  men.  Thus,  noth- 
ing is  ever  wasted.  Everything  is  utilized  forever, 
instead  of  being  destroyed  or  dissolved  to  start  again, 
as  the  common  evolution  assumes  ;  or  instead  of  be- 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  49 

ing  created  and  then  annihilated,  as  the  common 
theism  assumes  concerning  the  lower  animals.  The 
very  individuals  of  the  lower  orders  of  existence  are 
always  evolved  into  higher  (with  exceptional  deteri- 
oration). 

The  prc-Aiiimal  World   a  Sentient  World. 

On  the  same  principle,  we  are  justified  in  inferring 
the  sentient  condition  of  the  world,  or  ego,  through 
all  its  changes  and  in  all  its  forms  and  states  of  exist- 
ence. The  alleged  pre-animal  states  of  the  cosmos 
are  as  really  egoistic  as  any  other  of  our  experiences. 
As  symbols  of  the  past,  therefore,  none  of  them  can 
represent  the  infra-conscious,  or  insentient,  which  is 
unimaginable  and  inconceivable,  and  hence  cannot 
be  represented  at  all  by  anything.  Further,  the  inor- 
ganic cosmic  forms  of  every  order  and  class  are  ad- 
mitted to  be  conscious  forms  or  subjective  states  now  ; 
and  they  are  also  generally  assumed  to  be  just  what 
they  were  before  there  was  a  human  organism  or  any 
animal  organism,  and  even  before  there  was  a  vege- 
table organism.  If,  therefore,  they  are  sentient  states 
now,  we  must  infer  that  they  were  sentient  states 
then  and  always.  They  are  not  organic  states  now, 
and  they  never  were  ;  and  they  are  supposed  to  have 
preceded  and  originated  organic  states.  But,  though 
not  organic,  they  are  egoistic  ;  and  thus  the  conscious 
ego  existed  in  those  states  which  constituted  the  in- 
organic universe  before  the  origin  of  any  of  its  fauna 
and  flora.  The  nebulous  gas  which  is  an  extra-or- 
ganic subjective  state  of  me  now  was  a  sensation  or 
sentient  mode  of  me  then.  And  so,  forward  and  up- 
ward, through  all  the  cosmic  changes  till  an  animal 
organism  is  reached,  and  still  forward  through  all  the 
organic  evolutions  up  to  man,  all  the  known  are  con- 
scious modes  of  bhe  ego  and  symbols  of  past  sentient 
states.  There  was  thus  a  pre-organic  (and  there  will 
probably  be  a  post-organic)  consciousness.  The  ego 
is  the  universal  power  of  which  all  cosmic  phenomena 


50  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

are  the  conscious,  or  at  least  sentient,  unfoldings. 
Thus,  while  protoplasm  may  be  considered  as  the 
lowest  and  the  symbol  of  the  earliest  or  initial  form 
of  that  action  of  the  ego  or  energy  which  we  call  life, 
organic  life,  yet  the  ego  and  its  sentient  life  were  be- 
fore the  protoplasm,  and  were  the  source  of  it  and  of 
all  that  flows  from  it  in  all  the  subsequent  successive 
stages  of  the  evolutionary  process.  However  ludi- 
crous or  absurd  this  may  appear  to  some  readers,  it  is 
but  just  that  they  should  reflect  that  it  is  a  logical 
necessity  from  the  prevailing  psychology,  and  direct 
their  ridicule  against  the  premise,  and  not  against  the 
legitimate  conclusion  from  it. 

It  would  not  militate  against  my  main  thesis  if  any 
one,  on  the  basis  of  inorganic  phenomena,  were  dis- 
posed to  infer  an  infra-conscious  world,  which  for  one 
while  I  held  to  ;  and,  as  such  a  world  cannot  be 
directly  known,  I  could  only  suppose  it  to  be  sym- 
bolized by  inorganic  phenomena.  But  from  this  I 
was  subsequently  obliged  to  recede.  There  is  no 
scientific  ground  on  which  to  affirm  this  symbolism. 
Besides,  if  the  assumption  is  made,  it  is  a  mental 
void,  because  the  inconceivable  cannot  be  symbol- 
ized ;  and  such  is  the  alleged  infra-conscious  world. 
Thus,  the  assertion  of  the  existence  of  this  world  is 
arbitrary,  baseless,  and  meaningless.  It  has  no  pur- 
pose to  serve,  no  office  to  fill,  no  function  to  perform. 
Finally,  if  this  infra-conscious  world  is  admitted,  it  is 
insusceptible  of  discrimination  from  the  alleged  great 
unknown,  the  agnostic  source  of  all  the  known.  To 
this  final  conclusion,  I  do  not  here  object,  for  rea- 
sons which  will  soon  appear.  But  I  object  to  such 
a  method  of  proving  anything,  much  more  of  prov- 
ing the  incogitable.  Here,  as  everywhere,  I  prefer  to 
steer  along  the  coast  and  soundings  of  Positivism,  as 
some  would  call  it,  but  which,  in  its  profounder  con- 
ception and  bearing,  I  call  Philosophical  Realism. 

This  gives  me  occasion  to  withdraw  a  previous 
blind  statement  to  the  effect  that  the  organism  and 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  51 

all  its  characteristic  phenomena  do  not  originate  from 
the  external  world.  This  was  consistently  made  in 
logical  deference  to  the  prevailing  physiological  psy- 
chology, which  makes  the  organism  a  perceptive 
power,  equivalent  to  the  ego,  instead  of  accounting 
it  to  be,  as  it  is,  only  a  plexus  of  sensations.  If  the 
known  external  phenomena  are  affections  of  the  or- 
ganic ego,  they  cannot  exist  before  the  organism.  It 
is  usually  allowed,  in  general  terms,  that  all  phe- 
nomena are  modes  of  the  ego;  and  then  the  ego  is 
tacitly  assumed  to  be  limited  to  the  organism,  whence 
all  external  phenomena  prior  to  the  organism  are  log- 
ically though  unwittingly  precluded.  They  cannot 
exist  before  that  of  which  they  are  the  modes  or 
forms  and  manifestations.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  if 
we  take  the  more  common-sense  view,  which  in  this 
one  case  happens  to  be  the  more  scientific,  that  the 
external  inorganic  world  existed  before  our  bodily 
organism,  then  it  is  clear  that  those  external  phe- 
nomena cannot  be  the  creations  or  modes  or  affec- 
tions of  our  organism  ;  and,  conversely,  if  both  these 
classes  of  phenomena,  the  organic  and  extra-organic, 
are  egoistic,  and  if  the  inorganic  existed  long  before 
the  organic,  then  it  follows  that  the  ego  is  not  con- 
fined to  the  organism,  that  it  existed  long  before  the 
organism,  that  it  constitutes  and  is  co-extensive  with 
all  the  known  worlds  and  agencies  in  the  realms  of 
space,  and  that  thus  and  only  thus  the  external  and 
inorganic  world  can  be  the  source  whence  the  organ- 
ism is  by  successive  steps  evolved.  We  thus  see  that 
the  theory  of  objective  evolution  is  here  broken  in 
two  right  in  the  middle,  unless  it  be  supplemented  by 
our  doctrine  of  subjective  evolution;  for  the  organic 
cannot  be  evolved  from  the  extra-organic,  unless  the 
latter  had  a  prior  existence,  which  it  could  not  have 
unless  its  subject,  the  conscious  ego,  had  a  prior  ex- 
istence in  said  extra-organic  forms. 

We  cannot  yet  dismiss  the  question  of  the  sup- 
posed   infra-conscious    condition    of  the  pre-animal 


52  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

world.  The  shadow  of  pre-scientific  notions  here 
still  stretches  over  us,  as  it  always  does  with  deepest 
density  along  the  line  where  science  and  philosophy 
meet. 

It  will  seem  a  needless  truism  to  say  that  the  infra- 
conscious  condition  is  one  which  cannot  be  depicted 
or  imagined,  that  this  is  possible  only  of  the  con- 
scious. But  just  here  all  objective  evolutionists  have 
perpetually  blundered,  being  blind  to  this  very  tru- 
ism. They  speak  of  what  is  affirmed  to  be  an  infra- 
conscious  state,  and  describe  it  in  detail  as  a  familiar, 
sensible  phenomenon,  oblivious  of  the  acknowledged 
truth  that  every  phenomenon,  external  or  internal,  is 
always  simply  a  fact  of  experience,  a  mode  of  the 
speaker's  own  consciousness.  One  writer,  in  words 
which  have  rung  through  the  world,  has  spokeu  of 
the  fire-mist  or  fiery  cloud  as  the  potent  source  or  all 
the  forms  and  powers  of  consciousness,  as*  the  V  .sen- 
tient fountain  of  all  sentience,  assuming  that  it  is  itself 
non-egoistic  (ego  not  yet  being  generated).  It  is  thus 
made  the  natural  cause  of  the  ego,  and  the  womb 
and  generator  of  all  human  souls  and  all  their  pow- 
ers. On  the  same  erroneous  assumption  that  all  the 
cosmic  universe  is  unsentient,  other  writers  elabo- 
rately trace  back  the  evolutionary  history  of  things 
to  the  nebulae,  and  these  to  a  probable  single  primor- 
dial gas,  whence  all  consciousness  has  ultimately 
evolved.  I  do  not  quarrel  with  the  philosophy  which 
traces  all  later  life  and  thought  and  cosmic  forms 
and  motions  back  to  the  earliest  and  lowest  known 
forms  of  existence.  On  the  contrary,  I  fully  accept 
that  method  and  doctrine.  I  only  complain  that  the 
analysis  here  is  imperfect  and  erroneous.  Whatever 
be  otherwise  the  rank  of  these  gases  in  the  scale  of 
existence,  they  are  modes  of  my  present  self :  there- 
fore, they  are  not  unsentient ;  and,  while  their  pre- 
organic  existence  is  allowed,  their  pre-conscious  ex- 
istence cannot  be  allowed.  Whence  it  follows  that, 
while  they  could  be  the  source  of  my  organic  forms, 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  53 

they  could  not  be  the  source  of  my  conscious  exist- 
ence. Before  consciousness  there  was  no  cosmos  nor 
nebulae  nor  gas,  because  all  these  are  modes  of  con- 
sciousness. A  dubious  view  of  this  pervades  some 
of  the  writings  of  Mr.  Spencer.  At  times  he  loses 
sight  of  it,  and  then  again  it  dimly  recurs  to  him  ;  and 
he  tries  to  explain  it  by  saying  that  all  phenomena 
are  symbols  of  an  unknown  power  or  force.  Whence 
it  would  seem  that  he  thus  relegates  the  effective 
agency  and  process  of  evolution  to  the  region  of  the 
unknown,  and  leaves  it  to  be  supposed  that  the  phe- 
nomenal forms  and  motions  are  only  an  ineffective 
play  of  unsubstantial  images. 

This  Sentient    Being   or   World  is  a    Force. 

Symbols  of  an  unknown  force  these  phenomena 
may  be  ;  but  they  are  surely  themselves  forces,  else 
they  could  "not  be  symbols.  This  explanation  is, 
therefore,  very  erroneous  and  irrelevant,  if  it  is  de- 
signed to  insinuate  that  all  phenomena  are  forceless 
and  that  all  force  is  unknown.  While  an  objective 
evolutionist  may  thus  escape  from  the  false  position 
that  the  lower  cosmic  phenomena  are  unconscious 
and  the  generator  of  consciousness,  this  escape  is  no 
better  than  its  alternative.  It  contradicts  the  theory 
of  objective  evolution,  and  goes  against  the  general 
index  of  all  modern  science,  which  surely  declares  or 
indicates  that  the  known  pre-organic  world  is  a  force 
which  evolves  the  organic  forms  of  life.  It  also  con- 
founds all  speech  and  action  in  the  practical  world. 
If  all  phenomena  are  forceless,  and  so  evolve  nothing, 
then  it  is  but  to  repeat  the  same  in  more  concrete 
form  to  say  that  there  is  no  force  in  all  the  known 
action  of  gravitating  bodies,  in  all  the  motions  of 
winds  and  waters,  fire,  hail  and  frost,  thunder  and 
lightning,  or  in  what  is  called  electric  energy  ;  and  all 
the  science  of  modern  dynamics  is  a  nullity  and 
misnomer.  Surely  there  is  no  possible  evasion  of  the 
fact  that  phenomena  are  themselves  forces,  and  not 


54  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

merely  symbols  of  forces  unknown.  "Whatever  is,  is 
force."  It  can  prove  its  existence  only  by  its  action 
as  force  :  so  that  not  the  forceful,  but  the  forceless 
it  is  that  must  be  forever  unknown.  To  say  in  reply 
that  the  known  is  the  powerless  effect  of  the  un- 
known is  to  say  that  all  the  heavens  and  earth  and 
sense  and  inner  consciousness  do  nothing  and  suffer 
nothing.  In  that  case,  they  cannot  symbolize  and 
represent  the  action  of  the  unknown  ;  for  to  do  that 
is  a  vast  and  varied  exercise  of  power.  Further,  if 
the  known  universe  is  powerless,  and  so  cannot  do  or 
suffer  anything,  what  is  it,  and  what  is  the  use  of  it 
all?  It  is  a  wondrous  panorama  of  nothing.  Yet, 
being  so  wondrous,  it  certainly  is  a  power  to  produce 
the  feeling  of  wonder.  But  common  sense  and  all 
science  ascribe  quality  to  all  known  things,  and  we 
classify  and  describe  and  designate  them  according 
to  these  alleged  qualities  ;  and  the  term  "  quality  "  is 
but  another  term  for  force. 

This  Sentient   Being    or   World   in    One  with    the 
Alleged   Great  Unknown. 

If  we  attempt  a  recession  to  a  pre-sentient  exist- 
ence, we  shall  undertake  a  task  which  is  much 
greater  than  we  have  imagined.  That  goal  has  here- 
tofore been  supposed  to  be  reached  as  soon  as  we 
attain  the  pre-organic  world.  We  have  now  seen  that 
this  was  an  error,  that  the  said  pre-organic  world  is 
only  a  complex  mode  of  our  conscious  self,  and  that 
this  must  be  so  forever,  however  far  back  we  go. 
The  pre-sentient  can  never  be  known  by  experience. 
Whether  it  can  be  inferred  from  experience  is  the 
next  question  to  be  considered.  This  question  must 
be  answered  in  the  negative.  The  world  is  known 
and  conceivable  only  as  phenomenal,  and  its  lowest 
and  supposed  earliest  known  forms  (as  well  as  all 
later  and  higher  forms)  are  sentient  modes  of  the  ego. 
Heretofore,  no  one  has  attempted  the  incogitable 
supposition  that  a  world  existed  prior  to  all  phe- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  55 

nomena,  before  there  was  any  gas  or  light  or  fire- 
mist.  The  proposition  is  without  meaning,  and  only 
verbal  because  the  term  "  world"  is  here  empty  of 
every  thought  or  image.  Were  this  supposition  main- 
tained, it  would  admit  of  no  proof,  because  the  proof 
must  be  phenomenal.  In  short,  such  a  world  is  every 
way  inconceivable,  and  there  is  neither  logic  nor 
common  sense  nor  practical  use  to  call  for  the  asser- 
tion of  its  existence  ;  and  the  assertion,  if  made, 
would  be  only  verbal,  a  mental  nullity. 

In  considering  the  existence  of  a  known  force  whose 
extent  we  may  not  yet  know,  a  force  which  may 
in  future  exist  in  infinitely  different  and  nobler 
forms  than  in  the  past,  we  have  a  very  different 
question  before  us.  We  are  not  supposed  to  neces- 
sarily know  everything  that  exists,  or  the  capability 
of  everything  which  is  more  or  less  known.  We  are 
conscious  of  perpetual  changes.  Forms  come  and  go 
in  countless  multitudes  and  endless  variety.  These 
changes  are  not  examples  of  annihilation  and  crea- 
tion, but  of  evolution,  and  imply  a  continuity  of  sub- 
stance and  force  as  common  to  all  phenomena.  This 
great  common  substance  or  force  is  that  which  has 
been  called  the  unknown.  In  one  aspect  it  is  un- 
known, but  in  its  correlate  aspect  it  is  well  known. 
It  is  that  which  appears  in  the  phenomena  ;  and  they 
are  nothing  else  than  it,  and  they  are  perfectly  well 
known.  But,  then,  perhaps  no  phenomena  present  it 
in  its  total  capability.  It  has  an  unknown  power  of 
change.  In  this  respect,  and  this  only,  is  it  un- 
known; but  the  unknown  is  identical  in  substance  or 
force  with  the  known  or  sentient. 

And  both  the  Known  and  Unknown  of   this  Uni- 
verse are  One  with  the  "  Ego." 

If,  next,  we  inquire  what  these  are  in  relation  to  the 
ego,  the  answer  will  be  prompt  and  clear.  All  phe- 
nomena being  one  with  the  unknown  and  one  with 
the  ego,  it  follows  that  the  ego  is  one  with  them.  The 


56  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

ego  and  the  unknown  bear  the  same  relation  to  phe- 
nomena. Their  identity  is  therefore  an  obvious  dem- 
onstration, an  example  of  the  axiom  that  things 
which  are  equal  or  identical  with  a  third  are  equal  or 
identical  with  each  other.  Hence,  we  need  not  go 
beyond  the  ego  for  any  of  the  purposes  of  physical 
science.  If  there  is  an  ether,  it  is  ego ;  and  all  its 
vibrations  are  modes  of  the  ego,  conscious  or  uncon- 
scious. Egoistic  are  all  the  chemical  forces,  all  the 
so-called  correlated  forces,  as  well  as  the  uncorrelated 
force  of  gravitation,  all  forms,  colors,  and  motions  of 
chaos  and  cosmos,  and  also  the  great  unknown  whence 
they  all  are  supposed  to  spring.  Evolution  is  thus 
made  complete  and  consistent  by  being  made  subjec- 
tive. All  phenomena  and  their  intrinsic  source  are 
one  ;  and,  as  the  former  are  ego,  so  are  the  latter. 

Sublime  Representation  of   Tlim. 

This  exposition  brings  before  us  the  nature  of  man 
in  an  aspect  which  is  truly  sublime.  Man,  in  his  es- 
sential being  and  quality,  is  not  confined  to  a  corner, 
like  his  organism  ;  nor,  like  it,  is  he  a  thing  of  yester- 
day, but  of  ail  time  and  all  space.  Every  man  may 
say  of  himself :  "I  am  not  only  descended  from  the 
worm,  in  the  common  meaning  of  descent,  but  once  I 
was  a  worm.  Yet  I  was  never  all  worm.  So,  with 
less  emphasis,  I  am  a  worm  yet  (known  worms  being 
modes  of  me);  but  I  am  also  immeasurably  more. 
Just  as  each  of  my  modes  is  me,  but  not  all  of  me, 
so  my  organism  is  me,  but  not  all  of  me.  I  am 
all  that  my  senses  can  know,  and  ail  that  the  in- 
struments and  researches  of  science  can  reveal. 
Oceans,  worlds,  suns,  and  stars  are  rays  and  flashes 
of  my  individual  force  and  fire.  The  pealing  thunder 
and  the  vivid  lightning  are  exhibitions  of  an  energy 
of  unknown  extent  stored  up  in  the  magazine  of  my 
being.  All  knowable  space  and  time  are  of  me,  and 
are  marks  of  my  presence  and  action." 


PHILOSOPHICAL    KEALISM  57 

Relation    of   "Ego"   to   Organism    and    Kuviioii- 
uient. 

We  shall  hence  be  led  to  modify  certain  prevalent 
notions  concerning  the  relation  of  the  ego  to  the  or- 
ganism and  its  environment.  We  allow  that  the  or- 
ganic world  is  evolved  from  the  inorganic.  But  our 
organism  is  not  all  of  the  ego,  not  the  sum  total  of 
man.  It  is  only  one  complex  form  in  a  countless 
host,  a  very  small  fraction  of  the  known  ego;  and 
what  remains  unknown  we  cannot,  of  course,  define. 

It  should  also  be  observed  that  every  man  who  is  in 
the  possession  of  all  the  recognized  human  senses  has 
at  least  two  organisms  and  two  brains  and  nervous 
systems,  the  visible  and  tangible.  These  are  utterly 
unlike  each  other,  and  have  no  identity  or  connection 
except  as  they  are  both  modes  of  a  common  subject 
A  blind  man  has  only  one  organism  and  brain,  the 
visual  brain  being  extinct  or  undeveloped. 

Now,  all  objective  evolutionists  uniformly  expound 
the  relations  of  the  organism  to  the  environment  on 
the  assumption  that  they  are  thereby  expounding  the 
relations  of  the  ego  to  the  non-ego,  strangely  overlook- 
ing the  fact  that  all  the  environment,  whatever  its 
place,  form,  or  influence,  is  itself  wholly  ego,  though 
not  the  whole  of  ego,— a  great,  grand  combination  of 
its  conscious  modes,  a  portion  of  the  surface  and  crust 
of  the  egoistic  world.  The  relations  of  the  brain  and 
the  organism  and  environment  to  thought  and  to  each 
other  are  but  relations  of  some  modes  of  the  ego  to 
other  modes  of  the  ego. 

Hence,  another  obvious  conclusion  is  that  the  ego  is 
not  evolved  from  the  environment  (though  we  allow 
that  the  organism  is  thus  evolved),  since  the  environ- 
ment itself  is  ego.  It  is  the  evolution  of  one  mode  of 
the  ego  from  other  modes  of  the  ego,  not  from  the 
non-ego. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  see  that  we  have  no  proof 
nor  any  reasonable  ground  for  a  conjecture  that  the 
ego,  as  such,  is  the  product  of  evolution.  As  it  in- 


58  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

eludes  all  the  knowable  universe,  there  is  nothing 
conceivable  from  which  it  could  be  evolved.  If  the 
eqo  had  a  beginning,  that  could  not  be  by  evolution. 
It  must  be  created.  Evolution  is  only  the  beginning 
of  new  modes  in  that  which  has  existed  previously  in 
other  modes.  The  ego,  or  universe,  cannot,  therefore, 
be  evolved  from  anything  whatever.  It  is  eternal,  in- 
destructible, and  self-sufficing,  or  it  is  the  product  and 
created  pendant  of  a  Higher  Power. 

All  knowable  evolution,  then,  is  within  the  ego,  a 
change  in  the  modes  thereof  by  the  interaction  of 
part  on  part;  and  it  is  the  great  office  of  science,  in 
all  its  various  departments,  to  observe  the  laws  and 
conditions  in  accordance  with  which  this  evolution 
occurs,  whether  as  between  the  organism  and  its  en- 
vironment or  between  the  different  parts  and  forms 
of  either  of  them.  The  ego,  as  the  individual  man,  is 
the  great  abiding  and  universal  fact  and  factor,  and 
the  seat  of  all  immediately  known  authority  and 
power;  and  we  have  nothing  but  its  modal  changes 
to  observe  and  chronicle,  to  deduce  their  laws  and 
thence  to  learn  how  to  make  use  of  them.  And, 
while  doing  this,  an  imitator  of  Pascal  may  find  more 
evidence  than  even  Pascal  could  ever  before  see  of 
"the  greatness  and  littleness  of  man." 

Relation  between  Thought  nnd  Brain. 

A  little  further  reflection  will  hence  teach  us  that 
we  must  modify  some  of  our  notions  of  the  relation 
between  thought  and  brain,  and  that  we  should  learn 
to  be  less  profuse  and  confident  in  our  comparisons 
between  thinking  things  and  what  we  call  unthink- 
ing things,  which,  so  far  as  we  know,  are  modes  of 
our  conscious  selves.  To  say  that  we  know  of  no 
thought  or  consciousness  without  a  brain  has  now  be- 
come unmeaning  or  false.  Thought  is  everywhere, 
and  everything  is  thought.  Thought  is  the  substance 
and  force,  the  essence  and  form,  of  all  the  universe. 
We  know  nothing  else,  and  nothing  else  can  we  con- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  59 

ceive;  because  everything  is  mind  in  action,  a  mode 
of  consciousness.  Whenever  known,  brain  is  itself 
simply  a  mode  of  the  conscious  ego  equally  with  every 
tree,  rock,  or  star,  or  other  sensible  object.  There 
was  thought  before  there  was  brain,  because  there 
was  a  pre-organic  world,  or  conscious  ego.  Brain,  so 
far  as  we  know,  is  always  associated  with  an  organic 
form  of  consciousness,  but  with  no  other;  and  that 
form  is  infinitesimal  compared  with  all  the  rest. 
This  annihilates  the  modern  a  priori  argument  against 
the  existence  of  intelligence  without  a  brain  and 
nervous  system.  The  contrary  fact  meets  us  every- 
where in  the  inorganic  world.  To  deny  the  existence 
of  a  personal  Deity  because  he  cannot  be  supposed  to 
have  any  brains  is  an  apparition  of  the  old  defunct 
mediaeval  apriorism  in  antagonism  with  the  acknowl- 
edged dicta  of  modern  psychology.  This,  of  course, 
is  no  proof  of  Deity;  but  it  is  a  rebuttal  of  an  oppos- 
ing and  false  assumption. 

Relation  between  Organic  and  Extra-organic 
Phenomena. 

The  most  difficult  task  which  sensism  has  ever  been 
called  upon  to  perform  is  to  explain  the  connection 
between  organic  and  extra-organic  phenomena.  Here 
the  old  dualists  enjoyed  the  comfort  of  a  supposed 
obvious  advantage  over  the  old  atomists.  For  years, 
it  is  said,  Hobbs  labored  unsatisfactorily  to  answer 
the  question,  "What  kind  of  motion  can  it  be  that 
produces  the  sensation  and  imagination  of  living 
things?"  Modern  evolutionists  are  here  in  little 
better  condition,  according  to  their  own  confession. 
Several  of  them,  Spencer,  Huxley,  Tyndall,  and  John 
Fiske,  have  given  utterance  to  the  feeling  of  despair 
on  the  subject.  They  have  said  that  no  satisfactory 
explanation  has  been  given,  or  seems  as  yet  possible. 

I  hope  I  shall  not  be  hastily  and  inconsiderately 
pronounced  superficial  if  I  say  that,  if  the  old  atom- 
ism is  abandoned,  the  case  is  altered  so  that  even  on 


60  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

their  own  theory  they  make  this  gulf  artificially  wide 
and  raise  an  unscientific  difficulty.  I  deserve  the 
credit  of  candor  for  saying  this,  because  I  could 
easily  make  capital  for  my  own  theory  out  of  their 
admission,  if  I  thought  it  anything  more  than  a  mis- 
apprehension; for,  on  my  theory,  I  can  easily  show 
the  scientific  unity  of  inner  and  outer  phenomena, 
which  they  despair  of  showing  on  their  objective 
theory.  The  subject  should  be  contemplated  simply 
and  solely  in  the  light  of  the  great  scientific  law  of 
phenomenal  uniformities.  Science  does  not  recognize 
the  legitimacy  of  any  inquiry  or  answer  concerning 
the  mode  or  the  "how"  of  the  results  of  nature's 
operations,  except  so  far  as  they  refer  for  explanation 
or  justification  to  the  uniform  connection  of  phe- 
nomenal antecedents  and  subsequents.  When  these 
are  not  traceable  there  is  no  scientific  explanation. 
When  they  are  traceable,  then  the  explanation  is 
scientific.  I  hold  that  such  a  connection  is  traceable 
between  the  extra-organic  world  of  phenomena  and 
the  organic  consciousness.  We  have  no  right  to  say 
that  no  molar  or  molecular  motions  in  the  external 
world  in  any  condition  can  produce  the  forms  of 
organic  consciousness;  and  we  have  no  evidence  of 
the  power  of  aught  for  the  production  of  aught  else, 
except  from  their  uniform  relation  as  antecedent  and 
consequent  or  subsequent.  Hence,  we  need  not  in 
any  case  to  do  more  than  show  this  connection  (and 
in  no  case  can  we  do  more)  in  time  and  place  as  proof 
that  the  connection  is  one  of  cause  and  effect.  On 
this  ground,  I  see  no  more  gulf  between  these  two 
classes  of  phenomena,  on  the  objective  theory  of 
evolution,  than  I  see  between  different  classes  of 
external  phenomena  regularly  connected.  There  can 
be  no  question  that  the  organic  and  inorganic  are  as 
regularly  connected  with  each  other  as  are  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  external  world  with  each  other.  So 
much  in  aid  of  a  theory  which  I  supersede  or  rather 
absorb,  and  which  will  be  my  most  vigorous  oppo- 
nent. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  61 

This  question,  however,  assumes  quite  a  new  aspect 
under  the  light  of  philosophical  realism,  which  an- 
nihilates the  gulf  between  things  and  feelings  or 
thoughts,  by  making  all  things  to  be  modes  of  con- 
sciousness, different  species  of  feelings  under  one 
genus,  as  egoistic  modes  or  subjective  states;  and  so 
the  change  of  chyle  into  muscle  and  nerve  and  brain 
and  thought  and  volition  is  only  the  evolution  of  one 
set  of  experiences  or  subjective  states  into  others. 
The  transition  is,  therefore,  not  so  great  on  this  the- 
ory as  on  the  other.  There  is  no  transmutation  from 
unconscious  thing  to  feeling,  for  all  things  are  feel- 
ings. The  change  is  only  of  inorganic  and  extra- 
organic  feeling  into  organic  feeling  and  super-organic 
feeling  or  thought  and  volition.  The  whole  known 
universe  being  but  one  individual,  which  we  call 
the  subject  or  ego,  there  is  throughout  it  very  mani- 
festly a  perfect  unity  of  efficient  causation.  The 
origination  of  organic  life  from  pre-organic  forces 
presents  on  this  theory  no  a  priori  improbability, 
as  it  is  only  the  progress  of  one  individual  from  a 
lower  to  a  higher  condition,  a  process  which  in 
various  forms  and  degrees  is  allowed  by  all,  with- 
out any  question. 


VI. 

Superficial  Expositions  of  Objective  Reality, 


Mr.  J.  H.  Fowler's  essay  on  "Mind  Expression  in 
Evolution"  (in  The  Index  of  Aug.  9,  1883)  is  so  able 
as  to  entitle  its  errors  to  elaborate  correction ;  and  a 
direct  debate  on  questionable  points  is  the  short  cut 
to  a  general  attainment  of  the  truth.  I  will  there- 
fore stop  to  take  some  of  his  statements  and  subject 
them  to  criticism,  because  they  affect  the  whole  world 
of  thought,  and  exhibit  the  vague  and  erroneous  and 
inconsistent  mental  habit  which  in  these  days  has  a 
wide  prevalence,  even  in  the  high  places  of  science 
and  philosophy. 

Mr.  Fowler's  prime  error  is  very  common  and  two- 
fold, and  consists  in  the  assumption  that  whatever  is 
external  to  our  organism  is  non-ego,  and  that  this  doc- 
trine is  necessary  to  evolution  and  to  the  main  princi- 
ple which  he  wishes  to  expound.  These  errors  he 
shares  in  common  with  Spencer  and  all  his  followers. 
I  have  already  given  them  considerable  refutation, 
but  a  little  more  in  this  connection  may  be  of  service. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  wrong  to  suppose  that  evolu- 
tion, or  mind  expression  in  evolution,  depends  on 
any  theory  of  sense  perception  or  psychology.  That 
may  be  true;  and  I  doubt  not  it  is,  whether  we  ex- 
plain evolution  subjectively  or  objectively:  only,  I 
think  that  the  most  thorough  analysis  makes  a  de- 
mand for  a  subjective  treatment,  in  order  to  secure 
entire  consistency  in  the  process  and  results.  At  all 


PHILOSOPHICAL    KEALISM  63 

events,  when  we  have  for  our  declared  object  simply 
to  show  that  evolution  is  mainly  or  wholly  an  expres- 
sion of  mind,  it  would  be  every  way  better  for  us  not 
to  entangle  ourselves  with  any  theory  of  opposing 
philosophies  or  psychologies  which  are  or  may  be 
held  different  by  evolutionists.  If  Mr.  Herbert  Spen- 
cer had  not  pronounced  himself  here,  he  would  have 
been  less  vulnerable;  and  so  would  Mr.  Fowler.  If  it 
should  eventually  turn  out  that  there  is  a  philosophi- 
cal realism  in  what  they  assail  as  idealism,  their  labor 
is  so  far  in  vain,  and  all  their  work  has  a  false  color- 
ing on  it.  I  yield  to  no  man  on  the  score  of  the 
extent  of  evolution;  but  I  claim  that  this  can  be  con- 
sistently maintained  only  on  the  basis  of  a  realism 
which  is  generally  stigmatized  as  idealism,  and  that 
the  opposers  of  this  doctrine  overlook  admitted  facts 
and  contradict  themselves.  In  further  justification 
of  this  statement,  let  us  look  at  Mr.  Fowler's  prelim- 
inary attempt  to  prove  objective  evolution. 

He  asks:  "Can  I  go  out  of  myself  to  a  limiting 
cause  of  my  own  sensations?  Common  sense  an- 
swers, Yes.  Practically,  this  affirmation  holds  good 
against  all  negations  of  philosophy.  Instantly  and 
irresistibly,  my  eyelids  close  at  the  approach  of  a 
stick.  So  close  the  shells  of  a  living  oyster.  Sensing 
pressure,  the  unhatched  chick  pecks  and  bursts  the 
binding  shell;  then,  in  sense  of  want,  guided  by  sight 
and  smell,  gathers  nourishment,  and  fails  not  to  in- 
terpret rightly  sounds  of  friendly  call  or  warning. 
Thus  is  reality  environed  and  recognized  by  reality." 

This  performs  the  self-contradictory  feat  of  making 
sensation  transcend  sensation;  for  every  thing  here 
adduced  as  being  a  reality  beyond  sensation,  and 
affecting  or  causing  or  limiting  sensation,  is  itself 
nothing  else  than  sensation  in  every  case.  The  stick 
and  its  motion,  as  well  as  the  action  of  the  eyelids, 
are  simply  sensations;  and  the  two  classes  of  sensa- 
tions are  related  to  each  as  causes  and  effects.  All 
we  know  of  the  oyster  and  its  shells  and  actions  are 


04  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

nothing  but  another  set  of  sensations  lexically  re- 
lated to  each  other.  The  same  is  true  of  the  egg  and 
its  hatching  chick  and  all  its  action  and  experience, 
and  the  mother  hen  with  its  friendly  call  or  warning. 
If  there  is  anywhere  a  living  thing  answering  to  the 
sensations  we  call  oysters,  the  stick  which  it  fears  is 
a  mode  of  its  own  consciousness  or  subjective  state. 
If  there  is  anywhere  a  living  thing  which  answers  to 
our  sensations  which  we  call  the  chick,  that  shell 
which  it  pecks  and  the  mother's  call  and  the  mother 
herself,  so  far  as  known  to  it,  are  only  its  own  subjec- 
tive states;  and  the  same  is  true  of  the  food  it  eats. 
"Thus  is  reality  environed  and  recognized  by  reality," 
not  as  non-ego  and  ego,  but  as  two  great  classes  of  the 
modes  of  the  ego,— our  subjective  states,  which  are  all 
we  know.  Beyond  these  experiential  phenomena,  we 
know  nothing,  and  all  comparisons  made  by  us  must 
be  made  between  the  forms  and  changes  of  these,  the 
only  known  or  definitely  conceivable  realities.  And 
all  these  are  ego. 

I  understand  all  this  to  be  expressed  by  Helmholtz 
in  the  following  passage  from  his  Psychologische  Op- 
tik  (p.  443),  and  quoted,  I  believe,  within  a  year  in  the 
Princeton  Review  :  "I  hold  that  to  speak  of  our  ideas 
of  things  as  having  any  other  than  a  practical  validity 
is  absolutely  meaningless.  They  can  be  nothing  but 
symbols,  natural  signs  [relative  to  each  other],  which 
we  learn  to  use  for  the  regulation  of  our  movements 
and  actions.  Only  when  we  have  learned  to  read 
these  symbols  aright  are  we  able  with  their  aid  to 
direct  our  actions  so  that  they  shall  have  the  desired 
result;  that  is,  that  the  expected  new  sensation  shall 
arise"  (new  sensations  or  other  experiences  being  all 
we  can  find  and  all  we  should  seek,  each  guiding  to 
others  by  their  sematic  force,  which  grows  out  of  their 
uniformity).  Mr.  Helmholtz  adds:  "That  no  compar- 
ison between  ideas  of  things  and  things  in  themselves 
is  in  point  of  fact  possible,  all  schools  agree.  But  we 
insist  that  any  other  comparison  is  unthinkable  and 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  65 

meaningless  [unless  between  phenomena  or  subjec- 
tive states].  This  latter  is  the  vital  point  which  one 
must  see,  in  order  to  escape  from  the  labyrinth  of  con- 
flicting opinions."  I  have  read  between  the  lines,  be- 
cause of  the  general  indisposition  to  stop  and  take  it 
all  in. 

I  assent  to  the  affirmation  that  "a  sense  of  objective 
reality  is  clearly  implied  by  the  behavior  of  every 
organic  being."  But  objective  reality  is  not,  there- 
fore, non-egoistic  reality.  Whether  it  is  so  in  fact 
should  be  determined  by  scientific  analysis,  and  the 
science  of  modern  psychology  has  determined  that  it 
is  not;  and  its  opposers  are  only  those  who  appeal  to 
"common  sense"  which  is  mere  assumption,  and  gen- 
erally an  ignorant  and  false  prejudgment.  "Whether 
vegetable  or  animal,  every  individual  responds  to 
heat  and  light.  Each  senses  environment  as  objec- 
tive reality,  and  therefrom  selects  material  with 
which  to  build  up  its  own  structure  and  secure  in- 
ternal economy  and  external  harmony."  But,  so  far 
as  known  to  us  or  to  any  subject,  all  this  is  only  so 
many  changes  in  the  forms  and  relations  of  subjective 
phenomena  or  egoistic  states.  It  is  a  change  of  the 
inorganic  into  the  organic,  which  is  balanced  by  the 
opposite  change  of  the  organic  into  the  inorganic,  but 
no  more.  Both  the  organic  and  inorganic  are  egois- 
tic or  subjective  states.  Hence,  "the  recognition  of 
a  primitive,  simple  sense  of  objective  reality,  common 
to  all  organic  beings,"  would  here  be  of  no  avail. 
No  matter  how  it  originates,  it  is  egoistic.  We  gain 
nothing  by  ingenious  inventions  concerning  the  modus 
operandi.  If  the  material  used  in  building  up  the 
organic  structure  were,  for  instance,  known  and 
admitted  to  be  non-ego,  and  if  it  became  ego  by 
being  organically  assimilated  and  transformed,  that 
were  a  theory  sufficiently  clear  and  simple.  But  the 
universe  is  not  so  simple  a  thing  as  that,  or  else  it  is 
ultimately  much  simpler;  for  psychology  steps  in,  and 
says  that  this  theory  contradicts  fundamental  facts, 


DO  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

and  that  all  known  plurality  is  an  ultimate  egoistic 
unity,  whether  organic  or  inorganic. 

We  have  a  fine  distinction  drawn  for  us  in  the  fol- 
lowing sentence:  "In  states  of  consciousness,  not  as 
states  of  consciousness,  I  trace  my  being  back,  step 
by  step,  through  successive  stages  of  evolution,  to  the 
time  when  there  could  have  been  no  state  of  con- 
sciousness." This  is  important,  if  true;  and  true  it 
will  appear  to  all  objective  evolutionists.  But  we 
ought  to  be  informed  when  that  time  is  reached  when 
there  could  be  no  state  of  consciousness.  That  infor- 
mation cannot  be  had.  No  such  time  or  place  or  con- 
dition can  be  proved.  The  possible  states  of  con- 
sciousness we  cannot  a  priori  know.  That  is  the 
prerogative  of  Omniscience.  For  aught  we  can  tell 
there  are  unknown  and  unimaginable  states  of  con- 
sciousness of  some  beings  which  are  related  to  the 
moon  or  to  Jupiter  or  the  sun  analogous  to  our  rela- 
tions to  the  earth.  We  know  nothing  about  that  one 
way  or  another.  The  pre-conditions  and  possibilities 
of  consciousness  are  not  questions  either  of  science 
or  philosophy.  We  can,  however,  trace  the  develop- 
ment of  organic  consciousness  back  to  a  pre-organic 
world,  which  is  not  a  pre- conscious  state,  because  it 
is  only  a  complexus  of  sensations  or  states  of  con- 
sciousness. An  unconscious  state  we  can  never 
know.  The  supposition  contradicts  itself:  because, 
if  unconscious,  it  is  unknown;  and,  if  known,  it  is 
conscious.  Directly,  we  can  never  get  beyond  our- 
selves. This  is  surely  positive  and  final.  Our  expe- 
rience can  never  transcend  ourselves,  else  it  were 
not  experience,  which  is  a  state  of  consciousness. 
We  cannot  therefore  transcend  the  present  directly, 
since  all  experience  is  present;  and  the  past  is  only 
an  extinct  experience,  which  may  be  symbolized 
by  a  present  experience.  While  it  is  true  that  we 
know  nothing  except  in  states  of  consciousness,  it  is 
equally  true  that  we  know  nothing  except  as  states 
of  consciousness,  when  we  "know  ourselves"  well 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  67 

The  distinction  is  plausible,  but  superficial.  The  pre- 
scientific  mind  does  not  recognize  the  phenomena  of 
sight  and  touch  beyond  the  organism  "as  states  of 
consciousness,"  but  the  psychologically  scientific  man 
does;  and  the  one  class  will,  and  the  other  class  will 
not,  trace  the  historic  development  of  phenomena  "as 
states  of  consciousness."  And  it  is  the  latter  class 
which  can  trace  their  own  being  back  the  farthest 
and  most  consecutively  and  thoroughly,  because  that 
being  is  commensurate  and  coeval  with  the  universe. 
On  the  other  hand,  with  those  who  make  the  extra 
organic  to  be  non-egoistic,  the  case  is  entirely  altered. 
With  them  there  is  a  constantly  recurring  break  in 
the  historic  continuity;  and  all  individualities  are  be- 
ing continually  annihilated,  and  new  ones  formed  out 
of  a  common  substance  into  which  the  old  individu- 
alities are  reduced  or  dissolved.  On  that  theory,  my 
being  cannot  be  traced  back  beyond  my  birth  or  the 
pre-natal  organic  condition  in  the  f O3tus ;  for  that  was 
the  beginning  of  my  being  as  an  individual.  My 
parents  were  not  I,  and  their  parents  were  not  they, 
and  so  on  back  to  the  primordial  cell  and  protoplasm. 
On  this  theory,  it  is,  therefore,  not  true,  as  asserted, 
that  in  the  psychical  element  of  the  primordial  cell 
"I  find  my  identity,  which  has  never  been  lost,  and 
which  to-day  constitutes  my  personality."  That  ele- 
ment is  either  common  to  the  world  or  it  belongs  only 
to  that  individual  cell,  and  not  to  me  as  a  whole  and 
specialized  individual.  That  primal  cell  has  been 
comminuted  into  utter  destruction  and  fashioned  into 
other  forms  a  countless  number  of  times  before  any 
cell  became  a  part  of  my  organism,  and  only  those 
cells  which  are  or  were  parts  of  my  organism  are 
or  were  parts  of  my  being  as  an  individual,  unless 
this  individual  extends  beyond  the  organism  and  ex- 
isted before  the  organism,  as  philosophical  realism 
affirms.  These  cells  also  being  in  a  continual  flux  of 
generation  and  extinction,  there  is  no  fixity  to  my  in- 
dividuality, if  it  is  only  composed  of  these  cells. 


DO  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

Now,  consider  all  these  cells  and  all  the  world  to 
be — as  they  are — sensations,  as  I  do,  then  we  have  at 
once  the  absolute  unity  of  my  individuality  and  per- 
sonality with  all  the  past,  and  all  its  forms  and  cells, 
of  all  of  which  I  am  the  constant  and  abiding  sub- 
stance and  force;  and  it  is  I  that  has  undergone  all 
the  changes  which  are  indicated  as  the  successive 
changes  of  the  world.  And  there  are  as  many  such 
world-changes  as  there  are  individuals  like  me. 

We  are  also  informed  that  "we  cannot  conceive  of 
mind  in  space  as  matter,  nor  can  we  conceive  of  mind 
under  the  guise  of  dynamics.  Mind  is  not  a  force, 
but  a  force  cognizer  and  director.  It  is  not  matter  or 
form,  but  a  cognizer  and  director  of  these.  Mind  is 
the  organizing  reality,  the  architect  of  nature.  ...  It 
is  that  which  becomes  intelligible  in  nature  and  intel- 
ligent in  man."  When  men  speak  of  inability,  it 
would  sometimes  be  well  if  they  spoke  only  for  them- 
selves instead  of  speaking  for  all  the  race.  For  one, 
I  can  never  acknowledge  the  inability  here  confessed 
by  this  writer.  To  me,  it  is  perfectly  easy  to  conceive 
of  mind  under  the  guise  of  dynamics ;  and  this  small 
feat  I  am  constantly  performing,  because  I  always  con- 
ceive all  dynamics  as  modes  of  mind.  If  mind  were  not 
a  force,  how  could  it  be  a  cognizer  and  director  of  force, 
or  the  organizer  of  reality  and  architect  of  nature  ? 
Further,  if  it  is  "that  which  becomes  intelligible  in 
nature,"  it  must  be  extended  in  nature  as  if  identified 
with  matter.  The  discrimination  of  mind  and  matter, 
except  as  modes  of  the  same  one  reality,  is  impossi- 
ble, because,  so  far  as  known  or  knowable,  they  are 
both  subjective  states  or  modes  of  the  mind,  the  intel- 
ligible and  intelligent  in  man. 

"Matter,  force,  space,  and  time,"  says  Mr.  Fowler, 
"are  cognized  as  external.  Feeling  and  thought  are  in 
the  mind  as  states  or  actions.  Matter  and  force  can- 
not be  conceived  as  in  the  mind  as  states  of  conscious- 
ness or  as  phenomenal  or  real  mind  elements.  The 
identity  may  be  asserted,  but  cannot  be  conceived. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  69 

We  cannot  think  matter,  force,  space,  and  time,  being 
in  the  mind.  .  .  .  Space  cannot  be  abolished  or  con- 
ceived as  absent.  Time  is  necessary  succession:  we 
cannot  conceive  of  it  stopping;  but  my  consciousness, 
every  and  all  consciousness,  may  cease.  Matter, 
force,  space,  time,  continue.  They  may  be  symbol- 
ized in  thought  and  feeling,  but  not  identified  with 
them."  If  matter,  force,  space,  and  time  are  known, 
known  directly  in  experience,  they  are  not  external 
to  the  mind,  are  nothing  else  than  modes  of  the  mind 
or  states  of  consciousness.  Their  identity  with  mind, 
so  far  from  being  inconceivable,  is  a  logical  necessity, 
because  the  denial  is  self-contradictory,  affirming  that 
experience  is  something  other  than  experience  or  a 
subjective  state.  If  they  are  not  thus  directly  known 
or  knowable,  they  are  not  phenomena  at  all,  and  they 
do  not  come  within  the  range  of  scientific  discussion. 
The  unphenomenal  is  a  mental  void,  and  all  special 
assertions  concerning  it  are  void.  Positivism  only  is 
scientific,  and  positivism  only  can  be  the  basis  of  phi- 
losophy. 

The  known  matter,  force,  space,  and  time— and  it  is 
only  the  known  we  can  discuss — cannot  be  abolished 
so  long  as  consciousness  exists,  since  they  are  modes 
of  consciousness;  but,  for  the  same  reason,  they  would 
perish  with  the  extinction  of  consciousness;  and  if, 
therefore,  the  extinction  of  the  latter  can  be  con- 
ceived, the  extinction  of  the  former  is  conceivable. 

To  say  of  these  four  terms  or  things  that  "they  may 
be  symbolized  in  thought  and  feeling,  but  not  identi- 
fied with  them,"  implies  that  they  are  not  directly 
known.  But,  if  they  transcend  all  phenomena  and 
are  unconscious,  how  are  they  to  be  symbolized  ? 
How  shall  we  know  that  any  alleged  symbol  is  a  real 
one  and  not  an  unmeaning  invention?  How  shall 
the  phenomenal  and  conscious  symbolize  the  uncon- 
scious and  unphenomenal  ?  To  these  questions  there 
is  no  answer.  Legitimate  and  scientific  symbolism  is 
only  of  the  possible  phenomenal.  One  phenomenon 


70  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

may  be  a  symbol  for  others,  and  indicate  the  law  of 
their  occurence  and  recurrence. 

If  matter,  force,  space,  and  time  are  only  symbol- 
ized and  not  known,  they  are  surely  unknowable.  If 
we  do  not  know  them  now,  we  never  shall.  It  is 
surely  very  evident  that  we  have  never  made  any 
progress  here,  and  that  there  is  no  law  by  which  we 
can.  Their  relation  to  our  consciousness  is  a  fixed 
fact.  It  does  not  come  within  the  law  of  evolution, 
which  is  good  only  for  phenomena.  If,  therefore, 
they  are  unknown,  they  are  unknowable;  and  the  un- 
knowable is  rightly,  by  Mr.  Fowler  himself,  ruled  out 
of  the  sphere  of  science  and  philosophy,  in  the  follow- 
ing language:  "The  unknowable, — a  name  of  power  to 
conjure  by,  of  strength  to  support  a  weak  position, 
but,  as  an  ally  in  philosophy,  cowardly  and  treacher- 
ous. What  cannot  be  known  or  conceived  should  not 
be  relied  upon." 

If  there  are  other  beings  besides  me,  real  beings, 
conscious  or  phenomenal,  they  are  conceivable;  and 
they  may  be  symbolized  so  far  as  they  are  conceived 
to  resemble  anything  known  or  conceived  by  me,  and 
no  further.  Experience  and  the  analogies  of  experi- 
ence and  the  logical  consequences  which  these  in- 
volve are  all  that  science  or  philosophy  can  ever 
justly  admit.  Let  us  learn  to  be  more  sparing  in  our 
assertions.  Let  a  genuine  but  broad  positism  rule 
science  and  lay  the  basis  of  philosophy. 

The  doctrine  of  Relation  is  always  admitted  to  be 
of  primal  importance,  but  the  correctness  of  our  doc- 
trine on  the  subject  is  equally  important.  On  this 
point,  Mr.  Fowler  delivers  himself  as  follows:  "Noth- 
ing is  sufficient  unto  itself.  Subjective  reality  implies 
objective  reality :  the  two  are  related  by  phenomena 
and  knowing.  Everything  is  conditioned  by  all 
things.  Sensation  must  have  object  as  well  as  sub- 
ject, and  we  deny  our  perception  of  the  outward 
realities  at  our  peril.  The  distrust  of  our  senses  is 
mental  insanity,  and  leads  to  physical  destruction." 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  71 

It  is  a  striking  fact  in  the  history  of  thought  (in  all 
departments),  and  often  quite  discouraging,  that  er- 
rors, and  even  blunders  which  have  been  often  cor- 
rected, continue  to  be  repeated,  and  that  with  all  the 
assumption  and  aspect  of  an  important  truth  well 
said  or  argued. 

Now,  while  it  is  obvious  that  no  individual  phe- 
nomenon is  sufficient  to  itself  and  must  be  conceived 
as  one  of  two  counterparts,  as  subject  or  object, 
neither  of  which  can  be  alone,  this  is  not  true  of  the 
knowable  or  conceivable  universe  taken  as  a  whole. 
This  may  be  sufficient  unto  itself  and,  as  a  whole,  ab- 
solute, unrelated.  This  is  the  theory  of  the  world 
held  by  all  non-theistic  evolutionists.  Relation  is 
only  between  parts  of  a  whole.  The  relation  between 
all  the  phenomena  of  sense  has  never  been  doubted. 
The  only  question  is  as  to  whether  all  the  related 
phenomena  are  all  ego  or  not.  Now,  as  they  all 
belong  to  one  universe,  they  all  belong  to  one  indi- 
vidual, if  the  individual  constitutes  the  universe; 
and  that  he  does  is  the  unformulated  doctrine  of  mod- 
ern psychological  science,  which  affirms  that  all  phe- 
nomena are  egoistic.  Here,  there  is  no  distrust  of  the 
senses,  but  only  an  explanation  of  them;  and  all  phe- 
nomena, subjective  and  objective  (so  called),  are  fully 
admitted  in  their  mutual  relations  and  the  relations 
of  all  to  the  ego  as  their  grand  central  source  and 
cause  and  conscious  subject.  This  is  ultimate  and 
all-comprehensive.  Nothing  more  remains  to  be  said ; 
and  no  possible  peril  can  its  abettors  incur,  except 
the  frown  of  "common  sense"  and  the  laugh  of  fools. 


VII. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  EELATIVE. 


Our  further  progress  is  here  obstructed  by  some 
prevalent  and  subtle  errors  on  the  nature  of  absolute 
and  relative  and  the  relativity  of  knowledge.  All 
nature,  all  existence  which  is  a  living  substantial  re- 
ality, metaphysicians  have  anatomized  and  subli- 
mated into  a  ghost  called  the  "absolute,"  and  to  this 
ghost  they  have  given  a  shadow  called  the  "relative" ; 
and,  then,  they  are  unable  to  tell  which  is  which  or 
what  is  either.  They  follow  closely  the  directions  of 
Mephistopheles  to  the  student :  "See  that  you  con- 
ceive profoundly  what  is  not  meant  for  human  brains. 
A  fine  word  will  stand  you  in  stead  for  what  enters 
and  what  does  not  enter  there.  .  .  .  Generally  speak- 
ing, stick  to  words:  you  will  then  pass  through  the 
safe  gate  into  the  temple  of  certainty.  ...  It  is  pre- 
cisely where  meaning  fails  that  words  come  in  most 
opportunely."  A  system  may  be  built  with  words, 
the  devil  truly  adds.  And  systems  have  been  built 
with  the  terms  "absolute"  and  "relative,"  and  kindred 
terms,  used  without  real  and  definite  meaning,  such 
as  substance  and  noumena  as  opposed  to  quality  and 
phenomena. 

This  false  [method  of  philosophizing  was  first  in 
modern  times  made  conspicuous  by  Locke  by  the  em- 
phasis which  he  put  upon  the  old  distinction  between 
substance  and  attribute  and  between  essence  and 
quality.  Substance  and  essence,  being  discriminated 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  73 

from  attribute  and  quality,  are  void  of  them;  and  they 
are,  therefore,  a  nihility  alike  to  knowledge  and  con- 
ception, empty  words.  So  that  substance  and  essence 
are  really  ruled  out  of  existence,  though  nominally 
retained.  Berkeley  battled  earnestly,  but  with  inad- 
equate light,  and  therefore  ineffectively,  against  this 
distinction.  Hume  took  it  up,  and  properly  affirmed 
that  all  our  knowledge  is  hence  comprised  in  impres- 
sions and  ideas,  which  Locke  himself  had  explicitly 
affirmed  in  saying  that  essence  and  substance  are  un- 
known. So  that  nothing  but  impressions  and  ideas 
remained  to  be  known;  and  these  two  Locke  includes 
under  the  one  term,  "ideas,"  and  he  expressly  and 
frequently  affirms  that  these  are  all  we  know. 

Kant  adopts  the  distinction  under  the  terms  "phe- 
nomena" and  "noumena";  and  he  is  therefore  obliged 
to  confess  that  he  cannot  furnish  in  logical  unity  an 
ultimate  speculative  system.  Fichte  and  Schelling 
substitute  the  term  "absolute"  for  the  term  "noume- 
non,"  and  vainly  attempt  what  Kant  held  to  be  be- 
yond human  power,— the  reduction  of  the  absolute 
and  relative  to  a  logical  unity.  Here,  Hegel  burst  in 
and  boldly  took  the  bull  by  the  horns,  declaring  that 
the  impossible  logical  unity  is  not  necessary,  and  that 
to  seek  it  is  fundamentally  wrong;  that  contradic- 
tories may  both  be  true,  and  are  true,  since  being  and 
nothing  are  one,  because  the  universally  accepted 
definitions  of  being— essence,  substance— are  defined 
as  qualityless,  which,  to  conception,  is  just  the  same 
as  nothing.  Thus,  the  great  primal  logical  law  of  non- 
contradiction is  discarded;  and  a  new  logic  is  in- 
vented, which  consists  only  in  showing  the  orderly 
concatenation  of  phenomena  or  phenomenology. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  reimports  the  ill-starred  dis- 
tinction under  the  terms  conditioned  and  uncon- 
ditioned. But,  as  he  does  not  follow  Hegel,  he 
alternates  back  to  Kant  and  ultimate  mystery,  or 
Agnosticism;  and  he  is  followed,  with  a  slight  modi- 
fication in  the  dogmatic  direction,  by  Mr.  Spencer  in 


74  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

his  First  Principles,  only  he  uses  the  terms  absolute 
and  relative,  instead  of  unconditioned  and  condi- 
tioned. 

The  absolute  should  be  considered  as  numerically 
different  from  the  relative,  else  the  two  terms  are 
merely  synonymes;  and  much  of  what  all  these  phi- 
losophers say  of  them  implies  their  duality.  On  the 
other  hand,  they  all  really — and,  except  Hamilton,  all 
expressly— make  all  things  an  ultimate  unity.  On 
this  theory,  the  difference  between  absolute  and  rela- 
tive is  only  modal,  and  yet  to  the  absolute  there  are, 
it  is  alleged,  no  modes;  and,  if  they  are  ultimately 
one,  the  unknown  absolute  is  very  closely  and  vitally 
related  to  the  known  relative,  though  incapable  of 
relation.  This  kind  of  writing  in  the  name  of  phi- 
losophy makes  its  way  and  maintains  its  authority, 
because  it  is  too  incomprehensible  to  be  refuted  like 
the  mummeries  of  witches  and  gypsy  fortune-tellers; 
for,  as  Goethe's  Mephistopheles  says  again,  "A  down- 
right contradiction  remains  equally  mysterious  to 
wise  folks  and  fools."  I  allow  that  his  utterances 
are  not  always  immaculate,  but  on  some  spirits  they 
are  not  without  power;  and,  of  their  pertinence  and 
probable  influence  here,  the  reader  must  judge. 

The  paralogism  in  this  lofty  conceit  of  the  absolute 
is  more  conspicuously  flagrant  in  sensist  or  objective 
evolution  than  in  connection  with  preceding  theories, 
because  this  professes  to  be  simpler,  and  even  at 
times  affects  to  despise  metaphysics.  Mr.  Spencer 
affirms  that  the  absolute  is  unknown  and  incogitable; 
that  yet  it  exists  and  is  proved  by  the  known  exist- 
ence of  the  relative;  that,  if  we  suppose  the  absolute 
annihilated,  the  relative  itself  becomes  the  absolute, 
in  which  case  the  phenomenal  becomes  unphenome- 
nal,  since  this  is  the  character  of  the  absolute.  But 
since  he  makes  the  absolute  and  relative  together  to 
constitute  the  universe,  the  one  grand  totality  of  force 
and  action,  the  vast  and  labored  distinction  between 
the  two  is  without  a  difference.  They  are  both  forces 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  75 

and  causes,  and  as  such  they  are  mutually  related  in 
an  endless  series  of  changes;  and  so  the  absolute  is  as 
much  a  relative  as  the  relative  itself;  and  it  is  the 
relative,  for  the  two  are  intrinsically  one  and  the 
same.  In  short,  this  high  dialectic  absolute  is  not 
only  an  intrinsic  absurdity,  but  it  is  especially  foreign 
to  the  theory  of  evolution. 

This  style  of  pseudo-thinking  has  generated  a  false 
theory  of  cognition  concerning  the  relative  as  the 
known.  Oar  positive  experience  and  thought  have 
made  it  necessary  for  us  to  speak  often  of  subject 
and  object,  of  ego  and  non-ego,  of  outer  and  sensible 
forms  and  inner  and  supersensible  experiences;  and, 
now,  this  class  of  philosophers  assail  us  with  a  per- 
petual clatter  about  our  knowledge  of  these  things  not 
being  absolute,  but  only  relative;  and,  with  an  empty 
verbal  ingenuity,  they  bewilder  equally  themselves 
and  others,  and  erect  a  fabric  miscalled  philosophy, 
less  substantial  as  well  as  less  charming  than  the 
palace  of  Kubla  Khan  of  Coleridge's  dream.  Our 
first  task,  therefore,  now  is  to  sweep  the  air  clear  of 
these  phantasms ;  but  it  is  their  unsubstantial  charac- 
ter which  makes  the  difficulty  of  the  task,  for  they 
do  not  obey  the  laws  and  forces  of  the  real  world, 
and  the  motion  or  stroke  of  solid  things  has  no 
power  to  drive  or  crush  and  destroy  them.  Go 
through  them,  and  trample  them  and  roll  over  them, 
and  they  rise  again  or  reappear  as  large  as  before, 
like  a  parted  fog. 

Vast  is  the  flood  of  words  which  has  been  poured 
out  on  the  high  metaphysical  conceit  of  the  Absolute, 
pure  and  simple,  as  the  alleged  unrelated;  and  the 
utmost  degree  of  misled  subtlety,  in  wandering  mazes 
lost,  has  been  exercised  only  to  render  a  dark  and 
formless  topic  still  more  obscure  and  perplexed.  The 
main  proposition  is  intrinsically  self-contradictory, 
and  should  thence  be  considered  as  self-nullified.  But 
logic  has  no  rights  which  this  a  priori  metaphysics  is 
bound  to  respect.  A  little  reflection  will  make  it  ap- 


76  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

parent  to  any  one  that  nothing  that  we  know  or  can 
conceive  is  perfectly  simple.  Every  atom  contains  or 
constitutes  a  plurality  of  qualities.  It  has  locality, 
extension,  weight,  and  chemical  force,  and  what  else 
I  know  not.  But  of  all  these,  or  all  but  one,  we  can- 
not conceive  it  to  be  divested.  A  more  profound  an- 
alysis will  show  that  everything,  whether  considered 
as  object  or  subject,  must  include  in  the  conception  of 
it  a  set  of  logical  categories.  For  instance,  it  must  be 
of  some  quality,  some  quantity,  some  duration;  must 
be  either  cause  or  effect,  or  both;  must  be  of  some 
number,  one  or  more:  must  be  whole  or  part,  and 
have  some  degree  of  worth ;  and  there  must  be  a  de- 
gree of  relation  and  community  between  all  these. 

If  there  were  only  one  being,  it  would  have  no  ex- 
ternal relations.  But,  as  such  a  being  would  include 
all  things,  its  internal  relations  would  be  infinitely  or 
indefinitely  multifarious.  But,  if  there  is  a  plurality 
of  beings,  these  have  various  relations  to  one  another. 
In  any  case,  therefore,  the  unrelative  absolute  is  an 
impossibility.  Relativity  belongs  to  all  real  exist- 
ence, by  whatever  name  we  call  it. 

The  absolute  as  related  is  a  reality  and  a  genuine 
concept,  because  it  is  a  thing  of  positive  qualities 
which  have  various  relations  to  each  other;  while 
each  complex  reality  is  related  to  all  others,  so  that  it 
is  relative  as  well  as  absolute.  It  is  absolute  only  in 
the  sense  of  having  a  real  existence  as  a  thing  of  such 
or  such  a  quality  or  intrinsic  force  or  nature,  and 
would  be  such  though  it  were  the  only  existence. 
Relations  spring  from  the  existence  of  things,  not 
their  existence  from  their  relations.  Something  there 
must  be  as  an  a  priori  condition  of  relation.  In  this 
sense,  the  relative  not  only  presupposes  the  absolute, 
but  also  that  the  absolute  is  the  very  thing  which  is 
related,  and  is  therefore  also  the  relative.  Any  other 
absolute  than  this  is  an  illusion,  a  void  form  of 
thought,  which  has  imposed  on  many. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  77 


An  Erroneous  Notion  of  Relativity. 

In  a  region  less  aerial,  we  are  also  presented  with 
a  false  metaphysical  doctrine  of  relativity  concerning 
the  senses  and  supersensible  matter.  This  doctrine 
is  that,  as  all  subjective  phenomena  vary  with  or- 
ganic condition  and  constitution,  though  outward 
things  are  the  same,  our  experience  is  never  a  direct 
cognition  of  outward  things  or  extra-organic  realities, 
and  no  just  expression  of  truth,  except  as  relative  to 
the  conscious  subject  and  the  connection  of  its  vari- 
ous experiences  with  each  other.  Flavors  and  odors 
of  various  viands  are  imperceptible  to  some,  while 
very  powerful  to  others.  Savages  receive  impressions 
through  eye  and  ear  which  are  impossible  to  Europe- 
ans. Abnormal  conditions  as  to  health  beget  sensa- 
tions of  smell,  taste,  sight,  and  sound,  and  even  of 
the  muscles,  which  in  the  sa.me  circumstances  in 
health  are  impossible.  In  normal  conditions,  we  all 
have  different  sensations  from  the  same  object,  if  it  is 
only  changed  in  its  position  relative  to  the  different 
parts  of  the  organism;  as,  for  instance,  snuff,  pepper, 
and  ammonia  have  very  different  effects,  according  as 
they  are  applied  to  the  hand,  tongue,  eyes,  or  nostrils. 
The  hand  is  sensitive  to  heat,  but  not  to  light;  while 
the  eye  is  sensitive  to  light,  but  not  to  heat.  In  the 
language  of  Spencer,  "We  are  thus  driven  to  the  con- 
clusion that  what  we  conceive  as  space-relations  can- 
not be  either  in  their  nature  or  degrees  like  those 
connections  among  external  things  to  which  they  are 
due."  In  plainer  terms,  sensations  are  not  like  their 
external  causes,  because  they  vary  not  only  according 
to  the  variations  of  external  phenomena,  but  also  ac- 
cording to  organic  subjective  variations;  and  that, 
hence,  known  sensible  objects  are  not  ultimate  reali- 
ties, but  symbols  of  such  which  are  beyond  our  reach. 
Thus,  it  turns  out  that  we  know  only  subjective  states 
in  experience,  and  that  these  states  or  phenomena 
represent  transcendental  realities,  which  answer  to 


78  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

the  noumena  of  Kant,  at  least  in  a  good  degree;  and 
Mr.  Spencer  is  a  transcendentalist  as  well  as  an  ag- 
nostic, which  was  true  also  of  Kant. 

Source  of  this  Error,— Fossil  metaphysics  on 
flatter  and  Mind. 

This  is  a  relict  of  scholasticism,  which  was  excusable 
in  the  earlier  times,  when  they  knew  not  the  scientific 
compass,  which  should  teach  us  how  to  escape  these 
dark  and  vacuous  regions,  where  empty  words  are 
the  only  stars.  All  this  barren  show  of  reasoning 
and  profound  ulterior  conclusion  is  based  on  the  as- 
sumption of  a  supersensible  world,  whence  a  compar- 
ison is  drawn  between  the  sensible  and  the  supersen- 
sible connections;  the  latter  being  described  as  " those 
connections  among  external  things  to  which  they 
[sensations]  are  due."  The  confusion  is  augmented 
by  an  oblivion  of  the  oft  admitted  fact  that  all  phe- 
nomena are  subjective,  and  the  consequent  institution 
of  a  blind  comparison  between  sensations  and  ex- 
ternal realities,  so  called,  extra-organic  phenomena 
being  thus  assumed  to  be  non-ego.  Herbert  Spencer 
(Principles  of  Psychology,  §  77)  says,  ''Having  contem- 
plated feelings  in  their  relations  to  one  another  as 
components  of  our  consciousness,  we  have  now  to 
contemplate  them  in  relation  to  things  by  which  they 
are  produced."  He  then  proceeds  through  the  chapter 
to  carry  this  out,  on  the  assumption  that  whatever  is 
beyond  the  organism  is  beyond  consciousness,  and 
thence  to  explain  the  variations  of  sensation  relative 
to  extra-organic  objects  as  non-ego. 

The  whole  truth  in  the  expression  of  facts  of  the 
relativity  of  sensations  is  as  follows :  Sensations  vary 
uniformly,  according  to  a  simple  law  of  forces  in 
mutual  relation.  So  that,  if  all  the  related  terms  are 
the  same,  the  sensation  is  the  same;  and,  if  any  of 
the  related  terms  are  changed  or  their  relations 
changed,  the  sensation  is  changed.  This  law,  instead 
of  being  a  mystery  and  pointing  to  a  spectral  world, 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  7^ 

whether  called  noumenon  or  the  unknown,— and 
these  are  one,— is,  when  the  facts  are  duly  appre- 
hended, seen  to  be  the  simplest  possible  expression  of 
the  necessary  facts,— a  logical  truism,  in  fact,— because 
the  variation  of  the  related  terms  is  itself  a  variation 
of  sensations  as  well  as  of  the  forces  of  the  related 
group,  since  all  the  known  terms  are  nothing  else 
than  sensations  (with  their  implicated  forces).  Some 
of  the  terms  may  be  sometimes  more  or  less  unknown 
(but  never  unknowable  entirely);  and  yet,  relatively 
to  the  changes  of  these,  sensations  will  change,  be- 
cause we  are  always  the  subject  of  the  action  of  forces 
which  are  only  partially  disclosed  in  consciousness. 
But  it  is  only  for  phenomena  or  the  forms  of  con- 
sciousness that  we  seek  a  law.  This  shows  our 
knowledge  to  be  real,  direct,  and  perfect.  These  phe- 
nomena or  sensible  objects  being  sensations  only,— or 
conscious  forces  in  said  form,— to  know  them  is  to 
know  everything  involved  in  the  case,  and  that  so 
thoroughly  that  nothing  more  remains  to  be  known. 
Sensations  are  always  known  as  they  are,  precisely 
and  absolutely. 

The  term  "relative,"  so  far  as  it  has  any  real  mean- 
ing, does  not  refer  to  the  nature  or  forms  of  sensible 
objects,  but  only  to  their  temporal  and  spatial  order 
and  connection.  They  are  variously  related  to  each 
other  in  space  and  time  and  as  cause  and  effect.  As 
objects  of  sense,  they  are  always  perfectly  and  abso- 
lutely known,  else  they  are  so  far  not  sensible  objects; 
and  this  knowledge  is  not  vitiated  in  the  slightest  de- 
gree by  the  fact  that  we  have  another  knowledge,— the 
knowledge  of  their  relation  to  each  other  in  space  and 
time,  and  their  relation  to  the  ego  as  their  common 
subject,  which  may  be  wholly  conscious  or  partly  un- 
conscious. One  knowledge  does  not  nullify  another. 
And  it  is  entirely  certain, that  we  have  indubitable 
knowledge, of  certain  sensible  objects,  and  that  these 
are  lexically  related  to  each  other,  and  that  they  are 
all  the  modes  of  a  common,  conscious  subject,  which 


80  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

we  call 'I,  or  ego.  This  is  all  there  is  to  be  known  or 
surmised.  There  is  no  logical  necessity  or  possibility 
of  going  any  further,  and  there  is  no  room  for  the 
introduction  of  the  old  relativity.  The  relativity 
which  I  have  admitted  as  the  only  possible  one  does 
not  in  the  least  detract  from  the  knowledge  or  the 
value  and  verity  of  the  facts  as  known.  Facts  are 
facts;  and  sensible  objects  are  what  they  are,  not- 
withstanding their  relations,  which  do  not  annihi- 
late or  obscure  or  alter  the  nature  of  the  facts  or 
objects.  It  is  only  a  false  ontology  and  psychology 
which  have  led  to  the  adoption  of  any  doctrine  of 
relativity  which  implies  that  we  are  shut  off  from  a 
real  and  direct  knowledge  of  things  as  they  are.  It 
is  preposterous  to  suppose  that  things  can  be  known 
otherwise  than  as  they  are,  for  else  they  are  not  so  far 
known  at  all.  So  far  as  we  know  or  can  conceive, 
nothing  exists  but  experiences  and  their  subjects; 
and  these  are  one,  and  directly  known.  Here,  there- 
fore, there  is  no  possible  room  for  any  unknowable 
background,  no  fathomless  and  vacuous  gulf  of  the 
absolute  discontinuous  from  the  known,  nor  an  un- 
known, bewildering  something — nothing  called  the 
material  world  beyond  the  senses. 

As  a  further  exemplification  of  dementation  caused 
by  the  dualism  of  a  sensible  and  supersensible  mate- 
rial world,  I  will  quote  a  passage  from  a  representa- 
tive author  of  France  and  then  of  Germany,— one 
from  M.  Janet's  much-praised  work  on  Final  Causes* 
the  other  from  an  article  of  Lotze  in  Contemporary 
Review,  January,  1880.  Janet  says:  "Despite  the 
warnings  of  the  greatest  minds  and  of  all  great 
minds,  are  we  not  ceaselessly  tempted  to  yield  to  the 
automatic  instinct  which  makes  us  believe  things  to 
be  as  we  see  them,  makes  us  suppose  the  existence  of  a 
matter,  sonorous,  cold,  or  hot^such  as  the  senses  acquaint 
us  with?  No  doubt,  nothing  external  to  ourselves 
can  be  known  internally  by  us;  but,  if  the  exterior  be 
the  expression  of  the  interior,  is  not  the  one  equiva- 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  81 

lent  to  the  other  ?  And  to  ask  more  would  amount 
to  asking  to  be  more  than  men.  Science  teaches  us 
that  all  appearances  have  a  fixed  and  precise  relation 
to  reality.  The  visible,  apparent  sky  is  strictly  what  it 
ought  to  be  to  express  the  real  sky.  The  deeper  our 
knowledge  goes,  the  more  we  see  the  perfect  con- 
formity of  the  apparent  to  the  real,  the  more  do  phe- 
nomena translate  noumena."  A  strange  scientific  sin 
it  is  to  "believe  things  to  be  as  we  see  them."  Surely, 
there  is  "a  matter,  sonorous,  cold,  or  hot,  such  as  the 
senses  acquaint  us  with,"  else  the  senses  do  not  ac- 
quaiiit  us  with  it.  It  is  a  matter  for  deep  regret  that 
the  distinguished  academician  has  not  described  to  us 
more  fully  the  two  skies,  which  he  designates  respec- 
tively as  the  apparent  and  real  skies,  or  tell  us  where 
we  may  find  them,  in  order  that  we  may  be  able  to 
verify  or  test  his  assertion  that  they  are  equivalent  to 
each  other  and  conform  to  each  other,  so  that  one  is 
an  expression  of  the  other.  We  have  never  known 
but  one  sky,  which  is  apparent  to  our  senses,  and 
which  we  have  confounded  with  the  real  sky  in  spite 
of  all  warnings  from  great  minds;  and  because  we 
have  no  proof  of  any  other  "sky,  and  .because  the  as- 
sertion involves  many  logical  difficulties,  besides  be- 
ing unscientific,  we  are  content  with  this  one  sky,— 
the  sky  which  daily  floods  our  world  with  light  and 
at  the  same  time  constitutes  for  it  a  variegated,  fleecy 
canopy,  the  sky  which  by  night  looks  down  upon  us 
in  deeper  colors  and  with  myriads  of  eyes  more  brill- 
iant than  diamonds. 

The  promised  passage  from  Lotze  is  as  follows: 
"Whencesoever  our  knowledge  of  the  world,  of  its 
contents  as  well  as  of  its  great  fundamental  princi- 
ples, may  come,  it  remains  always  our  representation 
of  its  object,  and  not  that  object  itself."  To  the 
initiated,  this  means  that  the  world  itself  is  un- 
known, but  represented  by  certain  sensible  experi- 
ences. This  passage  does  not  shed  a  brilliant  light 
on  its  own  darkness,  like  stars  on  a  dark  sky.  In 


82  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

this  only  it  differs  from  Janet,  and  it  is  the  general 
difference  between  an  erring  Frenchman  and  Ger- 
man. How  Lotze  knows  that  sensible  phenomena 
represent  a  thing  he  does  not  know  and  never  can 
know,  as  he  confesses,  or  how  there  is  anything  rep- 
resentable,  he  does  not  inform  us. 

These  extracts  exhibit  the  Kantian  notion  of  rela- 
tivity (which  here  is  Spencerian)  and  its  paralysis 
of  ultimate  speculative  power.  It  affirms  that  what 
everywhere  uniformly  appears  as  real  is  not  real,  but 
only  a  representation  of  an  unknowable  real;  and 
that  what  appears  to  our  intelligence  as  an  ultimate 
necessary  truth,  and  which  we  are  obliged  to  act 
upon  in  that  light,  is  not  such,  but  may  be  a  reflec- 
tion from  such  a  truth.  It  proclaims  philosophy 
proper  (ultimate)  an  impossibility,  and  stultifies  all 
intelligence,  and  by  consequence  its  own  statement. 
These  are  dark  clouds  which  are  yet  exhaling  from 
the  primeval  metaphysical  world,  and  they  will  grad- 
ually roll  away  before  the  light  of  a  true  analysis. 
We  do  not,  with  Janet,  hold  to  any  instinct  which 
makes  us  believe  a  lie.  We  not  only  believe  that  we 
see  things  as  they  are,  but  we  know  it,  else  we  do  not 
see  them  at  all,  since  thase  things  exist  only  as  they 
are  seen  or  are  sensibly  manifest.  For  them,  esse  is 
percipi  and  per  dpi  is  esse.  It  is  no  false  faith  nor 
even  a  faith  at  all,  but  a  knowledge  that  the  solid 
and  sensible  material  world  exists.  All  the  darkness 
and  mystery  here,  all  the  philosophical  difficulty, 
limitation,  and  confusion,  arise  from  the  baseless  and 
persistent  assumption  of  dualism  that  there  is  a  non- 
egoistic  world,  non-egoistic  to  me  and  all  men  and 
common  to  all,  which  world,  it  is  reluctantly  al- 
lowed, is  unknown,  since  the  known  is  ego. 

It  were  to  be  expected  that  they  who  affirm  that  a 
false  and  misleading  instinct  dominates  our  sensible 
judgments  will  exhibit  a  similar  principle  concern- 
ing supersensible  judgments.  Whoever  affirms  that 
"there  is  never  any  sensible  object,  but  only  a  repre- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  83 

sentation  of  an  object,"  may  with  equal  reason  say 
that  there  is  never  any  mental  object,  but  only  a 
representation  of  such  object,  so  that  we  have  no 
logical  protection  against  utter  philosophical  scepti- 
cism. This  is  the  present  and  ultimate  result  of  all 
existing  forms  of  relativism,  intellectual  as  well  as 
sensible. 

Confusion  of  Identity  and  Similarity. 

Our  attention  is  now  claimed  for  another  oversight 
in  the  common  analysis  of  sensible  phenomena  con- 
cerning relativism.  It  is  that  the  word  "same"  is 
constantly  and  unwittingly  used  in  a  false  connection 
and  with  a  meaning  which  implies  identity,  where  in 
truth  we  should  have  a  word  which  denotes  similarity 
of  relations.  Thus,  Mr.  Spencer  says  that  a  fox,  a 
man,  and  a  snail,  going  over  the  same  ground,  will 
have  very  different  experiences.  The  fact  is  that  no 
two  living  things  ever  do  go  over  the  same  ground. 
Each  of  them  as  known  to  me  is  a  mode  of  myself,  as 
is  the  ground  over  which  they  pass.  These  cannot 
have  any  sensations  or  experiences  at  all,  being  them- 
selves only  sensations.  If  these  moving  phenomena 
are  taken  as  symbols  of  living  beings,  thus  corre- 
spondingly like  or  unlike  each  other,  then  we  must 
carry  out  the  symbolism  to  all  their  environment. 
Thus,  no  two  beings  can  see  or  feel  the  same  thing 
nor  be  in  the  same  world  or  the  same  space.  Each  is 
a  universe  to  itself  and  of  itself,  said  universe,  or- 
ganic and  inorganic,  being  its  various  modes,  a  grand 
complexus  of  sensations.  Whence,  again,  it  follows 
that  all  experiences  are  true  absolutely  and  not 
merely  relatively,  and  are  conformable  always  to 
facts  and  relations,  because  they  constitute  all  the 
facts  and  all  the  relations.  The  only  sources  of  error 
consist  in  a  false  analysis  or  a  false  inference  beyond 
experience,  and  these  present  no  logical  or  philo- 
sophical difficulty.  The  possibility  of  such  errors  is 
a  consequence  of  our  finite  limitations,  and  the  possi- 


84  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

bility  of  progress  till  we  are  able  to  correct  our  error 
has  the  same  root.  All  the  dense  shadows  and  cav- 
ernous obscurities  and  philosophical  nullifications  of 
relativism  thus  pass  away,  and  "there  is  found  no 
place  for  them." 

Cause  of  Relative  Sensitive  Variation. 

Our  analysis  and  exposition  must  now  take  another 
step.  Psychologically,  we  have  already  reached  the 
ultimatum;  but  a  logical  procedure  is  still  possible 
and  called  for.  We  have  seen  what  is  the  ultimate 
psychological  law  governing  the  facts,  which  are 
couched  in  the  general  statement  that  there  is  a 
variation  of  experience  corresponding  with  organic 
constitution  and  condition,  though  there  are  no  extra- 
organic  changes.  We  will  now  state  the  ultimate 
reason  and  cause  for  this  law.  It  is  found  in  the 
intrinsic  nature  of  all  being  as  a  force.  These  phe- 
nomena are  necessary  facts  as  the  expression  of 
the  various  existing  and  therefore  operating  forces. 
Things  cannot  be  different  without  operating  differ- 
ently in  producing  different  effects,  which  are  the 
causes  of  other  effects  correspondingly  different.  So 
the  effects  will  vary  according  to  the  connection  of 
the  forces  in  mutual  operation.  A  spark  dropped  on 
water  and  a  spark  dropped  on  powder  is  expected  to 
be  followed  by  different  effects.  These  are  absolute 
facts  and  absolute  perceptions.  So,  if  the  spark  drops 
on  my  organism,  the  effect  will  be  again  different, 
and  in  different  parts  of  the  body  the  effect  will  still 
be  different ;.and,  so  far  as  my  knowledge  extends  of 
either  the'  causes  or  effects  and  their  relations  in  the 
case,  it'.is  absolute,— that  is,  it  is  direct  and  real  and 
ultimate.  Antecedents  will  be  followed,  and  must 
be  followed,  by  different  consequents,  whenever  the 
relations  are  varied,  and  only  then,  whether  any  of 
these  related  terms  include  an  animal  organism  or 
not.  Hence,  it  is  an/absolute  necessity,  according  to 
the  known  general  law  and  the  essential  conception 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  85 

of  force,  that,  if  in  any  respect  my  organism  is  differ- 
ent from  another,  my  experience  must  be  different 
in  the  same  connections,  and  the  experience  must 
vary  in  different  parts  of  the  body. 

It  may  be  thought  that  this  leaves  us  just  where  we 
began,  with  the  knowledge  of  things  in  their  rela- 
tions to  each  other  only,  so  that  we  have  only  rela- 
tivity at  the  last  as  before.  This  is  a  misconception. 
It  is  true  that  we  know  only  things  in  their  relations 
to  each  other.  But  the  point  I  make  is  that  that  is 
just  the  way  to  know  them,  because  that  is  the  way 
they  are.  Since  they  are  related  to  each  other,  our 
knowledge  cannot  be  real  and  correct,  if  it  does 
not  embrace  these  relations  in  all  their  forms  and 
variations  and  effects.  We  know  things  in  them- 
selves and  in  their  relations,  and  these  are  different 
and  the  knowledge  of  them  is  different;  and  these 
include  everything.  Before  'it  falls,  I  know  that 
spark  in  itself  irrespective  of  all  its  antecedents  and 
consequences  as  an  object  of  sight  or  a  visual  sensa- 
tion, which  is  all  it  is,  brilliant,  transient,  mobile; 
and  this  knowledge  is  real,  absolute,  and  ultimate. 
And  I  also  know  that  spark  in  its  origin  and  cause,  or 
its  preassociation  with  other  sensations,  which  is  an- 
other real  and  absolute  (though  not  unrelative)  knowl- 
edge or  set  of  knowledges;  and,  then,  I  afterward 
know  it  in  its  subsequent  relations  or  effects  or 
its  post-associations  with  other  sensations,  which  is 
another  knowledge  or  set  of  knowledges,  real,  direct, 
and  as  absolute  as  anything  can  be.  Nothing  more 
remains  to  be  known,  because  everything  is  known 
as  such  or  such,  and  as  in  such  and  such  relations, 
and  always  as  sensations  or  modes  of  the  conscious 
ego,  which  is  just  what  they  are  and  all  they  are; 
and  here  our  ultimate,  logical,  as  well  as  psychologi- 
cal goal  is  attained,  so  far  as  it  affects  the  doctrine  of 
sense  perception;  and,  as  concerns  the  ontology  of 
the  ego,  that  must  be  left  to  be  treated  in  its  proper 
connections. 


86  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 


No  Unknowable  Absolute. 

Relativists  next  unite  all  phenomena  into  a  grand 
totality,  and  say  that,  when  we  have  traced  them  up 
to  their  highest  unity,  there  is  implied  beyond  them 
all  an  unknown,  if  not  unknowable  and  even  incon- 
ceivable, something  as  their  explanation  by  way  of 
substantive  base  or  cause  or  we  know  not  what.  All 
schools  and  parties  (except  positivists)  have  agreed 
on  this  in  general;  but  they  have  differed  in  the 
attempted  determination  in  detail  as  to  what  con- 
stitutes that  implicated  transphenomenal  reality  and 
the  amount  of  our  knowledge  and  proof  of  it.  Phe- 
nomena, it  is  said,  are  known  only  in  relation  to  this, 
and  this  is  only  conceivable  in  relation  to  phenomena; 
and  the  conception  and  knowledge  of  both  are  rela- 
tive only,  relative  to  each  other  as  well  as  relative 
to  the  conscious  subject.  So  that  all  our  alleged 
knowledges  and  conceptions  are  indirect,  a  mere  al- 
ternate reflection  of  things  unknown,  like  double  or 
treble  echoes  responsive  to  each  other,  only  the 
echoes  are  in  kind  like  the  original,  while  these  are 
not.  A  very  little  labor  now  in  the  line  of  our  previ- 
ous expositions  will  here  winnow  the  chaff  from  the 
wheat.  The  phenomena,  because  phenomena,  are 
perfectly  and  absolutely  known  in  themselves,  and 
they  are  also  known  as  being  related  to  a  self-con- 
scious egoistic  reality  as  modes  thereof;  and  this 
reality  or  ego  is  definitely  conceived  simply  as  a  force 
causative  of  these  phenomena,  in  which  phrase  the 
nature  of  the  force  is  described  with  accuracy,  though 
not  necessarily  with  perfect  fulness.  We  have  thus 
an  absolute  knowledge  of  phenomena,  and  of  their 
ultimate  relation  as  modes  and  effects  of  the  con- 
scious subject  or  ego,  the  force  which  is  their  cause. 
Thus,  again,  the  mystery  of  relativism  disappears; 
and,  to  the  utmost  of  our  inquiry,  our  knowledge  is 
real  and  direct  or  absolute. 


VIII. 

THE  EGO. 


What  is  Ego,  and  its  JProof  ? 

Questions  concerning  the  ego,  or  self-conscious  sub- 
ject of  phenomena,  have  for  some  time  been  pressing 
upon  us  for  attention.  What  is  the  ego  we  have  de- 
nned as  subject  and  cause  of  phenomena  ?  But  another 
point  we  must  now  endeavor  to  ascertain.  The  ques- 
tion here  to  be  considered  is,  Can  we  scientifically 
justify  the  affirmation  of  the  ego  as  a  known  reality 
and  as  substance  and  cause  relative  to  phenomena  ? 

I  answer  that  we  know  the  ego,  and  know  it  as  sub- 
stance and  cause,  in  knowing  egoistic  phenomena.  It 
is  universally  agreed  that  phenomena  presuppose  a 
subject,  whatever  this  may  be  or  imply.  On  this 
ground  it  is  that  a  transphenomenal  reality  is  gen- 
erally affirmed,  a  few  extreme  positivists  being  the 
only  dissenters  from  this.  But  this  is  to  go  at  a 
bound  further  than  I  wish  to  go.  I  do  not  here  affirm 
a  transphenomenal  subject.  I  cannot  affirm  the  ex- 
istence of  anything  entirely  unphenomenal,  because 
such  an  affirmation  were  an  empty  verbalism. 
Neither  can  I,  on  the  other  hand,  affirm  the  exist- 
ence of  pure,  unsubstantial,  and  forceless  phenom- 
ena, because  phenomena  cannot  be  conceived  and 
explicated  except  as  relative  causes  and  effects,  and 
as  having  a  common  and  pervasive  unity,  and  as 
being  subjective  states  with  a  perduring  conscious 
subject  or  ego.  Thus,  the  subject  or  ego  is  the  funda- 
mental force  felt  in  all  changes,  the  essential  unity 


88  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

manifested  in  all  diversity  of  forms  and  motions;  and  - 
it  is  one  with  these  forms,  as  it  is  these  very  forms  so 
and  so  existing  and  acting,  though  I  do  not  say  that 
it  is  wholly.  Thus  exhibited.  Yet  it  is  there  and 
thus  (for  these  are  itself)  directly  known,  really,  abso- 
lutely, and  ultimately. 

The  conception  of  the  ego,  therefore,  is  not  with  us 
a  mere  cris-cross,  interlaced  chain  of  phenomenal  net- 
work, as  it  is  with  Mill.  The  ego  is  all  that,  but  also 
much  more.  I  define  the  ego  as  that  which  feels, 
thinks,  wills;  and  this  is  also  my  definition  of  mind. 
Nothing  can  be  broader  or  simpler  or  ulterior.  It  is 
thus  distinguishable,  but  not  separable  from  its 
modes,  from  sensations  which  are  matter  or  material , 
and  sensible  modes  from  emotions,  thoughts,  voli- 
tions, which  are  immaterial  modes;  but  all  phenomena 
are  modes  of  mind.  Yet  all  of  mind  or  the  ego  may 
not  be  phenomenal.  The  ego  is  perhaps  and  prob- 
ably more  than  its  phenomena,  as  the  total  force  of 
any  thing  is  more  than  its  separate  transient  exer- 
tions. Substance  and  quality,  action  and  force,  are 
one,  and  one  with  all  phenomena,  whose  unit  is  ego, 
which  at  once  causes  and  constitutes  the  phenomenal 
network,  and  will  endlessly  modify  it.  Without  this 
there  is  no  possible  continuity,  and  all  apparent  com- 
munity is  illusive.  Without  this  there  is  separate- 
ness  and  juxtaposition,  coexistence  and  succession  of 
different  phenomena,  and  nothing  more.  There  is 
nothing  answering  to  our  consciousness  of  unity  and 
of  the  One  being  or  force  which  speaks  in  all  and 
through  all  as  identical  with  all.  We  have  many 
without  the  One,  whereas  consciousness  speaks  of  the 
One  as  modally  many  and  the  many  as  the  One.  In 
reference  to  every  phenomenal  form  and  change,  we 
say,  "I,"— I  experience  that,  or  That  is  a  mode  of  me. 
So  that  ego  and  all  phenomena  are  one,  and  they  are 
known  together  as  a  unity  of  force  in  various  and 
ceaseless  operation;  and  the  knowledge  is  absolutely 
ultimate,  the  knowledge  of  substance  and  quality  or 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  89 

force  as  one  and  phenomenal,  one  force  or  substance 
in  all  these  many  forms  or  phenomena,  which  are 
therefore  forceful. 

We  are  now  enabled  to  form  a  perfect  and  ultimate 
conception  of  personality.  With  the  Romans,  a  per- 
son was  an  actor,  the  visible  organic  automaton  on 
the  stage.  With  the  Greeks,  it  was  similar, — a  pro- 
sops,  a  visible,  organic  phenomenon.  It  is  both  of 
these  yet.  But  it  is  not  these  only.  Nor  is  it  limited 
to  the  organism,  nor  to  any  one  known  thing  or  object. 
It  includes  all  the  known  universe.  Neither  can  we 
say  that  this  is  all.  The  only  person  I  know  is  the 
power  which  is  the  subject  of  all  the  phenomena  of 
the  known  universe,  and  these  are  put  forth  and  end- 
lessly modified  by  this  power  or  person.  This  is  the 
individual  that  I  am,  an  omnipresent  reality  of  un- 
known extent  and  variety  of  power,  which,  while 
manifested,  is  not  wholly  manifested  in  its  capability 
in  any  or  all  of  the  existing  forms,  motions,  and  self- 
conscious  actions  of  the  universe,  since  the  future  is 
not  yet  manifested. 

Personality  and  Individuality. 

I  would  distinguish  individuality  from  personality. 
Every  individual  is  not  a  person,  but  every  person  is 
an  individual.  A  person  is  an  individual  which  is  self- 
conscious,— not  merely  sentient,  but  self-conscious. 
There  may  be  sentience  without  the  power  of  self- 
conscious  reflection;  and  this  I  suppose  is  exemplified 
in  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  lower  animals,  in  which  con- 
dition human  persons  once  existed,  and  from  which 
they  have  evolved  into  their  present  nobler  rank. 
(But,  if  animals  are  ever  pleased  or  displeased  with 
their  own  action,  as  they  surely  are,  are  they  not  self- 
conscious  ?) 

Personality  and  individuality  are  alike  in  this, — that 
they  are  not  constituted  into  any  particular  perma- 
nent shape  or  form  exclusively;  .and  neither  has  any 
kuowable,  physical  bounds.  All  physical  forms, 


90  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

masses,  motions,  and  changes  are  nothing  else  than 
the  sensitive  modes,  relatively  permanent  or  tran- 
sient, of  each  individual.  The  individual  itself  is 
formless,  except  as  it  exists  in  these  forms,  itself  the 
simple  subject  of  these  phenomena.  It  is  purely  a 
power  to  experience  these,  partly  irrespective  of 
volition  and  partly  by  the  aid  of  volition.  The  sub- 
ject ego  is  the  soul  of  the  world,  which  is  its  feeling 
and  action.  So  that  this  soul  of  the  world  is  the 
world. 

Personality  does  not  necessarily  imply  limitation, 
and  ah  infinite  personality  is  just  as  conceivable  as  a 
finite  personality.  Finite  personality  is  a  self-con- 
scious individual  of  limited  power.  An  infinite  per- 
sonality is  an  almighty  self-conscious  individual,  able 
to  do  whatever  does  not  involve  a  self-contradiction. 

Alleged  Obscurity  of  this  Doctrine. 

Sticklers  for  common  sense  in  a  region  where  un- 
common intelligence  is  called  for  object  to  this,  merely 
because  it  is  not  to  them  easy  of  comprehension. 
They  say  you  can  never  secure  credence  for  *such  a 
doctrine  as  that,  that  it  is  all  too  vague  and  abstract, 
that  it  refines  away  the  individual  until  he  becomes 
an  airy  nothing  without  a  local  habitation, — nothing 
but  a  name,  without  form  or  shape,  without  spacial 
or  temporal  limitation  and  circumscription,  so  that  it 
is  entirely  shut  out  from  the  sphere  of  imagination 
and  definite  conception.  How  can  we  believe  what 
we  cannot  imagine  or  conceive?  Our  individuality 
as  connected  with  the  organism  presents  something 
real  and  proximately  precise  for  the  understanding, 
but  as  timeless  and  spaceless  as  something  back  of  all 
phenomena,  and  which  appropriates  to  itself  all  the 
known  universe  as  a  series  of  modes  of  itself.  It 
is  then  worse  than  the  genie  of  the  Eastern  fable, 
which,  being  let  out  of  the  teapot,  becomes  diffused 
and  dissipated  till  it  is  lost  in  universal  space.  An 
objection  of  this  kind  will  long  and  widely  prevail 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  91 

and  with  pernicious  effect,  because  of  the  vastness 
and  subtlety  of  the  new  thought,  which  not  only  ex- 
tends beyond  the  wonted  range,  but  also  opposes 
dominant  tastes. 

Whence  comes  the  Apparent  Clearness  of  the  Vul- 
gar Notion? 

The  prevailing  notion  is  at  bottom  merely  sensism, 
or,  at  best,  organicism.  It  limits  the  ego  to  the  organ- 
ism. Whether  it  identifies  the  two  or  not,  it  gives  to 
the  soul  a  sort  of  spacial  outline,  and  thence  a  form 
or  image  which  appeals  to  the  imagination,  if  not  to 
the  senses.  In  this  way,  the  ego  is  proximately  de- 
fined. This  is  the  crudest  and  most  primeval  notion, 
but  it  prevails  practically  or  theoretically  over  the 
most  advanced  thinkers  as  well  as  over  the  vulgar 
mind.  A  distinguished  academic  president  recently 
said  to  the  author  that  he  considered  all  beyond  the 
organism  as  non-ego,  and  the  rest  as  ego,  expressing 
the  same  idea  also  at  the  same  time  by  gesticulating 
the  difference.  I  replied  that  that  is  the  essential 
theory  of  sensism  and  objective  evolution  which 
makes  the  ego  to  be  the  organism  and  never  the 
same  at  two  successive  moments,  the  ego  and  non-ego 
being  continually  transmuted  into  each  other;  and 
that,  besides  being  self-contradictory,  it  is  contrary  to 
the  most  familiar  principles  of  optics  and  psychologi- 
cal science.  All  this  my  learned  friend  could  see  at 
once,  but  could  not  conceive  any  other  notion  of  the 
ego  than  that  which  is  one  with  the  organism  or 
confined  to  the  organism. 

Two  Exclusive  Conceptions  of  the  Ego. 

There  are  only  two  main  conceptions  of  the  ego 
possible, — that  which  transcends  the  organism  and 
that  which  is  confined  to  the  organism.  The  latter  is 
of  two  forms,— that  which  identifies  the  organism  and 
ego,  and  that  which  pluralizes  them.  The  latter  is 
the  orthodox  religious  view,  for  religion  has  always 


92  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

insisted  on  some  psychology  and  philosophy.  Both 
these  have  an  advantage  over  the  first  relative  to  the 
senses  and  imaging  faculty  or  imagination,  which  are 
the  faculties  most  in  exercise  even  by  many  educated 
men;  and  even  reasoning  is  distrusted  or  repudiated 
where  its  successive  steps  cannot  be  presented  as  a 
.series  of  images,  and  intellect  is  thus  considered  as 
a  "faint"  impression  of  sense,  as  Hume  affirmed  and 
Spencer  has  repeated.  To  this  class  of  minds  there  is 
a  great  advantage  in  being  able  to  screw  and  circum- 
scribe the  ego  within  the  confines  of  a  limited  time 
and  space  like  the  organism,  and  its  convenience  has 
a  dementing  influence  of  great  and  insidious  power. 

Now  let  us  pass  beyond  this,  and  we  are  obliged  to 
traverse  the  utmost  extent  of  the  sensible  universe, 
and  include  it  all  as  modes  of  the  ego.  If  we  affirm 
anything  beyond  the  organism  to  be  ego,  we  have  no 
stopping-place  anywhere.  The  sphere  is  boundless, 
commensurate  with  all  phenomena  of  every  possible 
form  and  quarter.  Now,  we  are  out  on  a  shoreless 
ocean  as  to  sense;  while  thought  rises  to  the  image- 
less,  which  is  beyond  and  above  all  sense,  just  as  the 
lark  rises  above  embrasured  turret  and  gilded  spire  to 
sing  viewless  in  the  viewless  air.  But  it  is  not  strictly 
spaceless  and  timeless,  because  its  modes  constitute 
space  and  time. 

This  is  the  logical  outcome  of  modern  science, 
which  makes  all  phenomena  to  be  subjective  states, 
so  that  all  the  known  universe  is  ego,  and  ego  is  at 
least  commensurate  with  that  universe,  and  the 
power  which  evolves  it,  which  is  sensible  or  organic 
only  so  far  as  it  evolves  itself  in  sensible  and  organic 
forms;  and,  beyond  this,  we  can  only  conceive  and 
describe  it  as  a  power  of  so  and  so  thinking  and 
acting. 

This  will  appear  appalling  to  all  but  minds  of  the 
strongest  fibre.  Even  brave  old  seamen  have  often 
shook  with  fear  in  unknown  seas.  But  shall  philoso- 
phy surrender  itself  to  cowardice,  and  shall  we  fight 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  93 

against  oar  own  intelligence,  because  it  calls  us  to  a 
brave  conquest  of  new  lands,  or  because  it  disturbs 
our  old  prejudice  and  mental  comfort  and  ignorant 
and  delusive  sense  of  power,  and  yet  calls  us  to  the 
possession  of  a  grander  dignity  and  larger  power  ? 

Mutual  Destruction  of  the  Organicists. 

The  two  parties  into  which  the  advocates  of  organ- 
icism  are  divided  are  in  deadly  hostility ;  and,  in  their 
frequent  tournaments,  each  is  always  able  to  unhorse 
the  other  by  using  different  weapons,  and  each  party 
has  again  and  again  confessed  its  relative  weakness. 
Each  proves  the  other  to  be  inconsistent  and  irra- 
tional somewhere;  and  the  battle  always  ends  by  the 
affirmation  of  each  that  it  is  less  irrational  than  the 
other,  which  is  the  utmost  that  either  can  claim. 
Their  relative  merits  is  .not  our  concern.  We  care 
not  which  of  the  two  is  the  greater  fool.  Enough 
that  we  cannot  accept  either  of  them  without  shut- 
ting our  eyes;  and  that  for  those  who  prefer  to  keep 
their  eyes  open  there  is  no  logical  alternative  but  to 
accept  the  theory  of  extra-organicism  in  the  simplest 
possible  form,  as  we  have  expounded  it. 

Superior  Clearness  of  Extra-orgaiiicism. 

This  theory,  so  far  from  being  specially  obscure,  is 
perfectly  clear,  and  the  only  theory  that  can  be  clear, 
because  it  only  is  self-consistent  and  rational.  It  has 
no  mental  lacunae.  It  does  not  require  us  to  ignore 
our  intelligence  anywhere.  It  is  self-justified  and 
luminous  in  every  part.  And  it  is  the  least  possible 
assertion  that  can  be  made  self-consistent  and  in  har- 
mony with  experience. 

The  supposition  that  a  peculiar  vagueness  is  char- 
acteristic of  this  theory  is  erroneous.  It  is  ultimately 
quite  as  definite  and  precise  as  its  rivals.  It  gives  us 
consciousness  in  all  its  forms,  all  phenomena,—  or- 
ganic, extra-organic,  and  super-organic,  if  there  is 
any  of  the  last, — and  all  these  it  presents  in  a  consist- 


94  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

ent  formula;  and  no  theory  can  do  more.  It  says 
that  the  ego  is  the  power  of  being  and  of  knowing  all 
these,  and  this  is  perfectly  definite.  We  could  have 
no  other  ultimate  definition,  if  we  should  limit  the  ego 
to  the  organism;  for  it  would  still  be  nothing  more 
nor  less  than  the  power  of  so  being  and  acting, — that 
is,  as  the  subject  of  these  phenomena.  The  only  dif- 
ference between  them  is  in  their  implications.  The 
limitation  of  these  phenomena  to  the  organism  in- 
volves various  contradictions,  from  which  the  other 
is  exempt. 

Unrecognized  Prevalence  of  Extrn-orgauicisni. 

While  organicism,  monistic  or  dualistic,  is  a  very 
common  habit  of  thought,  yet  on  the  other  hand,  side 
by  side  with  this  in  the  same  minds,  the  opposite  no- 
tion to  organicism  is  generally  entertained,  so  that  it 
is  extensively  ingrained  in  modern  literature.  We 
give  one  striking  example  from  a  brilliant  French 
writer  (Taine),  who  cannot  easily  be  referred  to  any 
recognized  class  of  dogmatic  theorizers.  It  is  from 
his  English  Literature  (Intro.  II.),  and  is  as  follows: 
"When  you  consider  with  your  eyes  the  visible  man, 
what  do  you  look  for?  The  man  invisible.  The 
words  which  enter  your  ears,  the  gestures,  the  mo- 
tions of  his  head,  the  clothes  he  wears,  visible  acts 
and  deeds  of  every  kind  are  expressions  merely. 
Somewhat  is  revealed  beneath  them,  and  that  is  a 
soul.  An  inner  man  is  concealed  beneath  the  outer 
man:  the  second  does  but  disclose  the  first.  You 
look  at  his  house,  furniture,  dress,  in  order  to  dis- 
cover in  them  the  marks  of  his  habits  and  tastes,  the 
degree  of  his  refinement  or  rusticity,  his  extrava- 
gance or  his  economy,  his  stupidity  or  his  acuteness. 
You  listen  to  his  conversation,  and  you  note  the  in- 
flections of  his  voice,  the  changes  in  his  attitudes,  in 
order  to  judge  of  his  vivacity,  his  self-forgetfulness  or 
his  gayety,  his  energy  or  his  constraint.  You  consider 
his  writings,  his  artistic  productions,  his  business 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  95 

transactions,  or  political  ventures,  in  order  to  meas- 
ure the  scope  and  limits  of  his  intelligence,  his  in- 
ventiveness, his  coolness,  to  find  out  the  order,  the 
character,  the  general  force  of  his  ideas,  the  modes  in 
which  he  thinks  and  resolves.  All  these  externals 
are  but  avenues  toward  a  centre,  and  that  centre  is 
the  genuine  man.  I  mean  that  mass  of  faculties  and 
feelings  which  are  the  inner  man.  We  have  reached 
a  new  world,  which  is  infinite,  because  every  action 
which  we  see  involves  infinite  association  of  reason- 
ings, emotions,  sensations  new  and  old,  which  have 
served  to  bring  it  to  light,  and  which,  like  great  rocks 
deep-seated  in  the  ground,  find  in  it  their  end  and 
their  level.  This  underworld  is  a  new  subject-matter 
proper  to  the  historian.  If  his  critical  education  is 
sufficient,  everything  is  a  symbol  to  him,  whence  'he 
works  out  its  psychology.' "  Though  this  author's 
object  here  is  not  metaphysical,  and  shows  no  steady 
philosophical  vision,  yet  it  is  quite  evident  that  he 
makes  the  ego  to  be  something  other  and  vastly 
greater  and  more  subtle  and  persistent  than  organic 
forms  or  any  other  forms, — a  wondrous  and  incom- 
prehensible unit,  which  is  partially  manifest  in  all 
phenomena.  And,  in  this,  he  has  nothing  peculiar. 

ITUiniacy  of  our  Doctrine. 

Our  exposition  gives  us  not  only  a  combination,  but 
a  perfect  unity  of  the  permanent  and  transient,  the 
substantial  and  phenomenal,  and  makes  them  equally 
known,  each  in  the  other.  Phenomena  are  always 
changing.  The  ego  is  always  the  same  through  all  the 
changes;  and  it  changes  while  it  remains  the  same, 
changing  in  its  modes  and  remaining  the  same  sub- 
stantive subject  and  source  of  such  changing  modes. 
It  therefore  comprises  at  least  all  the  phenomena  of 
both  sense  and  inner  consciousness,  and  is  the  womb 
of  other  possible  phenomena  which  we  cannot  yet 
even  imagine.  These  phenomena  are  organic  and  ex- 
tra-organic and  super-organic.  The  ego  is  at  least  com- 


06  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

mensurate  with  all  of  these;  and,  in  all  these,  it  is 
known,  though  not  fully  known.  It  cannot  in  any 
sense  be  less  than  all  these  taken  together,  nor  less 
enduring,  so  that  it  covers  all  known  and  knowable 
space  and  time.  It  does  not  exist  in  space  and  time 
for  these,  so  far  as  phenomenal  or  knowable  exist  in  it 
with  all  their  contents.  Nor  is  there  any  more  mys- 
tery about  its  existence  than  about  anything  else. 
All  else,  if  there  is  anything  else  supposed  to  be 
known,  simply  exist  and  operate  as  so  and  so  related; 
and  it  is  just  as  simple  and  clear  to  say  that  the  ego 
exists  in  relation  to  them  as  conscious  subject.  It  is 
only  as  phenomena  of  the  conscious  subject  that  they 
are  known,  and  the  subject  or  ego  is  known  only  as 
knowing  them,  as  the  thing  which  knows  them ;  and 
then  analysis  shows  us  that  to  know  them  is  to  be 
them,  to  be  their  subject  and  source,  so  that  they  are 
but  so  many  modes  of  the  ego,  the  ego  itself  so  and 
so  existing  and  acting.  To  ask  anything  beyond  this 
betrays  obtuseness  instead  of  acuteness  and  thor- 
oughness of  mental  power,  because  it  is  meaningless. 

Environment   of   Organism  not   Environment  of 

^go- 
Evolution,  so  far  as  it  has  yet  evolved,  is  a  form  of 
orgauicism.  Hence,  it  has  considered  its  chief  task  to 
be  to  show  the  interaction  between  the  organism  and 
its  environment;  and  laboriously  has  it  wrought  at 
this  on  the  assumption  that  in  so  doing  it  has  been 
showing  the  interaction  between  the  ego  and  the  non- 
ego.  It  finds  that  an  environment  of  constant  action, 
yet  always  lexically  changing,  is  necessary  to  the 
evolution  of  the  organism,  and  determines  its  forms 
and  duration,  whence  it  is  inferred  that  this  environ- 
ment effects  the  same  for  the  ego;  and,  as  the  chief 
quality  of  human  personality  is  intelligence,  this  is 
said  to  have  the  same  origin  and  end.  From  their 
objective  stand-point,  they  are  right.  If  the  external 
world  is  non-ego,  there  is  no  other  legitimate  conclu- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  97 

sion.  But  we  now  see  that  this  is  a  great  error; 
and  that,  compared  with  the  greatness  and  grandeur 
of  the  facts  disclosed  to  us,  it  is  very  narrow  and 
superficial.  Relative  to  the  organism,  an  environment 
is  a  fact  and  a  necessity,  physically  and  logically. 
But,  to  the  ego,  any  environment  of  space  or  time  is 
impossible,  a  self-contradiction,  because  the  ego  is 
and  must  be  commensurate  with  all  the  knowable 
forever,  all  space  and  time,. and  all  their  contents. 
Whatever  is  known  is  a  mode  of  intelligence,  is  the 
knowing  subject  in  said  knowing  mode.  An  envi- 
ronment is  therefore  neither  necessary  nor  possible 
to  any  intelligence  except  an  organic  intelligence. 
But  we  know  no  intelligence  which  is  purely  organic. 
Even  our  sensible  intelligence  is  mostly  extra-organic, 
and  spreads  over  the  whole  universe,  with  which  our 
personal  intelligence  is  identified,  which  excludes  the 
possibility  of  an  environment.  This  is  important  as 
we  go  along.  I  will  add  that  it  annihilates  the  argu- 
ment against  an  infinite  Personality,  which  it  is  said 
requires  an  impossible  environment,  an  argument 
which  further  on  will  receive  due  consideration. 

Argument  of  Comicality. 

''Common-sense  people,"  no  doubt,  will  readily,  if 
not  necessarily,  conceive  this  in  a  light  which  is  suf- 
ficiently comical,  apparently  ridiculous,  and  a  good 
refutation  of  it,  or  at  least  a  good  reason  for  holding 
it  in  small  esteem.  Nearly  every  new  truth  in  science 
and  philosophy,  and  elsewhere  there  is  nothing  new 
under  the  sun,  is  comical,  if  not  ridiculous,  to  old 
error  and  prejudice.  How  absurdly  ludicrous  it  ap- 
peared to  the  pre-Copernicans  to  affirm  the  existence 
of  people  and  things  at  antipodes  to  each  other,  which 
was  supposed  to  make  those  opposite  to  us  to  be  up- 
side down,  as  how  could  it  be  otherwise,  since  we 
are  upside  up?  We  all  now  easily  see  that  no  other 
kosmic  conception  than  the  Copernican  is  really  pos- 
sible, that  all  are  equally  antipodes  to  some  others, 


98  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

and  yet  all  are  equally  right  side  up,  and  that  all 
people  and  all  mundane  things  cling  to  the  earth  in 
every  situation  by  the  same  one  law  of  gravitation. 
Organicists  may  laugh  at  the  idea  of  a  man  always 
seeing  and  handling,  embracing  or  righting,  or  eating 
and  drinking  only  himself,  and  of  his  being  burned 
or  crushed  to  death  by  himself  or  drowned  by  him- 
self or  devoured  by  himself,  whether  in  the  form  of 
sharks  or  wolves  or  worms.  But  there  is  at  least 
one  mind  to  whom  it  appears  that  we  must  either 
return  to  the  prescientific  condition  or  advance  to 
the  clear  perception,  that  this  is  the  only  way  of 
conceiving  the  present  or  past  forms  of  our  exist- 
ence, and  that  this  is  the  course  and  nature  of  all 
existence  under  organic  and  sensible  forms.  The 
organism  is  engendered  or  destroyed  by  other  phys- 
ical forms  which  are  egoistic ;  but  the  ego  itself  never 
is,  so  far  as  we  know,  because  through  all  known  and 
knowable  mutations  the  ego  persists,  else  we  could 
not  know  the  mutations. 


IX. 

Permanence  and  Simplicity  of  the  Ego, 


BY  the  simplicity  of  the  ego,  I  mean  that  it  is  not 
an  aggregation  of  parts  and  particles,  but  one  and  the 
same  homogeneous  thing  throughout, — simply  a  force 
which  is  able  to  be  and  to  do  and  suffer  so  and  so. 

This  doctrine  stands  opposed  to  the  theory  of  or- 
ganic atomism,  whether  the  atoms  be  the  monads  of 
Leibnitz  or  the  material  particles  of  Epicurus  and 
Lucretius  or  of  modern  chemistry  and  evolution.  It 
is  opposed  to  the  dualism  of  mind  and  matter  of  all 
ages.  Still  more  is  it  opposed  to  the  theory  of  a  few 
in  different  ages  and  recent  times  who  have  held  to 
a  trichotomy  of  substances  in  the  human  individual. 
From  all  these,  the  doctrine  of  the  simplicity  of  the 
ego  needs  to  be  well  discriminated  and  defended. 

The  Constant  and  Perduring  Ego. 

There  is  a  sense  in  which  the  ego  is  rightly  con- 
sidered as  various,  complex,  and  multiplex.  This  is 
the  organic  ego,  which  is  inconstant,  variable,  local. 
But  this  is  not  a  full  account  of  the  ego,  and  it  be- 
comes false  when  taken  for  the  whole  and  proper  ego. 
All  along  our  history,  through  all  the  changes  of  our 
experience,  both  organic  and  inorganic,  the  ego  as- 
serts itself  as  abiding  the  same  simple,  indivisible, 
and  unchanged  (yet  changed)  and  continuous  ego,  as 
a  perfect  unity  without  parts  or  organs.  The  stars  of 
childhood  are  the  stars  of  maturity  and  old  age,  and 
I  who  saw  them  then  am  the  very  one  who  sees  them 
now.  If  they  have  changed,|I  have  not.  With  all 


100  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

my  modal  changes  since  childhood,  I  am  the  very 
same  person  I  was  then,— the  very  same  substance 
and  reality,  nothing  removed,  nothing  added.  All 
the  changes  I  have  undergone  in  the  long  interval  are 
only  modal,  while  I  remain  the  same  individual  force 
in  which  all  the  changes  occur,  and  which  evolves 
them  all  from  and  in  itself,  because  such  is  its  abiding 
nature.  Thus,  through  all  the  successions  of  the 
memory,  and  far  beyond,  the  ego  is  the  same.  It  is 
not  memory,  nor  the  continuity  of  consciousness, 
which  makes  it  the  same,  though  these  may  help  a 
certain  class  of  verifications.  The  ego  exists,  and 
exists  through  all  these  changes,  which  are  only  and 
always  its  modal  mutations. 

We  must  here  refer  again  to  the  commonplace  in 
philosophy,  and  signalized  by  Kant,  that  change  is 
only  possible  in  the  permanent.  Without  a  perdur- 
ing  permanent,  there  is  no  possible  change,  but  only 
successive  annihilations  and  creations;  and,  as  the 
latter  horn  of  the  alternative  is  inadmissible,  the  first 
is  inevitable.  Not  creation,  but  evolution,  is  the 
nature  of  all  known  change  in  the  varying  and  suc- 
cessive phenomena  of  the  world.  In  accordance  with 
this,  all  the  atomists  admit  and  contend  that  there 
is  a  great  perduring  world  whose  total  force  remains 
the  same  through  all  kosmic  changes.  The  same 
principle  surely  holds  good  for  the  6.170,  especially 
when  we  consider  that  the  great  world  is  the  ego. 
All  its  forms  are  known  only  as  sensations,  and 
hence  its  source  and  subject  is  the  ego,  which  is  the 
substantive  force  and  generator  of  all  phenomena. 
Thus  there  is  certainly  an  unchanging  ego,  which  re- 
mains the  same  through  all  atomistic  mutations  and 
combinations. 

Its  Immortality. 

What  remains  the  same  through  all  the  mutations 
of  the  human  organization  and  of  the  kosmic  world 
may  be  reasonably  presumed  to  remain  or  continue 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  101 

to  exist  through  the  mutations  of  the  dissolving  or- 
ganism. Its  annihilation  is  declared  to  be  inconceiv- 
able when  it  is  contemplated  as  the  kosmic  force, 
which  is  the  ego,  though  unrecognized  as  such  by  the 
kosmicists.  In  short,  the  ego  full  and  proper  is  the 
unchanging  subject  of  all  phenomena,  the  abiding 
force  which  is  the  cause  of  all  change,  and  which 
must  forever  change  because  it  is  a  force,  and  yet 
must  remain  the  same  force. 

The  great  law  of  change  in  the  past,  so  far  as 
known  to  us,  is  one  of  progress.  Man  is  the  evolved 
product  of  all  the  innumerable  past  changes.  And 
man,  as  an  individual  substance  and  force,  did  not 
begin  his  existence  with  his  organic  birth.  Innumer- 
able were  his  successive  births  and  lives  and  deaths 
before  that;  for  he  had  previously  existed  in  every 
type  and  form  from  chaos  up  to  mammal,  yet  remain- 
ing ever  the  same  in  all  the  great  features  of  life  con- 
stituting the  world  (which  yet  was  always  changing), 
and  at  the  same  time  undergoing  specific  changes 
in  organic  evolution.  What  has  lived  in  and  through 
and  constituted  all  these  forms  and  changes  is  not 
likely  to  perish  with  the  dissolution  of  the  present 
organism. 

In  the  next  place,  our  survival  of  the  organic  ego 
is  supported  by  our  doctrine  of  the  simplicity  of  the 
nature  of  the  ego.  As  it  is  not  organic,  it  cannot  be 
disorganized  nor  dismembered  nor  in  any  wise  fun- 
damentally affected  by  any  possible  changes. 

It  is  supported  by  our  doctrine  of  the  ego  as  a  force, 
which  is  the  source  of  all  its  own  changes, — that  is,  of 
all  the  changes  of  the  universe  whose  soul  it  is;  and 
so  there  is  no  known  or  conceivable  force  to  operate 
on  it  from  without  and  hurt  it. 

The  organic  ego  is  mortal;  and,  if  this  were  all  there 
is  of  us,  the  notion  of  immortality  would  be  baseless. 
But  this  is  the  doctrine  of  materialism,  not  ours.  Let 
materialists  perish,  if  they  wish,  as  they  will,  and 
their  doctrine,  too;  and  the  sooner,  the  better.  Doubt- 


102  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

less,  they  will  die  hard,  and  will  endeavor  to  prolong 
their  existence  by  feeding  on  our  argument,  as  moth 
and  mice  often  feed  on  fine  garments  when  they  can 
get  at  them  in  a  dark  place. 

They  will  plead  that  the  external  world  is  only 
known  through  the  senses  of  the  organism,  so  that, 
if  these  are  all  destroyed,  the  whole  universe  is  to  us 
blotted  out,  and  conscious  existence  and  individual- 
ity are  destroyed.  This  is  a  combination  of  truth  and 
error,  both  as  to  fact  and  inference. 

In  the  first  place,  we  do  not  see  the  external  world 
through  the  senses,  as  we  see  things  outside  the  house 
through  a  window,  as  is  often  supposed.  We  are  not 
inside  the  organism  as  the  organism  is  inside  the 
house.  The  organism  and  all  the  universe  are  in 
us;  and  we  see  the  extra-organic  world  directly  as  a 
spirit-power,  super-organic.  The  eye  is  blind,  the 
ear  is  deaf,  and  the  tongue  is  dumb,  the  palate  knows 
nothing  of  taste  nor  the  hand  of  touch.  It  is  only  I 
who  know  and  do  all  these  things;  and  all  the  senses, 
total  and  several, — that  is,  the  whole  organism  and 
all  its  forms  and  motions, — are  only  so  many  sensa- 
tions, as  are  all  the  forms  and  motions  of  the  world 
beyond;  and  these  senses  of  our  body  have  no  more 
power  of  discernment  or  experience  than  those  rocks 
or  clouds  or  stars  which  are  equally  sensations. 
There  is  a  law  of  connection  between  organic  experience 
and  extra-organic  experience.  This  is  the  statement  of 
the  truth  and  of  all  the  truth  on  this  subject.  The 
soul  sees  both,  and  all  things  directly,  but  only  in 
accordance  with  certain  subjective  laws  (and  there 
are  no  other  laws).  There  is,  therefore,  no  logical 
difficulty  in  conceiving  that  the  soul  may  develop  a 
power  of  knowing  what  answers  to  sensible  phenom- 
ena, though  the  present  organism  be  dissolved.  In 
what  we  call  the  normal  state  of  the  present  order, 
the  two  classes  of  perceptions,  the  organic  and  extra- 
organic,  are  lexically  connected;  but  this,  so  to  speak, 
is  only  an  accident.  It  may  at  any  time  be  changed 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  103 

by  the  ever-active  forces  of  evolution  within  the  soul. 
Still,  the  possible  proved  is  no  proof  of  the  fact;  yet 
since  the  soul,  and  not  the  senses,  and  that  directly, 
discerns  extra-organic  objects,  we  have  here  a  ground 
on  which,  in  connection  with  other  material,  we  may 
build  up  a  probable  argument  for  conscious  activity 
after  the  dissolution  of  the  body,  and  plenty  of  other 
material  is  at  hand. 

This  material,  in  addition  to  the  arguments  fur- 
nished above,  is  found  in  the  set  of  facts  which  has 
given  rise  to  the  doctrine  of  sensible  relativity  that 
experiences  change  with  the  changing  conditions  and 
circumstances  and  forms  of  the  organism.  How  dif- 
ferent the  world  of  the  ant,  the  fly  and  elephant 
and  man !  Now,  all  evolution  of  the  past  has  been 
a  change  of  the  modes  of  the  subject,  which  has  thus 
attained  new  organic  forms  and  sensible  experiences. 
That  is,  in  brief,  the  history  of  all  organic  evolution 
in  the  past,  and  the  only  index  we  have  of  the  future. 
So  that,  presumably,  our  death,  so-called,  or  organic 
dissolution,  is  simply  a  change  of  organic  experiences; 
and  so  the  world  will  be  different  and  yet  connected 
with  this,  perhaps  as  the  lower  animals  are  with  the 
higher,  and  the  animals  of  the  water,  air,  and  land 
with  each  other. 

Then  there  are  evolutions  within  the  present  life 
which  exhibit  a  transition  from  one  state  to  another, 
which  is  equivalent  to  a  transition  from  one  world  to 
another.  It  is  seen  in  all  foetal  existence  compared 
with  the  after  life.  It  is  still  more  fully  seen  in  the 
larval  condition  compared  with  the  insect  condition, 
especially  where  the  larvae  lived  in  the  water.  It  is 
seen  with  equal  clearness  in  some  batrachians,  espe- 
cially the  frog,  which  first  lives  the  life  and  wears  the 
fish  form  chiefly,  and  then  takes  a  singularly  human 
form  and  breathes  the  air. 

In  men,  also,  there  are  some  wonderful  experiences 
indicative  of  a  latent  supra-organic  power  struggling 
for  freedom  and  development.  Among  these  indica- 


104  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

tions,  we  may  mention  trances,  clairvoyance,  and 
action  which  cannot  be  attributed  to  any  known 
organic  agency;  as,  for  instance,  writing  between  two 
slates  pressed  close  together,  separated  only  by  the 
rim  of  their  frames,  and  so  held  together  by  many 
strong  hands  and  even  by  an  iron  clamp, — a  phe- 
nomenon which,  with  others  equally  wonderful,  has 
been  often  witnessed  and  testified  to  by  many  of  the 
ablest  men  of  our  times.  Whether  these  are  con- 
sidered as  the  effect  of  human  agency  or  ex-human 
agency  is  all  one  relative  to  our  argument.  They 
prove  that  the  human  spirit  has  a  super-organic  power 
of  perception  and  action. 

Numerous  testimonies  of  the  highest  authority  also 
certify  the  existence  of  sensible  knowledges  without 
the  action  of  any  of  the  recognized  senses.  Things 
are  seen  at  a  distance  and  through  stone  walls  and 
through  various  coverings.  For  example,  nine  men 
of  ability  and  culture  have  each  rolled  into  a  pellet  a 
sentence  on  a  separate  slip  of  paper,  and  then  mixed 
them  all  together,  so  that  no  one  knew  his  own  paper 
or  could  tell  the  contents  of  any  one  of  them  by 
specification.  Yet  a  tenth  man  in  the  company,  who 
has  had  no  sensible  knowledge  of  any  one  of  them, 
direct  or  indirect,  has  told  the  contents  of  each  one 
in  succession  with  entire  accuracy,  as  verified  by  all 
the  nine  men.  Whatever  was  the  agent  or  faculty  or 
operation  which  achieved  this  result,  it  was  not  or- 
ganic vision  or  tactual  impression  or  hearing;  and 
yet  it  was  accurate  and  unerring  perception  of  visual 
forms  and  their  meaning. 

These  phenomena  are  not  adduced  as  supernatural, 
but  as  the  natural  evolution  of  human  power,  whether 
its  action  be  considered  as  originated  in  the  men  of 
our  world  or  with  those  who  have  left  and  who 
return  to  operate  upon  it.  As  they  demonstrate  a 
super-organic  power  already  existing  and  operating 
in  and  through  man  now,  they  utterly  disprove  the 
materialist's  notion  that  our  individuality  with  all  its 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  105 

power  is  the  product  or  the  action  of  the  material 
organism  with  which,  it  is  alleged,  it  began  its  exist- 
ence and  will  end  its  existence.  The  proof  is  surely 
very  strong  that  the  ego  is  essentially  super-organic, 
and  will  survive  and  probably  evolve  into  a  higher 
condition  on  the  dissolution  of  the  organism. 

Finally,  for  this  topic  here,  who  will  believe,  who 
can  believe,  that  the  dissolution  of  my  organism  is 
the  utter  annihilation  of  the  entire  universe?  No 
one.  Yet  that  is  the  event  which  constitutes  my 
extinction  ;  for  I  am  the  universe,  which  is  only  a 
congeries  of  my  subjective  states,  modes  of  the  ego, 
which  is  the  only  conceivable  substance  of  the  uni- 
verse, the  one  great  force  everywhere  and  always 
working  and  generating  and  destroying  the  myriads 
of  forms  and  motions  which  constitute  the  sensible 
kosrnos,  as  well  as  all  the  supersensible  experience 
and  action  of  feeling,  thought,  and  volition.  All  are 
known  only  as  the  modes  of  the  one  ego;  and,  if 
they  live,  I  live  also,  and  only  because  I  am  are  they 
possible. 

The  Aggregated  iTloua<li«m  of  Leibnitz. 

The  monadistic,  not  monistic,  theory  of  Leibnitz  is 
so  thoroughly  and  purely  an  invention,  so  completely 
unbased  on  observed  facts,  that  it  is  a  wonder  how  it 
should  ever  have  received  so  much  attention,  though 
it  is  probably  quite  as  much  founded  on  fact  as  some 
other  noted  systems, — as,  for  instance,  those  of  Schell- 
ing  and  Hegel.  But,  when  such  systems  are  at  many 
points  inconsistent  with  themselves,  the  wonder 
grows  that  they  could  ever  have  been  developed  to 
such  fulness  in  the  author's  mind  as  well  as  in  the 
interest  of  the  philosophic  public.  The  theory  of 
Leibnitz  is  irreconcilable  with  any  rational  or  scien- 
tific doctrine  of  individual  unity.  According  to  it, 
the  individual,  so  called,  cannot  even  admit  of  a  col- 
lective unity,  such  as  belongs  to  an  army  or  a  nation, 
still  less  of  the  unity  of  a  vital  organism  like  an  an- 


106  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

imal  body.  For  these  are  supposed  to  be  the  effect  of 
perpetual  interaction  of  part  on  part  and  on  environ- 
ment,  so  that  every  part  and  the  total  result  are  thus 
continuously  modified,  exemplifying  a  law  of  cause 
and  effect  all  through.  All  otherwise  is  it  with  the 
theory  of  Leibnitz  ;  for  his  monads  are  all  self- 
sufficient,  so  that  no  one  can  be  affected  by  anything 
beyond  itself,  and  each  is  a  force  only  for  its  own 
conservation  and  development,  never  for  operation 
on  one  another  or  others  or  on  aught  else.  Hence, 
it  is  impossible  for  their  aggregation  to  be  ever  any- 
thing more  than  so  many  contiguous  unities,  like 
grains  of  sand  in  a  heap. 

Then  these  monads  are  entirely  unknown ;  and 
their  infinitely  multitudinous  and  minute  existence 
and  separate  action  are  opposed  to  our  conviction  of 
individual  unity,  and  equally  opposed  to  the  known 
action  of  our  modalities  in  causal  relation  to  each 
other.  Again,  Leibnitz  makes  time,  space,  matter, 
and  motion  to  be,  not  any  realities,  but  merely  phe- 
nomena ;  but,  if  these  are  all  nothing,  what  is  there 
that  is  real  ?  Our  thoughts  and  volitions  are  no  more 
real  than  matter  and  motion,  which  in  the  last  analy- 
sis are  subjective  states  ;  and  these  two  classes  of 
phenomena,  the  sensible  and  supersensible,  are  all 
we  know  or  ever  can  know,  and  so  the  monads  are 
nowhere  found  within  the  range  of  science  or  philoso- 
phy or  common  sense  or  imagination. 

Still  further,  these  monads  are  said  to  be  without 
extension,  and  yet  are  perceived  only  under  the  rela- 
tion of  extension  because  of  their  aggregation  ;  but 
how  the  inextended  can  be  aggregated,  collocated, 
and  thence  seem  to  be  extended,  he  does  not  explain. 

The  difference  between  body  and  mind  in  this 
theory  is  quite  pretty,— the  difference  between  sleep- 
ing monads  and  waking  monads,  which,  in  the 
proper  place,  would  be  as  good  as  some  poetry  ;  and 
to  learn  how  these  sleeping  monads  may  be  waked 
into  life,  and  to  see  them  rising,  would  be  very  inter- 
esting. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  107 

This  theory  has  been  much  noticed  because  of  the 
great  name  of  its  author,  because  of  its  appeal  to  a 
certain  order  of  religious  feeling,  because  of  its  alli- 
ance with  a  certain  kind  of  atomistic  rigid  necessity 
in  the  world,  and  because  of  its  inconsistent  capa- 
bility of  being  interpreted  either  in  accord  with  dual- 
ism or  modern  materialism  by  judicious  selections 
from  its  incoherent  materials.  Besides,  it  has  the 
real  merit  of  affirming  that  all  things  are  intrinsic 
force,  though  they  can  affect  only  themselves. 

Organic  Atomism. 

Far  more  simple  as  well  as  more  familiar  is  the 
atomistic  theory  of  material  organicism,  according  to 
Epicurus,  Lucretius,  and  modern  evolution.  This 
makes  the  eyo  to  be  an  organic  evolution  from  the 
world,  changing  as  changes  the  action  of  the  evolu- 
tionary forces,  and  perishing  with  the  dissolution  of 
the  organism.  The  human  ego  is  thus  only  an  or- 
ganic mode  of  the  world-force.  It  is  constituted  by 
the  building  up  of  the  material  atoms  in  certain  rela- 
tions to  each  other  into  the  living  structure  of  the 
human  body  ;  and  it  continues  to  be  the  same  only 
while  they  continue  the  same  forms  and  relations, 
which  is  never  a  measurable  moment  at  once,  and  it 
ends  entirely  when  their  organic  existence  and  rela- 
tions end.  Emphatically  is  it  true,  according  to  this 
theory,  as  Dr.  Maudsley  unblushingly,  and  without 
any  spasm  of  the  larynx,  observes,  man  "never  con- 
tinueth  in  one  stay."  This  is  thorough-paced  atom- 
ism. Many  who  reject  dualism  and  every  form  of 
spiritual  monism  are  unwilling  to  avow  this  ;  and 
tjiey  prefer  to  obscure  their  position  and  mental 
action,  and  wrap  themselves  in  the  nimbus  of  agnos- 
ticism. This  may  be  to  their  credit  in  some  aspects, 
but  not  in  any  philosophical  aspect.  From  the  lofty 
position  and  faculty  of  immortal  duration  and  ever- 
rising  power  and  felicity  as  a  supermaterial  being 
down  to  the  rank  and  condition  of  a  mere  congeries 


108  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

of  animated  material  particles,  an  ego  ever  changing 
and  speedily  dissolving  away,  the  descent  is  awful 
and  horrid.  Those  who  have  cherished  the  loftier 
view,  whose  entire  moral  and  spiritual  life  has 
wrought  in  accordance  with  it,  who  have  found  in 
it  an  elevating  and  ennobling  enjoyment,  cannot 
abandon  it  for  this  low-born  theory  without  the  very 
strongest  of  reasons.  That  man  so  far  above  himself 
should  erect  himself  through  all  the  ages,  and  with 
growing  facility,  delight,  and  grandeur  as  the  human 
race  makes  progress,  is  immensely  improbable.  Bean- 
stalks do  not  grow  up  into  the  clouds.  Heaven-in- 
vading agencies  must  be  of  stronger  and  more  endur- 
ing quality  than  material  atoms  organized  into  ani- 
mal consciousness,  which  is  constantly  perishing  as 
soon  as  it  begins  its  existence.  Such  a  thing  as  that 
could  not  survive  the  night  for  Jack  to  see  it  in  the 
morning,  much  less  climb  up  on  it  to  the  land  of  the 
giants.  "The  superior  man"  will  demand  something 
stronger  as  an  argument  against  his  best  thought  and 
life  than  the  base  and  impotent  negative  that  matter 
cannot  prove  spirit  and  immortal  life.  (Whoever 
thought  it  could  ?)  And  what  else  is  our  science  of 
objective  evolution  than  an  utterance  like  this  ?  It  is 
the  evolution  of  sensible  phenomena  and  of  all  else 
from  sensible  phenomena  ;  but  it  cannot  prove  to  us 
that  the  power  which  underlies  all  these  phenomena, 
and  gives  to  them  all  their  significance  and  impor- 
tance,—that  is,  the  subject  which  experiences  them,— 
is  not  itself  immortal.  It  has  no  right  to  speak  on 
the  question  at  all ;  and,  but  for  its  infinite  impudence, 
it  would  be  like  the  man  at  the  wedding  feast  with- 
out a  wedding  garment  on,  speechless,  and  speechless, 
it  deserves  to  gnash  its  empty  teeth  forever. 

Again,  this  ex-animal  thinker  of  low  development 
needs  to  be  reminded  of  the  principle  that  transient 
phenomena  imply  a  perduring  ego  as  their  common 
subject,  so  that  there  is  no  such  constant  mutation 
and  dissolution  and  generation  of  egos  as  atomism 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  109 

implies  ;  and  there  is  nothing  in  the  world  which 
philosophically  implies  any  limit  to  the  duration  of 
the  ego.  If  the  principle  of  subjective  continuity 
through  all  known  and  knowable  phenomenal  or 
modal  changes  fail,  then  intellectually  (and  morally, 
too) 

"The  pillared  firmament  is  rottenness, 
And  earth's  base  built  on  stubble." 

Our  opponents  may  retort  that  this  may  be  so  for 
aught  they  know,  and  they  may  be  willing  to  believe 
it.  But  we  are  not,  and  deem  we  have  good  reason 
for  believing  better  things. 

It  is  but  right  to  add  that  the  doctrine  we  oppose  is 
contrary  to  a  series  of  facts  which  are  attested  as 
directly  and  experientially  known  by  a  vast  number 
of  witnesses  in  all  lands  and  all  ranks  of  society  and 
all  grades  of  intelligence  and  culture.  Passing  by  the 
ghost  stories  of  the  olden  time,  which  have  helped  to 
keep  alive  the  belief  of  immortality  in  the  world,  the 
phenomena  of  modern  Spiritualism  demand  at  the 
very  least  a  suspension  of  judgment  concerning  per- 
sonal extinction  by  organic  dissolution.  That  there 
is  much  fraud  and  folly  connected  with  this  move- 
ment there  can  be  no  doubt ;  but  let  who  says  there 
is  nothing  else  beware,  lest  he  be  found  belying  the 
oracles  of  the  superior  gods.  It  is  not  according  to 
the  spirit  of  science  to  say  that  all  men  are  knaves  or 
fools,  because  some  are  such  at  times.  It  is  not  the 
spirit  of  science  which  refuses  to  analyze,  discrimi- 
nate, and  classify,  or  which  draws  final  conclusions 
from  a  few  experiments  which  do  not  exhaust  all  the 
methods  and  conditions  of  testing  and  determining 
the  question  under  consideration,  as  Dr.  Tyndall 
does  in  his  singular  paper  on  this  subject.  While  I 
have  given  small  attention  to  the  phenomena  in  ques- 
tion, and  have  had  little  experience  of  them,  I  think 
there  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  of  the  well-proved 
existence  of  very  many  facts  which  material  atomists 


110  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

have  not  assimilated  nor  scarce  attempted  to  explain 
in  accordance  with  their  philosophy  ;  and,  till  they 
have  done  this  satisfactorily,  they  have  no  right  to 
affirm  that  these  phenomena  are  not,  as  is  claimed,  in- 
dicative of  supra-mundane  presence  and  agency.  Let 
these  dogmatic  scientists  remember  that  their  own 
utterances  will  be  short-lived  in  proportion  as  they 
overlook  or  ignore  any  class  of  facts,  and  the  honors 
of  a  broader  as  well  as  a  profounder  philosophy  will 
be  won  and  worn  by  others. 

Dichotomy* 

On  the  other  hand,  if  evolution  is  required  to  dis- 
prove or  assimilate  the  phenomena  of  Spiritualism  in 
order  to  be  complete,  so  there  is  a  reciprocal  duty 
binding  on  the  philosophical  advocates  of  Spiritualism 
to  square  themselves  with  evolution,  which  cannot 
well  be  disputed,  though  its  special  bearing  on  the 
final  philosophy  may  be  questioned.  Therefore,  evo- 
lution must  be  recognized  ;  and  all  exposition  must  be 
in  accordance  with  it.  The  external  world  is  the 
source  of  our  bodily  organism.  Of  this  there  can  be 
no  doubt.  And  with  this  organism  are  vitally  con- 
nected and  identified  an  organic  life  and  ego.  Is  this 
to  be  explained  consistently  with  the  supra-mundane 
theory  of  the  existence  of  the  individual  as  a  self- 
conscious  personality  after  the  dissolution  of  the 
body? 

The  advocates  of  the  theory  may  invent  an  answer 
which  satisfies  themselves.  They  may  suppose  or 
conjecture  that,  along  with  the  grosser  world  of  the 
commoner  senses,  there  is  also  a  finer  world  which 
the  grosser  senses  cannot  discern  (except  in  very  rare 
and  exceptional  conditions  which  change  their  nature 
and  action),  and  that,  out  of  this  finer  world,  a  finer 
form  of  the  ego  is  developed,  which  is  the  real  and 
superior  ego ;  that  the  two  egos  and  worlds  coincide, 
so  far  as  the  inferior  extends,  and  until  what  is 
called  death  ;  that  the  finer  world  and  ego  survive  the 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  111 

dissolution  of  the  grosser,  and  form  then  a  more 
exclusively  spiritual  economy,  with  laws  of  action 
and  enjoyment  and  expression  peculiar  to  itself,  so 
that  it  and  its  action  can  be  made  known  to  us  in  the 
gross  body  and  world  only  partially  under  the  limita- 
tions of  certain  poorly  comprehended  conditions. 

Now  let  it  be  remembered  that  this  finer  ego  and 
world,  as  co-existing  along  with  the  common  world 
of  our  recognized  senses,  is  only  a  conjecture.  No 
such  world  is  certainly  known  by  us  nor  any  such 
ego  or  evolving  process.  It  may  possibly  be  true, 
but  that  proves  nothing.  Yet,  if  the  alleged  phenom- 
ena of  Spiritualism  are  true,  and  if  this  theory  is 
necessary  and  sufficient  for  their  explanation,  it  is 
worthy  of  respect.  But,  even  in  that  case,  it  would 
be  far  better  if  Spiritualism  could  abut  on  a  founda- 
tion of  known  fact,  instead  of  resting  on  an  ingenious 
theoretic  invention,  as  it  would  thus  become  thor- 
oughly philosophical.  Here  is  indicated  a  defect 
which  probably  it  can  never  supply. 

This  theory  also  involves  a  personal  dualism  which 
is  irreconcilable  with  the  unity  of  consciousness.  It 
is  analogous  to  the  old  dualistic  doctrine  of  soul  and 
body.  But  consciousness  and  science,  physiological 
or  psychological,  know  of  no  such  a  duality.  These 
identify  the  body  and  the  soul.  As  before  observed, 
the  soul  identifies  with  itself  all  the  motions,  actions, 
pains,  and  pleasures  of  the  body.  Here,  the  unity  is 
equally  constant  and  perfect. 

Further,  if  a  part  of  what  has  ever  been  really  ego, 
and  especially  so  great  and  important  a  part  as  the 
body,  can  be  separated  from  the  ego  and  cease  to  be 
such,  we  may  say  the  same  of  any  other  part  and  of 
all  the  parts  :  so  that,  after  all,  this  ego  is  only  an 
agglomeration  of  parts,  whether  organized  or  crys- 
tallized or  merely  juxtaposed.  All  definite  concep- 
tion of  the  ego  thus  vanishes,  except  as  a  varying 
aggregate  of  material  atoms,  of  which  we  can  never 
say  it  is  so  and  so,  because,  before  our  sentence  is 


112  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

uttered,  it  is,  or  may  be,  something  else.  We  must 
steadily  hold  to  an  ego  which  is  always  one  and  the 
same  through  all  changes,  because  this  is  demanded 
by  experience,  by  logical  consistency  and  definite 

conception. 

Trichotomy. 

All  these  difficulties  are  augmented  and  intensified 
in  the  theory  of  trichotomy.  This  makes  the  sensible 
organism  the  outer  rind  and  husk  of  the  ego.  Within 
this  is  its  animating  force,  the  soul  ;  and  then  within 
this  is  the  reason  or  spirit, — the  principle  of  pure 
intelligence,  which  gives  to  body  and  soul  the  light 
and  authority  of  general  laws  and  imperative  princi- 
ples. Such  a  triple  ego  is  utterly  fanciful.  At  least, 
we  know  nothing  of  it  in  this  life.  We  know  these 
three  great  lines  of  phenomena,  but  we  know  them  as 
modes  of  the  one,  indivisible,  only  known  ego.  This 
conception  is  clear,  consistent,  and  ultimate  and  all- 
sufficing  and  the  simplest  possible,  so  that  nothing 
more  is  admissible, — a  simple  ego  of  many  modes, 
among  which  are  body,  soul,  and  spirit. 

Perhaps,  however,  it  ought  to  be  observed  that  this 
trichotomy  is  incomplete.  It  omits  the  regnant  ele- 
ment of  our  nature, — the  will.  Will  is  the  executive 
faculty,  and  hence  it  is  often  considered  as  the  prime 
element  of  personality.  These  four  great  classes  of 
faculty  are  integral  parts  of  our  nature  as  now  exist- 
ing and  known.  But  they  are  inseparable,  and  have 
not  merely  an  organic  unity,  but  a  substantive  unity, 
which  may  possibly  change  in  form,  but  not  in  sub- 
stance. Will  implies  intelligence  and  feeling,  else  it 
would  have  neither  guide  nor  motive  of  its  action  ; 
and  it  implies  a  body  of  some  form  and  kind  as  a 
fasciculus  of  personal  power.  So  intelligence  implies 
feeling,  else  there  could  be  no  preference  of  one 
thought  to  another,  and  no  comparison  of  better  and 
best ;  and  feeling  may  be  of  various  forms,  sensible  or 
supersensible.  These  are  one  in  many,  simplicity  of 
substance  or  force  with  modal  variety. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  113 

Logical  Difficulties  of  all  Forms  and  Pluralism. 

All  the  four  theories  of  pluralism  which  we  have 
criticised  involve  in  common  certain  logical  falsities 
which  through  all  the  ages  have  been  the  vampires  of 
the  philosophy  of  pluralistic  egoism.  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  in  support  of  his  philosophy  of  the  Condi- 
tioned,— a  species  of  agnosticism,  which  with  the 
Kantians  was  pure  criticism,— reduced  these  illogical 
dicta  to  fifteen,  and  gave  them  utterance  ;  and  they 
are  all  involved  in  all  theories  of  philosophy  except 
those  which  explain  matter,  time,  space,  motion,  and 
all  sensible  phenomena  as  spiritual, — the  modes  or 
subjective  states  of  a  simple  unitary  being  ;  and  these 
paralogisms  are  adduced  and  adopted  by  Spencer  in 
his  First  Principles  in  justification  of  agnosticism, 
which  is  a  denial  or  doubt  of  the  possibility  of  phi- 
losophy. Certainly,  no  theory  can  be  perfect  which 
does  not  dissipate  these  contradictions.  As  truth  is 
always  self-consistent,  every  theory  which  involves 
self-contradictions  is  somewhere  false. 

One  of  these  contradictions,  as  given  by  Hamilton, 
is  as  follows  :  "A  quantity,  say  a  foot,  has  an  infinity 
of  parts.  Any  part  of  this  quantity,  say  an  inch,  has 
also  an  infinity  (of  parts).  But  one  infinity  is  not 
larger  than  another.  Therefore,  an  inch  is  equal  to  a 
foot."  In  these  days  there  are  some  who  imagine 
that  the  doctrine  of  ultimate  atoms  removes  this  logi- 
cal difficulty  as  far  as  it  concerns  matter,  because 
these  atoms  are  indivisible.  But  who  knows  that 
they  are  indivisible?  No  one.  The  assertion  is 
merely  an  unverified  and  unverifiable  theory.  But, 
if  it  were  a  known  fact,  it  would  not  remove  the  diffi- 
culty as  a  conception.  It  is  not  an  actual  and  sensi- 
ble but  a  theoretical  divisibility  about  which  philoso- 
phy is  concerned.  It  is  a  logical  necessity  that  no 
atom  of  matter,  no  quantity  of  space  or  time,  consid- 
ered as  objective  realities,  can  be  so  small  but  it  can 
be  conceived  as  divisible,  so  that  the  smallest  pos- 
sible may  yet  be  smaller,  and  the  smallest  may  have 


114  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

as  many  parts  as  the  largest.  By  no  physical  or  dy- 
namic theory  of  atoms  as  ultimate  actual  units  can 
we  escape  these  contradictions.  All  objective  non- 
egoism  is  therefore  slain  by  these  hair-fine  cimeters. 

The  Ego  of  Philosophical  Realism  a  Pure  and 
Simple   Unity. 

Philosophical  realism,  which  is  absolute  egoistical 
idealism,  is  invulnerable  to  all  such  weapons.  This 
theory  is  the  most  simple  and  modest,  because  it 
affirms  nothing  but  the  phenomena  of  consciousness 
(including  sense),  and  their  necessary  logical  impli- 
cations. It  is  therefore  entirely  self-consistent,  as 
well  as  conformable  to  facts,  necessary  to  the  ex- 
planation of  facts,  sufficient  for  that  purpose. 

It  exemplifies,  first,  the  unity  of  consciousness  as  of 
a  personal  individual  perduring  through  all  the  many 
forms  and  conditions  of  experience,  sensible  or  super- 
sensible, organic  or  extra-organic  or  super-organic  ; 
so  that,  all  known  things  being  the  conscious  modes 
of  one  subject,  we  demonstrate  the  unity  of  all  at 
once  as  egoistic.  As  this  has  been  previously  ex- 
pounded, it  needs  no  further  elucidation  here. 

There  is  a  class  of  very  striking  and  extraordinary 
phenomena  which  have  commanded  much  attention 
in  recent  times,  and  which  in  such  a  connection  can- 
not be  wisely  overlooked.  They  constitute  what  is 
supposed  by  some  to  indicate  a  change  of  personality . 
Persons  have  been  known  to  forget  all  at  once  every- 
thing in  their  past  life,  so  that  they  have  had  to  begin 
their  education  afresh  from  the  very  bottom  or  there- 
abouts. Then,  again,  after  a  while  they  have  suddenly 
changed  back  to  their  first  state,  and  their  old  knowl- 
edge and  feelings  and  habits  ancj.  dispositions  return . 
While  these  phenomena  are  very  striking,  they  pre- 
sent no  special  logical  or  psychological  problem  any 
more  than  any  other  changes  of  feeling  and  disposition 
and  lapses  of  memory.  The  individual  person  is  the 
same,  whatever  be  his  modal  variations,  and  what- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  115 

ever  be  the  extent  or  limit  of  his  knowledge  or  mem- 
ory of  them.  That  he  does  not  know  that  he  has 
done  so  or  so  alters  not  the  fact.  He  is,  notwith- 
standing everything,  the  very  one  who  did  it ;  and  he 
has  been  the  one,  the  very  same,  through  all  the 
changes  which  have  intervened,  however  numerous 
or  various  or  long  continued  they  may  have  been . 
"We  often  forget  what  we  did  but  a  very  few  moments 
ago,  and  these  minor  but  ever-recurring  lapses  of 
memory  differ  from  the  other  only  in  degree  ;  and 
as  these  involve  the  same  principles,  and  give  us  no 
trouble  on  the  score  of  identity,  so  neither  should 
those.  If  in  the  morning  I  remember  not  the  cir- 
cumstances of  my  going  to  bed  the  night  previous, 
which  is  quite  too  common  with  some  men,  that  does 
not  destroy  the  fact  that  I  my  very  self  did  go  to  bed 
one  way  or  another,  and  that  I  who  thus  lay  down  am 
the  one  who  now  gets  up.  The  cases  in  question  are 
simply  unusual  examples  of  modal  changes  in  a  per- 
during  subject.  For  the  identification  of  such  per- 
sons we  have  to  resort,  in  some  degree,  to  the  connec- 
tion of  circumstances.  But,  then,  that  is  what  we  are 
all  doing  to  some  extent  most  of  the  time.  That  I 
am  the  one  who  did  a  certain  act  yesterday  or  last 
year,  I  prove  to  myself  and  others  by  the  aid  of  cir- 
cumstances, without  which  my  memory  would  not 
serve  me  with  due  certainty. 

But  observe  that  I  do  not  in  any  such  case  doubt 
that  I  am  the  same  person  I  was  yesterday  or  last 
year.  I  am  only  ignorant,  or  in  doubt,  concerning 
my  own  history.  So,  in  all  other  cases,  the  only 
rational  question  is  not  whether  any  individual  re- 
mains the  same  through  successive  modal  changes, 
but  only  what  are  those  changes,  and  how  to  deter- 
mine that  an  individual  now  in  a  certain  state  or  con- 
dition is  the  same  individual  as  the  one  whom  we 
knew  in  a  very  different  state  or  condition,  and  this 
may  be  variously  determined  at  different  times  ;  and 
whether  determined  or  not,  or  how  determined,  does 


116  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

not  affect  the  continuity  of  the  individual  himself. 
Every  individual  is  a  simple  unity  of  force,  a  subject 
undergoing  modal  changes,  the  forms  and  extent  of 
which  we  cannot  anticipate.  The  plurality  is  in  the 
modes  or  activities  only  ;  and,  because  everything  is  a 
force  ever  active,  it  is  always  necessarily  changing  its 
own  modes. 

If  our  personal  and  conscious  existence  continues 
after  our  bodily  dissolution,  which  I  doubt  not,  and 
if  it  is  made  known  by  many  infallible  proofs,  as  a 
large  number  of  respectable  people  affirm,  we  have 
still  only  the  same  individual  under  different  psycho- 
logical or  subjective  states.  The  sloughing  off  of  the 
body  is  only  a  change  in  the  modes  of  the  soul.  It 
loses  nothing,  parts  with  nothing.  The  body  is  ever 
only  a  mode  of  mind  ;  and,  at  death,  the  mind  simply 
undergoes  a  change,  so  that  the  old  bodily  modes  give 
place  to  other  modes,  just  as  daily  one  thought  or  ex- 
perience gives  place  to  another.  We  often  say  that 
at  death  the  soul  enters  on  another  state  of  existence . 
That  is  a  literal  truth,  the  whole  truth,— all  that  has 
occurred  :  only,  the  change  is  wholly  subjective,  not 
chiefly  non-egoistic,  as  the  vulgar  suppose. 


X. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  LOCAL  EGO. 


LONG  we  dwell  on  the  ego,  and  it  is  necessary  ;  for, 
in  more  senses  than  one,  this  is  the  pivot  on  which 
everything  turns.  Till  the  ego  is  well  determined 
and  defined,  no  further  progress  can  be  made  or  intel- 
ligently attempted.  We  can  never  know  when  we 
leave  the  ego  till  we  know  what  the  ego  is  ;  and  only 
after  such  knowledge  is  attained  can  we  begin  to 
understand  the  conditions  on  which  a  philosophical 
transit  from  the  ego  is  possible. 

The  Absolute  Ego. 

It  was  the  absolute  ego  which  was  expounded  in 
the  last  chapter ;  and  this  ego  will  be  understood  by 
very  few  for  a  long  time,  I  fear,  fit  subject  deemed 
by  most  for  amusement  instead  of  philosophical  in- 
vestigation. 

The  absolute  ego  readily  emerges  from  an  analysis 
of  phenomena,  all  of  which  are  found  to  be  only  sub- 
jective states,  whatever  their  form  or  action  or  rela- 
tions ;  and  the  ego  is  simply  their  common  subject, 
that  of  which  they  are  the  conscious  modes.  The 
ego  must  at  least  be  commensurate  with  its  own 
states  or  modes  ;  and,  therefore,  it  cannot  be  less  than 
co-extensive  with  the  known  universe  forever.  All 
time,  all  space,  and  all  their  contents  and  changes  are 
one  with  their  subject ;  and  their  subject  is  the  one 
absolute_e#o.  Thus,  I  and  all  that  ever  has  been 


118  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

known,  is  known,  or  ever  can  be  known  by  me,  are 
one,  the  only  difference  being  that  between  the  sub- 
ject and  its  modes  ;  and  these  are  the  same  substance 
or  force,  for  the  modes  are  the  subject  or  substance 
or  force  itself  existing  in  said  modes.  This  we  will 
consider  as  having  been  sufficiently  expounded  and 
supported  ;  that  is,  for  all  whom  any  amount  of  expo- 
sition and  evidence  could  benefit.  This  is  what  we 
call  spiritual  monism.  On  this  theory  there  is  no 
possible  discrimination  of  the  ego  from  the  non-ego 
within  the  bounds  of  the  universe,  because  the  ego 
includes  all  that  universe.  The  absolute  ego  is  all 
the  knowable,  and  the  non-ego  is  all  the  unknowable. 
This  is  precise  and  final. 

This  ego  includes  the  whole  deity  of  pantheism, 
which  identifies  God  and  the  universe,  from  which  I 
exclude  God  and  all  else  except  myself.  Spinoza's 
deity  is  extension  and  thought,  a  duality  which  con- 
stitutes the  universe  in  all  its  forces,  forms,  and  activ- 
ities ;  and  all  this  I  expound  as  constituting  my  own 
exclusive  individuality. 

One  of  the  most  notable  of  recent  thinkers  is  Lotze, 
and  he  also  identifies  the  world  with  God  ;  though 
he  does  not  say  but  that  God  transcends  the  world, 
and  (however  inconsistent)  he  sometimes  seems  to 
think  of  man  as  different  from  the  world.  On  the 
other  hand,  our  exposition  allows  of  no  such  line  of 
discrimination  between  God  and  man  or  between  the 
world  and  man.  The  universal  substance  of  the 
world  which  he  pronounces  to  be  God  I  call  man 
and  my  own  sole  individuality,  because  it  is  certain 
that  the  known  ego  and  the  known  world  are  one. 
If  there  is  a  God  and  any  other  being  besides  myself, 
they  are  purely  extra-mundane.  As  says  Emerson 
(Essays,  First  Series,  p.  245),  "The  art  of  seeing  and 
the  thing  seen,  the  seer  and  the  spectacle,  the  subject 
and  object,  are  one."  But  that  does  not  include  God 
and  all  beings,  as  he  imagines,  but  only  one  man,  the 
observing  ego. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  119 

Against  this  absolute  ego,  sole  individuality  of  the 
universe  and  constituting  the  universe,  the  empty 
shells  and  dried  skins  of  effete  metaphysics  will  be 
freely  thrown  ;  and  we  must  brush  them  aside.  One 
of  these  is  the  assertion  that  the  ego  can  become  con- 
scious only  through  interaction  with  the  non-ego. 
Not  a  particle  of  proof  has  ever  been  offered  of  this 
dogma,  which  is  worth  as  much  as  the  poorest  of 
dogmas  in  other  departments  of  human  invention  ; 
and  I  take  it  for  what  it  is  worth.  It  has  arisen  from 
a  confusion  (very  obvious  in  Fichte)  of  the  absolute 
with  the  local  or  organic  ego.  The  latter  is  evolved 
from  the  external  world,  and  changes  by  interaction 
with  it,  which  is  ego,  to  the  organic  ego. 

But  the  absolute  ego  includes  the  world  and  the 
organism,  and  its  diversity  of  modes  operate  on  each 
other  or  relative  to  each  other.  It  is  objectively  con- 
scious of  itself  in  its  consciousness  of  these  diversified 
modes,  which  are  itself ;  and  it  needs  nothing  else 
as  a  condition  of  its  conscious  action.  We  may,  if 
we  will,  call  these  diversities  parts,  and  sometimes 
that  will  be  convenient  in  practice  ;  and  they  are 
parts  proper  only  in  the  sense  that  they  are  not 
wholes,  but  necessary  constituents  of  One,  the  Grand 
Totality,  which  some  call  the  Unknowable,  some  call 
God,  and  which  I  call  Ego,  which  some  think  is 
unconscious,  but  which  I  know  to  be  conscious,  if 
it  is  I.  All  agree,  however,  in  making  this  great 
Being  a  simple  unitary  force,  with  a  possible  infinity 
of  modal  diversity.  Even  those  who  attempt  to  deny 
it,  and  who,  therefore,  use  the  vaguest  possible  term 
to  describe  it,  are  obliged  to  come  to  this  at  last, 
allowing  an  ultimate  "potential  substratum,  out  of 
which  issued  the  divisions  and  separations,  the  hete- 
rogeneity which  constituted  the  properties  and  qual- 
ities on  which  all  conscious  experience  depends." 
This  I  grant ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  also 
granted  that  this  "heterogeneity"  is  the  same  potency 
and  essential  reality  as  the  "potential  substratum." 


120  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

So  that  here,  also,  we  have  diversity  as  the  modal 
unfoldiDgs  of  the  Abiding  Unity,  which  is  my  doctrine  ; 
and  this  opposition  to  it  is  a  mere  logomachy.  Fichte 
himself  affirmed  this  kind  of  a  simple  unitary  force, 
working  and  manifesting  itself  in  infinite  diversity, 
only  he  strangely  mistook  it  for  the  non-ego,  contrary 
to  his  idealism. 

The    l.oral   Ego. 

There  is  a  special  and  elliptic  form  of  the  ego  which 
we  will  designate  as  the  local  ego.  This  is  limited, 
because  local,  in  distinction  from  being  everywhere. 
The  absolute  ego  is  virtually  omnipresent :  this  is 
limited  and  localized,  though  it  may  not  be  agreed  as 
to  what  are  its  exact  boundaries.  This  local  ego  is 
variously  conceived,  and  all  the  disputes  among 
psychologists  concerning  the  ego  have  been  about  the 
local  ego.  It  was  necessary  to  discriminate  such 
an  ego  from  the  non-ego,  because  the  non-ego  is  sup- 
posed to  be  known,  and  indefinitely  vaster  than  the 
ego.  But  this  necessary  task  has  not  been  satisfacto- 
rily performed  ;  and  the  local  ego  has  assumed  differ- 
ent aspects  to  the  mind,  according  to  the  method  of 
performing  this  task.  , 

The  JLocal  Ego  defiued  as  Transplieuoiucnal,  iiml 
all  Pheiiomeua  as  Noii-cgo. 

Some  philosophers  have  pronounced  all  phenomena 
to  be  non-egoistic  ;  and  the  ego  they  have  considered 
to  be  a  transphenomenal  subject  and  agent,  lexically 
connected  with  organic  phenomena.  This  is  the 
method  of  the  pre-scientific  mind,  and  of  the  initial 
stages  of  scientific  inquiry  ;  and  this  method  often 
shoots  far  onward,  into  the  era  of  cultivated  thought. 
It  is  the  source  of  Plato's  doctrine  of  superhuman 
ideas  as  the  regnant  principles  of  the  human  mind  ; 
for  those  ideas  are  not  described  as  modes  of  the 
human  mind,  but  as  external  to  the  mind,  though 
intimately  connected  with  it,  as  divine  glories  at 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  121 

which  it  gazes  with  a  charmed  reverence.  The  doc- 
trine of  the  non-egoistic  nature  of  all  phenomena  finds 
distinct  utterance  even  in  so  recent  a  writer  as  Bishop 
Berkeley,  who  was  Platonic  in  his  spirit  and  style, 
though  he  was  an  ardent  nominalist.  In  the  first 
paragraph  of  his  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge, 
Berkeley  describes  ideas  as  follows  :  "It  is  evident 
to  any  one  who  takes  a  survey  of  the  objects  of  human 
knowledge  that  they  are  either  ideas  actually  im- 
printed on  the  senses  or  else  such  as  are  perceived 
by  attending  to  the  passions  and  operations  of  the 
mind,  or  lastly  ideas  formed  by  the  help  of  memory 
and  imagination."  It  is  clear  that  he  uses  the  term 
idea  with  the  same  breadth  of  meaning  as  Descartes 
and  Locke,  to  denote  all  phenomena,  whether  sen- 
sible or  supersensible.  In  the  next  paragraph,  con- 
trary to  the  theory  of  Descartes  and  Locke,  perhaps 
unconsciously,  he  says  the  ego  is  something  besides 
these,  as  a  different  thing  from  them.  "But,  besides 
all  that  endless  variety  of  ideas  or  objects  of  knowl- 
edge, there  is  likewise  something  which  knows  or 
perceives,  and  exercises  divers  operations,  as  willing, 
imagining,  or  remembering  about  them.  This  per- 
ceiving, active  being  is  what  I  call  mind,  spirit,  soul, 
or  myself.  By  which  words  I  do  not  denote  any  one  of 
my  ideas,  but  a  thing  entirely  distinct  from  them." 
This  is  clear  and  distinct  verbally.  The  non-ego, 
according  to  this,  is  immediately  known,  and  that 
with  indubitable  certainty,  because  it  constitutes  the 
phenomena  of  sense  and  consciousness.  Whenever 
the  mind  acts  or  is  conscious,  the  non-ego  is  then 
present  as  a  known  object.  This  is  the  most  simple 
and  easy  method  that  could  be  invented  of  transcend- 
ing the  ego.  The  non-ego  is  of  two  kinds,  sensation 
and  reflection  ;  and  the  former,  according  to  Berkeley, 
is  created  by  God,  and  the  latter  by  the  human  mind, 
or  ego. 

This  theory,  in  the  first  place,  is  antiquated  by 
modern  psychology,  which  makes  all  phenomena  to 


122  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

be  modes  of  the  ego,  and  one  with  it.  In  the  second 
place,  the  distinction  between  ego  and  non-ego  is 
merely  verbal,  an  intellectual  void.  The  ego  ren- 
dered absolutely  unphenomenal  is  therefore  unknow- 
able and  inconceivable,  so  that  it  cannot  be  discrimi- 
nated from  or  identified  with  anything  whatsoever. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  all  phenomena  are  non-ego, 
most  or  all  of  our  mental  processes,  so  called,  lose 
their  significance.  All  pronouns,  personal  and  pos- 
sessive, are  nullified.  Thought,  feeling,  volition,  are 
neither  states  nor  qualities  nor  acts  of  the  mind  or 
spirit ;  and  we  have  no  means  of  knowing  that  they 
represent  our  mind  or  spirit,  or  sustain  any  relation 
to  it.  All  principles  are  destroyed,  and  all  intel- 
lectual guides  and  indicators  are  obliterated  ;  and  it 
is  utterly  gratuitous  to  talk  of  the  mind,  or  ego,  form- 
ing and  compounding  ideas  of  reflection  by  the  help 
of  memory  and  imagination,  or  any  other  way. 
Every  assertion  whatsoever  concerning  its  nature 
and  action  and  relations  is  utterly  unwarrantable. 
In  the  third  place,  its  explanation  of  the  origin 
and  existence  of  sensible  phonomena  by  referring 
them  to  the  creative  will  of  God  is  a  vast  and  needless 
leap,  however  pious.  A  philosopher  will  spare  him- 
self such  an  effort,  if  he  can  find  an  easier  explana- 
tion ;  and  this  explanation  is  found  in  the  subjectivity 
of  all  phenomena.  But  it  may  be  also  found  in 
Berkeley's  own  doctrine  of  the  ego.  If  it  is  unphe- 
nomenal and  the  author  of  the  ideas  of  reflection,  it 
may  be  the  author  of  the  ideas  of  sensation.  The 
only  objection  he  brings  against  the  subjective  origin 
of  the  sensible  work  is  that  it  is  involuntary.  He 
assumes  that  it  is  different  from  us,  because  against 
or  irrespective  of  our  volition,  forgetting  that  he  has 
already  defined  volition  as  non-egoistic  :  so  that  to  be 
different  from  it  is  not  to  be  different  from  the  ego. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  123 


The    r,ocal    Ego   conceived  as  Supersensible  and 
Sensible  Phenomena  as  Non-ego. 

The  next  method  to  be  noticed  is  that  which  defines 
the  sensible  phenomena  only  as  non-ego,  and  affirms 
that  all  the  phenomena  of  interior  consciousness  are 
egoistic.  This  is  the  old  dualism  of  matter  and  spirit 
in  its  purity.  On  this  theory,  the  non-ego  is  composed 
of  our  organism  and  all  sensible  objects  beyond  it ; 
and,  then,  all  that  is  identified  with  the  remaining 
forms  of  experience  is  ego,  spirit.  We  are  conscious 
of  various  experiences  which  have  in  them  no  ele- 
ment of  extension  or  motion  or  any  recognized  form 
of  matter  or  sense,  These  are  all  egoistic  and  spir- 
itual and  modes  of  the  ego,  which  pronounces  itself 
a  spirit  in  distinction  from  matter  ;  and  it  is  also  con- 
scious of  perceiving  sensible  phenomena  as  external 
to  itself  and  non-egoistic. 

This  sensible  non-ego  has  been  considered  by  many 
others  as  only  a  series  of  images  flashed  upon  us  by 
God,  a  series  of  divine  acts,  a  multifarious  form  of  the 
divine  energy.  But  that  involves  vast  theistic  as- 
sumptions, and  such  a  creed  should  wait  on  proof  or 
some  reasonable  evidence.  It  is  more  simple  and 
ulterior  to  say  with  common  dualists  that  matter  is 
a  solid,  forceful  reality  of  many  varying  forms  or 
modes,  which,  according  to  its  nature  and  internal 
relations  and  its  various  external  relations,  operates 
upon  itself  and  upon  us. 

As  the  personal  ego  is  thus  contradistinguished 
from  matter,  it  is  free  from  all  the  elements  of  muta- 
bility which  are  characteristic  of  all  the  organic  forms 
of  matter  ;  and  its  immortal  capability  and  indepen- 
dence are  thus  disclosed  as  possible  and  highly  prob- 
able. We  hence  see  also  that  it  cannot  be  evolved 
from  any  previous  condition  of  matter. 

This  is  a  fair  picture  ;  but,  like  all  pictures,  it  shows 
only  one  side.  It  is  dualism  in  its  most  unsophisti- 
cated form  of  philosophic  creation.  A  lunatic  said 


124  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

he  had  two  sides  to  his  head,  a  potato  side  and  a 
brain  side  ;  and  that  he  was  sane  or  insane  according 
as  he  spoke  from  one  side  or  the  other  of  his  unfort- 
unate cephalic  dualism.  We  have  seen  one  side  : 
now  let  us  see  the  other.  This  other  shows  all  human 
action,  utterance,  and  history  a  mere  dead  force. 
The  soul  of  things  is  fled.  Man  has  left  the  stage, 
and  mere  puppets  play  in  his  place  and  name.  All 
men,  so  called,  and  all  their  motion  and  action  and 
speech,  as  known  to  each  other  and  to  history,  are 
only  the  motions  of  organic  matter,  never  of  real 
men  and  human  beings.  All  the  play  of  domestic 
and  social  or  public  life  and  interest,  all  the  inven- 
tions and  discoveries  of  physical  science,  all  physical 
work,  pleasures,  pains,  battles,  sieges,  wounds,  heal- 
ing,  nursing,  are  nothing  essentially  human,  only  the 
various  plays  of  material  elements.  War,  murder, 
death,  birth,  marriage,  kisses,  tears,  laughter,  groans, 
and  songs  have  all  lost  their  chief,  their  human  sig- 
nificance and  importance.  Where  before  we  had 
seen  the  flow  and  eddyings  of  a  vast  and  varied  tide 
of  human  beings,  now  wallowing  in  vice  or  reeking 
with  blood  and  crime,  now  flashing  with  the  corus- 
cations of  bright  genius,  now  gleaming  in  the  loveli- 
ness of  beauty,  or  shining  in  the  loftier  power  and 
charm  of  pure  goodness,  we  now  see  nothing  but  so 
many  automatic  motions  of  matter  as  distinguished 
from  spirit,  non-human,  unconscious.  It  may  be  said 
that  these  phenomena  are  symbols  of  human  reali- 
ties. But,  as  a  system  of  symbolism,  it  is  not  less 
ghastly  than  the  Ancient  Mariner's  company  of  dead 
shipmates  working  at  the  ropes,  without  the  asso- 
ciated relief  or  explanation  of  angelic  agency. 

The  further  and  popular  allegation  that  these  bod- 
ies are  really  alive,  conscious,  and  purposeful,  being 
animated  by  spirits  which  use  them  as  their  several 
instruments,  is  good,  if  admitted  ;  but  it  furnishes  a 
reason  for  its  own  rejection.  For,  if  a  finite  spirit  can 
give  life  and  conscious  energy  and  purpose,  much 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  125 

more  may  the  Infinite  Spirit  do  the  same  for  all  these 
forms  ;  and,  for  aught  we  can  see  to  the  contrary,  the 
evolution  of  this  result  may  be,  under  certain  condi- 
tions, a  necessity  from  nature's  intrinsic  force.  And, 
as  this  is  the  more  simple  and  scientific  hypothesis,  it 
is  to  be  preferred,  so  that  we  are  bound  to  dispense 
with  the  hypothesis  of  finite  spirits  distinct  from 
matter,  and  step  at  once  on  to  the  more  solid  and  sen- 
sible foundation  of  materialism,  pure  and  simple. 

This  theory  is  utterly  without  proof  or  evidence  at 
any  point ;  and  it  is  everywhere  inconceivable,  be- 
cause it  is  either  a  mental  void  or  a  self-contradic- 
tion. As  we  know  of  no  mental  phenomena  disso- 
ciated from  matter,  so  we  have  no  evidence  that  they 
are  not  at  the  bottom  the  same.  There  are  different 
classes  of  phenomena,  but  this  is  no  proof  that  they 
have  not  the  same  subject  and  substance.  It  is  also 
too  late  in  the  day  to  pronounce  all  sensible  phe- 
nomena to  be  non-ego.  So  far  as  the  ego  is  connected 
with  the  organism,  it  is  identified  with  the  organism. 
We  always  say  "me"  and  "my"  concerning  bodily 
forms,  feelings,  and  motions,  and  that  they  are  ego- 
istic is  as  well  proved  as  that  any  of  our  mental 
states  are. 

The  Local  Ego  defined  as  Organic  and  the  Non- 
ego  as  Extra-organic,  which  given  us  the 
Physiological  Ego. 

This  brings  us  to  the  physiological  ego  of  the  ma- 
terial monists,  who  hold  that  mind  and  matter  are 
one,  and  differ  only  in  their  aspects  or  phases  ;  that 
the  organism  is  the  ego,  which  changes  as  changes  the 
organism,  and  which  therefore  begins  and  ends  its 
existence  with  the  animated  organism.  This  theory 
is  burdened  with  the  contradiction  of  consciousness 
affirming  personal  unity  and  sameness  all  through 
life,  while  its  individual  substance  is  not  the  same. 
The  me  of  yesterday  is  not  the  me  of  to-day,  while 
consciousness  affirms  that  it  is.  No  one  ever  at- 


126  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

tempted  in  a  criminal  court  to  prove  an  alibi  on  the 
ground  that  the  crime  imputed  to  him  was  committed 
a  long  time  ago,  though  on  this  theory  he  has  abun- 
dant right  to  do  so.  The  spontaneous  as  well  as  the 
reflective  action  of  consciousness  repudiates  the  the- 
ory ;  and  all  human  institutions  are  based  on  that  re- 
pudiation, for  they  all  assume  the  continued  personal 
sameness  through  all  organic  changes.  Without  this, 
society  could  not  exist,  and  life  itself  would  be  impos- 
sible. To  say  that  the  ego,  or  conscious  unity,  is  the 
organic  unity,  which  at  any  moment  prevails,  is  only 
to  say  that  this  ego  is  forever  changing,  never  the 
same  ;  because  this  is  the  case,  not  only  with  the 
material  particles  of  the  organization,  but  also  with 
the  form  and  action  of  the  organic  structure  in  many 
of  its  functions  and  faculties.  On  this  theory,  it  is 
true  that  we  may  say  "I"  ;  but  it  must  always  be  of 
as  well  as  in  the  present  only.  It  is  I  who  write  this 
word,  but  it  is  not  the  same  "I"  who  wrote  some  of 
the  earlier  pages.  Yet  my  consciousness  affirms  that 
it  was  the  same  "I"  who  wrote  at  the  far  distant 
times,  thus  contradicting  the  theory.  In  all  this,  it  is 
like  the  antiquated  French  sensism. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  very  clear  that  there  is  a 
relation  of  responsibility  between  successive  periods 
of  the  same  community.  A  nation  may  be  saddled 
with  a  duty  to-day,  because  of  an  act  of  the  nation 
generations  or  centuries  ago.  This  is  constantly  seen 
in  the  action  of  its  internal  economy.  It  is  exempli- 
fied very  constantly  in  the  application  of  common 
and  statute  law  ;  and  we  all  easily  see  how  certain 
actions  of  parents  may  devolve  obligations  on  their 
heirs  for  generations,  and  one  administration  of  gov- 
ernment devolves  obligations  on  another,  though  the 
latter  may  be  of  very  different  political  views.  But 
it  is  only  by  mental  confusion  that  any  one  can 
imagine,  as  some  have  done,  that  these  facts  favor 
the  doctrine  of  physiological  egoism.  The  commu- 
nication of  responsibility  is  not  limited  either  to  the 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  127 

same  individuality  or  organic  connection,  but  only 
by  power  and  circumstance.  The  story  of  the  "Good 
Samaritan"  suffices  to  show  that  responsibility  is  de- 
rived from  opportunity  and  power  in  given  circum- 
stances, no  matter  who  is  responsible  for  the  situa- 
tion. An  action  of  one  generation  devolves  duties 
on  another  generation,  not  because  the  latter  genera- 
tion is  morally  responsible  for  the  first,  but  because 
each  and  all  are  under  obligation  always  to  do  the 
best  they  can  with  their  powers  and  opportunities. 
Our  relations  to  each  other,  whether  individual  or 
corporate,  affect  our  obligations,  not  because  we  are 
parts  of  a  common  and  organic  individuality,  but  be- 
cause of  our  personal  individuality  in  relation  to 
others.  Each  is  responsible  for  his  own  action  in  all 
connections,  and  that  collectively  constitutes  the 
action  of  the  whole. 

On  the  physical  side,  there  is  found  in  the  modern 
discoveries,  by  the  microscope,  of  germ-cells  a  strong 
argument  in  favor  of  a  bold  utterance  to  the  effect 
that  personality  is  but  the  abiding  expression  of  an 
organic  combination  whose  constituents  are  always 
changing.  The  organism  is  made  up  of  an  indefinite 
number  of  microscopic  cells,  each  of  which  is  alive, 
an  organism  in  itself,  and  gifted,  like  the  general 
organism  into  which  it  enters,  with  the  power  of  pro- 
creation or  self-multiplication,  and  that  by  three  (or 
four)  different  methods.  According  to  this,  there  is 
a  combination  of  a  vast  number  of  individualities 
in  each  organism,  and  our  personal  individuality  is 
their  combined  and  organized  expression  and  repre- 
sentative ;  and  thus  its  continuity  and  responsibility 
are  analogous  to  that  of  a  municipality  or  a  nation, 
which  in  its  corporate  capacity  is  represented  by 
its  legislature,  its  executive,  and  its  judiciary.  Com- 
munities are  held  responsible,  though  always  chang- 
ing, and  in  this  they  are  like  our  organic  individu- 
ality ;  and  they,  too,  are  organic  individuals,  only 
they  are  more  complex  organisms  than  that  of  our 


128  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

body.  To  escape  this  result,  a  result  which  was 
claimed  before  these  cells  were  discovered,  dualism 
was  invented,  according  to  which  the  organism  is 
not  the  ego  or  a  constituent  of  it,  that  the  ego  is 
a  spirit  in  contradistinction  from  matter,  spirit  being 
alleged  to  be  one  and  simple  and  continuous,  and  that 
the  individuality  of  communities  is  only  figurative. 

Sensism  can  defend  itself  against  dualism  by  show- 
ing the  radical,  logical  inconsistencies  of  the  latter. 
Yet  the  latter  possesses  a  vast  and  manifest  advantage 
in  its  appeal  alike  to  reason  and  consciousness  in 
support  of  its  fundamental  position  that  the  ego  is 
substantively  one  and  the  same  through  all  organic 
or  other  changes.  This  is  infinitely  more  sublime 
than  its  opposite,  and  it  is  in  perfect  accord  with  all 
mental  and  moral  phenomena  ;  while  its  opposite  is 
not.  However  much  we  may  explain  and  evade,  it 
still  remains  clear  that  responsibility  belongs  only  to 
agents  ;  and  these  are  responsible  only  for  their  own 
action,  not  for  any  action  which  is  attributed  to  them 
hypothetically  merely  because  of  certain  organic  as- 
sociations. Two  animals  of  different  species  have 
been  organically  spliced  together,  so  that  they  shared 
the  same  blood  and  organic  life  ;  and  what  fed  or 
poisoned  either  fed  or  poisoned  both.  Men  might  be 
treated  in  the  same  way  ;  and  nature  did  this  for  the 
Siamese  twins.  A  good  man  and  a  bad  man  might 
thus  be  conjoined,  retaining  their  separate  and  oppo- 
site moral  consciousness  and  character,  which  are 
always  wholly  and  absolutely  individualistic.  In 
the  community,  each  is  responsible  only  for  himself  ; 
and,  if  he  suffers  from  others,  that  is  not  a  moral 
consequence  relative  to  himself,  is  not  a  moral  punish- 
ment to  him.  On  the  assumption  of  this  perduring, 
substantive  individualism,  all  thought  and  all  action 
proceed  ;  and  no  analogies  or  arguments  can  change 
or  obscure  it.  Here,  sensism  of  every  form  is  baffled 
and  beaten  into  hopeless  defeat. 

But,  though  dualism  is  irrefutable  in  its  affirmation 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  129 

of  an  ego  which  remains  absolutely  the  same  unit  all 
the  way  through  the  progression  of  the  hours  and 
years  with  their  multifarious  metamorphoses,  yet 
it  has  a  weak  point  which  it  cannot  protect,— its 
denial  of  the  unity  of  body  and  mind.  Here,  the 
physiological  psychologists  occupy  an  impregnable 
position.  Their  arguments  against  dualism  are  con- 
clusive, and  they  ought  to  be  repeated  till  they  be- 
come universally  effective.  There  is  a  law  of  invari- 
able relations  between  certain  conditions  of  brain 
and  certain  forms  of  consciousness,  and  these  con- 
nections are  historic  and  evolutionary.  This  ego, 
therefore,  is  not  strictly  constant,  but  variable.  It 
constitutes  the  aggregate  of  conscious  states  existing 
at  any  given  time.  Hence,  also,  it  has  all  the  exten- 
sion which  belongs  to  organic  phenomena.  This  in- 
dividuality is  an  inconstant  field  of  life,  of  special 
form  and  development,  a  definable  portion  of  the 
larger  life  of  universal  nature,  a  portion  which  is 
transient,  as  all  the  various  forms  of  this  universal 
nature  are  transient.  This  ego  is  therefore  suscep- 
tible of  disintegration  in  various  forms  and  degrees, 
and  to  the  utmost ;  and  with  the  signs  of  such  opera- 
tions we  are  painfully  familiar  in  bodily  diseases, 
in  mental  derangement,  and  in  some  forms  of  vice  and 
crime.  Since  this  ego  is  composed  of  all  organic 
forms  and  forces  and  motions,  with  the  brain  as  the 
central  organ  of  bodily  synthesis,  sympathy,  and 
synergy,  it  follows  that  the  disorganization  of  the 
cerebral  centre  is  the  dissolution  of  this  6*70,  so  far 
as  the  dissolution  of  the  physiological  unity  extends. 

On  physiological  grounds  (which  are  also  ultimately 
psychological  grounds),  Dr.  Maudsley  is  rigidly  just 
and  scientific  in  using  the  following  language  :  "  The 
consciousness  of  self,  the  unity  of  the  ego,  is  a  conse- 
quence, not  a  cause  ;  the  expression  of  a  full  harmo- 
nious function  of  the  aggregate  of  differentiated  mind 
centres,  not  a  mysterious  metaphysical  entity  lying 
behind  function  and  inspiring  and  guiding  it ;  a  sub- 


130  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

jective  synthesis  or  unity,  based  on  the  objective  syn- 
thesis or  unity  of  the  organism.  As  such,  it  may  be 
obscure,  deranged,  divided,  apparently  transformed. 
For  each  breach  of  the  unity  of  the  united  centres  is 
a  breach  of  it :  subtract  any  one  centre  from  the  inti- 
mate physiological  co-operation,  the  self  is  pro  tanto 
weakened  or  mutilated  ;  obstruct  or  derange  the  con- 
ducting function  of  the  associating  bonds  between 
the  various  centres,  so  that  they  are  dissociated  or 
disunited,  the  self  loses  in  corresponding  degree  its 
sense  of  continuity  and  unity  ;  stimulate  one  or  two 
centres  or  groups  of  centres  to  a  morbid  hypertrophy, 
so  that  they  absorb  to  them  most  of  the  mental  nour- 
ishment and  keep  up  a  predominant  and  almost  ex- 
clusive function,  the  personality  appears  to  be  trans- 
formed ;  strip  off  a  whole  layer  of  the  highest  centres, 
.  .  .  you  reduce  man  to  the  condition  of  one  of  the 
higher  animals ;  take  away  all  the  supreme  centres, 
you  bring  him  simply  to  the  state  of  a  sentient  creat- 
ure ;  remove  the  centres  of  sense,  you  reduce  him  to 
a  bare  vegetative  existence,  when,  like  a  cabbage,  he 
has  an  objective,  but  no  subjective  ego."  (Body  and 
Will,  Part  Third,  Sec.  6.) 

To  this  theory  considered  as  "  the  conclusion  of  the 
whole  matter,"  a  fatal  objection  is  presented  by  one 
of  our  modern  sciences,  the  science  of  optics,  whose 
long  and  undisputed  deliverances  on  this  subject  Mr. 
Maudsley  and  all  physiological  egoists  here  overlook. 
Optics  teaches  that  the  objects  of  sight  are  never  the 
same  as  those  of  touch  :  so  that  the  tangible  and  visi- 
ble organisms  are  not  only  dissimilar,  but  numerically 
different.  It  follows  that  there  are  at  least  two  phys- 
iological egos;  and  there  is  no  unity  or  community 
between  them,  unless  we  go  back  to  an  extra-physio- 
logical and  extra  or  supra  organic  reality  and  agent, 
which  is  common  to  both  of  these  organisms,  and  to 
all  phenomena  ;  and  this  agent  is  our  absolute  Ego. 
Thus,  this  physiological  egoism  is  broken  utterly 
asunder  ;  and  it  can  find  no  rational  or  logical  and 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  131 

scientific  bond  until  it  abut  on  our  basis  and  adopt 
our  doctrine  of  an  absolute  and  universal  Ego  as  well 
as  the  sub-doctrine  of  a  local  and  physiological  ego 
as  one  of  the  generic  classes  of  the  modes  of  the 
great  and  absolute  Ego. 

This  narrow  conclusion  of  pure  organicism  is  the 
prevailing  view  of  modern  science  working  on  the 
physiological  side  of  our  nature.  It  is  modern  sens- 
ism  ;  and  it  coincides  with  a  very  early,  if  not  primi- 
tive, notion  of  man.  Indeed,  it  shows  the  still  common 
and  popular  line  of  demarkation  between  the  ego 
and  non-ego ;  and,  in  spite  of  themselves,  it  invades 
all  isms  and  theories.  But  a  faithful  and  progressive 
conformity  to  this  method  leads  us  to  far  loftier 
heights  and  broader  and  grander  vistas  than  material 
monism  can  ever  attain.  It  leads  us  to  the  discovery 
of  an  Ego  which  is  infinitely  more  glorious  than  the 
organic  or  physiological  ego.  The  same  style  of  in- 
vestigation and  argument  which  identifies  the  organic 
soul  and  body,  or  proves  the  organism  to  be  ego,  com- 
pels us  to  identify  both  these  and  all  extra-organic 
phenomena  with  a  super-organic  ego,  commensurate 
with  them  all  in  duration,  in  spatial  extension,  power 
and  variability, —  a  modal  variability,—  while  itself  re- 
mains the  same,  the  same  substance  or  force.  While 
the  organism  is  ego,  it  is  not  the  whole  of  ego.  All 
the  known,  including  the  organism  as  a  very  small 
fraction,  is  ego ;  and  the  physiological  ego  is  not  dis- 
criminated, as  is  supposed,  from  the  non-ego,  but  only 
from  certain  other  forms  of  the  general  or  absolute 
Ego,  and  so  the  degeneration  and  dissolution  of  the 
physiological  ego  are  only  a  small  modal  change  in  the 
absolute  or  total  ^170. 

The  Panheisenist  Ego. 

Here  creeps  in  panheisenism.  If  there  is  an  ego 
general  and  an  ego  local,  and  as  many  local  egos  as 
animated  organisms,  and  if  these  constitute  all  the 
knowable  universe,  what  is  this  but  to  say,  with 


132  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

Spinoza,  that  the  universe  is  one  being  and  sub- 
stance, with  many  special  forms  of  conscious,  personal 
beings  of  limited  power  and  duration  perpetually 
evolving  from  it  and  then  again  relapsing  into  it  ?  It 
will  be  very  natural  and  easy  for  some  to  state  my 
doctrine  in  this  way,  and  draw  the  inference  con- 
tained in  this  interrogation.  For  we  are  seldom' duly 
careful  or  competent  to  understand  an  unwelcome 
system  or  theory  and  its  logical  issues.  Therefore,  I 
so  state  it  now  by  anticipation,  to  prevent  such  per- 
version. The  terms  above  italicized  are  incorrect.  I 
have  affirmed  only  one  known  ego,  local  or  general. 
The  many  local  personalities  are  only  apparent.  I. 
who  affirm  my  personality  in  connection  with  my 
organism,  affirm  that  other  organic  forms  are  not 
persons,  but  only  symbols  of  persons  and  modes  of 
myself  :  so  that  I  recognize  but  one  being  in  all  the 
universe,  myself,  who  am  the  conscious  subject  of  all 
the  knowable.  So  that  the  absolute  and  universal 
being  of  this  theory  is  an  entirely  different  concep- 
tion from  the  unconscious  and  impersonal  universal 
absolute  existence  of  those  philosophies  which  have 
been  considered  pantheistic  or  panheiseuistic.  This 
existence  as  expounded  thus  far  in  Philosophical 
Realism  is  simply  and  solely  my  own  conscious  in- 
dividual self,  multifarious  and  ever-changing  in  its 
conscious  states.  It  is  always  and  forever  absolutely 
alone,  knowing  itself  only,  and  evolving  only  into 
new  forms  of  its  conscious  self  without  end,  but 
never  more  than  one  consciousness  or  conscious 
subject. 

Now,  the  question  arises  whether  I  am  the  only 
reality.  On  this  question  there  will  be  no  serious 
debate,  so  that  we  may  consider  it  settled  as  soon  as 
raised.  We  all  believe  in  the  existence  of  other  be- 
ings. On  what  grounds?  In  experiential  knowledge, 
I  am  shut  up  to  myself,  which  includes  the  whole  uni- 
verse. How  can  this  be  scientifically  transcended? 
This  is  the  great  question  for  us  to  answer,  now  that 
we  have  thoroughly  defined  the  ego. 


XI. 


Inductive  Method  of  Transcending 
the  Ego, 


WHEN  we  speak  of  transcending  or  of  being  shut 
up  in  the  ego,  we  must  hold  clear  in  mind  what 
ego  we  mean,  whether  the  absolute  or  the  local  ego. 
We  are  always  transcending  the  local  ego,  are,  in- 
deed, always  beyond  it  as  well  as  in  part  within 
it.  Sight  and  touch  directly  acquaint  us  with  objects 
which  are  external  to  the  organism;  but  those 
objects  external  to  the  organism,  or  local  ego,  are 
modes  of  the  absolute  ego.  What  we  need  now  is  a 
method  of  transcending  the  absolute  ego,  which  is 
our  total  individuality,  in  distinction  from  the  local 
ego,  which  is  a  part  of  the  absolute  ego. 

Fichte's  Efforts  at  Transcending  the  Ego. 

The  failure  to  notice  this  important  distinction 
is  one  of  the  causes  of  the  failure  to  find  a  logical 
egress  from  the  true  and  total  ego.  It  makes  the 
whole  effort  confused  and  inconsistent.  There  is 
a  frequent  unconscious  sliding  between  the  local  and 
absolute  ego,  and,  because  the  local  ego  is  trans- 
cended, a  halt  is  made  as  if  that  were  all  that  is 
called  for;  while  the  dimly  perceived  inconsistency 
of  this  with  the  doctrine  that  all  phenomena,  whether 
beyond  the  organism  or  not,  are  egoistic,  reveals 
a  hopeless  bewilderment.  This  describes  a  phasis 
of  nearly  all  modern  philosophies  of  perception  from 
the  time  of  Descartes,  but  especially  of  German  phi- 
losophy since  the  time  of  Kant. 


,  134  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

Here,  the  failure  of  Pichte  is  not  more  real,  though 
it  is  more  striking  than  the  rest  of  Kant's  followers. 
Like  his  master  Kant,  he  was  critical  rather  than 
constructive;  and  his  failure  was  just  what  the 
critical  philosophy  necessitated.  His  failure  was 
also  made  the  more  complete,  because  of  his  defective 
knowledge  of  induction  and  his  erroneous  notion 
of  substance  and  quality.  He  held  the  old  super- 
annuated doctrine  which,  in  different  nations  and 
ages,  has  been  variously  designated  or  indicated  as 
the  doctrine  that  we  do  not  know  things  in  them- 
selves, but  only  certain  phenomena  with  which  they 
are  in  some  inconceivable  way  connected ;  that, 
especially,  while  quality  or  attribute  is  known,  sub- 
stance is  unknown,  except  as  an  unphenomenal, 
inconceivable  something  which  is  supposed  to  be 
necessary  to  the  action  and  existence  of  phenomena, 
or  attribute  or  quality.  This  doctrine  generates 
nescience  and  contradiction  everywhere.  It  throws 
an  equal  shadow  over  ego  and  non-ego.  Both  are 
shut  away  from  us  in  perfect  darkness.  We  have 
nothing  to  start  from  and  nowhere  to  go  to.  We 
must  at  least  have  the  ego  known,  in  order  to  begin 
an  inquiry  for  the  non-ego.  If  the  prime  substance 
or  essence  of  the  ego  is  not  known  in  consciousness, 
and  is  of  that  non-distinguishable  and  inconceivable 
character  (without  character)  as  the  so-called  sub- 
stance or  thing  in  itself,  then,  of  course,  it  is  utterly 
impossible  for  any  distinctive  individuality  ever  to 
be  proved,  whether  ego  or  non-ego ;  and  even  the  con- 
ceptual distinction  between  them  and  between  all 
things  fades  away,  for  all  characteristics  have  per- 
ished. Pure  and  universal  phenomenalism  is  the  nec- 
essary result,  and  here  it  is  agreed  on  all  hands  Fichte 
was  held  in  logical  confinement. 

But  Fichte  differed  from  other  philosophers  on  this 
subject  only  in  his  superior  boldness  and  thorough- 
ness. He  only  carried  their  doctrine  to  its  logical 
issue.  They  laugh  at  him,  and  know  not  that  they 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  135 

are  pouring  a  double  ridicule  on  their  own  heads. 
In  this,  they  are  aH  alike. 

Very  different  is  the  logical  position  of  Philosophi- 
cal Realism.  It  holds  that  substance  and  quality  and 
phenomena  are  one,  so  that,  m  knowing  phenomena, 
we  know  substance  or  the  thing  in  itself,  which  is 
always  and  only  quality  or  force.  Hence,  the  ego  is 
the  conscious  subject,  whose  very  essence  or  sub- 
stance we  know  in  knowing  phenomena  as  subjec- 
tive states;  because  these  are  the  ego,  its  very  sub- 
stance and  essence  existing  in  these  modes.  There- 
fore, one  substance  we  absolutely  know  in  its  very 
essence;  and  our  conception  of  it  is  definite,  clear, 
and  precise,— a  force  active,  and  manifested  as  the 
modes  of  consciousness. 

But  another  and  chief  cause  of  Fichte's  failure 
was  his  superficial  and  unsteady  view  of  his  own  logical 
position.  His  doctrine  of  idealism  absolutely  isolates 
each  individual,  and  makes  him  commensurate  and 
identical  with  the  whole  universe  knowable  to 
him.  This,  I  believe,  he  never  saw,  though  he  saw 
what  so  clearly  implies  it,  the  egoism  of  all  phe- 
nomena. Indeed,  no  idealist  has  ever  clearly  seen 
this.  It  is  one  of  the  most  astonishing  of  historic 
phenomena,  as  an  illustration  of  the  fragmentary 
working  of  the  human  mind,  that  one  of  these  should 
be  so  generally  seen,  and  the  other  never  seen, 
though  the  two  are  one.  Hence,  Fichte  generally 
speaks  as  if  all  men  belonged  to  the  same  world 
and  were  partial  exemplifications  of  its  one  mighty 
force,  which  at  first  evolves  them  and  then  reabsorbs 
them  into  its  mighty  unity.  He  is  thus  really  an 
objective  evolutionist  of  a  vague  and  indefinite  rank. 
I  will  give  a  free  translation  of  an  eloquent  passage 
from  his  Vocation  or  Destiny  of  Man  (Die  Bestimmung 
des  Menschen),  which  shows  his  prevailing  thought  on 
this  subject.  It  is  as  follows: — 

"We  behold  ourselves  in  the  midst  of  a  vast 
concatenation  of  forces,  in  which  no  one  can  work 


136  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

for  himself  without  working  for  another,  in  which 
the  prosperity  of  one  is  the  prosperity  of  all, — a 
spectacle  whose  beauty  and  harmony  and  intrinsic 
beneficence,  which  we  behold  in  infinite  manifold- 
ness,  make  our  spirit  mighty.  The  interest  rises 
when  a  man  begins  to  consider  himself  as  an  integral 
member  of  this  great  intrinsic  unity.  The  sense  of 
our  dignity  and  power  still  rises  when  a  man  says, 
as  every  man  may:  My  life  is  not  vain  and  fruitless! 
I  am  a  necessary  member  of  the  great  connection 
which  moves  ever  onward  from  the  evolution  of  the 
first  man  to  its  full  manifestation  in  eternity."  Such 
radical  and  unrecognized  contrariety  of  thought  is 
proof  of  partial  and  inadequate  comprehension  of  both 
sets  of  thought,  so  that  no  philosophic  issue  is  possi- 
ble. He  flies  from  one  system  of  thought  to  the  other 
with  more  speed  and  agility  than  Ariel,  and  so 
easily  that  he  is  all  unconscious  of  the  infinite  gulf 
he  has  crossed.  Still,  his  great  achievement  is  not 
unparalleled.  Indeed,  it  has  from  his  day  to  this 
been  a  common  and  every-day  performance  by  ad- 
vanced psychologists;  for  all  these  have  resolved 
all  phenomena  into  modes  of  the  ego,  and  then  they 
have  straightway  proceeded  to  speak  as  if  the 
great  organic  connectional  unity  called  the  world 
(Fichte's  Verbindung)  were  a  non-egoistic  thing,  on 
whose  common  surface  all  men  subsist.  Concur- 
rently admitting  that  all  phenomena  are  egoistic, 
they  fail  to  see  the  truth  of  the  same  thought  put 
in  its  converse  form,  that  the  ego  comprises  always 
all  the  known  universe,  all  its  forms,  motions, 
forces  on  the  earth  or  in  the  heavens,  organic  or 
inorganic  ;  and,  while  the  former  is  admitted  by  the 
competent,  the  latter  is  universally  denied,  and 
scouted  as  lunacy.  It  is  the  lunacy  of  this  effete 
metaphysical  method  which  here  stubbornly  stands 
in  the  way  of  the  positive  method  which  seeks 
a  consistent  generalization  and  ordination  of  what  we 
know  by  experience. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  137 

This  universal  blunder  arises,  as  we  have  said,  from 
the  failure  to  discern  the  distinction  between  the 
absolute  and  the  local  ego.  The  local  ego  is  related 
to  the  world,  as  they  describe  that  relation.  It  is 
evolved  from  the  world,  and  returns  to  the  world. 
It  is  one  of  the  parts  and  forms  of  the  great  world's 
force  and  action,  and  it  originates,  develops,  and 
decays  by  lexical  regularity  and  necessity,  just  as 
Fichte  describes  in  the  passage  above  quoted,  where 
he  also  assumes  that  he  is  thus  describing  the  course 
of  the  whole  man,  man  as  man  ;  whereas,  he  is  really 
describing  only  one  of  the  innumerable  complex 
modes  of  man's  existence  and  action, —  a  description 
of  the  relation  of  the  organic  ego  to  the  inorganic  and 
preorganic  ego  which  constitute  the  kosmos,  which, 
again,  is  a  mode  of  the  absolute  ego,  which  is  the  true 
and  complete  or  total  ego,  and  that  which  philoso- 
phers have  never  recognized,  though  all  affirm  that 
all  the  known  universe  is  ego,  or  a  series  of  subjective 
states. 

Here,  all  theories  are  equally  faulty.  They  never 
pretend  to  transcend  the  universe  ;  and,  therefore, 
they  never  transcend  the  ego,  though  they  know 
it  not,  and  see  not  their  inconsistency.  Phenomenal 
fulness  and  completeness  and  logical  unity  demand 
that  we  find  a  scientific  egress  from  the  ego.  How 
shall  this  be  accomplished  ?  Past  failures  to  answer 
the  question  enjoin,  not  silence  or  despair,  but  fresh 
effort,  guided  by  lights  which  those  failures  supply. 
Let  us  also  be  reminded  that  no  failures  of  theoretic 
construction  can  alter  facts.  The  inscription  of  truth 
on  the  granite  walls  of  the  universe  is  not  erased 
by  our  unsuccessful  effort  to  decipher  it.  Part  of 
this  inscription  we  know,  that  all  we  immediately 
know  is  ego,  and  this  is  neither  to  be  ignored  nor 
perverted  merely  because  we  cannot  yet  read  the 
rest  of  the  inscription. 

But,  while  only  the  ego  is  known,  an  altruistic  faith 
is  universal ;  and  on  this  faith  all  thought  and  action 


138  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

proceed.    It  is  the  scientific  justification  of  this  faith 
which  is  the  task  now  on  the  hands  of  philosophy. 

Sematism  the  Basis  of  Induction* 

An  immediate  knowledge  of  the  non-ego  is  forever 
impossible.  It  is  only  possible,  at  the  utmost,  to 
reach  an  indirect  proof  of  its  existence  and  character 
by  inference  from  the  known.  But  it  is  also  possible 
for  this  proof  to  be  so  clear  and  strong  and  scientific 
as  to  satisfy  all  the  demands  of  the  most  rigorous 
investigation,  and  I  am  quite  confident  of  being  able 
to  give  as  good  an  inductive  proof  as  science  usually 
requires  in  concrete  investigations.  Deductive  or 
demonstrative  proof  I  do  not  promise.  This  is  a 
necessary  inference  from  accepted  premises  ;  and  no 
other  inference  is  admissible  in  the  abstract  sciences, 
as  in  pure  mathematics.  This  argument,  and  no 
other,  always  forms  a  perfect  syllogism,  if  formulated. 
It  is  not  always,  nor  even  generally,  available  in 
the  concrete  sciences,  whether  physical  or  psychical. 
Here,  induction  must  suffice  ;  and  induction  is  a 
probable  or  reasonable,  but  not  necessary,  inference 
from  accepted  premises.  In  deduction,  the  premises 
always  contain  the  conclusion.  In  induction,  they 
never  do. 

We  may  adduce  the  modern  proof  of  the  derivation 
of  the  horse  from  the  Eocene  Eohippus  and  Oro- 
hippus  as  an  example  of  a  good  induction,  which  is 
yet  not  the  very  clearest  and  strongest.  The  induc- 
tion is  based  on  resemblances  of  structure,  on  known 
laws  of  structural  mutation  and  evolution,  which  are 
indirectly  observed  to  obtain  and  operate  in  a  line 
between  these  two  extremes  or  terms,  the  Eocene 
animal  and  the  modern  horse  ;  and,  though  all  the 
connections  cannot  be  traced  in  the  geological  record, 
yet  what  we  do  know  of  this  record  is  taken  by 
nearly  all  physical  scientists  as  a  sufficient  ground  for 
the  inference  that  the  later  animal  is  evolved  from 
the  earlier.  What  we  know,  the  actual  phenomena 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  139 

of  geological  science,  are  taken  as  signs  of  what  we  do 
not  know.  As  a  different  and  far  stronger  example 
of  induction,  we  may  adduce  the  law  of  gravitation, 
which  always  and  everywhere,  as  far  as  we  can 
go,  admits  of  being  tested,  and  which  has  been 
verified  wherever  tested,  and  which  yet  may  possi- 
bly fail  to  answer  to  the  test  in  some  future  experi- 
ment, though  that  is  utterly  improbable  ;  but  all  that 
we  know  is  considered  as  an  index  or  sign  of  the 
extension  of  the  law  beyond  the  region  of  our  ex- 
perience. 

This  leads  us  back  to  a  presupposed  law  or  doctrine 
of  Sematology,  implied  in  all  induction.  Sematology 
is  based  on  the  knowledge  of  nature  as  a  force. 

All  force  is  necessarily  active  and  effective,  accord- 
ing to  its  nature  and  quantity  or  degree.  Its  action 
and  effect  must,  therefore,  be  absolutely  uniform  in 
the  same  connections,  so  long  as  its  nature  is  the 
same.  This  is  a  logical  necessity  from  the  conception 
of  being  as  a  force,  and  it  is  supported  by  our  ex- 
perience of  nature's  uniformity.  This  principle  of 
nature's  uniformity  is  the  basis  of  all  induction  and 
all  that  is  necessary  for  its  exposition.  It  is  useless 
and  futile  to  enter  into  a  long  and  elaborate  and 
obscure  inquiry  for  the  support  of  a  questionable 
hypothesis  of  causation,  like  that  of  John  Stuart 
Mill.  It  is  enough  for  every  purpose  of  science  and 
every  inductive  argument  to  know  that  nature  al- 
ways operates  in  the  same  way.  From  this,  we  can 
proximately  anticipate  its  action  where  we  cannot 
sensibly  trace  it,  and  draw  reasonably  probable 
conclusions  where  we  cannot  verify  them.  Hence  it 
is  that,  to  a  skilled  anatomist  and  physiologist,  a 
fossil  bone  is  a  good,  though  not  a  perfect,  index 
to  the  whole  skeleton  to  which  it  belonged,  and  to 
the  habits  of  the  living  animal ;  and  the  conclusion 
which  we  thus  reach  from  these  phenomena  as  signs 
is  an  induction.  Hence  it  is  that,  by  induction  in 
every  department  of  human  research,  we  are  enabled 


140  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

to  widen  indefinitely  the  area  of  mediate  knowledge  ; 
and,  in  every  department  of  practical  life,  we  are 
also,  hence,  enabled  to  regulate  our  action,  so  as 
to  secure  good,  and  escape  evil  to  a  degree. 

Many  writers  are  (sometimes  at  least)  under  an  er- 
roneous impression  (fostered  by  one  portion  of  Mr. 
Mill's  inconsistent  work  on  Logic)  that  nothing  can 
properly  be  called  science  till  it  is  verified  by  experi- 
ence. This  makes  the  reasoning  power  to  be  always 
only  a  servitor  to  experience,  instead  of  a  grand  and 
superior  complement  of  experience.  This  is  not  sus- 
tained by  the  course  of  any  of  the  acknowledged 
sciences.  They  do,  indeed,  indefinitely  extend  the 
area  and  particularity  of  our  experiential  knowl- 
edge; and  this  is  their  primal  object  and  the  founda- 
tion of  their  progress,  but  it  is  not  their  largest,  their 
grandest  and  most  ulterior  result.  These  are  all 
inferences  beyond  experience  or  the  physical  possi- 
bility of  experience.  Such  are  the  law  of  gravita- 
tion, the  paths  of  some  of  the  comets,  all  the  past 
conditions  of  the  kosmic  universe,  all  the  past  history 
of  the  flora  and  fauna  of  our  own  world,  and  very 
many  of  the  relations  of  existing  phenomena,  of 
which  examples  can  be  given  in  every  recognized 
science.  Verified  experiential  knowledge  is,  there- 
fore, but  a  very  minute  fraction  of  what  are  included 
in  the  legitimate  conquests  and  treasures  of  modern 
science.  Experience  is  the  fulcrum  on  which  we  rest 
our  inductive  lever,  which  is  a  compound  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  lexical  sequences  and  of  the  sematic  signifi- 
cance of  all  phenomena,  as  lexically  related  to  each 
other  or  to  something  beyond  our  experience. 

We  are  thus  led  to  see  that  all  inductive  reasoning 
is  a  process  of  lexical  sematism,  and  the  word  Sema- 
tology  describes  the  ultimate  philosophical  character 
of  induction.  By  the  uniformity  of  nature,  certain 
events  necessarily  become  signs  of  other  events 
which  are  as  yet  beyond  our  experience.  The  most 
striking  exemplification  of  the  certainty  and  uncer- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  141 

tainty  which  attend  the  application  of  this  principle 
in  practical  life  is  seen  in  the  phenomena  of  "circum- 
stantial evidence"  in  criminal  cases.  We  combine 
and  concatenate  the  phenomena  which  are  considered 
as  signs  of  certain  events  into  a  strong  inductive  ar- 
gument. Yet  it  may  not  be  true,  and  an  opposing 
argument  of  equal  or  greater  strength  may  be  con- 
structed from  these  phenomena  in  different  combina- 
tions. The  whole  argument  on  both  sides  is  a  process 
of  sematism;  and,  though  the  result  is  less  certain 
here  than  in  many  departments  of  acknowledged 
science,  yet  sematism  is  no  less  essential  to  induction 
in  one  department  than  in  another.  In  some  concrete 
sciences  there  is  more  certainty  in  sematic  or  induc- 
tive reasonings  than  in  others,  as  in  astronomy  com- 
pared with  sociology;  yet  it  is  equally  necessary  in 
all.  In  all,  it  is  the  great  light  of  modern  thought, 
the  electric  illuminator  of  the  modern  scientific 
world,  which  without  it  would  speedily  perish  in 
utter  darkness. 

Now  let  us  apply  this  principle  in  prosecuting  the 
most  important  of  the  sciences,  Psychology,  espe- 
cially in  relation  to  the  senses.  We  will  begin  with 
the  relations  of  the  senses  to  each  other.  Here,  we 
are  in  a  path  not  wholly  untrodden.  Indeed,  practi- 
cal sematology  in  some  form  or  other,  and  in  some 
degree  of  comparative  purity,  is  as  old  as  human 
thought,  though  the  reflective  exposition  of  it  must 
necessarily  come  in  at  a  late  epoch,  and  a  scientific 
justification  of  it  has,  I  believe,  never  before  been 
attempted.  Berkeley's  theory  of  vision  made  it  nec- 
essary for  him  to  utilize  it  more  conspicuously  than 
any  preceding  thinker.  Following  in  the  wake  of 
Berkeley,  though  deviously,  blindly,  and  protest- 
ingly,  Dr.  Reid  also  makes  some  use  of  the  principle. 
But  neither  of  them  could  explain  its  grounds  and 
reasons,  because  neither  had  any  adequate  philosoph- 
ical or  scientific  conception  of  nature  and  force. 


142  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

Sematism  between  the  Several  Senses. 

To  begin,  then,  where  Berkeley  used  it,  in  the  com- 
parison of  one  sense  with  another.  All  the  phenom- 
ena of  one  sense  have  a  lexical  connection  with  those 
of  all  other  senses,  and  on  this  account  each  can 
stand  as  a  sign  in  relation  to  all  the  others.  While 
the  objects  of  each  sense  are  different  from  all  the 
rest,  they  are  practically  connected  and  made  of 
mutual  service  only  by  the  law  of  Sematology. 
What  I  see  I  cannot  hear,  because  I  see  only  color 
and  hear  only  sound.  But  because  of  the  uniformity 
of  the  action  of  the  senses,  what  I  see  is  a  sign  of 
what  I  may  hear  or  touch  or  smell  or  taste  ;  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  action  of  any  of  these  other  senses 
may  become  a  sign  for  the  action  of  sight.  In  short, 
the  prior  action  of  any  sense  is  a  sign  of  what  may 
be  the  experience  of  any  other  sense  ;  and  so  each 
allures  to  pleasure  or  warns  of  pain,  and  acts  as  sen- 
tinel and  signal  for  all  the  senses,  and  also  for  inter- 
nal consciousness. 

On  this  basis,  we  are  able  to  prosecute  extended, 
systematic  researches,  the  results  of  which  will  by 
classification  and  generalization  form  distinct  sciences 
as  well  as  scientific  conclusions,  because  the  uniform- 
ity and  fixedness  of  nature  afford  a  sematology  for 
all  science  as  well  as  for  all  practical  life. 

Sematism  between  all  the  Senses  and  their  Com- 
mon Subject. 

So  far,  its  action  is  all  subjective.  All  the  senses 
and  all  their  objects  are  egoistic,  and  we  have  con- 
sidered their  action  only  relative  to  each  other.  A 
step  further,  and  we  consider  all  the  senses  relative 
to  their  subject.  On  our  principle  of  sematism  it  is 
that  my  organism  is  especially  and  pre-eminently 
the  sign  and  symbol  of  my  sensitive  and  cognitive 
and  absolute  individuality.  It  is  not  itself  that  indi- 
viduality, proper  and  total ;  for  that  individuality 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  143 

spreads  over  all  the  universe,  all  of  whose  lights  and 
shadows,  forms  and  motions,  are  its  various  modes 
and  inadequate  manifestations  of  its  all-pervading 
presence.  Of  this  wondrous  individual,  the  organism, 
as  the  local  ego,  is  the  special  symbol.  The  organism 
fills  a  peculiar  and  extraordinary  office.  While  all 
known  things  are  equally  modes  of  myself,  nothing 
else  sustains  to  my  experience  and  action  and  respon- 
sibility the  same  office  and  relation  as  those  which 
belong  to  my  own  organism.  Through  it,  and  usually 
through  it  only,  by  laws  which  are  more  or  less  fa- 
miliar, I  become  the  organically  related  subject  of 
certain  external  or  extra-organic  experiences,  and  by 
means  of  it  I  change  or  modify  these  external  expe- 
riences in  various  ways  and  degrees.  Thus,  in  cer- 
tain conditions  and  relations  of  the  organism,  I  have 
certain  experiences  of  sensible  phenomena  which  are 
external  to  the  organism.  In  the  light,  for  instance, 
with  my  eyes  open,  I  discern  certain  visible  objects, 
and,  by  varying  my  organic  position  and  direction  of 
vision,  I  change  the  visible  objects.  Likewise,  exter- 
nal, tangible  objects  are  discerned  and  varied  by 
varied  organic  connections.  These  objects  are  truly 
external  to  our  organism,  and  not  a  part  of  that  or- 
ganism, as  the  clouds,  the  church-spire,  the  hand  of 
my  Mend,  or  my  cane  or  pen  ;  and  so  these  objects 
are  not  themselves  my  organic  changes  or  phenom- 
ena or  experiences.  Their  subject  is  therefore  extra- 
organic,  the  total  or  absolute  ego,  which  is  the 
common  subject  of  both  organic  and  sub-organic  and 
super-organic  phenomena. 

Sematism  between  the  Ego  and  its  Organism. 

I  also  treat  my  own  organism  as  my  representative 
relative  to  all  other  organisms,  and  in  special  and 
distinctive  contrast  with  all  other  modes  of  myself ; 
and,  in  that  light,  I  treat  it  with  pre-eminent  distinc- 
tion and  respect.  It  may  be  indifferent  to  me  how 
stars  and  sky  and  earth  and  certain  animated  forms 


144  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

are  treated.  It  is  far  otherwise  when  action  or 
speech  is  directed  toward  my  organism.  That  is  ad- 
dressed to  me,  and  treated  accordingly.  Through 
this,  also,  I  have  feelings  which  come  to  me  through 
no  other  medium  ;  and  my  pains  and  pleasures  are  so 
peculiarly  identified  with  it  that  with  it  I  peculiarly 
identify  myself,  and  say  of  it  I  or  me. 

My  organism  is  also  treated  by  other  organisms 
precisely  in  the  same  way  as  the  symbol  or  embodi- 
ment of  a  distinct  personal  ageney,  and  as  such  it  is 
courted,  favored,  shunned,  feared,  opposed ;  and, 
thence,  speech  as  well  as  action  takes  shape  and  di- 
rection. 

Sematism  between   our  Organism  and  Other  Or- 
ganisms. 

There  is,  in  the  next  place,  an  evident  and  peculiar 
causal  connection  between  our  action  and  that  of 
other  human  forms  (as  well  as  animal  forms).  We 
know  that  their  action  often  varies  regularly  rela- 
tively to  ours,  proving  clearly  that  the  antecedent 
and  consequent  are  somehow  related  to  each  other  as 
cause  and  effect.  But  the  peculiarity  here  is  that  all 
the  forms  seem  to  be  animated  by  passion  and  will, 
while  they  are  certainly  not  animated  by  the  passion 
and  will  of  our  local  ego.  We  know  our  own  feel- 
ings and  volitions,  and  their  connection  with  our  own 
organism.  But  those  other  forms  and  motions  have  no 
such  connection  with  our  consciousness;  and,  some- 
times and  not  unfrequently,  they  are  in  decided  and 
forceful  opposition  to  all  our  desires  and  most  ear- 
nest endeavors.  How,  then,  can  we  escape  the  infer- 
ence that  they  are  the  symbols  of  other  spirits  who 
thus  express  and  exert  their  passion  and  will  and 
power  ?  This  is  the  universal  and  spontaneous  infer- 
ence of  the  human  mind,  an  inference  which  the 
latest  science  justifies  and  necessitates  and  explains. 
The  pre-scientific  inference  is  only  too  large  and 
indiscriminate,  as  it  generally  is.  It  considers  that 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  145 

the  external  sensible  form  is  non-ego,  because  it  is  not 
sensitive  in  the  same  way  as  is  the  form  which  we 
call  our  own  organism.  Science  corrects  this,  and  at 
the  same  time  confirms  the  inference  that  these  forms 
and  motions  are  signs  and  effects  of  a  spirit  corre- 
sponding to  our  own  as  their  cause.  In  passing  thus 
beyond  the  universe  to  beings  who  exert  their  power 
upon  us,  we  do  not  pass  from  the  relative  to  the  un- 
relative  absolute;  for  those  inferred  beings  are  cau- 
sally related  to  us  in  various  ways,  which  relations 
are  the  grounds  of  our  inference,  and  furnish  scope 
for  the  action  of  the  principle  of  Sematology. 

As  these  egoistic  forms  are  Symbols  of  spiritual 
individualities,  so  the  activities  of  these  forms  and 
all  their  passivities  are  also  for  the  same  reason 
symbolic  of  the  phenomena  of  the  unknown  but  sym- 
bolized or  represented  spirits.  And  as  all  our  phe- 
nomena vary  relative  to  each  other  according  to  law, 
including  all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe,  and  the 
action  and  passion  of  all  phenomenal  men  and  ani- 
mals, they  are  all  symbolic  of  the  lexical  variations 
in  the  action  and  experience  of  the  beings  repre- 
sented, that  thus  there  are  laws  of  inter-communica- 
tion between  these  various  beings  and  their  universes, 
that  there  is  a  lexical  correspondence  between  them, 
though  they  have  no  direct  connection  or  communi- 
cation with  each  other. 

The  principle  through  which  this  mediate  knowl- 
edge is  attained,  the  law  of  Sematology,  through 
known  likeness  and  uniformity,  is  not  a  mere  in- 
stinct, but  the  operation  of  intelligence,  spontaneous 
and  reflective.  That  the  burnt  child  dreads  the  fire 
is  a  maxim  which  shows  the  early  operations  of  the 
understanding  learning  wisdom  by  experience,  one 
experience  leading  it  to  fear  that  another  of  like  kind 
will  be  equally  painful, — a  fear  which  has  abundant 
cause  in  due  time  to  ripen  into  perfect  assurance. 
The  child  and  untutored  barbarians  are  strongly 
disposed  to  think  that  all  bodies  have  feeling,  just 


146  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

because  their  body  has.  But,  as  their  knowledge 
advances  and  becomes  rectified,  they  learn  to  distin- 
guish between  animated  and  inanimate  bodies.  But 
how  is  this  done?  It  is  impossible  except  by  com- 
parison on  the  principle  of  analogy.  Even  men  of 
science  sometimes  find  it  difficult  to  determine 
whether  a  body  is  animated  or  not ;  and  they  settle 
this  point  by  a  careful  investigation  for  some  phe- 
nomena which  from  consciousness  and  observation 
they  know  to  be  peculiar  to  animate  organisms. 

This  is  precisely  the  way  in  which,  as  a  Philosoph- 
ical Realist,  I  attain  the  knowledge  of  other  beings 
subject  to  the  same  laws  with  myself.  I  observe  how 
my  consciousness  is  uniformly  connected  with  my 
own  organism  ;  and  I  then  observe  that  there  are 
other  organisms  than  my  own  which  present  all  the 
varied  phenomena  that  my  own  does,  and  this 
knowledge  of  the  resemblance  is  so  full  and  minute, 
and  so  continually  repeated,  that  the  conclusion  ia 
irresistible  that  these  organisms  represent  other 
spirits  essentially  like  my  own. 

In  the  same  way,  from  the  organic  phenomena 
which  comprise  the  bodies  of  animals,  by  comparing 
and  contrasting  their  differences  and  resemblances 
in  reference  to  my  own,  I  discover  that  these  also  are 
symbols  of  sentient  beings  correspondingly  like  and 
unlike  myself. 

While  the  principle  of  Sematology  everywhere 
operates  spontaneously,  it  is  for  that  reason  suscepti- 
ble o<f  scientific  exposition.  From  the  conception  of 
natural  force  whose  action  is  uniform,  we  have  a 
very  great  probability,  if  not  certainty,  that  the 
same  phenomena  will  have  the  same  antecedents  and 
consequents.  The  color  sensation  called  fire,  being 
followed  by  the  touch  sensation  called  burning,  we 
infer  that  it  will  be  so  always.  This  is  the  method 
of  physical  science  in  all  departments  and  all  cases. 
It  is  on  the  same  method  and  the  same  principle  that 
we  say  that  the  organism  which  we  call  our  body, 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  147 

being  peculiarly  associated  with  our  personal  ego  in 
its  conscious  activity,  we  infer  that  other  bodies  like 
ours  are  associated  with  and  emblematical  of  other 
spirits  or  self-conscious  beings  like  our  own,  and  that 
animal  bodies  prove  the  same  of  animal  spirits  of 
corresponding  likenesses  and  differences.  Deny  this, 
and  we  confound  all  philosophy,  we  deny  a  primary 
principle  and  procedure  of  all  science,  and  we  trans- 
mute all  the  phenomena  of  supposed  animated  ex- 
istences into  mere  chimeras  without  a  meaning  or  an 
object.  If  any  one  elects  to  take  this  position,  it  is 
not  our  fault.  Our  doctrine  is  scientific  in  its  proofs 
and  philosophic  in  its  results.  While  in  common 
with  other  philosophies  it  makes  all  animated  phe- 
nomena, as  well  as  others,  egoistic,  they  are  not 
meaningless  and  confusing  to  all  intelligence.  Being 
made  significant  of  transcendent  realities  correspond- 
ing with  the  phenomenal  forms,  then  philosophy, 
science,  and  practical  intelligence  are  illuminated. 


XII. 

PSYOHE-MOEPHISM. 


WE  are  now  logically  driven  to  a  conclusion  which 
has  often  been  conjectured  and  widely  accepted 
among  Oriental  minds,  but  which  has  never  been 
rationally  conceived,  much  less  scientifically  sup- 
ported, and  which  has  generally  been  contemplated 
with  repulsion  or  disdain  by  the  intellect  of  the  West. 
We  are  now  prepared  to  understand  that  there  is 
a  demand  in  the  known  natural  law  of  cause  and 
effect  for  a  theory  of  metempsychosis,  or,  more 
strictly,  metamorphosis  of  the  soul,  or,  still  better, 
psyche-morphism . 

Problem  of  Permanence  and  Change  in 
Causation. 

One  of  the  chief  and  fundamental  problems  of  the 
ages  concerns  the  possibility  of  natural  causation,  or 
the  rational  conception  of  it.  The  cause  is  described 
as  an  antecedent  phenomenon,  uniformly  connected 
with  a  subsequent, —  its  effect.  In  these  days,  with 
the  law  of  correlation  before  us,  we  often  define  the 
effect  as  its  transmuted  antecedent.  But,  in  either 
form,  the  problem  concerning  the  nature  and  possi- 
bility of  the  change  is  inevitable.  The  difficulty 
arises  from  its  implication  that  the  cause  must  cease 
to  be  before  the  effect  exists,  else  the  relation  is  not 
one  of  antecedent  and  subsequent.  But,  in  that  case, 
how  can  it  operate  as  a  cause?  How  can  the  non- 
existent do  anything?  That  is  self-contradictory. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  it  has  not  ceased  to  be,  how 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  149 

can  it  exist  as  a  transmuted  form  in  its  lexical  subse- 
quent? To  explain  this,  philosophers  have  always 
assumed  a  transphenomenal  substance.  But  this  is 
ineffective  and  illogical,  unless  the  substance  is  con- 
ceived as  ultimately  one  and  the  same  for  all  phe- 
nomena, as  Spinoza  did;  and  then,  further,  we  must 
identify  the  substance  with  the  phenomena,  so  that 
the  latter  are  the  lexical  modes  and  working  of  the 
former,  which  is  thus  made  a  force,  and  the  only 
cause.  Then  and  not  till  then  have  we  a  rational 
expression  of  permanence  in  causal  changes.  Mr. 
Spencer  resorts  to  the  same  assumption  of  trans- 
phenomenal  substance,  which,  in  order  to  be  of  use, 
it  must  also  be  assumed  that  this  substance  is  cause. 
But  neither  he  nor  any  of  his  predecessors  gives  any 
reason  for  this  assumption,  and  to  explain  the  rela- 
tion of  the  substance  to  the  phenomena  has  always 
been  treated  as  an  insoluble  problem  ;  and  so,  to 
evade  one  problem,  others  are  invented.  Mr.  Spen- 
cer only  says  that  phenomenal  changes  cannot  be 
supposed  to  be  absolute  beginnings  and  cessations  of 
existence,  and  that,  therefore,  there  must  be  a  per- 
manent somewhat  back  of  them,  which  they  repre- 
sent. 

All  these  problems  find  an  ultimate  and  perfect 
solution  in  our  previous  exposition  of  the  Absolute 
and  Relative  as  one,  and  both  as  one  with  substance 
and  phenomena,  and  these,  so  far  as  known  or  know- 
able,  as  one  with  ego,  as  conscious  spirit.  It  is  not 
phenomena  as  phenomena  merely  that  are  causes  and 
effects.  But  it  is  phenomena  as  modes  of  a  substan- 
tive force  or  spirit  which  perdures  through  all  phe- 
nomenal changes,  and  operates  them  all ;  and  the 
phenomena  are  not  the  trajected  and  disconnected 
creations  of  the  spirit  or  substantive  force,  but  the 
very  thing  itself,  so  and  so  existing,  as  its  transient 
modes,  because  whatever  is  is  force,  which  must 
exist  in  some  mode  and  in  various  modes,  since  force 
must  act,  and  so  undergo  modal  changes.  Then,  as 


150  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

these  phenomena  are  known  as  egoistic,  and,  there- 
fore, as  conscious  spirit,  as  substantive  and  perdu  r- 
ing  force,  that  which  operates  everywhere,  and  per- 
dures  through  all  changes,  is  known  as  such  ego. 
We  thus  attain  a  perfect  unity  amid  all  diversity, 
and  permanence  combined  with  causal  changes  ; 
the  law  of  natural  cause  and  effect  is  preserved  real 
and  intact,  and  philosophically  expounded  ;  and  our 
ultimate  abutment  is  not  a  mere  postulate  or  as- 
sumption, much  less  a  somewhat,  which  is  con- 
fessedly unknowable  and  inconceivable,  but  that 
which  is  directly  and  indubitably  known,  egoistic 
phenomena,  which  are  equally  spirit  and  substance 
and  force,  all  these  being  one.  And  these  phe- 
nomena are  the  ego  existing  in  these  modes,  and 
acting  because  it  is  a  force,  and  acting  according 
to  its  nature,  or  the  kind  and  degree  of  its  force 
or  being,  and  therefore  acting  with  regularity,  and, 
in  so  doing,  lexically  changing  its  modes,  ending 
some  and  beginning  others  forevermore. 

With  this  light,  and  on  this  basis,  we  can  discuss 
even  such  a  subject  as  metempsychosis  philosoph- 
ically and  with  scientific  rigor,  by  showing  it  as 
a  succession  of  different  "forms  or  modes  of  the  same 
soul,— psyche-morphic  changes. 

Pro-existence  in  Other  Forms. 

Objective  evolution  makes  individuality  to  be  very 
superficial  and  factitious,  merely  apparent  or  phe- 
nomenal, but  not  substantial.  It  makes  all  individ- 
ualities of  every  grade  and  kind  to  be  but  the  modes 
or  mutable  forms  of  the  one  great,  only,  and  eternal 
force  or  power,  and  all  generation  and  births  are 
merely  changes  in  these  forms;  so  that  progeny  in 
all  cases,  whether  in  the  seed,  egg,  or  living  animal, 
is  a  transmutation  of  what  was  once  a  vital  part  of 
its  parent  source.  It  forgets  that  all  these  individ- 
ualities, as  well  as  all  other  phenomena,  so  far  as 
they  are  known  or  knowable  to  any  one,  are  states 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  151 

of  flie  knowing  subject,  and  that  all  births,  deaths, 
progress,  or  decay,  and  all  possible  known  forms  and 
mutations  of  the  universe,  are  modes  of  the  perceptive 
ego,  and  that  the  real  generation,  birth,  death,  or 
extinction  of  any  other  individual,  or  of  its  mode 
of  life,  is  never  known  to  us  ;  and  that  we  know  only 
certain  present  changes  in  ourselves,  which  are  taken 
as  signs  of  corresponding  changes  in  others  and  in 
our  past  conditions.  When  my  organism  was  gener- 
ated, that  which  was  or  is  known  and  designated 
as  such  by  others  (each  knowing  a  different  organ- 
ism) was  to  them  the  sign  that  I  had  passed  over 
from  some  other  state  into  this,  which  ranks  me  so 
and  so  with  men.  Now,  the  question  arises,  "What 
was  that  other  state  ?  " 

We  must  reply  that  it  was  some  mode  of  my  own 
individual  self.  Here  is  a  fact  of  vital  importance, 
of  which  only  subjective  evolution  can  take  cog- 
nizance. Objective  evolution  makes  one  being  or 
individual  to  become  extinct,  and  its  disorganized 
forces  to  become  transmuted  into  another  by  fresh 
organization,  the  utter  ending  of  one  and  the  absolute 
beginning  of  another,  as  individualized  forms  of  the 
one  eternal  force.  But  that  is  irrational  and  does 
not  agree  with  known  facts.  The  known  facts  are 
only  modal  changes  of  the  same  one  subject  or 
individual,  which,  in  every  case,  includes  the  whole 
universe,  all  its  force  and  all  its  forms.  No  evolution 
can  transcend  the  universe  to  which  it  belongs.  The 
course  of  evolution  is,  therefore,  always  confined  to 
the  modal  changes  of  the  same  one  individual,  which 
undergoes  a  succession  of  changes,  answering  to,  or 
rather  constituting,  those  of  the  known  universe. 
As  this  egoistic  universe  contains  other  forms  like 
ours,  it  symbolizes  that  there  are  other  men  who  have 
undergone  the  same  line  of  successive  evolutions 
as  we  have,  from  the  lower  stages  of  existence  up  to 
organic  man. 


152  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

Pre-existence  in  the  Human  Form 

The  human  stage  being  reached,  it  were  unreason- 
able to  suppose  that  the  process  of  evolution  here 
ends.  Such  a  view  finds  no  support  in  the  analogies 
of  experience.  As  a  rule,  evolutionary  changes  are 
not  great  and  sudden,  but  by  successive  small  de- 
grees. Yet  very  vast  is  the  difference  between  the 
highest  and  the  lowest  intellect  of  man,  between 
the  most  advanced  and  the  least  advanced  of  our 
race.  This  advance  cannot  be  supposed  to  have 
taken  place  all  at  once.  There  has  been  gradual 
progress,  though  with  steps  of  varying  extent. 
Hence,  to  the  question  as  to  what  was  our  immedi- 
ately preceding  state,  we  may  answer,  with  con- 
siderable confidence,  that  it  was  some  other  and 
lower  human  form  and  condition,  on  the  ground 
that  all  scientific  indexes  seem  to  point  to  this 
conclusion.  Phenomenally,  all  human  forms  and 
states  follow  in  birth  upon  others,  as  the  effects  or 
transformed  force  of  those  others.  This  is  also  the 
utterance  of  objective  evolution,  and  accords  with 
all  serious  popular  thought  and  expression.  But, 
as  all  phenomena  are  modes  of  one  individual  sub- 
ject, and  as  my  organism  especially  represents  me, 
and  as  its  generation  represents  the  beginning  of 
my  present  organic  mode  of  existence,  so  it  appar- 
ently represents  that  my  previous  state,  as  sym- 
bolized in  its  phenomenal  parents,  was  proximately 
like  my  present  state.  The  phenomenal  difference 
between  phenomenal  parents  and  offspring  being 
generally  not  very  great,  and  of  lexical  regularity,  we 
may  or  must  infer  that  such  is  the  same  concerning 
the  real  individualistic  changes  which  these  phe- 
nomena sematize.  These  changes  carry  us  back  suc- 
cessively to  lower  human  conditions,  till  we  reach 
the  dark  border-land  of  Moss-trooper  contests  as  to 
which  side  of  the  line  a  thing  belongs,  and  then 
back  to  the  pre-human,  then  the  pre-faunal,  and  even 
to  the  pre-floral  condition. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  153 

Some  phenomena  may  be  considered  as  symbols  of 
what  is  below  organic  consciousness.  All  the  inor- 
ganic world  may  belong  to  this  class.  It  is  the  form 
of  my  infra-organic  and  human  consciousness,  and  it 
shows  what  was  once  wholly  my  life  and  conscious- 
ness. That  I  or  anything  is  or  was  wholly  uncon- 
scious I  know  not.  It  cannot  be  proved  nor  con- 
ceived. It  is  the  supposition  of  a  state  which  is 
wholly  devoid  of  all  intelligible  marks.  There  may 
be  egoistic  force  which  is  not  yet  or  always  in  full 
conscious  action.  But  even  of  this  we  can  never  have 
any  direct  proof.  We  know  that  different  states  of 
consciousness  frequently  fail  to  connect  in  memory, 
and  all  apparent  unconsciousness  may  be  of  this 
kind.  At  all  events,  the  spirit  has  evolved  itself 
(not  from  itself),  first,  as  chaos,  then  as  kosrnos,  and 
then  as  the  forms  of  organic  life,  vegetable  and  ani- 
mal, and  the  process  of  evolution  is  still  advancing  ; 
and  what  further  capabilities  are  within  the  vast  and 
awful  womb  of  this  spirit,  the  absolute  ego,  only 
everlasting  experience  can  disclose. 

Number  and  Duration  of  Psyche-iiiorphigms. 

This  conclusion,  it  must  be  confessed,  is  very 
sweeping  and  very  far  removed  from  prevailing 
modern  thought;  and,  on  that  account,  it  will  be  held 
to  be  very  objectionable.  It  implies  a  doctrine  of 
universal  psyche-morphisins  of  vast  and  incalculable 
multiplicity  and  duration.  It  implies  that  every 
advanced  human  being  has  probably  undergone  a 
psyche-morphic  change  many  times  between  his 
present  state  and  the  state  in  which  he  first  emerged 
or  evolved  into  man,  if  we  may  suppose  such  a  point, 
on  the  location  of  which  we  are  not  likely  to  agree. 
It  implies  that  this  same  creature  or  individual  in 
that  supposed  immediately  pre-human  state  probably 
underwent  many  such  transformations  between  the 
first  and  last  generation  of  the  whole  monkey  family 
previous  to  the  evolution  into  the  human  state.  It 


154  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

implies  further,  perhaps,  as  many  more  psyche-rnor 
phisms  as  there  were  generations  from  that  time  back 
to  the  beginning  of  its  organic  life. 

But  we  should  not  assume  that  life  had  only  one 
point  of  beginning  and  only  one  time  for  all.  There 
were  just  as  many  as  there  are  living  beings,  or  in- 
dividuals, which  are  never  derived  from  any  other  or 
others,  each  form  being  evolved  from  its  previous 
state,  and  all  from  the  first  state,  which  in  each  case 
was  a  separate  creation,  if  not  eternal  ;  and  each 
one,  let  us  remember,  is  itself  always  a  universe. 
There  can  be  no  natural  symbol  for  creation,  because 
it  can  have  no  lexical  antecedent  and  no  natural 
process.  Abiogenesis,  were  it  well  established, 
would  only  show  another  example  of  evolution;  and 
in  that  light  it  has  been  investigated,  and  the  failure 
to  establish  it  is  of  small  account,  by  the  methods 
used,  because  it  is  not  necessary.  Subjective  evolu- 
tion shows  it  to  be  a  logical  necessity  which  gives  a 
theoretical  completeness  to  the  order  of  things:  first, 
creation,  which  is  unimaginable,  but  not  inconceiv- 
able ;  second,  the  first  and  lowest  created  condition, 
which  is,  perhaps,  infra-conscious  and  therefore  pre- 
kostnic  ;  third,  evolution  into  the  lowest  conscious 
condition,  a  pre-organic  kosmic  experience ;  then, 
fourth,  abiogenetic  evolution  from  the  kosmic  form  ; 
and,  then,  successive  biogenetic  evolution  as  before 
indicated,  and  every  such  change  or  evolution  simply 
a  psyche-m orphic  change. 

In  this  long  course  of  psyche-morphic  changes,  the 
change,  as  indicated  by  the  symbols,  is  sometimes  a 
deterioration;  but  the  main  trend,  the  vast  and  over- 
whelming force  and  sweep  of  movement,  is  in  the 
direction  of  progress. 

I  have  spoken  of  a  possible  unconscious  pre-kosmic 
condition  (though  I  do  not  believe  it),  because  the 
kosmos  is  a  mode  of  our  consciousness,  and,  there- 
fore, whatever  is  in  that  state  is  conscious;  but,  as 
many  think  we  have  reason  for  believing  there  is 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  155 

occasionally  even  now  an  unconscious  state,  I  name 
that  the  pre-kosmic  or  infra-kosmic  state,  and  sup- 
pose that  it  is  the  lowest  and  preceded  the  kosmic. 

This  appears  to  me  consistent,  thorough,  and  com- 
plete; and,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  it  is  a  legitimate  in- 
duction from  facts  and  principles  which  are  known 
and  acknowledged  by  all.  We  ought  not  to  be 
utterly  repelled  from  the  consideration  of  it  because 
of  its  novelty  in  part;  for,  if  it  were  nothing  new, 
why  should  I  write?  Nor  should  its  apparent  prox- 
imate resemblance  to  any  theory  supposed  to  be  ob- 
solete condemn  it  without  investigation.  It  is  not 
improbable  that  some  hoary  errors  are  partial  antici- 
pations of  truth.  Many  will  identify  the  last  few 
pages  with  one  portion  of  Buddhism,  and  with  that, 
too,  which  is  deemed  the  most  unfounded  and  fanci- 
ful. But  the  metempsychosis  of  Buddhism  is  with- 
out a  scientific  basis.  It  is  a  dualism  all  through,  the 
body  being  always  other  than  the  soul.  Its  final 
goal  is  indifferentism  absolute,  if  not  entire  un- 
consciousness and  personal  annihilation.  In  all 
these  points  of  great  and  vital  importance,  our  psy- 
che-morphism  differs  from  the  metempsychosis  of 
Buddhism.  Yet,  notwithstanding  this  difference, 
the  one  point  of  coincidence  with  Buddhism  will  ex- 
tensively stand  in  the  way  of  its  reception,  and  in 
some  minds  excite  a  stubborn  prejudice  and  opposi- 
tion. Borne  interesting  inquiries  will  grow  out  of 
this  exposition,  which  we  cannot  entertain,  much 
less  conclusively  develop. 

A  method  of  evading  Psyche-morphism. 

There  is,  some  may  think,  another  course  open  to 
us,  and  leading  to  different  conclusions,  arising  from 
the  reasonable  possibility  of  making  a  different  in- 
ference from  one  class  or  series  of  facts  which  we 
have  been  obliged  to  use  as  symbols  of  transcendent 
realities.  As  our  organism  is  the  sensitive  expression 
of  the  ego,  and  as  other  human  organisms,  though 


156  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

egoistic,  are  symbols  of  other  men,  so  what  we  call 
our  parents  represent  other  human  beings,  who 
sustain  to  us  very  peculiar  and  important  relations. 
Now,  since  phenomenally  the  progeny  is  from  the 
progenitors,  a  part  of  their  force  transformed,  it  may 
be  asked  whether  the  law  of  symbolism  does  not 
require  or  justify  the  proposition  that  all  real  suc- 
cessive generations  are  not  merely  changes  in  the 
same  person  or  individual,  but  the  generation  of  new 
individualities  from  the  parent  sources,  the  progeny 
being  a  transformed  part  of  the  former  energy  of  the 
progenitors,  and  now  specialized  into  new  individ- 
uals. It  will  appear,  at  first  sight,  very  reasonable 
to  answer  this  question  in  the  affirmative.  This 
would  afford  us  a  subjective  theory,  quite  analogous 
to  the  popular  objective  evolution.  This,  like  that, 
implies  that  all  forms  of  existence  are  but  modes 
of  one  all-embracing  and  all-perduring  Force,  which 
evolves  itself  into  all  these  forms  according  to  laws 
of  its  own  generation.  This  Force  may  be  appropri- 
ated by  Theists  as  the  Supreme  Being,  though  some 
may  oppose  it  because  of  its  implicated  pantheism. 

Objections  to  this  method. 

I  object  to  this  because  of  its  superficial  individu- 
alism. I  cannot  believe  that  we  are  all  simply  modes 
of  One.  All  the  logical  implications  of  experience 
compel  me  to  think  that  each  one  of  us  is  an  individ- 
ual, distinct  and  separate,  at  once,  always,  and  for- 
ever. I  am  not  a  mode  of  God,  or  of  the  great  and 
only  One,  call  it  by  whatever  name  you  will.  It 
makes  all  men  one,  just  as  all  the  members  are  one 
body,  which  my  consciousness  and  reason  repudiate. 

I  object,  again,  because,  like  objective  evolution,  it 
logically  excludes  personal  immortality.  The  whole 
existence  of  each  is  included  within  the  period  be- 
tween birth  and  death.  Our  existence  as  specialized 
individuals  consists  in  this  form  and  its  functions; 
and,  when  these  are  ended,  our  existence  has  passed 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  157 

away  as  individuals.  This  mortalism  is  distasteful  to 
my  higher  aspirations,  and  cannot  be  admitted  with- 
out the  strongest  evidence.  Of  course,  I  shall  be  re- 
minded that  all  do  not  feel  like  this,  and  that,  if  they 
did,  a  mere  feeling  proves  nothing.  It  may  be  right 
or  it  may  be  wrong,  and  the  feeling  of  to-day  may 
not  be  the  feeling  of  to-morrow,  which  is  very  true  ; 
and  so  much  the  worse  for  him,  I  say,  who  ever  feels 
satisfied  with  mortalism. 

I  object  to  this  mortalism,  because  I  believe  it  is 
inconsistent  with  a  regnant  moral  economy.  It  may 
be  that  there  is  no  such  moral  economy  as  that  which 
is  conceived  by  me.  But  I  am  glad  to  be  able  to 
despise  an  economy  which  can  seldom  live  more  than 
three  or  four  score  years,  and  usually  not  so  long, 
and  which,  after  that,  is  only  an  imaginary  shade, 
hovering  in  impotent  menace  or  approval  around 
imaginary  shades,  which  are  equally  impotent  to  be 
either  cursed  or  blessed.  I  cannot  conceive  the 
moral  life  to  be  an  insignificant  ephemeral  or  a  hot- 
house annual,  but  a  tree  (like  the  Igdrasil)  which 
perdures  through  all  the  ages  and  ages,  whose  roots 
grasp  all  the  nether  universe,  and  whose  top  extends 
and  spreads  through  all  the  heavens.  Perhaps  there 
is  no  such  thing.  Perhaps  this  conceit  is  only  a 
relict  of  the  old  fuliginous  pre-scientific  brain.  So 
think  some  of  our  modern  scientific  ephemerals 
and  animalculse.  But,  if  time  and  occasion  offered, 
it  were  easy  to  show  that  morality  is  this  or  nothing. 

I  object,  again,  because,  apart  from  any  moral 
scheme,  evolution  has  thus  in  it  no  element  of  dis- 
tributive rational  propriety  and  honest  verity.  Forms 
come  and  go,  and  set  themselves  up  for  something 
distinct,  as  if  they  were  ultimate  individualities, 
when  they  are  only  automatic  members  of  one  Indi- 
viduality. This  is  an  intolerable  falsity,  ever  and 
forever  repeated.  The  theory  here  conflicts  with  all 
psychological  assumptions  and  convictions  and  the 
practical  judgment  of  mankind,  and  makes  all  nature 


158  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

a  series  of  hollow,  deceptive,  and  deceived  simulacra. 
That  falsity  cannot  be  the  truth.  We  treat  these 
simulacra  as  verities;  and,  therefore,  our  theories 
should  accord  with  this,  or  they  will  justly  and 
speedily  be  relegated  to  shades  themselves. 

I  object  to  this  theory,  in  the  next  place,  because 
it  divests  the  order  of  events,  always  and  everywhere, 
of  all  rational  significance  and  moral  propriety.  No 
reason  whatever  can  ultimately  be  assigned  why  any 
of  the  innumerable  figures  of  the  universe  should 
be  what  it  is,  or  why  it  appears  and  disappears  where 
and  when  it  does.  Very  true,  indeed,  it  is  that  this 
system  can  admit  of  no  final  causes.  It  is  unintelli- 
gent and  non-moral.  "  It  knoweth  not  whence  it 
cometh  nor  whither  it  goeth."  Gradually,  we  see  it 
sloughing  off  every  distinctive  intellectual  as  well  as 
moral  quality;  and  there  is  left  to  us  a  mere  black 
hulk,  rolling  on  waters  ever  dark  and  restless. 
Live  there  who  can.  It  is  the  primeval  world  of 
falling,  simmering  waters,  of  vapors,  clouds,  and 
gases,  with  all  the  lights  of  heaven  obscured.  It 
cannot  long  be  accepted  as  the  ultimate  evolution 
of  the  intellectual  world,  especially  with  those  who, 
as  subjective  evolutionists,  have  already  proved  the 
agency  of  a  mighty  personal  and  supernatural  Power. 

I  object  to  this  theory,  in  the  next  place,  because  it 
conflicts  with  the  fundamental  notion  of  being,  which 
is  deduced  from  subjective  evolution.  Subjective 
evolution  directly  knows  no  being  but  the  subject, 
ego,  which  is  personal  spirit.  All  being  is  force,  and 
all  is  spirit  and  individualistic,  though  often  of  a 
very  low  order;  and,  as  each  includes  all  of  an  entire 
universe,  there  is  nothing  in  common  to  any  two, 
though  there  may  be  much  of  resemblance  between 
many.  Therefore,  the  notion  of  one  great,  under- 
lying root,  from  which  all  phenomena  are  temporary 
outshoots  (not  offshoots),  like  the  extemporized  feet, 
hands,  or  mouth,  or  stomach  of  the  monera  or  amoebae, 
is  inadmissible.  The  universe  —  every  universe  —  is 


-iin.OSOPHICAL    REALISM  159 

une,  one  individual;  but  all  universes  together  are 
mot  one  individual,  but  many.  And  these  are  abso- 
''n.eiy  isolated  from  each  other.  Infinite  vacuum  is 
vm;ween  them,  and  they  can  reach  each  other  no 
more  than  the  swinging  of  bells  in  airless  space  will 
generate  sound. 

I  object  to  it,  in  the  next  place,  because  it  involves 
a  notion  of  the  ego  indefinitely  inferior  to  that  which 
is  logically  necessitated  by  subjective  evolution, 
which  identifies  all  the  power  and  glory  and  duration 
of  the  knowable  universe  with  the  ego,  so  that  no 
natural  bridging  of  the  gulf  which  separates  one  from 
another  is  possible;  and  all  limitation  to  their  power 
and  duration,  except  as  somewhere  within  the  finite, 
is  precluded.  After  attaining  this  conception  of  the 
ego,  there  is  no  room  left  in  the  mind  for  the  beggarly 
notion  of  a  transient  wafe,  which  is  well  compared 
to  a  vapor  or  breath  or  a  meteor,  or  to  burning 
stubble.  The  organism  is  but  an  infinitesimal  por- 
tion of  the  ego,  and  each  organic  life  is  but  such 
a  fraction  of  the  total  life  of  the  ego.  So  the  absolute 
isolation  of  individuals  precludes  the  possibility  of 
one  being  the  natural  issue  of  another,  as  one  sub- 
jective organism  is  from  another.  Such  a  notion 
makes  the  individual  superficial,  unreal,  puny,  and 
temporary,  limited  to  a  very  little  space  and  time, 
with  corresponding  disabilities.  The  sensible  child 
to  which  the  mother  gives  birth,  being  but  a  mode  of 
herself,  to  call  either  of  them  a  distinct  individuality, 
as  if  they  comprised  two  persons,  is  to  contradict  the 
science  of  psychology.  They  do  not  comprise  even 
one  person.  They  are  only  two  out  of  an  indefinite 
number  of  the  experiences  of  one  person, — the  abso- 
lute ego,  though,  as  we  have  expounded,  they  sym- 
bolize two  different  persons. 

A  final  objection  is  that  all  the  good  of  the  universe 
is  on  this  theory  accidental.  There  is  good  devel- 
oped in  certain  conditions ;  and  these  conditions 
come  and  go  with  the  same  indifference  as  opposing 


160  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

conditions,  aud  all  are  equally  legitimate,  and  neither 
are  any  more  an  end  than  the  other.  With  certain 
physical  changes,  all  attained  good  passes  away 
remorselessly  and  irrevocably,  because  it  was  a  mere 
accident  of  physical  conditions,  just  as  all  evil  is. 
It  is,  therefore,  utterly  void  of  all  moral  significance, 
just  the  same  as  lightning,  mildew,  and  springing 
flowers,  which  are  temporary  consequents  of  certain 
physical  interactions  simply. 

limitation  of  Psyche-morphic  Changes. 

Let  it  not  be  overlooked  that  these  psyche-morphic 
changes  are  only  partially  relative  to  their  subject. 
They  do  not  comprise  the  whole  being,  not  tho  abso- 
lute eyo,  but  only  the  local  and  organic  ego,  which 
changes  by  changing  interaction  with  the  environ- 
ment; which  environment  is  the  extra-organic  and 
pre-organic  subject,  which  first  generates  and  then 
endlessly  modifies  the  organic  ego.  In  the  mean 
while,  the  inorganic  ego,  or  universe,  is  constantly 
changing  in  its  forms  and  in  the  relative  motions, 
force,  and  effect  of  its  parts;  and  it  is  these  changes 
which  modify  the  organic  world,  which  again  reacts 
on  the  inorganic  world.  These  organic  forms  and 
changes  we  can  trace  back  to  their  origin  in  the 
inorganic.  But  they  are  modes  of  the  same  individ- 
ual through  all  the  changes;  and  they  have  the  same 
conscious  subject  as  that  whose  phenomena  consti- 
tute the  inorganic  and  extra-organic  universe,  which 
changes  comparatively  little.  And  so  our  total  indi- 
viduality changes  very  slowly,  while  the  modes  of 
our  local  organism  change  rapidly.  I— the  one  indi- 
vidual constituting  the  universe — exist  through  all 
time  and  constitute  all  time,  because  I  am  the  subject 
of  all  known  changes,  all  co-existence  and  succession. 

Dignity  and  Significance  of  the  Lower  Animals. 

Subjective  evolution  implies  that  in  the  whole 
course  of  times  there  are  just  as  many  creatures  of 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  161 

one  grade  or  kind  as  of  any  other  (except  the  highest, 
where  they  stop  and  accumulate,  if  we  may  suppose 
any  such  rank,  which  we  do  not) ;  for  all  the  lower 
pass  into  the  higher  (unless  there  be  some  irretrieva- 
ble deterioration  and  perversion),  and  all  the  higher 
were  once  in  all  the  lower  conditions,  and  have 
evolved  out  of  them.  This  gives  us  an  ascending 
series  of  existences  of  a  nobler  order  and  significance 
than  any  of  which  poets  and  theorists  have  ever 
dreamed.  The  lowest,  the  most  insignificant,  and  the 
most  repulsive  has  before  it  a  sublime  destiny  possi- 
ble or  certain.  Its  goal  is  manhood  or  archangelhood 
or  we  know  not  what  of  greatness  and  elevation  be- 
yond. What  a  glorious  right  to  be  is  thus  conferred 
upon  the  humblest  creatures!  and  what  a  persistent 
power  to  be  is  theirs,  also,  for  their  organic  destruc- 
tion is  only  a  psyche-morphic  change,  which  is  pre- 
liminary to  a  first  evolution  somewhere  by  birth,  in 
perhaps  a  nobler  form  I  For  each  and  all,  not  for  a 
few  late  comers  only,  is  this  grand  and  endless  des- 
tiny. The  oft-raised  question  is  now  answered: 
"What  did  God  make  such  things  as  these  for?" 
He  made  them  that  they  might  be  men,  and  better 
and  wiser  men  than  those  who  captiously  ask  the 
question.  In  the  mean  while,  they  have  their  own 
enjoyments,  and  subserve  unconsciously  many  pur- 
poses of  importance  as  they  move  on  their  unknown 
way  to  the  higher  stations  which  they  are  destined  to 
attain  ;  and,  above  all,  the  whole  vast  and  grand 
chain  of  progressive  existence  discloses  a  teleology 
far  surpassing  any  that  theologians  have  ever  endeav- 
ored to  expound. 

Reality  and  Thoroughness  of   Subjective  Evolu- 
tion. 

Subjective  evolution  is  thus  complete  and  universal. 
It  is  the  normal  privilege  and  law  of  every  individual 
organic  being  to  evolve  itself  from  the  lower  to  the 
higher  evermore.  Objective  evolution,  on  the  con- 


1(5:2  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

trary,  is  accidental,  partial,  and  limited.  All  animals, 
including  man,  die  to  live  no  more;  for  at  death  their 
individuality  is  forever  extinguished.  Even  where 
there  is  said  to  bs  an  evolution  from  the  lower  into 
the  higher,  that  means  only  the  extinction  of  one 
individual  and  the  beginning  of  another  and  a  higher, 
—a  new  individuality  as  well  as  a  new  order  or  spe- 
cies. No  one  individual  itself  ever  evolves  into  a 
higher  order,  except  it  be  from  the  embryonic  and 
preliminary  and  amphibious  state  into  the  subse- 
quent developed  condition.  There  is  a  succession  of 
rising  (or  falling)  orders,  and  no  more.  On  the  other 
hand,  according  to  the  scheme  of  subjective  evolu- 
tion I  have  briefly  described,  each  individual  ex- 
isted in  every  order,  the  same  individual  in  every 
preceding  order,  and  the  same  will  exist  in  every 
succeeding  order.  Death  is  but  the  ending  of  one 
form,  and  birth  the  beginning  of  another.  Each  in- 
dividual is  immortal,  and  an  endless  duration  in  an 
innumerable  succession  of  mortal  lines  is  the  heri- 
tage of  each.  The  general  outline  of  the  past  history 
of  those  who  are  now  men  we  are  getting  quite  able 
to  trace  on  the  pages  of  palaeontology  ;  but  what  are 
to  be  the  evolutions  of  the  future  and  the  duration 
of  each  is  beyond  our  power  even  to  imagine,  except 
in  a  faint  degree,  as  an  inference  from  our  present 
intellectual  and  moral  life  and  action.  But  here 
Spiritualism  may  possibly  help  us  some  time. 

Universality  of  Evolution  because  Subjective. 

Objective  evolution  is  also  limited,  in  that  it  is  con- 
fined to  particular  points  where  only  the  ascent  takes 
place.  It  searches  for  the  forms  in  an  order  which 
makes  the  closest  approach  to  some  of  the  forms  of 
another  and  higher  order,  and  then  says  that  here, 
and  here  only,  was  the  ascent  made.  Here  is  the 
narrow  and  crooked  stairway  up  which  nature 
climbed  to  the  next  landing  place  above.  At  all 
other  points,  the  order  or  species  remains  unchanged; 


PHILOSOPHICAL    HKAL1SM  163 

and  none  of  its  individuals  ever  pass  beyond  their 
present  rank.  This  is  a  scientific  necessity  with  ob- 
jective evolution,  because  it  proves  evolution  (in  dis- 
tinction from  creation)  only  by  showing  gradual 
approaches  of  the  antecedents  as  a  sign  of  natural- 
istic transition  to  the  subsequent  of  a  higher  order. 
It  has  no  other  proof,  and  it  can  claim  evolution  only 
so  far  as  it  can  show  a  close  structural  approximation 
of  antecedents  to  certain  subsequents  of  a  superior 
rank. 

With  subjective  evolution,  the  case  is  entirely 
changed.  The  egoistic  unity  of  the  universe  is  im- 
mediately found  by  an  analysis  of  consciousness,  and 
all  space  and  time  and  their  contents  are  concen- 
trated in  the  ego.  I  can  transcend  myself  only  by  a 
sematic  inference,  never  by  experience  or  the  action 
of  any  natural  force  or  influence  ;  nor,  therefore,  in 
any  wise  can  I  be  brought  into  contact  or  association 
or  connection  of  actual  proximity  or  natural  influ- 
ence with  any  other  being.  Hence,  it  is  impossible 
for  one  being  to  be  evolved  from  another.  All  action 
and  interaction,  all  succession  of  cause  and  effect, 
are  only  between  the  different  modes  of  the  same  one 
individual  which  is  the  subject,  the  cause  and  effect, 
antecedent  and  subsequent,  of  all  change  and  evolu- 
tion in  the  same  universe  from  the  beginning  to  the 
end  of  its  transmutations.  This  is  a  logical  necessity, 
and  we  need  not  adduce  close  physical  connections 
to  prove  this  general  proposition.  And  now,  as  no  in- 
dividual can  be  evolved  from  another,  the  later  states 
of  each  may  be  and  must  be  evolved  from  its  earlier 
states.  This  is  the  only  evolution  that  is  possible, 
and  this  necessarily  prevails  from  the  beginning  of 
the  world  onward  and  without  end.  Every  succes- 
sive state  of  the  same  individual  or  universe  is  nec- 
essarily an  evolution  from  its  predecessors,  whatever 
they  may  have  been;  and  this  can  never  for  a  mo- 
ment be  brought  into  question  by  any  alleged  unlike- 
ness  between  the  succeeding  and  preceding  forms 


1H4  PHILOSOPHICAL    KKAL1SM 

known  to  us;  for  here,  in  the  same  subject,  there  is  no 
possible  room  for  the  supposition  of  the  creation  of  a 
new  species.  This,  therefore,  is  true  of  my  local  ego, 
which  has  certainly  evolved  from  precedent  and 
lower  forms  of  my  universe,  or  absolute  ego,  whether 
I  can  give  a  scientific  verification  of  the  points  where 
the  transitions  took  place  or  not. 

But,  as  there  is  a  phenomenal  order  of  succession, 
which  is  symbolical  of  transcendent  realities,  it  fol- 
lows that  what  is  true  of  me  is  true  of  all,— all  other 
individuals  and  universes  which  transcend  my  own. 
And  as,  in  this  symbolical  universe,  there  is  a  suc- 
cession of  species,  with  birth  and  death  for  all,  it 
follows  that  there  is  a  succession  of  evolving  states 
for  all  individuals,  each  from  itself. 

One  more  question  still  remains  on  this  vast  and 
almost  awful  subject, —  a  question  which,  if  it  were 
overlooked,  would  be  asked  by  others  with  a  laugh, 
as  if  they  had  found  in  it  a  refutation  of  our  doctrine. 
As  we  have  concluded  that  men  have  probably  many 
successive  human  lives  —  how  many  I  know  not  —  as 
successive  psyche-morphic  mutations,  we  now  want 
some  rule  or  principle  to  determine  when  shall  cease 
this  process,  if  it  ever  shall,  when  men  shall  pass 
beyond  the  human  rank  by  evolution  into  something 
permanently  higher,  with  no  more  earthly  reincarna- 
tions. There  is  nothing  in  the  mere  order  of  things 
as  successive  phenomena  to  help  us  determine  this. 
The  degree  of  intellectual  advancement  might  be 
interrogated  on  the  subject,  but  the  response  is 
equivocal. 

There  is  a  higher  principle  than  mere  intelligence. 
It  is  the  moral  and  religious  power  and  quality. 
These  are  certainly  peculiar  to  civilized  men  in  the 
extent  of  their  development  and  in  many  of  the  forms 
which  they  assume  and  develop,  whether  they  differ 
in  essential  kind  from  the  faculties  of  the  brute  or 
not.  I  hold  that  the  moral  faculty  is,  in  a  degree,  a 
supernatural  power,  and  that,  as  such,  it  belongs 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  165 

to  all  beiDgs  in  a  state  of  moral  probation,  so  that  it 
is  always  in  the  power  of  such  a  being,  without  any 
change  of  circumstances  or  antecedents  or  subjective 
state,  to  do  either  right  or  wrong.  And  therefore, 
on  that  account,  all  such  are  for  a  period  in  a  state  of 
moral  probation,  since  such  a  power  is  necessary  to 
such  probation,  and  necessitates  it,  until  they  have 
determined  and  fixed  their  character  for  good  or  evil. 
The  development  and  proof  of  this  theory  belong  to 
another  connection  and  topic.  Here  we  take  it  for 
granted  that  we  may  use  it  in  answering  the  question 
under  consideration.  This  moral  probation  is  the 
highest  possible  end  of  man  as  man  ;  and  through  it 
every  man  must  be  supposed  to  go,  and  enjoy  every 
possible  advantage  and  opportunity  it  implies  and 
involves,  and  to  the  utmost  extent,  until  he  has  fixed 
and  sealed  his  own  fate  for  the  future,  and,  perhaps, 
forever.  Then  his  human  career  is  run.  There  is  no 
more  call  for  his  existence  in  this  probationary  form. 
He  now  enters  upon  another  state,  in  which  he  reaps 
by  self -inheritance  what  he  has  here  morally  sown. 
With  the  good  there  is,  then,  fixity  in  good  ;  and  all 
after  that  is  a  course  of  education,  while  the  certainty 
of  an  everlasting  ascending  series  of  felicity  and 
glory  is  before  them.  With  the  bad  — well,  we'll 
leave  them.  It  is  neither  as  pleasant  nor  as  clear 
on  this  side  as  on  the  other.  They  have  taken  the 
dark  path,  and  it  is  difficult  to  follow  them.  We 
know  there  are  animal  deteriorations,  but  will  leave 
it  to  others  to  draw  conclusions.  Indeed,  all  this 
discussion  as  to  the  future,  and  the  passage  of  men 
from  the  ranks  of  men,  is  quite  theoretical,  with  little 
in  the  way  of  positive  indices  to  guide  us.  Only  the 
indices  of  a  future  existence,  unequivocal,  and  the 
psychic  change  it  involves,  should,  in  the  normal 
course,  be  a  progressive  evolution  beyond  the  pres- 
ent kosmic  form  and  order. 

There  is  a  dualism  which  imagines  that  the  body 
comes  by  natural  generation,  and  that,  at  the  mo- 


166  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

ment  of  the  gestation  of  the  human  body,  God 
creates  for  it,  in  each  separate  instance,  an  individual 
soul.  Thus,  the  fiatism  of  creation  is  still  going  on, 
only  God  now  creates  infant  souls  for  infant  bodies, 
instead  of  a  manly  soul  and  a  manly  body,  as  in  the 
legendary  Adam.  Some  who  affect  to  despise  fiatism 
seem  to  believe  that  the  soul  is  different  from  the 
body;  that  it  is  not  the  product -of  any  known  ante- 
cedents, like  the  body  ;  that  it  is  not  subject,  as  to  its 
origin,  to  the  law  of  evolution  and  correlation  ;  and 
that  it  comes  we  know  not  how  or  whence.*  The 
only  alternative  is  either  the  old  fiatism  or  an  evolu- 
tion of  the  soul,  according  to  the  unknown  laws  of  an 
unknown  spirit  world. 

A  thorough-going  evolution  dispenses  with  all  this. 
It  refuses  to  assume  an  infinite  fiatism,  contingent  on 
the  sexual  action  of  the  animal  world.  It  knows 
nothing  of  the  duality  of  body  and  spirit,  and  of  one 
as  naturally  engendered  and  the  other  as  super- 
naturally  introduced,  preserved,  and  developed. 
But  the  new  doctrine  is  here  beset  with  another 
difficulty  of  its  own  creation, —  the  self-contradictory 
miracle  of  a  new  human  soul  and  life,  absolutely 
originating  as  a  series  of  links  in  an  unbroken  chain 
of  sequences.  It  is  a  stupendous  and  incredible 
marvel  that  such  a  being  as  man,  with  all  his  spirit- 
ual capabilities,  should  absolutely  begin  his  existence 
in  the  womb  as  the  natural  product  of  certain  phys- 
ical antecedents.  This  can  never  be  widely  received 
by  the  human  mind.  Hence,  the  foremost  evolu- 
tionists, like  Spencer  and  his  followers,  here  make  an 
unscientific  hiatus,  and  declare  the  actions  of  the 
mind  and  body  concomitants,  and  not  correlatives  ; 
and  they  relegate  the  origin  and  cause  of  the  mind  to 
the  Unknowable. 

But  philosophy  cannot  be  content  with  anything 
like  that.  It  demands  intellectual  completeness  and 
unity.  This  is  attainable  in  accordance  with  our  doc- 

*  John  Fiske. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  167 

trine  of  Philosophical  Realism.  According  to  this, 
all  births  are  but  changes  in  the  old  and  common  life 
of  the  universe,—  the  subjective  ego  ;  and  every  birth 
is  the  symbol  of  an  evolution  of  some  subject  from 
one  condition  into  another  and,  perhaps,  a  higher 
condition  or  form  of  existence,— a  psyche-morphic 
change  in  the  individual  or  spiritual  being,  which 
exists  in  all  the  successive  forms,  so  that  the  change 
is  an  evolution  strictly,  not  the  destruction  of  one 
individual  and  the  beginning  of  another,  but  the 
unfolding  of  higher  powers  and  the  attainment  of  a 
higher  form  by  the  same  one  individual. 

The  doctrine  of  metempsychosis  will  probably  be 
offensive  to  some,  on  the  assumption  that  it  is  not 
Christian.  It  is  not  taught  in  the  Bible,  but  it  is  not 
opposed  to  the  Bible,  as  we  know  that  many  of  the 
Jews  who  revered  the  Bible  rather  leaned  to  the 
doctrine ;  and  they  thought  that  John  was  Elias 
metamorphosed,  thus  fulfilling  the  prophecy  that 
Elias  must  first  come, — before  the  Messiah.  Allow- 
ing the  name  of  Adam  to  the  first  man,  like  the  Jews, 
that  does  not  debar  his  sons  from  any  number  of 
transmigrations,  whether,  to  begin  with,  they  inherit 
his  depravity  or  not  ;  and  it  affects  not  in  the  least 
man's  relation  to  Christ  or  the  Holy  Spirit.  But,  if 
any  have  not  had  an  adequate  moral  probation  in  one 
life,  they  may  have  it  in  a  second  or  third  here  in  this 
world.  This  would  remove  some  objections  to  the 
Scripture  doctrine  that  probation  is  confined  to  this 
world.  It  allows  that  every  one  may  have  in  this 
world  every  possible  advantage  for  the  determination 
of  moral  character.  Against  the  doctrine  here  pro- 
pounded, neither  the  Bible  nor  the  councils  nor  the 
creeds  have  uttered  a  word. 


XIII. 


HUMAN  INTEKCOUKSE. 


Collateral   Testimony. 

IF  on  this  subject  there  is  a  babel  of  voices,  there  is 
an  unrecognized  unity  of  thought.  Against  Idealism, 
Dr.  Reid  argues  in  the  following  terms  :  "It  seems  to 
take  away  all  the  evidence  we  have  of  other  intelli- 
gent beings  like  ourselves.  What  I  call  a  father 
a  brother,  or  a  friend,  is  only  a  parcel  of  ideas  in  my 
own  mind  ;  and,  being  ideas  in  my  mind,  they  cannot 
possibly  have  that  relation  to  another  mind  which 
they  have  to  mine,  any  more  than  the  pain  felt  by  me 
can  be  the  individual  pain  felt  by  another.  I  can 
find  no  principle  in  Berkeley's  system  which  affords 
me  even  probable  ground  to  conclude  that  there  are 
other  intelligent  beings  like  myself,  in  the  relations 
of  father,  brother,  friend,  or  fellow-citizens."  (/.  P., 
Es.  2,  c.  10.) 

It  is  characteristic  of  the  human  mind  that  we  are 
ever  apt  to  think  opinions  easy  and  clear  when 
familiar  to  us,  and  to  think  that  all  that  is  repugnant 
to  these  is  obscure  and  beset  with  difficulties.  This 
is  a  sufficient  explanation  of  Reid's  trouble  on  the 
matter  under  consideration.  To  all  who  are  not  pre- 
possessed with  Reid's  view,  it  will  be  easy  to  show 
that  his  doctrine  on  this  point  is  at  least  as  obscure 
and  thorny  as  ours. 

How  does  dualism,  whether  expounded  by  himself 
or  Stewart  or  Hamilton,  hold  intercourse  with  or 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  169 

attain  the  knowledge  of  other  men?  Certainly,  not 
directly  by  the  senses.  By  the  eye,  a  dualist  sees 
nothing  but  color ;  by  the  touch,  he  immediately 
knows  nothing  but  organic  impressions  or  sensations  ; 
and  so,  through  all  the  senses,  he  knows  only  some 
impulse  of  air  or  combination  of  light  or  peculiar 
muscular  pressure.  Will  he  allow  these  disjointed 
phantoms  to  be  his  father,  brother,  friend  ?  The  real 
father,  brother,  friend,  are  hid  behind  all  these  phe- 
nomena, and  are  entirely  unknown  by  the  senses.  It 
is,  therefore,  evident  that  he  can  really  know  them 
only  at  second  hand  by  the  help  of  some  medium, 
which  has  never  been  clearly  conceived,  much  less 
expounded,  by  any  of  the  Scottish  School.  In  accord- 
ance with  their  theory  or  notions,  the  medium  can 
only  be  some  "instinct,"  or  "an  inference  without 
reasoning,"  or  some  "fundamental  principle  of  human 
belief,"  or  a  "mental  impotency."  The  Philosophical 
Realist  has  as  much  right  as  they  to  assume  such 
things,  if  he  needs  them  ;  but  he  needs  them  not,  and 
not  one  of  them  would  he  accept. 

Berkeley  explains  the  method  as  follows  :  "I  per- 
ceive several  notions,  changes,  and  combinations  of 
ideas,  that  inform  me  that  there  are  certain  particular 
agents,  like  myself,  which  accompany  them,  and 
concur  in  their  production  "  (Princ.,  §  145).  He  might 
better  have  been  more  full  and  explicit ;  but  he  is  as 
clear  as  his  critic,  and  more  relevant  to  his  own 
theory  as  it  is  a  partial  explanation  of  Idealism, 
while  it  is  entirely  foreign  to  the  needs  of  a  genuine 
Natural  Realism,  as  described  by  Hamilton,  which, 
after  all,  has  no  real  existence.  For  all  theories 
are  virtually  idealistic,  however  disguised  ;  and  they 
all  equally  need  a  bridge  from  the  ego  to  their 
friends  and  all  other  non-ego.  They  have  con- 
structed bridges,  which  have  all  given  way  under 
the  pressure  of  criticism.  Constitutional  convic- 
tion of  immediate  perception  was  surrendered  by 
Hamilton,  and  he  never  attempts  more  than  to 


170  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

tell  us  how  the  objects  of  muscular  tension  are 
known.  He  allows  that  we  do  not  know  other  men 
by  the  eye  or  ear,  or  even  the  common  sensation 
of  touch.  All  this  is  generally  overlooked  by  the 
English  readers  of  his  works,  and  by  nearly  all  his 
admirers. 

Condition*  of  mutual  Intercourse. 

Several  of  our  prominent  writers  have  given  brief 
utterances  which  show  that  the  intellect,  seeking  to 
get  beyond  itself,  is  beginning  to  discover,  though 
dimly,  that  the  only  route  is  that  which  we  have 
described.  Prof.  Huxley  writes:  "It  is  wholly  im- 
possible absolutely  to  prove  the  presence  or  absence 
of  consciousness  in  anything  but  one's  own  brain, 
though,  by  analogy,  we  are  justified  in  assuming  its 
existence  in  other  men."  Herbert  Spencer  writes  : 
"  Each  individual  is  absolutely  incapable  of  knowing 
any  feelings  but  his  own.  That  there  exist  other 
sensations  and  emotions  is  a  conclusion  implying, 
in  the  first  place,  the  reasoning  through  which  he 
identifies  certain  objects  as  bodies  of  a  like  nature 
with  his  own  body,  and  implying,  in  the  second 
place,  the  further  reasoning  which  convinces  him 
that,  along  with  the  external  actions  of  these  bodies, 
there  go  internal  states  of  consciousness,  like  those 
accompanying  such  external  actions  in  his  own 
body."  Prof.  Clifford  says  :  "  I  have  absolutely  no 
means  of  perceiving  your  mind.  /  judge  by  anal- 
ogy that  it  exists."  I  am  aware  that  these  had  no 
such  notion  proper  as  I  have  expounded,  and  that, 
in  penning  these  very  sentences,  they  were  sub- 
mitting to  the  usual  illusion  of  considering  external 
organisms  as  non-egoistic  ;  yet  they  all  clearly  affirm 
that  only  by  analogy  and  sematism  can  they  attain 
other  minds  and  their  thoughts. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  171 

Demand  for  a  Method  or  Medium  of  Inter- 
course. 

If  it  is  agreed  that  every  animated  being  is  a  uni- 
verse of  itself,  numerically  different  from  all  others  ; 
that  every  soul  is  absolutely  shut  up  to  itself  always 
and  forever  ;  that  it  is  only  by  sematology  that  we 
can  scientifically  justify  any  one  in  asserting  the 
existence  of  aught  but  himself  ;  that,  by  this  prin- 
ciple, we  have  proved  not  only  the  existence  of  other 
living  beings,  corresponding  to  the  phenomenal  world 
of  men  and  animals,  but  also  their  mutual  relation  in 
action  and  influence,—  it  behooves  us  now  to  inquire 
respecting  the  possible  condition  or  medium  through 
which  this  relation  is  maintained.  Such  a  medium 
must  be  something  on  which  each  can  operate  by 
natural  force  and  law,  and  through  it  on  each  other. 
If  there  is  no  medium,  and  if  no  medium  is  possible, 
then  the  intercommunication  in  question,  if  there  is 
any,  is  not  a  natural  process  of  cause  and  effect,  but 
a  supernatural  appointment.  This  question  is,  there- 
fore, of  very  great  importance,  and  philosophy  must 
endeavor  to  determine  it  with  scientific  precision  and 
logical  rigor.  The  reader  will  easily  see  that  the 
proof  of  the  fact  of  this  interaction  and  influence,  and 
the  proof  of  the  method  or  process  or  conditions  of  the 
interaction,  are  two  different  things  ;  and  it  is  the 
latter  which  we  are  now  to  endeavor  to  ascertain. 
The  fact  of  the  intercommunion  we  assume  to  be 
already  proved.  The  mode  or  condition  or  law  of  its 
action  we  have  yet  to  furnish. 

The  Method  not  explained  by  Sematology. 

Sematology  explains  and  scientifically  justifies  it- 
self; and,  at  the  same  time,  it  justifies  our  affirmation 
of  the  existence  of  conscious  beings,  which  answer  to 
the  extra-organic  phenomena  of  our  consciousness. 
It  is  on  the  same  principle  that  we  have  affirmed 
that,  between  all  these  living  beings,  there  is  a  law 
of  action  and  reaction,  so  that  the  action  and  ex- 


172  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

perience  of  one  are  changed  relatively  to  others. 
The  argument  for  both  is  precisely  the  same.  But, 
while  it  proves  the  intercourse,  it  does  not  show  the 
means  or  natural  conditions  of  that  intercourse,  as  of 
this  it  says  nothing. 

No  such  Ulediuni  in  IVoii -egoistic  Matter. 

We  therefore  inquire  if  such  a  medium  can  be  con- 
ceived in  a  supposed  non-egoistic  matter.  This  is 
a  question  never  before  considered.  It  is  entirely 
different  from  the  question  whether  matter  is  the 
cause  or  condition  of  sensation,—  a  question  which 
we  have  already  answered  in  the  negative.  We  are 
inquiring  for  the  cause  or  condition  of  intercourse 
between  two  or  more  universes  or  minds. 

Since  matter,  as  known  to  us,  is  sensation,  self,  it 
follows  that  non-egoistic  matter,  if  there  is  any  such, 
must  be  unknown,  or  not  the  direct  object  of  our 
knowledge.  Hence,  it  cannot  be  the  medium  sought. 
We  cannot  be  conscious  of  our  operation  on  such  a 
thing,  nor  of  its  operation  on  us.  And,  as  we  can 
use  only  that  which  is  known,  and  whose  laws  are 
also  known,  we  cannot  have  any  guidance  in  the  use 
of  such  a  medium.  Accordingly,  in  point  of  fact,  it 
is  only  in  relation  to  the  known  that  we  ever  do  act. 
The  supposition,  therefore,  of  an  unknown  medium 
explains  nothing,  but  introduces  another  incompre- 
hensible element. 

Such  a  medium  would  also  involve  all  the  logical 
difficulties,  on  account  of  which  we  have  been  com- 
pelled to  reject  hylatic  dualism  and  sensism,  and 
kindred  theories  which  assert  a  non-egoistic  matter, 
known  or  unknown. 

Further,  whatever  is  non-egoistic  is,  by  the  very 
hypothesis  on  which  we  are  proceeding,  utterly  in- 
competent to  serve  as  a  medium,  since  we  have 
agreed  that  we  can  never  transcend  ourselves  in 
immediate  action  and  knowledge. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  173 

Nor  iu  the  Forms  of  Sensible  flatter. 

Shall  we,  then,  suppose  a  medium  composed  of  the 
forms  of  sensible  matter  ?  That  is  to  say,  that  we 
are  ourselves  the  medium,  which  contradicts  itself, 
because  the  medium  sought  is  something  between  me 
and  others.  Besides,  there  is  no  medium,  if  we  oper- 
ate only  on  ourselves  ;  and,  as  we  can  operate  on 
nothing  else,  all  media  are  impossible. 

An  Impassable  CJu If  between  Different   Tliuds. 

Therefore,  so  far  as  concerns  natural  force  and  law 
and  their  operation,  there  is  an  absolute  gulf  between 
one  being  and  another.  There  is  no  known  or  con- 
ceivable natural  force  nor  means  which  can  span  that 
gulf,  and  no  intelligence  can  throw  over  it  a  bridge 
constructed  out  of  natural  elements  and  forces.  It  is 
a  gulf  which  reaches  from  the  confines  of  all  know- 
able  nature  to  an  unknowable,  but  inferred,  nature 
beyond.  It  is  a  gulf  which  natural  science  has  never 
contemplated,  which  is  entirely  and  forever  beyond 
the  range  of  scientific  investigation,  because  beyond 
the  universe  of  phenomena,  with  all  their  connections 
of  cause  and  effect,  of  antecedent  and  consequent. 

It  can  only  be  by  Supernatural  Appointment. 

There  remains,  therefore,  but  one  possible  con- 
clusion,—  that  the  connection  that  obtains  between 
the  action  and  utterance  of  animated  beings  is  wholly 
supernatural;  that  is,  it  follows  a  law  which  tran- 
scends nature  or  the  universe.  All  admit,  as  they 
must,  this  connection.  All  must  see  that  it  is  a 
natural  impossibility.  Therefore,  it  must  be  a  fact 
which  transcends  nature.  We  have  thus  disclosed  to 
us  a  supernatural  agency,  which  has  appointed  cer- 
tain correspondences  between  animated  beings  (that 
is,  between  all  beings),  and  made  the  action  and 
passion  of  each  to  have  a  fixed  relation  to  others,  as 
certain  and  regular  as  if  it  were  a  process  of  natural 


174  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

causation,  which  (natural  causation)  the  reader  will 
bear  in  mind  is  confined  to  the  natural  universe, 
knowable,  ourselves. 

The  magnitude  of  supernatural  agency  thus  demon- 
strated is  unutterably,  inconceivably  stupendous. 
It  regulates  in  detail  the  relative  action  of  a  countless 
number  and  variety  of  universes,  with  absolute  and 
unvarying  precision.  How  vast  the  power  and  in- 
telligence which  all  this  involves  ! 

Pre-established  Harmony. 

We  have,  hence,  a  striking  picture  of  the  perfect 
isolation  of  every  living  thing;  that  is,  of  everything. 
No  one  ever  knows  aught  or  affects  aught  but  itself, 
and  all  things  constitute  a  sublime  system  of  Pre- 
established  Harmony.  Whatsoever  is  is  a  living 
monad,  a  unit  of  force.  But  every  monad  is  a 
whole  soul,  which  is  always  a  whole  universe.  The 
natural  action  and  influence  of  each  are  confined  to 
itself;  and  its  parts,  so  called,  are  only  modes  of  the 
one.  And  each  universe  is  sufficient  to  itself,  and  by 
its  action  on  itself  is  the  source  of  its  own  develop- 
ment or  decay;  and  within  each  individual  or  uni- 
verse causation  is  real  and  vast.  But  each  develops 
or  decays,  and  variously  operates,  according  to  fixed 
laws  of  relation  to  others,  by  the  appointment  of  a 
supernatural  agent. 


XIV. 


THEOLOGY  IMPLIES  PHILOSOPHY, 


WE  have  thus  suddenly,  and  by  a  singularly  origi- 
nal route,  been  brought  face  to  face  with  the  super- 
natural ;  and  that  subject  is  now  fairly  forced  upon 
our  attention.  And,  through  the  vast  rnound  of 
mental  excreta  which  the  abortive  thought  of  past 
ages  (and  the  present  age)  has  built  up  before  us,  we 
will  as  fast  as  possible  make  our  way.  And  we  will 
first  utter  some  protests  and  caveats  concerning  the 
method,  without  a  better  understanding  of  which  the 
problem  cannot  be  solved  or  intelligently  attempted. 

Theism  and  Agnostic  I>eism. 

To  confound  one  thing  with  another,  and  to  assume 
that  one  is  proved  or  admitted  because  the  other  is,  is 
a  procedure  which  is  but  too  common  in  the  history 
of  thought  and  dialectics.  In  all  ages,  some  Christian 
divines  have  been  guilty  of  it ;  and  they  still  keep  it 
up.  All  the  admissions  of  the  anti-supernaturalists 
concerning  what  is  called  Deity,  they  appropriate  to 
themselves  as  equally  good  for  themselves.  All  unite 
in  making  the  divine  existence  a  postulate  instead 
of  a  logical  conclusion  from  known  data.  Some  of 
these  are  scientists,  and  others  are  theologians.  The 
authors  of  the  "Unseen  Universe"  say,  "Let  us  begin 
by  stating  at  once  that  we  assume,  as  absolutely  self- 
evident,  the  existence  of  a  Deity  who  is  the  Creator 
of  all  things."  As  confirming  and  coinciding  with 


176  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

this  assumption,  they  quote  the  following  from  Her- 
bert Spencer:  "We  are  obliged  to  regard  every  phe- 
nomenon as  a  manifestation  of  some  Power  by  which 
we  are  acted  upon.  Though  omnipresence  is  unthink- 
able, yet,  as  experience  discloses  no  bounds  to  the 
diffusion  of  phenomena,  we  are  unable  to  think  of 
limits  to  the  presence  of  this  Power,  while  the  criti- 
cisms of  science  teach  us  that  this  Power  is  incom- 
prehensible." These  writers  ought  to  remember 
that  Spencer's  ultimate  and  incomprehensible  Power 
is  not  the  "Creator  of  the  world,"  is  not  even  dis- 
criminated from  the  world,  but  identified  with  it, 
and  as  devoid  of  consciousness,  purpose,  and  will, 
being  in  every  essential  particular  opposed  to  the 
standard  theistic  conception  of  God.  That  such  a 
power  as  this  which  Spencer  affirms  exists  is  incon- 
testable, since  to  affirm  it  is  simply  to  affirm  that 
there  is  a  known  universe  which  we  do  not  fully  com- 
prehend. This  is  not  a  mere  postulate,  though  it  is 
called  a  postulate  by  Spencer.  It  is  a  logical  conclu- 
sion from  known  data,  and  as  such  is  deduced  by 
Spencer. 

God's  Existence  to  be  Proved,  not  Postulated. 

It  is  wrong  to  say  that  "  the  existence  of  God  is  the 
common  postulate  of  all  religion  and  all  philosophy ," 
if  by  God  is  meant  the  Creator  of  the  world,  or  as 
aught  else  than  the  world  itself.  There  are  great  re- 
ligions and  philosophies  which  deny,  and  indeed 
most  of  them  deny,  creation  proper.  It  is  unhistoric 
for  a  creationist  to  affirm  that  in  this  he  occupies  the 
common  ground  of  all  religion  and  all  philosophy. 
Religion  postulates  a  supreme  power;  but  whether 
creative  or  not,  whether  mundane  or  supra-mundane, 
it  does  not  say  with  united  voice. 

On  the  other  hand,  philosophy  does  not  properly 
postulate  anything.  Its  essential  nature  and  office 
and  object  are  exposition  and  comprehensive  intellec- 
tion. It  is  therefore  bound  to  prove  the  existence  of 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  177 

God,  and  show  his  character  and  agency,  not  to  post- 
ulate them.  And  any  affirmation  without  such  proof, 
whatever  else  it  may  be,  is  not  philosophy.  Whether 
nature  is  all,  or  whether  we  can  have  any  proper 
proof  of  a  supra- mundane  Deity  and  Creator  of  the 
universe,  is  the  greatest  philosophical  problem  of  the 
age  ;  and  as  a  problem  it  should  be  treated,  and  not 
assumed  as  a  postulate  unproved. 

Penumbra  I  Metaphysics  IV  o  Refuge  for  Theology. 

In  apology  for  their  inability  to  give  us  satisfactory 
exposition  and  logical  defence  of  their  systems,  theo- 
logians have  frequently  pleaded  that  "no  difficulty 
emerges  in  theology  which  had  not  previously  emerged 
in  philosophy."  This  is,  indeed,  in  substance  the  en- 
tire argument  of  Butler's  celebrated  Analogy  against 
Deism.  It  is  very  valuable  as  a  thoughtful  com- 
parison on  some  points,  chiefly  the  darker  points,  of 
nature  and  revelation.  It  is,  however,  not  only  with- 
out value  as  a  positive  argument  for  revealed  religion, 
in  which  all  are  agreed,  but  it  is  also  of  less  force  as 
a  shield  against  assailants  than  its  admirers  have 
supposed.  To  say  that  nature  has  as  many  and  as 
serious  difficulties  as  revelation  is  to  say  very  little 
for  the  latter  in  the  estimation  of  most  people,  in- 
cluding the  majority  of  divines,  who  generally  harp 
much  on  nature's  defects  in  order  to  enhance  the 
need  and  value  of  revelation  ;  and  even  Butler  him- 
self, in  the  chapter  on  the  "Importance  of  Christian- 
ity," follows  to  some  extent  the  same  track.  To  say 
that  metaphysics  is  just  as  obscure  and  chaotic  as  the- 
ology would  sound  like  a  satire  on  theology,  if  we  did 
not  know  the  assurance  and  seriousness  with  which 
it  is  uttered  as  an  effective  rebuttal  of  the  weightiest 
objections.  Yet  this  rebuttal  is  simply  a  confession 
that  theology  is  just  as  unreliable  as  metaphysics, — 
a  confession  which,  in  the  estimation  of  almost  every- 
body, divests  theology  of  all  value  ;  for  nobody  greatly 
values  any  metaphysics,  except  it  be  some  theory  of  his 


178  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

own.  To  endeavor  to  shelter  theology  under  the 
defects  of  philosophy  is  a  wretched  subterfuge.  It  is 
analogous  to  the  bad  man's  plea  for  his  sins,  that  he  is 
as  good  as  his  neighbors.  To  one  who  has  no  system 
of  metaphysics  except  that,  no  satisfactory  philosophy 
of  things  is  yet  attained  or  appears  to  be  possible  ; 
and  that  the  universe  gives  no  evidence  of  the  exist- 
ence of  an  infinitely  perfect  Being,  which  John 
Stuart  Mill  and  many  others  affirm,  there  is  on  this 
principle  no  answer.  Theology  is  bound  to  have 
a  philosophy,  while  philosophy  is  not  bound  to  have 
a  theology,  and  may  possibly  forbid  it.  Theology 
must  be  logically  consistent  and  philosophically  ten- 
able. Where  it  is  wanting  in  either  of  these  two 
points,  it  is  wrong  ;  and  we  should  correct  it  instead 
of  defending  acknowledged  inconsistencies,  under  the 
plea  that  its  philosophical  supports  are  equally  bad. 


XV. 

Method  of  Conceiving  and  Proving 
Creation, 

Conception  of  Deity* 

THICK  and  manifold  are  the  metaphysical  cobwebs 
which  have  been  woven  over  the  face  of  Deity,  yet 
I  hold  that  he  is  not  wholly  hid  from  all  human  con- 
ception as  an  Infinite  Personality.  In  the  first  place, 
this  conception  is  perfectly  clear  and  distinct  as  the 
conception  of  a  Being  who  is  above  all  knowable 
nature, — that  is,  strictly  supernatural,  relative  to  the 
universes  ;  and  this  is  the  logical  correlate  of  finite 
nature  and  finite  personality,  so  that  the  two  are 
equally  clear  and  distinct,  as  defining  each  other. 
Nature  is  necessarily  conceived  as  limited  in  space 
and  in  power.  It  does  not  comprehend  itself,  its 
processes  and  issues,  which  is  a  limitation  ;  and  this 
we  cannot  distinctly  conceive  without  conceiving  its 
logical  counterpart,  iliimitation  on  all  these  points, 
which  is  an  infinite  personality.  People  are,  there- 
fore, under  no  illusion  when  they  affirm  that  it  ap- 
pears to  them  perfectly  easy  to  conceive  and  believe 
in  a  Being  who  is  superior  to  all  nature,  who  com- 
prehends it  in  whole  and  detail,  who  has  brought  it 
into  existence,  and  whose  will  prolongs  its  existence, 
who  gives  to  it  its  essential  force  and  direction,  and  in- 
telligently controls  it.  To  assert  that  such  a  concep- 
tion is  not  possible  to  man  is  metaphysical  trifling. 


180  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

Surely,  those  who  affirm  know  their  own  thoughts 
better  than  anybody  else,  and  are  as  competent  as 
others  to  analyze  the  contents  of  consciousness  with 
accuracy,  besides  being  able  to  affirm  that  this  con- 
ception is  a  logical  implication  from  the  affirmations 
of  their  opponents. 

Besides,  as  all  kuowable  nature  is  ego,  which  is 
conceived  as  limited,  though  we  can  never  define  or 
know  its  limits,  the  supernatural  Infinite  is  that  which 
is  superior  to  ourselves  and  to  all  other  conscious 
limited  beings,  taken  together  ;  and  all  beings  are 
conscious  beings.  I  myself  constitute  all  nature 
knowable  to  me.  By  the  law  of  sematism,  we  have 
inductively  proved  that  there'  are  countless  myriads 
of  other  beings  of  various  forms  and  orders,  each  one 
of  which  constitutes  a  universe  or  system  of  nature. 
The  Deity  of  which  I  speak  is  simply  a  Being  who  is 
numerically  different  from  each  of  these  separately  or 
all  of  them  taken  together,  and  who  is  without  limits 
in  the  various  ways  in  which  all  these  are  limited. 
The  action  of  such  a  power,  we  have  already  seen,  is 
implied  in  the  universal  assumption  of  harmony  and 
intercourse  between  different  spirits  and  universes. 
We  are  compelled  to  conceive  and  also  to  recognize 
a  power  indefinitely  superior  to  all  these  separately  and 
collectively,  entirely  apart  from  them  as  other  than 
they,  whose  action  is  a  condition  of  their  regular  in- 
teraction. Oar  doctrine  of  the  subjectivity  of  all 
nature  and  of  our  individuality,  as  commensurate  and 
identical  with  all  the  universe,  therefore,  furnishes  not 
only  the  conception,  but  also  data  for  the  proof  of  the 
existence  of  a  supernatural  Being,  who  is  virtually 
infinite  as  the  Author  of  the  universes. 

In  the  second  place,  the  Infinite  is  the  conception 
of  a  personality.  By  personality  is  not  meant  that 
old  vulgar  notion,  which  is  begotten  of  sense,  which 
implies  form  and  outline  and,  therefore,  limitation, 
against  which  there  is  a  violent,  misconceiving  out- 
cry, on  the  supposition  that  it  is  the  only  notion 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  181 

of  personality,  and,  therefore,  the  one  held  by  Chris- 
tian philosophers.  Oar  known  personality  is  simply 
a  limited  power  to  think,  feel,  and  will,—  a  power 
which  is  super-sensible  and  non-spatial.  The  Infinite 
Person  is  precisely  that  same  power,  without  limit  or 
infinitely  perfect.  Personality  is  the  highest  form  of 
being.  It  is  the  highest  conceivable  definite,  coher- 
ent differentiation,  and  the  upper  sunlit  antipodes  to 
the  pre-animate,  which  is,  therefore,  not  only  limited, 
but  exceedingly  limited,  compared  with  a  supernat- 
ural personality,  even  though  this  may  not  be  strictly 
infinite. 

In  the  third  place,  we  conceive  this  Personality  as 
of  infinite  perfection  and  excellence.  By  this,  I 
mean  that  he  is  able  to  do  whatsoever  does  not  in- 
volve a  self-contradiction.  This  is  my  definition  and 
conception  of  the  Infinite  Power  and  Person.  This 
is  clear  and  definite  as  a  conception.  There  can  be 
no  higher  power,  because  the  supposition  of  such 
power  contradicts,  and  so  nullifies,  itself.  Not  to  be 
able  to  work  a  self-contradiction  is  no  limitation, 
because  the  contradictory  in  thought  or  action  is 
self-nullifying;  and  to  be  able  to  do  everything  but 
this  is  to  be  able  to  do  everything  real.  And  that  is 
power  infinite.  To  say  that  personality  always  in- 
volves limitation  begs  the  question.  That  assertion, 
we  allow,  is  true  of  human  personality  ;  but  that  it  is 
true  of  all  possible  and  conceivable  personality  is  the 
point  in  debate.  And,  in  proof  of  this,  no  argument 
has  ever  been  offered,  except  the  fact  that  human 
personality  involves  limitation,  which  is  surely  no 
argument  at  all.  What  !  Is  it  impossible  for  us  to 
.  conceive  anything  above  ourselves  in  degree  ?  And, 
if  we  can,  where  shall  we  lirnH  the  degree  ?  There  is 
no  conceivable  limit  till  we  reach  the  point  we  have 
described  as  the  nullifying  self-contradiction. 

The  term  "consciousness,"  as  the  chief  synonyme 
of  personality,  is  turned  about  in  every  possible  way 
(but  one)  to  show  its  implication  of  finity,  which, 


182  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

relative  to  our  experience,  is  very  true.  But  that  is 
trifling.  By  consciousness,  we  mean  knowledge,  and 
nothing  else;  for  it  is  nothing  else,  and  all  our  knowl- 
edge is  limited.  But,  in  affirming  this,  we  imply  a 
conception  of  its  logical  opposite, —  unlimited  knowl- 
edge ;  and  this  implies  an  omniscient  Personality. 
Does  limitless  knowledge  imply  limitations  of  said 
knowledge?  Do  limitless  goodness  and  power  imply 
that  they  are  limited  ?  That  is  only  the  same  as 
saying  that  all  consciousness  (or  knowledge)  implies 
limitation  ;  for,  if  all  is  conceived  as  limited,  the 
limitless  is  so  conceived. 

To  say  that  the  alleged  notion  of  the  Infinite  is  only 
negative  and  empty,  and  that  to  bring  it  within  con- 
ception and  definition  is  to  limit  it,  is  an  assertion 
which  is  good  for  those  who  so  think.  Spinoza,  who 
is  quoted  in  support  of  this,  himself  defines  the  In- 
finite. With  him,  it  comprises  all  substance  and  all 
quality.  Nothing  could,  be  more  clear,  distinct,  and 
definite  as  a  conception  ;  and  on  the  assumption  that 
this  notion  of  the  Infinite  is  not  negative  and  empty, 
but  positive  and  pregnant  and  definite,  most  of  his 
writings  are  based.  My  definition  differs  from  his 
in  being  apparently  smaller,  but  really  larger.  With 
him,  the  Infinite  is  nature.  With  me,  it  is  a  person- 
ality which  does  not  include  nature,  but  which  is 
above  nature,  and  infinitely  greater.  His  Infinite 
cannot  create  or  destroy,  cannot  increase  or  diminish, 
the  sum  of  Being  ;  and  mine  can.  So  mine  has  a 
power  of  supremest  quality  which  his  wants,  and 
many  other  such  powers  are  implied  in  Infinite 
Personality. 

I  will  add  that  Spinoza  explicitly  and  constantly 
teaches  not  only  the  conception,  but  the  knowledge  of 
the  Infinite.  He  says,  "  Understanding  or  intellec- 
tion, whether  finite  or  infinite  in  act,  must  compre- 
hend the  attributes  o'  God  and  the  affections  of  God" 
(Ethics,  Part  II.,  Prop.  30).  "The  human  soul  has  an 
adequate  knowledge  or  cognition  of  the  eternal  and 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  183 

infinite  essence  of  God"  (76.,  Part  II.,  Prop.  47).  In 
another  proposition,  he  tells  us  that  this  knowledge 
is  the  supreme  good  and  highest  virtue  of  the  soul. 
As,  with  him,  God  and  nature  are  one,  the  knowledge 
of  God  is  a  necessity,  where  there  is  any  knowledge 
at  all.  With  the  theist,  God  is  only  known  by  infer- 
ence; and  there  is,  therefore,  here  room  for  possible 
doubt  and  for  opposing  arguments  as  to  the  exist- 
ence, but  not  the  conception  of  God. 

Finally,  the  denial  of  the  notion  of  infinity  over- 
looks one  of  the  first  laws  of  thought, —  the  law  on 
which  the  doctrine  of  logical  opposition  is  built. 
That  law  is  that  we  think  in  doubles,  so  that  every 
thought  is  incomplete,  except  so  far  as  it  includes  a 
duality  of  logical  counterparts.  Thus,  whole  and 
part,  subject  and  object,  true  and  false,  fair  and  foul, 
good  and  evil,  right  and  wrong,  more  and  less,  are  so 
many  examples  of  terms  which  express  a  dual  unity 
of  thought.  Neither  term  of  the  pair  can  be  truly 
thought,  except  as  both  are  thought.  To  these  might 
be  added  many  others.  I  know  not  how  many.  But 
it  is  certain  that  finite  and  infinite  belong  to  this 
class  ;  and,  therefore,  it  is  beyond  dispute  that,  if  we 
have  the  conception  of  finite  intelligence,  power,  and 
goodness,  we  have  also  the  conception  of  infinite 
intelligence,  power,  and  goodness.  And  they  are 
equally  clear  as  a  whole.  Such  a  Being  is  a  person- 
ality of  infinite  perfection ;  and  it  is  not  any  one  of 
these  attributes  which  properly  constitutes  his  in- 
finity, but  all  together  as  a  total  unity. 

It  is  along  this  line  that  I  am  happy  to  coincide 
with  a  fundamental  position  of  Hegel,  whom,  on  the 
whole,  I  regard  as  unsurpassed  among  philosophers, 
because,  with  faculties  equal  to  any,  he  inherits  their 
bequests,  and  uses  them  as  he  only  could. 

Oil  conceiving  Creation. 

In  these  days  of  unprecedented  progress,  men  have 
discovered  not  only  new  capacities,  but  new  inca- 


184  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

pacities.  The  philosophic  world  is  now  afflicted  with 
a  very  general  inability  to  conceive  creation.  It  is 
said  that  a  Newton  approaches  no  nearer  to  the 
peculiar  power  of  the  Creator  than  the  lowest  sav- 
age, and  that  we  should  have  to  say  the  same  if 
Newton's  powers  were  indefinitely  exalted  and  aug- 
mented, because  the  power  of  creation  is  not  among 
these  powers  possessed,  and  no  higher  degree  of 
these  would  bring  that  in.  He  could  so  much  better 
comprehend,  expound,  and  use  the  things  that  are; 
but  he  could  not  add  an  atom  to  their  sum  total  or 
detract  an  atom  from  it.  This  is  the  analytical  state- 
ment, to  which  modern  thought  has  attained,  of  an 
intellectual  hiatus  in  the  philosophic  mind  of  all  ages 
and  lands.  It  really  never  has  formed  a  clear,  defi- 
nite, and  consistent  conception  of  creation  ;  and  what 
it  has  designated  as  creation  it  has  always  described 
as  if  it  were  evolution.  It  is  well  that  this  has  come 
to  be  recognized,  and  the  notion  of  creation  discarded 
as  a  phrase  without  any  meaning,  except  that  of 
evolution  ;  for,  till  the  thought  is  developed  into 
definiteness,  it  can  never  be  refuted,  however  errone- 
ous. This  developed  denial  enables  us  to  show  that 
it  is  the  product  of  three  definable  errors. 

(1)  The  statement  that  progress  in  degree  would 
never  result  in  a  higher  order  or  kind  is  not  justified 
by  human  experience.    All  experience,  all  science, 
now  utters  a  different  note.    It  is  the  essential  prin- 
ciple of  naturalistic  evolution,  in  whose  interest  the 
denial  in  question  is  made,  that  higher  forms,  species, 
genera,  and  orders  are  evolved  out  of  the  lower  forms 
and  orders  of  existence,    Man  has  kinds  as  well  as 
degrees  of  powers,  physical  and  mental,  which  do 
not  belong  to  the  polyp  and  ferns  and  gases.    It  is, 
therefore,  conceivable  that  a  very  high  development 
of   human    powers    might   result  in   the    power    of 
creation. 

(2)  At   all   events,  this    comparison   of   kinds    of 
powers  brings  into  bold  relief  the  contrasted  concep- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  185 

tion  of  a  kind  of  power  to  which  man  has  not  at- 
tained. By  what  right  and  with  what  significance 
can  we  say  that  man  cannot  create,  if  we  have  no 
notion  or  conception  of  creation  ?  We  use  words,  in 
such  a  case,  without  meaning.  We  describe  evolution 
as  a  change  in  the  form  of  a  pre-existing  and  per- 
during  force  ;  and  we  say  that  this  is  exemplified  in 
all  experience,  that  it  is  not  creation,  that  creation 
can  be  nothing  less  than  an  absolute  contrast  to  this, 
—  the  absolute  beginning  of  being  and  force  as  well 
as  of  phenomenal  forms.  No  one  who  develops  ar- 
ticulately his  whole  thought  can  escape  this  ;  and 
this  is  the  distinct  and  definite  expression  of  the 
conception  of  creation,  in  contrast  with  the  concep- 
tion of  evolution.  Indeed,  the  two  are  the  logical 
contradictory  correlatives  of  each  other.  Neither  can 
be  definitely  conceived,  except  in  contrast  with  the 
other  ;  and  the  proper  and  adequate  conception  of 
either,  analytically  developed,  involves  the  concep- 
tion of  the  other,  just  as  good  and  bad,  light  and 
dark,  high  and  low,  heavy  and  light,  must  be  con- 
ceived together,  if  truly  and  fully  conceived  at  all. 

(3)  While  it  is  true  that  the  difference  between  the 
philosopher  and  the  troglodyte  is  chiefly  one  of  in- 
telligence, this  is  not  the  only  power  man  possesses. 
He  has  a  will  power  which  is  peculiar  and  striking,  if 
not  wonderful  and  awful.  Education  and  culture  in 
art  and  science  do  not  necessarily  develop  this  in 
proportion  to  the  intellect.  But  we  know  that  it 
exists  in  different  degrees  of  power  in  different  men, 
that  in  the  lowest  as  well  as  the  highest  its  action 
often,  if  not  always,  generates  a  new  order  of  phe- 
nomena and  sequences,  both  internal  and  external. 
Will  is  thus  universally  recognized  as  a  power  of 
changing  to  some  extent  the  forms  and  direction  of 
the  forces  of  the  world.  True,  it  cannot  increase  or 
diminish  the  sum  of  these  forces.  That  were  to  create 
and  annihilate,  and  to  say  we  cannot  thus  create  is 
to  express  a  definite  conception  of  creation  as  well  as 


186  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

to  deny  that  it  is  within  the  power  of  man.  We  can 
conceive  of  a  Being  who  can  do  what  we  cannot  do, 
who  can  do  for  essential  force  and  being  what  we  can 
do  by  volition  only  for  the  form  and  order  of  tem- 
poral phenomena  in  some  degree.  As  my  puny  voli- 
tion can  set  a  vast  train  of  forces  in  operation  in 
a  determined  direction,  so  my  mind  can  conceive  of 
a  Being  whose  will  may  have  brought  these  forces 
into  existence,  and  who  can  increase  or  destroy  them 
at  his  pleasure. 

The  old  allegation,  that  Infinite  Power  would  be- 
come finite  as  soon  as  there  were  aught  besides  itself, 
contradicts  the  presupposition  on  which  it  is  made, — 
that  the  Infinite  is  immutable  and  yet  a  power  that 
can  create  or  increase  the  sum  of  existence.  Its  own 
nature  is  not  changed  by  the  act,  else  it  would  not  be 
immutable  or  infinite  or  creative,  all  of  which  are 
contained  in  the  presupposition  which  the  allegation 
in  question  seeks  to  invalidate.  If  you  define  infinite 
as  the  sum  of  all  existence,  then,  of  course,  it  cannot 
create  anything  which  is  not  a  constituent  of  itself ; 
that  is,  it  cannot  create  in  the  sense  of  adding  to  the 
sum  of  being:  it  can  only  evolve  new  modes  of  itself. 
But  that  definition  assumes  the  point  in  debate,  while 
the  definition  we  have  given  does  not.  The  Infinite 
is  the  immutable  Power  which  is  competent  to  do 
whatsoever  does  not  involve  a  self-contradiction.  All 
are  obliged  to  admit  no  less  than  this,  and  none  can 
go  higher.  It  now  remains  to  inquire  whether  crea- 
tion is  inconsistent  with  this.  I  claim  that  it  is  not, 
because  it  leaves  the  Infinite  the  same  ;  and  it  is  not 
a  self-contradiction  to  say  that  he  can  add  to  the  sum 
of  being  indefinitely.  Therefore,  this  power  must 
belong  to  him,  else  he  is  not  able  to  do  whatsoever 
does  not  involve  a  self-contradiction.  Such  a  power 
is  of  the  highest  rank,  and,  if  it  does  not  exist,  there  is 
no  Infinite  Being  ;  and,  if  this  creative  power  does 
not  exist  and  operate,  the  term  infinite  is  only  a  name 
for  the  indefinite,  the  finite. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  187 

Equally  false  and  illogical  is  the  declaration  that 
Creative  Power  must  work  under  conditions  which 
prove  its  finity,  since  the  conditions  are  limitations. 
Primarily  and  ultimately,  the  Infinite  Creative  Power 
cannot  work  under  finite  conditions,  because,  to 
begin  with,  or  before  creation,  there  are  none;  and, 
after  creation,  they  are  infinitely  subordinate,  and 
are  therefore  of  no  account  in  the  calculation.  The 
only  conditions,  therefore,  under  which  the  Creative 
Power  works  are  the  qualities  and  laws  of  his  own 
being;  and,  as  he  is  infinite,  the  alleged  conditions 
are  infinite.  They  are  not  conditions  at  all,  in  the 
sense  of  limitation,  but  only  as  modes  in  which 
Infinite  Perfection  operates  with  infinite  freedom, 
which  is  the  action  of  Infinite  Power,  self-approved. 

The  creative  act  needs  no  explanation  in  a  higher 
law  and  power,  because  it  is  itself  the  action  and 
expression  of  the  Highest  Power  and  Law,— the  In- 
finite Nature  itself.  This  Being  is  absolutely  and 
supremely  a  law  unto  himself,  because  he  is  infinite  ; 
and  conformity  to  this  law  is  at  once  perfect  freedom 
and  absolute  necessity,  else  he  would  not  be  infi- 
nitely perfect.  As  there  are  no  objective  conditions 
before  creation,  God  is  the  creator,  not  only  of  all 
finite  things,  but  of  all  finite  conditions  and  relations, 
so  that  there  is  here  no  logical  obstacle  in  the  way  of 
creation. 

While  God  is  shut  out  of  the  universe  so  far  that 
he  is  not  identified  with  its  forces  any  more  than 
with  its  forms,— so  that  the  universe  is  an  automa- 
ton,—it  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  the  old  deistic 
mechanism,  the  violability  and  inviolability  of  whose 
laws  have  been  so  much  debated.  So  far  as  known 
to  us,  mechanisms  do  not  sustain  and  repair  them- 
selves, while  the  universe  does.  The  universe  is  a 
living  organic  whole,  not  as  the  organism  of  Deity, 
but  as  the  working  forms  of  the  human  spirit,  as  the 
absolute  ego. 

If  this  leaves  nothing  for  God  to  do, — as  some  may 


188  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

regretfully  say,— so  much  the  better,  I  should  say. 
Why  should  we  be  anxious  to  find  work  for  God? 
Cannot  he  be  supposed  to  be  worthily  employed 
except  at  some  task  we  have  given  him?  Besides, 
what  is  the  value  of  that  product  of  his  creative 
power  which  cannot  do  anything  except  as  he  works 
it?  The  more  it  contains  in  itself  of  an  elemental 
force,  manifested  in  ceaseless,  various,  and  progres- 
sive action  and  unfoldment,  the  more  nobly  does  it 
bear  the  stamp  of  the  divine  wisdom  and  power. 
Such  is  the  universe,  the  mind  of  man,  the  soul  of 
the  world.  It  is  a  superficial  and  logically  anti- 
theistic  philosophy  which  assails  the  created  product 
as  a  mechanical  contrivance  which  dispenses  with 
its  Creator,  shutting  him  out  from  all  action  in  the 
world  unless  he  interfere  with  its  laws,  which  would 
confound  science  and  dishonor  his  own  work  and 
plan.  It  is  possible  for  the  kosmic  mechanism  to 
have  been  so  planned  as  to  require  extra  agency  all 
along  the  route  of  its  action  or  at  intervals  here  and 
there.  As  this  is  conceivable,  it  is  enough,  because 
it  is  the  conception  of  the  universe  which  we  are 
considering. 

Further,  for  an  extra-natural  agent  to  act  on  nature 
and  use  nature,  or  in  any  wise  modify  nature's 
action,  is  not  a  violation  of  its  order.  The  human 
volition  thus  operates  on  organic  nature,  and  thence 
on  the  external  world;  and  any  superhuman  volition 
may  do  this.  And,  if  such  agency  is  invisible  or 
supersensible,  so  that  we  see  its  effects  only,  whether 
these  appear  through  the  organism  of  a  human  being, 
as  in  prophets,  or  directly  in  the  changed  phenomena 
of  nature,  it  becomes  a  miracle,  a  wonder,  a  "sign" 
of  said  agency.  This  does  not  in  any  wise  imperil 
or  impair  either  science  or  religion,  because  science 
itself  observes  its  own  boundaries  and  nature's 
fixity,  together  with  the  interactions  of  the  higher 
forces.  All  that  we  need  here  is  due  proof  of  super- 
human action  in  relation  to  nature's  action  and 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  189 

forms;  and  this  we  can  know  by  knowing  Nature's 
own  regular  and  necessary  action  and  the  difference 
of  its  action  in  all  such  superhuman  interpositions* 
so  that  all  through  it  is  a  scientific  observation.  It 
is  not  the  mechanical  construction  of  the  world  which 
is  here  the  source  of  our  trouble,  but  the  mechanical 
notion  of  human  and  superhuman  action  relative  to 
nature  as  a  mechanism,  as  if  that  action  interfered 
^with  the  nature,  plan,  and  laws  of  the  mechanism, 
as  scientists  assume  sometimes. 

The  Church  has  never  been  much  divided  on  the 
question  of  the  immanence  and  emmanence  of  the 
Divine  Being  relative  to  the  universe;  and  very  few 
Christian  divines,  if  any,  have  held  either  view  to 
the  exclusion  of  the  other.  For  all  alike  hold  that 
the  universe  is  finite  and  other  than  God,  as  well 
as  infinitely  less  than  God.  They  therefore  all  hold 
that,  in  every  possible  meaning,  God  must  transcend 
the  universe.  They  must  also  logically  allow,  as 
they  do,— the  Greek  as  well  as  the  Latin,— that  the 
created  universe  is  really  something,  that  it  consti- 
tutes some  complexus  of  forces,  so  that  of  itself  it 
can  and  will  do  something,  or  else  what  is  the  wis- 
dom of  creating  it,— a  thing  utterly  powerless  and 
useless?  They  also  claim,  with  united  voice,  that 
this  created  universe  is  not  to  be  worshipped,  because 
it  is  not  God,  but  that  it  is  yet  a  thing  of  such  grand- 
eur, glory,  and  power  as  to  be  worthy  of  the  creative 
fiat  of  the  Infinite.  They  only  differ  in  that  some  of 
them  more  than  others  vaguely  identify  or  unite  the 
agency  of  God  with  the  agency  of  nature.  And  the 
Greek  Fathers,  perhaps,  do  this  more  than  the  Latin, 
— not  always;  for  the  Gnostics  and  Platonizing  Chris- 
tians, who  were  far  the  most  numerous  among  the 
Greeks,  made  matter  an  eternal  force  other  than  and 
independent  of  God  (and,  indeed,  so  did  Aristotle 
and  some  of  the  Latin  Fathers  and  theologians  down 
to  a  late  date).  But,  whatever  their  minor  differ- 
ences, all  the  Christian  Fathers  and  theologians  have 


190  PHILOSOPHICAL    ItKALISM 

equally  been  at  an  infinite  remove  from  the  kosmic 
philosophers  who  merge  God  in  an  eternal  universe, 
conscious  or  unconscious.  No  writer  should  con- 
found these  two  systems  of  God  and  the  universe, 
and  attempt  to  advance  the  latter  view  in  the  name 
of  the  former,  as  some  are  doing,  which  is  a  discredit 
either  to  their  perspicacity  or  equity. 

The  kosmic  view,  so  far  from  exalting,  as  its  advo- 
cates claim,  degrades  the  notion  of  God.  Though  it 
may  allow  that  God  is  more  or  less  a  sort  of  mentality 
as  adumbrated  by  our  own,  yet,  as  it  confines  his  ac- 
tion to  nature  and  conscious  finite  beings  as  the 
modes  of  his  agency,  it  limits  him,  because  these  are 
limited.  Metaphysicians  may  affirm  the  infinity  of 
space,  if  they  choose  ;  but  the  assertion  of  the  in- 
finity of  its  contents  is  a  self-contradiction,  unless  all 
space  is  absolutely  filled,  which  no  one  can  affirm. 
Further,  this  notion  degrades  Deity  to  the  rank  of  the 
lowest  organic  and  even  inorganic  beings,  and  does 
not  raise  him  anywhere  above  them,  for  that  were 
to  transcend  the  universe;  and,  if  that  were  allowed, 
we  could  assign  no  limit  to  his  possible  varied  action, 
whether  in  accordance  with  or  in  counteraction  of 
some  natural  forms  and  motions  or  irrespective  of 
them. 

Finally,  this  kosmic  notion  furnishes  no  advan- 
tages in  relation  to  science  and  natural  law.  It  does, 
indeed,  secure  by  necessity  regularity  of  nature's 
action;  but  so  does  the  conception  of  the  world  as  a 
created  unconscious  complexus  of  forces.  It  has, 
indeed,  the  peculiar  distinction  of  keeping  its  God 
constantly  occupied,  like  a  blind  Samson  grinding 
in  the  prison-house  to  keep  the  mill  going,— a  form 
of  activity  we  do  not  court  for  God  or  man  relative 
to  their  creations  or  inventions.  It  keeps  God  al- 
ways at  work,  without  ever  being  able  to  effect  an 
achievement.  According  to  the  counter  theory,  he 
is  able  to  achieve  some  works  at  once,— to  speak,  and 
it  is  done;  to  command,  and  it  stands  fast.  Kosmic 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  .  191 

theism  says  that  God  is  the  universe  and  no  more. 
Christian  theism  says  that  the  Creator  infinitely 
transcends  the  universe,  and  is  able  to  vary  it  at  will, 
and  also  to  work  with  infinite  variety  in  ways  tran- 
scending our  imagination,  which  is  limited  by  our 
experience;  and  we  suppose  he  is  so  working,  as 
implied  in  his  infinity. 

The  theory  of  a  kosmic  deity  immanent  in  the  uni- 
verse, if  pondered  a  little  more  deeply,  will  disclose 
a  new  and  more  startling  aspect.  The  advocates  of 
this  theory  hold,  for  the  most  part,  to  the  doctrine  of 
modern  psychological  science,  that  all  phenomena 
are  subjective  states;  and  these  states  include  all  the 
known  and  knowable  universe.  Hence,  immanence 
in  the  universe  is  only  immanence  in  the  individual 
sensible  ego. 

It  is  evident  that  writers,  in  the  course  of  their 
exposition  of  divine  immanence  in  the  universe,  have 
forgotten  the  proper  modern  scientific  meaning  of 
the  word.  Their  thought  has  slipped  down  to  the 
old  pre-scientific  and  still  vulgar  notion  of  the  uni- 
verse as  non-egoistic.  In  unfolding  their  theology, 
they  have  entirely  contradicted  their  psychology. 
They  think  only  of  one  universe  as  all-embracing, 
vast,  and  boundless,  fit  area  for  the  Infinite  Presence, 
and  affording  scope  for  the  exercise  of  his  infinite 
energies.  Hence,  in  close  connection  with  the  sub- 
ject, they  dwell  upon  the  proofs  of  the  unity  of  the 
universe,  which  are  utterly  needless  to  those  who 
keep  in  mind  that  all  phenomena  are  modes  or  states 
of  one  subject,  which  implies  that  the  universe  is 
not  only  a  unity,  but  a  conscious  unity,  of  which 
doubt  is  impossible. 

Now,  if  we  recollect  the  great  dictum  of  psycho- 
logical science,  that  the  universe  is  a  complex  state 
of  consciousness,  it  becomes  very  obvious  that  the 
immanence  of  God  in  the  universe  is  only  his  imma- 
nence in  me  and  in  others  like  me;  and  all  will  allow 
that  it  does  not  take  much  of  a  deity  to  fill  the  im- 


192  .  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

mensity  of  the  sensations  of  a  human  being  or  any 
number  of  them.  A  God  coufined  to  such  a  domicile 
will  never  command  much  reverence. 

If,  as  is  often  alleged,  this  immanent  Deity  oper- 
ates all  the  universe,  he  operates  my  sensibility  and 
no  more.  He  is  thus  made  the  subjective  energy  of 
all  my  sensitive  being  and  experience,  and  so  is  iden- 
tified with  me.  He  and  I  cannot  be  discriminated. 
From  psychological  science,  I  learn  that  I  am  the 
immanent  subject,  active  and  passive,  of  all  my 
own  conscious  states,  and  that  these  include  the 
whole  universe.  From  the  theology  of  kosmic  the- 
ism, I  learn  that  this  immanent  subject-agent  of  all 
my  sensitive  conscious  states,  or  the  universe,  is 
Deity.  God  is  thus  but  another  name  for  self,— cer- 
tainly, a  practical  truth  often  exemplified. 

Kosmic  theism  appears  to  no  better  advantage  in 
arguing  from  cause  to  effect,  or  from  effect  to  cause. 
Contrary  to  all  the  affirmations  and  implications  of 
modern  science  that  matter  is  not  dead  and  inert, 
but  contains  all  the  quality  and  potency  of  life,  they 
unwarrantably  pronounce  that  its  energy  is  a  foreign 
element  which  pervades  matter,  shapes,  animates, 
and  directs  it;  that  all  the  material  sciences  show 
only  forms,  colors,  and  relative  local  changes,  not 
the  action  of  any  force;  that  the  recognition  of  force 
is  extra-scientific  and  supersensible,  so  that  it  is  not 
material;  that  this  force  is  persistent  through  all  ma- 
terial changes,  the  eternal  and  almighty  factor  of  all 
things.  What  is  universally  in  all  other  connections 
called  material  force  is  called  by  kosmic  theism  God. 
The  God  of  kosmic  theism  is  material  force. 

But  this  persistent  force,  this  god  almighty  in  the 
material  world,  can  never  be  discriminated  from  the 
material  world  itself.  Matter  and  its  force  are  never 
known  apart,  and  never  can  be.  If  the  force  is  not 
a  sensible  phenomenon,  it  is  not  immediately  known, 
but  only  inferred.  And  the  question  next  arises 
whether  we  are  to  infer  that  it  is  intrinsic  or  extrin- 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  193 

sic  to  known  matter;  that  is,  whether  or  not  it  is  mat- 
ter as  one  with  matter.  The  simplest  inference  is 
that  they  are  one;  that  matter  is  intrinsically  forceful, 
and  the  simple  is  to  be  preferred,  as  there  is  no  rea- 
son for  the  opposite.  Now,  we  have  an  intelligible 
unit  of  perception  and  conception;  and  matter  is 
competent,  for  aught  we  know,  to  be  the  sole  author 
of  all  the  forms  and  motions  that  the  universe  un- 
folds. We,  therefore,  need,  so  far,  no  other  god;  and 
kosmic  theism  is  good  only  for  those  who  are  pleased 
to  split  matter  into  form  and  force,  and  to  call  the 
latter  god,  and  to  forget  that  the  form  in  which  this 
god  is  said  to  dwell  is  the  conscious  sensitive  ego. 
The  theism  of  Jesus  and  Paul  and  of  Christianity  is 
of  a  very  different  character,  and  must  have  a  very 
different  support. 

The  Logical  Method   and   Demands  in  Proof   of 
Deity. 

The  popular  heisenism  or  objective  evolution  be- 
gins its  investigations  with  the  senses  and  the  outer 
world.  This  is  the  way  philosophy  began  among  the 
early  Greeks.  A  loftier  method  and  scope  were  given 
to  it  by  Plato  and  Aristotle.  In  this  age,  a  very  nu- 
merous and  conspicuous  party  return  to  philosophic 
juvenility,  and  proclaim  it  loudly  and  with  absolute 
assurance  to  be  the  acme  of  philosophic  procedure. 
And  it  is  of  eminent  service  in  working  a  fruitful 
field,  which  is  only  one  sphere  of  consciousness.  It 
is  possible  to  begin  our  inquiries  with  our  inner  con- 
sciousness instead  of  our  senses;  and,  in  that  case,  we 
must  analyze  the  senses  and  their  objects  in  relation 
to  consciousness.  This  is  the  correct  and  most  thor- 
ough method;  for  we  are  not  thorough  with  the 
senses  till  we  have  gone  as  far  in  our  analysis  as  con- 
sciousness and  its  logical  implications  justify,  and  we 
cannot  justly  go  any  further.  As  all  philosophers 
admit,  the  phenomena  of  the  outer  world  itself  are 
all  resolvable  into  sensations ;  that  is,  modes  of  con- 


194  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

sciousness.  Consciousness  should  be  our  starting- 
point,  as  this  method  is  the  most  comprehensive  and 
profound  and  ulterior.  Still,  to  meet  sensism  on  its 
own  ground,  we  have  commenced  with  the  senses, 
and  have  analyzed  them  into  forms  of  consciousness, 
or  have  supposed  this  to  have  been  already  done. 

If  the  analysis  of  the  facts  of  sense  or  conscious- 
ness then  compels  us  to  identify  the  objects  and  sub- 
jects of  sense,  and  so  to  accept  some  form  of  heisen- 
ism,  that  form  will  be  subjective,  the  outward  world 
being  but  a  mode  of  our  subjective  being,  the  evolu- 
tion into  consciousness  of  our  intrinsic,  subconscious 
force,  which  first  evolves  the  inorganic  world,  and 
then,  successively,  the  organic  forms  of  life,  includ- 
ing what  I  call  my  own  organism. 

The  process  and  result  of  this  subjective  heisenism 
are  pre-eminently  individualistic  and  personal.  The 
cosmic  world  known  to  each  person  or  individual 
being  himself  is  numerically  different  from  that 
known  to  any  other  individual,  just  as  the  individ- 
uals are  different.  Hence,  the  universe,  as  known  or 
knowable  to  each,  begins  with  his  own  conscious 
existence,  if  this  had  a  beginning. 

The  operation  of  the  law  of  natural  causation,  by 
which  naturalism  maintains  itself,  to  the  exclusion 
of  all  supernaturalisin,  is  confessedly  all  confined 
within  the  kosmic  universe,  as  thus  knowable  to  each 
individual,  which  universe  is  often  styled  "  Nature." 
Hence,  they  are  precluded  from  applying  their  prin- 
ciple to  the  connection  of  one  mind  or  individual  man 
with  another.  Hence,  also,  if  men  have  a  beginning, 
universes  have  a  beginning ;  and  naturalism  cannot 
account  for  this.  And  natural  force  and  law  have 
here  no  place  or  operation.  Such  beginnings  are 
supernatural,  and  must  have  a  supernatural  cause. 
On  the  theory  of  subjective  heisenism,  if  we  can 
.prove  the  commencement  of  our  individual  existence, 
we  shall  prove  that  the  kosmic  universe,  known  to  us 
or  knowable  by  us,  had  a  beginning,  and  that  it  is  the 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  195 

product  of  a  supernatural  agency.  A  supernatural 
Being,  as  the  Creator  of  all  knowable  things,  will 
thus  be  demonstrated . 

This  being  attained,  all  subordinate  supernatu- 
ralisin  necessarily  associated  with  theism  may  be 
easily  vindicated.  A  Creator  and  creation  being 
proved,  we  have  gained  the  great  point  of  religions, 
supernaturalism  ;  and  subordinate  forms  and  varie- 
ties of  supernatural  operation  and  manifestation  may 
be  proved  to  be  reasonable  and  proper. 

The  Positive  Method  must  supersede  the  Old 
Metaphysical  Method. 

Positivism  is  normally  religious,  because  it  is  in- 
evitably impressed  with  religious  phenomena,  which 
it  cannot  ignore,  though  it  may  not  be  able  to  ex- 
plain. The  old  metaphysical  method  invented  cer- 
tain essences  and  quiddities, —  an  abstract  substance 
or  noumenon  or  absolute  as  the  explanation.  Posi- 
tivism prefers  to  do  without  the  explanation  for  three 
good  reasons  :  First,  the  explanation  does  not  ex- 
plain ;  second,  we  have  no  proof  of  the  existence  of 
the  things  alleged,  because  they  are  beyond  the 
sphere  of  any  possible  experience  ;  and,  third,  be- 
cause they  are,  therefore,  in  themselves,  confessedly 
incogitable.  Admit  such  things,  and  we  may  as  well 
admit  anything  ;  for  all  sensible  and  all  logical  bar- 
riers are  broken  down.  The  admission  may  then 
defeat  the  object  for  the  sake  of  which  it  was  made. 
The  mediaeval  theologians  distinguished  themselves 
by  these  admissions  in  support  of  Orthodoxy;  and,  in 
modern  times,  these  have  been  the  most  prolific 
source  of  heresy  in  high  intellectual  latitudes. 

The  old  metaphysical  distinction,  for  instance,  be- 
tween substance  and  quality  cannot  be  made  by  Posi- 
tivism, because  such  substance  is  unknowable.  The 
only  substance  it  can  affirm  is  that  which  is  identical 
with  the  known,  with  quality  or  attribute,  which  is 
the  doctrine  we  have  advocated,  and  must  insist  on. 


196  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

Had  this  principle  been  fully  grasped  by  Spinoza, 
how  different  would  have  been  his  speculations  and 
the  course  of  modern  thought  !  His  Ethics  is  based 
and  carried  out  on  that  old  and  incogitable  distinc- 
tion of  substance  from  quality.  If  substance  is  differ- 
ent from  all  quality  (and  even  from  essence),  as  he 
affirms,  there  is  nothing  to  distinguish  one  substance 
from  another,  and  no  reason  for  asserting  more  than 
one  ;  and,  with  logical  rigor,  he  affirms  only  one,  and 
all  quality  and  essence  as  its  modes.  This  notion  of 
substance  helped  to  seduce  Leibnitz  into  his  doctrine 
of  monadology,  as  it  furnished,  verbally  at  least,  a 
possible  unity  at  the  base,  where  he  was  made  even 
with  Spinoza,  whom  he  dared  not  own.  The  same 
distinction,  with  different  terminology,  has  had  an 
equally  conspicuous  place  and  power  in  all  systems 
and  in  popular  apprehension,  down  to  our  own  time, 
save  where  the  recent  spirit  of  Positivism  has  shed  an 
effective  light.  While  I  hold  to  the  unity  of  the 
knowable  universe,  I  object  to  such  a  method  of 
proving  it.  Intrinsically  false,  it  is  certain,  every- 
where, to  be  obstructive  to  all  true  science  and 
philosophy. 

If  our  exposition  is  correct,  Positivism  is  more 
profound  and  thorough  than  it  claimed  to  be.  If 
substance  and  quality,  force  and  phenomena,  cause 
and  effect,  are  one,  then,  in  getting  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  either,  we  have  both  ;  and  our  knowl- 
edge, if  sufficiently  comprehensive,  is  ultimate  and 
perfect, —  the  true  and  final  philosophy. 

This  implies  a  rebuke  of  Agnosticism,  which  deals 
so  largely  in  the  intrinsically  unknowable,  in  dis- 
tinction from  the  phenomenal.  It  is  either  one  with 
the  phenomenal  or  there  is  no  unity  ;  and,  if  there  is 
any  such  unity,  it  is  a  unity  of  force,  of  which  all 
phenomena  are  so  many  modes.  And,  if  there  is 
anything  beyond  this  unitary  force  or  quality,  it  is 
useless,  since  forceless,  and  can  be  dispensed  with, 
and  must  be,  since  it  is  only  a  word. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  197 

Positivism,  however,  is  intrinsically  averse  to  su- 
pernaturalism  in  the  spirit  of  its  votaries,  but  not  in 
its  essential  method.  Its  glory  is  that  it  is  a  method, 
and  the  correct  and  perfected  method  to  which  the 
other  and  imperfected  methods— the  theological  and 
metaphysical — were  not  only  preliminary,  but  an- 
cillary. Now,  if  the  method  itself  should  ever  be 
found  to  lead  to  the  supernatural,  of  course  that  is 
properly  the  end  of  all  aversion  to  such  a  conclusion, 
and  the  legitimate  end  of  pure  and  exclusive  natural- 
ism. Besides,  in  any  case,  Positivism  is  bound  to  be 
consistent  in  its  procedure  and  conclusions.  If,  in 
following  its  method  faithfully,  it  is  obliged  either  to 
contradict  itself  or  infer  the  supernatural,  it  must  do 
the  latter,  or  it  violates  its  fundamental  law  and  de- 
stroys its  own  method,  and  its  glory  is  departed. 
This  is  the  alternative  forced  upon  us  in  the  present 
chapter.  We  have  tracked  and  analyzed  the  varying 
phenomena  of  sense  till  we  have  classified  them  all 
as  modes  of  the  ego.  We  have  then  seen  that  we 
universally  act  on  a  system  of  sematic  symbolism, 
on  which  we  assume  the  existence  of  other  beings 
beyond  our  universe,  answering  to  the  extra-organic 
forms  of  our  experience.  On  the  basis  of  this  symbol- 
ism, we  next  infer  that  they  and  we  act  and  change 
with  lexical  regularity  relative  to  each  other.  But 
for  this  correspondence  there  can  be,  it  is  plain,  no 
natural  cause.  Here  the  original  Positivism,  in  its 
crudest  form,  comes  in  and  says:  We  have  nothing 
to  do  with  that.  We  do  not  seek  causes,  but  only 
related  phenomena.  But  a  wiser  and  more  mature 
representative  of  the  method  approaches,  and  speaks 
as  follows:  It  is  true  we  invent  no  metaphysical  or 
abstract  entity  which  can  never  be  known  by  expe- 
rience in  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  experi- 
ence; but  we  may  infer  what  we  do  not  experience 
and  actually  never  can  experience,  else  logic  or  rea- 
soning and  even  intellectual  intuition  were  of  no  use. 
The  great  body  of  science  is  largely  made  up  of  suoh 


198  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

inferences.  Now,  if  by  common  consent  we  enter  on 
a  certain  line  of  reasoning  on  admitted  facts,  we  may 
not  stop  arbitrarily  alo-ng  the  route  where  there  is 
just  the  same  reason  for  advancing  as  there  was  for 
taking  the  first  step.  Here,  without  being  conscious 
of  the  vast  movement,  we  have  crossed  a  gulf  such  as 
was  never  before  contemplated,  vaster  and  more  vac- 
uous than  the  awful  chaos  crossed  by  Milton's  fallen 
arch-fiend  in  his  primal  passage  from  hell  to  earth. 
This  gulf  we  have  passed  on  the  wings  of  induction, 
which  are  the  great  and  lauded  powers  of  scientific 
locomotion  through  the  universe.  In  the  case  under 
consideration,  they  have  carried  us  beyond  the  known 
universe  to  other  universes.  This  passage  is  made 
by  all,  every  day.  We  affirm  the  existence  of  such 
universes,  and  that  they  are  like  our  own.  But  we 
never  saw  them.  No  one  ever  saw  any  but  his  own. 
He  induces  them  on  the  basis  of  the  sematic  princi- 
ple. In  so  doing,  we  have,  for  some  of  our  experien- 
ces, inferred  a  cause  and  explanation  which  tran- 
scend the  known  universe  and  all  possible  experience; 
and  it  is  very  arbitrary  and  irrational  to  stop  here  and 
refuse  to  answer  on  the  same  principle  the  irresist- 
ible question,  Whence  comes  the  harmony  which  we 
so  confidently  affirm  between  other  men  and  us;  that 
is,  between  unknown  universes  and  our  own  ?  And 
Positivism  will  not  be  true  to  its  better  self  to  utter 
this  refusal.  It  would  become  the  victim  of  a  self- 
engendered  and  fatal  atrophy,  and  be  speedily  super- 
seded by  a  more  robust  philosophy. 


XVI. 

OKIGIN  OF  MAN. 


IVot  Known  Directly. 

THAT  our  individual  existence  had  a  beginning 
has  never  been  questioned,  and  to  go  about  with 
much  ado  to  furnish  the  proof  of  this  universal 
postulate  will  appear  to  most  men  ludicrously  su- 
perfluous. But  to  be  assured  of  a  thing,  and  to  be 
able  to  give  a  scientific  account  of  it,  are  far  from 
being  the  same;  and  it  is  the  latter  we  want  and 
which  we  are  bound  to  furnish,  and  the  question  is 
not  so  simple  as  it  at  first  seems.  Neither  our  senses 
nor  our  inner  consciousness  can  inform  us  of  the  be- 
ginning of  our  own  existence,  since  we  are  already 
in  existence  when  these  powers  come  into  operation. 
So  Milton  represents  the  rebellious  angels  doubting 
their  creation  because  they  know  nothing  about  it, 
and  arguing  that  they  may  have  always  existed. 

We  see  other  children  born;  but  those  visible  chil- 
dren are  only  secondary  qualities  of  matter,  mere 
affections  of  sight,  modes  of  our  own  conscious 
selves.  In  the  same  way  and  with  the  same  result, 
we  may  go  through  all  our  sensible  experience  re- 
specting the  birth  of  children  and  the  beginning  of 
human  existence. 

Our  proof  of  the  beginning  of  our  own  existence 
is  inferential,  an  induction  from  the  facts  of  expe- 
rience; and  we  make  this  induction  on  the  principle 
of  analogy  and  sematology.  This  organism  of  ours, 
pronounced  to  be  ours  because  of  its  special  and 


200  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

peculiar  sensitiveness  relative  to  ourselves,  resembles 
those  forms  which  we  call  the  bodies  of  other  men ; 
and,  as  we  know  from  consciousness  that  ours  is  the 
outward  embodiment  and  impersonation  of  a  living 
conscious  being,  we  infer  by  analogy  that  those  other 
bodies  are  signs  of  the  existence  of  other  beings 
who  are,  in  endowments  and  circumstances,  as  much 
like  ourselves  as  these  bodies  are  like  our  own,  and 
that,  as  our  bodies  undergo  certain  changes  in  con- 
currence with  certain  conscious  changes  in  accord- 
ance with  fixed  laws,  we  infer  that  the  changes  in 
those  other  bodies  (which  are  only  modes  of  self) 
indicate  certain  other  changes  in  the  conscious  beings 
which  they  represent.  As  we  can  often  observe  the 
changes  in  many  of  these  bodies  more  than  in  our 
own  in  some  respects,  the  knowledge  of  them  may 
help  us  to  determine  respecting  ourselves  what  we 
cannot  directly  learn  from  consciousness. 

We  can  be  conscious  of  being,  though  we  cannot 
be  conscious  of  beginning.  We  can  be  also  con- 
scious of  the  anterior  end  of  a  train  of  recollected 
states  of  consciousness,  which  affords  a  presumption 
of  the  absolute  beginning  of  such  states.  By  the 
law  of  sematology,  on  which  in  some  way  we  are 
always  acting,  from  infancy  to  old  age,  each  knows 
that  others  had  a  beginning  as  organic  forms  before 
himself,  that  our  parents  preceded  us,  and  that  they 
had  parents.  By  the  same  law,  they  know  that 
other  human  beings  are  all  the  time  commencing 
existence  as  organic. 

Our  Alleged  Parents  noi  the  Cause  of  our 
^Existence. 

No  being  can  be  strictly  the  offspring  or  natural 
effect  of  anything  in  the  same  universe,  because  all 
the  alleged  products  or  offspring  of  each  are  himself 
or  modes  of  himself.  The  child  that  is  immediately 
known  to  the  parents  is  the  parents;  and  each  pa- 
rent, and  all  others,  know  or  see  and  hear  and  feel 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  201 

a  different  object,  which  they  call  the  same.  As  all 
immediate  percepts  are  egoistic,  no  two  persons  can 
have  the  same  immediate  percepts;  and  the  objects 
of  each  sense  are  peculiar  to  that  sense.  No  sense 
cognizes  any  thing  or  object  cognized  by  any  other 
sense.  The  one  child  is,  therefore,  a  different  child 
for  every  person  and  for  every  sense  of  every  person. 
This  egoistic  child,  so  called,  which  is  immediately 
known  because  it  is  egoistic,  is  a  sign  or  representa- 
tion of  a  conscious  being,  which  holds  a  very  sublime 
and  mysterious  relation  to  those  who  are  called  the 
parents  of  the  phenomenal  child,  and  by  whom  it  is 
considered  and  appropriated  as  theirs  in  a  peculiar 
sense.  The  real  child— the  spirit  or  conscious  being — 
is  known  to  them  immediately  only  through  the 
egoistic  sign-child. 

The  sign-child  is  from  the  parents,  because  it  is  the 
parents;  and  the  alleged  parent  is  also  the  child. 
The  real  child  or  spirit  is  not  from  the  recognized 
parents,  but  from  some  other  source  or  cause.  These 
parents  are  not  the  natural  cause  of  the  non-egoistic 
or  real  child,  because  it  does  not  belong  to  the  cos- 
mic system  to  which  they  belong,  or,  rather,  which 
belongs  to  them,  and  which  they  constitute,  and  with 
which  only  they  are  or  can  be  immediately  ac- 
quainted. Natural  causation,  as  recognized  by  sci- 
ence, is  only  between  the  objects  and  forces  of  the 
same  one  kosmic  system.  But,  as  every  conscious 
subject  has  a  kosmic  universe  of  its  own,  absolutely 
egoistic  and  numerically  different  from  all  others, 
so  the  child,  the  real  child  or  spirit,  has  no  universe 
in  common  with  the  parents.  Natural  causation  is, 
therefore,  as  before  seen,  impossible  between  any 
two  human  beings,  so  far  as  that  causation  is  im- 
mediately known  or  knowable,  which  is  the  charac- 
ter, we  repeat,  of  all  natural  causation  heretofore 
recognized.  Recognized  natural  causation  is  always 
between  antecedents  and  consequents  that  are  or 
may  be  immediately  known  as  objects  of  conscious- 


202  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

ness.  But  we  can  thus  know  only  the  ego.  There- 
fore, natural  causation  is  always  limited  to  the  ego. 
Hence,  parents  are  natural  causes,  not  of  real  chil- 
dren, but  only  of  sign-children,  which  are  modes  of 
self. 

The  declaration  that  there  is  no  recognized  natural 
causation  between  different  men  and  successive  gen- 
erations will  strike  many  as  absurdly  wrong.  They 
will,  in  refutation  of  it,  confidently  point  to  obvious 
facts  of  life  and  history,  the  unity  of  the  social  fabric, 
and  the  manifest  evolution  of  all  things.  But  this 
is  irrelevant.  All  these  phenomena  and  their 
changes  are  purely  subjective  states.  So  far  as 
known,  they  are  simply  the  evolutions  of  thought 
and  feeling  and  volition,  modes  of  the  individual 
life;  and  all  the  interaction  here  spoken  of  is  only 
that  which  obtains  between  these  modes  of  the  ego. 
While  admitting  the  egoism  of  all  sense  percepts, 
Positivism  can  only  be  positive  for  the  subject,  which 
is  all  it  positively  knows.  The  subject  is  the  sphere 
of  all  phenomena,  of  all  succession,  and  of  all  action 
and  interaction  that  we  ever  directly  know.  The 
known  action  and  interaction  are  of  phenomena, 
which  include  what  are  called  men,  women,  animals, 
and  inanimate  forms  and  forces;  and  all  these,  in 
every  case,  are  one  man.  If  there  is  any  causal  inter- 
action between  that  one  man  and  any  other  in^elli- 
gence,  that  action  does  not  belong  to  the  phenomena 
of  the  known  universe.  If  there  were  those  who  pre- 
ceded us  and  had  an  agency  in  our  production  or 
generation,  we  never  knew  them  and  never  can. 
They  never  had  an  existence  in  the  universe  to  which 
we  belong.  Those  forms  which  are  called  our  parents 
and  ancestors  are  our  own  very  selves,  and  not  our 
natural  authors  or  even  predecessors.  All  times, 
all  spaces,  are  included  in  the  vast  capacity  of  my 
small  individuality.  It  is,  therefore,  a  logical  impos- 
sibility that  anything  in  the  universe  should  be  the 
cause  of  my  existence;  for,  since  all  that  universe  is 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  203 

myself,  I  should  then  have  to  be  my  own  creator, 
and  act  with  creative  energy  before  I  had  an  exist- 
ence. The  universe  is  the  cause  of  my  organic  ex- 
istence; but  that  is  only  to  say  that  I  have  evolved 
this  as  one  of  the  many  modes  of  myself. 

Knowable  Nature  not  the  Cause  of  Man. 

As  our  recognized  and  sensible  parents  cannot  be 
the  source  of  our  being  or  the  cause  of  our  existence 
as  individualities,  so  neither  can  the  knowable  world 
called  Nature  be  such  source  or  cause  ;  for  the  reason 
that  all  Nature,  so  far  as  known  to  each  of  us,  is  his 
own  nature  or  self  only.  The  universe  known  to  me 
could  not  exist  before  me  and  generate  me,  any  more 
than  I  could  exist  before  I  existed,  and  be  my  own 
creator.  It  is,  however,  possible,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  I  existed  before  the  known  universe,  and  that  I 
am  its  author  as  I  am  its  subject.  And  the  universe 
having  been  created  by  God  (or,  less  probable,  engen- 
dered by  myself),  it  generates  organic  forms. 

Universal  Symbolism  of  Successive  Changes. 

We  have  already  seen  that  human  and  animal 
forms  are  symbols  of  living  beings  beyond  our  uni- 
verse, which  correspond  with  us  as  these  correspond 
with  our  organism.  We  shall  now  be  permitted  and 
logically  obliged  to  extend  this  symbolism,  so  as  to 
make  every  birth  the  symbol  of  an  unknown  creature 
entering  on  a  new  state  of  existence,  corresponding 
to  the  form  and  state  of  the  body  born  ;  and  every 
death  the  symbol  of  such  a  being  leaving  the  state  in 
which  it  has  been  existing,  and  entering  on  another 
which,  perhaps,  is  not  symbolized  to  us.  This  sym- 
bol'sm  is  familiar  to  modern  thought,  and  it  is  only 
the  formulation  of  it  which  is  really  novel.  It  there- 
fore needs  no  proof  or  defence.  All  acknowledge 
that  human  bodies  are  not  other  men,  yet  all  agree 
that  the  birth  and  death  of  these  bodies  are  proofs 
of  the  beginning  and  ending  of  distinctly  organic 


204  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

human  lives  ;  and  this  is  justifiable  only  on  the  basis 
of  the  symbolism  which  I  have  expressed.  We  make 
this  system  of  symbolism  perfect  by  making  it  strictly 
universal,  extending  it  to  all  lower  organic  changes, 
whether  modern  or  ancient  or  fossil.  It  is  thus  we 
read  the  past  record  of  our  own  and  countless  other 
universes  with  assurance. 

Creation  in  the  Lowest  Condition. 

The  theory  that  every  birth  denotes  there  and  then 
an  immediate  creation  is  not  favored  by  Sematology. 
Sematology  seems  rather  to  indicate  that  all  organic 
human  beings  have  evolved  from  inferior  pre-existing 
conditions,  extending  in  a  receding  series  back  to 
the  preorganic  world,  the  source  of  all  organic  forms 
and  organic  life.  Because  such  is  the  fact  concerning 
the  men  and  animals  of  the  phenomenal  world. 

This,  however,  does  not  necessarily  invalidate  the 
argument  for  creation  ultimately,  bat  only  for  the 
immediate  separate  creation  in  every  instance  when 
a  new  form  appears.  While  it  allows  that  evolution 
is  of  vast  extent  and  marvellous  variety,  it  also  im- 
plies that  the  original  being,  which  at  first  is  very  low 
down  in  the  scale  of  existence,  and  which  admits  of 
all  this  evolution,  is  endowed  with  a  very  marvellous 
capacity.  This  evolution,  be  it  remembered,  is  not 
the  successive  extinction  and  generation  of  new  be- 
ings, but  only  the  evolution  of  new  forms  of  the 
same  being.  The  whole  known  universe  is  a  sub- 
stantive unity,  and  that  unity  is  the  one  subject  and 
no  more,  so  that  every  evolution  of  an  apparently 
new  life  is  the  evolution  only  of  a  new  mode  of  the 
same  life  or  subject.  In  the  capacity  for  this  evolu- 
tion from  the  lowest  organism  and  preorganic  form 
up  to  man,  and  perhaps  indefinitely  beyond  him,  is 
seen  the  wondrous  power  of  the  original  endowment 
of  the  one  subject.  And  each  of  these,  if  created,  is 
the  creation  of  a  thing  with  all  this  power  of  develop- 
ment, which  is  not  less  wondrous  than  the  creation  of 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  205 

the  power  fully  developed.  And,  if  all  this  is  fore- 
thought and  planned,  it  is  far  more  wonderful. 

It  is  the  primitive  and  still  popular  opinion,  and 
favored  by  objective  evolution,  that  the  world  of 
inorganic  matter  preceded  man  and  all  organic  life. 
But  how  can  that  be,  if  it  have  no  existence  except  so 
far  as  it  is  perceived?  This  question,  raised  by  the 
theory  of  Berkeley,  Berkeley  met  by  saying  that  it 
was  seen  by  angels  before  the  creation  of  organic  life. 
But  that  answer  is  fantastic,  besides  travelling  be- 
yond the  domain  of  philosophy  and  obtruding  into 
that  of  theology  ;  and,  even  then,  it  is  good  only  for 
his  own  solitary  notion  that  all  sensible  phenomena 
are  non-egoistic,  while  all  modern  psychologists  have 
affirmed  that  they  are  subjective  states. 

So  far  as  they  are  subjective  states,  they  cannot 
precede  their  subject  ;  and,  so  far  as  they  are  organic 
affections,  they  cannot  precede  the  organism.  But 
modern  psychology,  with  great  and  growing  una- 
nimity, affirms  the  subjective  and  organic  character 
of  all  sensible  phenomena.  And  yet  it  is  universally 
assumed,  inconsistently,  that  the  organism,  if  not  the 
conscious  subject,  is  evolved  out  of  the  sensible 
world,  which  has  been  already  declared  to  be  an  or- 
ganic affection,  which  must  hence  be  evolved  from 
itself,  which  is  its  own  refutation. 

To  evade  this,  resort  is  had  to  the  assumption  of  a 
sort  of  unimaginable  as  well  as  unknowable  mind- 
stuff,  out  of  which  the  known  world,  organic  and  in- 
organic, is  evolved.  That  is  equally  blind  and  unwar- 
rantable by  any  principle  in  science  or  philosophy,  a 
mere  invention  without  any  conception  of  the  thing 
invented,  so  that  it  is  only  a  verbal  process. 

Besides,  it  is  ineffective  at  the  best,  so  long  as  sen- 
sible phenomena  are  pronounced  to  be  organic  affec- 
tions, because  it  cannot  dispel  the  conviction  or 
annul  the  fact  that  the  inorganic  world  is  preorganic 
and  the  source  of  the  organic,  which  it  cannot  be,  if  it 
is  itself  only  an  organic  affection  as  well  as  a  subjec- 


(T7HI7ERSITT' 


206  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

tive  state.  Our  organism  is  posterior  to  the  sensible 
world,  arises  from  it  and  returns  to  it  by  dissolution  ; 
and  thus  the  world  exists  after  as  it  was  prior  to  the 
organism. 

The  solution  of  this  knotty  problem  is  to  be  found 
in  conceiving  all  sensible  phenomena  as  subjective 
states,  but  not  as  organic  affections.  Some  of  them 
are  organic  affections,  and  some  are  not  ;  and  we  need 
to  discriminate  the  two  classes  of  subjective  states. 

All  visual  phenomena  except  the  visible  organism 
are  extra-organic.  Their  occurrence  and  recurrence 
are  conditioned  on  some  conditions  and  relations  of 
the  organism,  but  they  are  not  the  organism  nor  any 
affections  thereof.  The  earth,  the  houses,  the  rivers, 
mountains,  and  ocean  which  I  see  are  all  beyond  my 
organism,  though  they  are  subjective  states.  They 
are  extra-organic  modes  of  my  own  existence.  All 
men  see  them  as  extra-organic  ;  and  psychologists  dis- 
cern them  as  subjective  states,  and  have  thence  erro- 
neously concluded  that  they  are  also  organic  states, 
which  is  the  source  of  all  our  confusion  here.  While 
muscular  contraction  is  an  organic  affection,  the 
stone  wall  which  resists  its  action  is  extra-organic. 
In  touch  (without  special  resistance)  there  is  a  two- 
fold sensation  when  we  touch  our  vital  organism  ; 
and  this  is  wanting  when  we  touch  anything  beyond 
the  organic  periphery,  and  this  is  the  recognized  sign 
that  the  object  touched  is  beyond  the  organism,  an 
extra-organic  conscious  state  or  affection. 

This  extra-organic  world  existed  before  the  or- 
ganic. It  existed  as  it  does  now  as  a  subjective  state, 
without  its  present  lexical  relations  to  the  organism 
and  its  affections.  These  relations  it  establishes  as 
fast  as  it  evolves  the  organism;  and  they  vary  as  vary 
the  forms  and  stages  of  evolution,  both  organic  and 
inorganic.  Thus,  while  the  world  preceded  all  or- 
ganic life,  as  all  sense  and  science  affirm,  it  did  not 
precede  ourselves  as  a  conscious  being,  because,  as 
known  to  me,  it  is  me,  the  sub-organic  modes  in  which 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  207 

I  exist  and  operate  and  express  myself.  Hence,  the 
creation  of  the  world  is  the  creation  of  a  conscious 
spirit,  the  whole  knowable  universe  one  such  being, 
and  the  universes  therefore  just  as  numerous  as  indi- 
vidual spirits  or  souls. 

It  is  perhaps  possible  that  these  several  universes 
or  individuals  are  uncreated  and  are  eternally  under- 
going a  process  of  successive  evolution  and  involu- 
tion or  deterioration.  But  the  very  marvel  of  evolu- 
tion in  the  facts  of  which  we  have  already  taken  cog- 
nizance renders  that  supposition  extremely  improb- 
able. As  each  individual  constitutes  a  universe,  and 
as  these  have  no  connection  of  natural  cause  between 
them,  and  as  they  are  each  evolving  themselves  in 
lexical  connection  with  all  the  rest,  as  shown  by  sem- 
atology,  we  hence  see  how  vast  and  various  and  all- 
seeing  is  the  supernatural  agency  which  secures  this 
lexical  harmony  and  sematizes  it  to  all.  It  is  easy  to 
see  that  such  a  Being  can  be  better  employed  than  in 
the  labor  of  an  eternal  balancing  of  evolution  and  in- 
volution, or  progress  and  deterioration,  and  that  the 
better  employment  would  be  creation.  It  accords 
better  with  our  higher  intuition  as  well  as  with  the 
phenomena  of  science  that  under  the  dominion  of 
such  a  Power  there  is  an  absolute  progress,  and  not 
merely  the  everlasting  rise  and  fall  successively  of 
the  two  ends  of  a  beam. 

If  we  look  at  the  history  of  phenomena,  we  shall 
find  no  ground  for  a  theory  of  an  eternal  balancing  of 
evolution  and  involution.  Deterioration  is  infinites- 
imal, so  far  as  known  to  us,  compared  with  progress. 
Kosmic  collapse  and  re-evolution  do  not  here  enter 
into  the  calculation,  because  they  are  unknown,  are 
only  conjectural  and  without  any  sure  or  strong  evi- 
dence. And,  if  they  were  known,  they  could  only  in- 
dicate what  is  common  to  the  race,  not  the  elevation 
of  some  and  the  depression  of  others  ;  and  a  new 
kosmic  cycle  might  introduce  an  order  of  creatures 
far  superior  to  any  we  know,  including  man.  So 


208  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

vital  decay  in  old  age  and  other  cases  may  be  prelim- 
inary, as  in  the  supposed  worn-out  world,  to  entering 
on  a  new  and  higher  career.  Certainly,  the  various 
forms  of  weakness  preceding  death  are  no  proof  of 
coming  degradation  in  the  next  state,  else  there 
would  be  no  progress  or  evolution  anywhere,  which 
contradicts  all  phenomenal  indicators.  The  only 
evidence  of  an  eternal  balancing  of  progress  and  ret- 
rogression is  to  be  sought  in  a  comparison  of  progres- 
sive organic  evolution  and  deterioration.  Here  the 
case  becomes  clear.  There  is  organic  deterioration 
where  it  is  not  a  process  of  dissolution  or  a  sign  of 
transition,  but  a  comparatively  permanent  state  and 
propagated  by  generation ;  and  this  deterioration 
compared  with  progressive  evolution,  so  far  as  we 
can  judge,  is  almost  infinitely  small,  so  that,  to  keep 
up  this  progression,  a  successive  origination  of  lower 
creatures  is  necessary. 

Proofs  of  Creation  summed  up. 

Now  let  us  in  conclusion  sum  up  our  evidence  in 
favor  of  creation.  We  have  already  proved  the  exist- 
ence of  a  supernatural  Being,  whose  power  and  intel- 
ligence are  of  vast  and  unknown  extent,  as  the  great 
relative  regulator  of  the  mighty  clock  universes,  so  as 
to  make  them  keep  time  with  each  other,  and  to  guar- 
antee this  as  the  foundation  of  the  sematic  proof  of 
the  existence  of  other  men  and  of  our  practical  inter- 
course with  them,  which  is  all  supernatural,  because 
transcending  nature.  The  very  existence  of  such  a 
Being  makes  creation  probable  ;  for,  as  he  is  thus  su- 
perior to  all  nature  or  natures,  it  is  but  natural  and 
easy  next  to  suppose  that  he  is  their  Creator.  And, 
further,  it  would  seem  that  their  creation,  with 
certain  specific  capacities  relative  to  each  other,  were 
necessary,  in  order  that  they  may  work  in  accord  with 
each  other.  Then  let  us  bear  in  mind  the  further 
fact  that,  so  far  as  our  knowledge  extends,  evolu- 
tion is  very  vastly  in  excess  of  deterioration,  which 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  209 

makes  creation  necessary  in  order  to  keep  up  the 
process,  because  there  can  be  no  common  stuff  out  of 
which  it  has  heretofore  been  supposed  they  are  or 
may  be  evolved,  and  all  existence  is  individualistic, 
and  all  evolution  is  self-evolucion,  the  same  thing 
evolving  itself  into  other  modes  of  the  same  thing, 
never  into  other  things. 

Then,  having  followed  the  order  of  lexical  muta- 
tions back  and  down  to  the  lowest  conditions,  we 
must  ask  an  explanation  of  that  condition,  why  and 
whence.  And  the  most  rational  answer  is,  Creation. 
Else  we  must  suppose  an  (almost)  infinite  number  of 
individualities  existing  unchanged  from  all  eternity, 
and  yet  endowed  with  powers  of  developing  into 
various  successive  universes,  and  then  begin  a  course 
of  evolution  in  marvellous  and  absolutely  inex- 
plicable supernatural  yet  lexical  harmony  with  all 
other  evolutions.  That  were  far  more  astonishing 
than  creation,  especially  now  that  we  have  already 
found  a  Being  who,  for  aught  we  know,  is  competent 
to  create,  and  who,  it  seems,  must  determine  their 
original  endowments,  relative  to  all  others,  in  order 
that  they  may  evolve  themselves  in  accord  with  all 
the  rest  of  the  great  general  class  to  which  they 
belong;  and  it  would  be  hard  to  distinguish  this  from 
creation,  since  original  quality  or  force  is  the  only 
being  or  substance.  Finally,  let  us  remember  that 
the  creation  of  each  individual  is  the  creation  of  an 
incipient  universe,  and,  therefore,  that,  in  every 
birth,  we  see  the  sematic  (inductive)  proof  that  such 
creation  has  preceded  said  birth  as  a  precondition  of 
its  occurrence,  and  that  the  process  of  such  pre- 
organic  creation  is  still  going  on  always,  and  prom- 
ises to  continue  to  do  so  without  end. 

Our  Creation  in  the  Preorgauic  State. 

Here  let  us  guard  against  a  natural  misconception, 
atomic  and  rudimentary  :  When  I  advocate  creation, 
I  do  not  plead  for  the  creation  of  a  human  organism, 


210  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

nor  any  other  organism,  high  or  low.  That  is  evolved 
from  the  world.  Nor  do  I  plead  for  the  creation  of 
the  human  soul,  to  be  put  into  the  developed  human 
organism,  as  some  hold.  The  organically  conscious 
human  soul  is  one  with  the  organism ;  and,  as  such, 
it  is  evolved  from  the  world.  Nor  do  I  speak  of 
man's  origin  or  creation  in  time.  Man  himself  in- 
cludes all  time  and  times,  and  time  begins  and  ends 
with  his  conscious  existence.  The  question,  there- 
fore, as  to  when  man  began  his  existence  is  utterly 
unmeaning.  Each  man  began  his  existence  at  least 
as  early  as  the  universe  known  to  him  began  to  be, 
if  there  ever  was  such  a  beginning  ;  for  this  universe 
is  he  or  it,  the  ego.  Of  this  beginning,  we  can  have 
no  demonstrative  proof ;  but  I  think  we  have  some 
probable  evidence,  which,  to  me,  is  quite  satisfactory. 

The  hasty  reader  may  object  that  we  know  the 
sensible  world  only  in  connection  with  organic  affec- 
tions; that  to  destroy  the  organic  sense  is  to  destroy 
for  us  the  sensible  world;  that,  therefore,  we  should 
conclude  that  we  had  no  preorganic  knowledge  of 
the  world;  and  that  we  have  no  knowledge  or  memory 
of  our  own  preorganic  existence;  and  that  we  know 
ourselves  only  as  organic,  or  as  related  to  the  organ- 
ism. This  is  a  specimen  of  a  very  natural  but  un- 
scientific way  of  thinking  and  reasoning.  There  is 
truth  in  it,  but  the  truth  is  rendered  false  by  its 
isolation  from  other  truths  with  which  it  is  vitally 
connected. 

By  implication,  it  contradicts  the  doctrine  of  the 
subjectivity  of  sensible  phenomena,  because,  as  before 
noticed,  if  they  are  subjective  states  or  modes  of  our- 
selves, and  if  we  had  no  existence  before  the  organ- 
ism, then  the  sensible  world,  which  exists  only  in  us, 
as  our  various  feelings,  had  no  preorganic  existence, 
which  contradicts  both  all  science  and  all  common 
sense.  Let  the  reader  consider  this,  and  be  con- 
sistent. Let  him  deny,  if  he  can,  that  the  sensible 
world  is  a  subjective  state  or  mode  of  self,  or  that  it 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  211 

had  a  preorganic  existence,  or  else  he  is  logically 
bound  to  affirm  that  its  subject  existed  before  the 
organism,  and  that  the  external  world  thus  pre- 
existed as  its  subjective  states  or  modes.  The  science 
of  psychology  impales  him  on  the  first  horn  of  the 
trilemma.  All  the  physical  sciences  and  common 
thought  unite  to  impale  him  on  the  second  horn. 
And,  hence,  the  forceps  of  logic  seizes  him,  and 
pitches  him  on  to  the  third. 

How  comes  it,  then,  that  we  know  the  world  only 
through  organic  affections?  If  we  knew  it  before 
we  had  an  organism,  before  we  were  born,  why  do 
we  not  know  it  now  independently  of  any  of  the 
senses?  Whether  we  can  answer  this  question  sat- 
isfactorily or  not,  that  does  not  affect  the  value  or 
verity  of  the  above  exposition  and  argument.  It  is 
possible  that  we  were  once  able  to  do  what  we  can- 
not do  now,  though  we  cannot  duly  explain  either 
the  ability  or  the  inability.  We  know  that  modes  of 
knowledge  and  action  have  changed  in  the  history 
of  the  life  of  our  planet,  and  that  new  forms  of  knowl- 
edge and  power  have  been  continually  relegating 
old  ones  into  desuetude  and  oblivion.  Stubborn  solid 
facts  do  not  liquefy  and  flow  off,  because  impotency 
bids  them  in  vain  to  explain  themselves.  Yet,  in 
this  case,  the  facts  are  not  wholly  inexplicable,  be- 
cause we  see  them  in  their  connections  of  time  and 
place,  which  is,  for  the  most,  all  the  explanation  that 
science  claims  to  give. 

There  is  also  an  explanation  to  be  found  in  the 
very  existence  of  the  organism,  such  as  it  is.  The 
fact  that  it  has  come  into  existence  especially  by 
natural  evolution  implies  that,  so  long  as  it  exists 
as  such,  it  establishes  and  maintains  relations  with 
the  world,  so  that  only  or  chiefly  in  such  relations  is 
the  world  henceforth  known.  These  relations  cannot 
be  ignored  so  long  as  they  exist.  And,  as  the  organ- 
ism is  only  a  mode  of  self  and  the  external  world 
another  mode  of  self,  their  common  subject  simply 


212  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

knows  both  in  their  mutual  relations.  If  we  falsely 
conceive  ourselves  as  not  only  identified  with  the 
organism,  but  as  confined  to  it,  we  may  then  suppose 
that  we  know  the  world  only  through  the  organism, 
and  only  on  that  false  basis. 

What  is  called  sense  perception  is  not  an  organic 
perception  or  the  organism  perceiving.  The  organ- 
ism and  the  extra-organic  are  perceived  by  a  super- 
organic  and  a  super-material  power,  of  which  both 
these  are  perceptive  acts  or  subjective  states.  It  is 
not  the  eye  that  sees  or  the  ear  that  hears.  They 
are  seen  and  known  by  the  supersensible  ego.  As 
before  quoted  from  the  Greek  poet,— 

"Mind,  it  seeth;  mind,  it  heareth: 
All  beside  is  deaf  and  blind." 

This  supersensible  power  discerns  the  external 
world  usually  in  certain  relations  with  the  organism; 
but  that  is  only  a  temporary  fact,  and  not  a  necessity. 

Nor  is  it  a  universality  of  human  experience. 
There  are  numerous  and  indubitable  proofs  that  the 
mind  often  has  knowledges  which  do  not  come 
through  any  organic  media.  Clairvoyance  and  clair- 
audience  and  trance  perceptions  are  proofs  of  this. 
Things  are  seen  and  heard  at  distances  of  time  and 
place,  and  the  soul  can  give  no  organic  explanation 
of  its  knowledge.  Cases  of  this  kind  are  so  numer- 
ous and  clear  and  well  attested,  and  the  prints  in 
which  they  are  found  are  so  accessible,  that  it  were 
superfluous  here  to  give  examples  and  proofs.  It  is 
enough  to  refer  to  them,  and  especially  to  such  pub- 
lications as  those  of  the  London  Society  for  Psychi- 
cal Research,  the  London  journal,  Light,  the  American 
journals,  Mind  in  Nature  and  the  Religio-Philosophical 
Journal,  of  Chicago. 

A  still  further,  but  more  questionable  proof  is  fur- 
nished by  the  apparition  and  manifested  agency  of 
disembodied  spirits,  which  all  ages  have  believed  in, 
and  which  in  these  days  have  received  a  study  and 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  213 

a  faith  unparalleled  in  more  credulous  and  less  scien- 
tific ages.  Doubtless  there  is  a  nucleus  of  fact  in 
the  mountain  of  illusion  and  imposture  which  consti- 
tute modern  Spiritualism.  And,  if  we  live  and  know 
the  world  after  the  body  is  dissolved,  we  may  have 
done  it  before  the  body  was  formed  ;  and  here  and 
there,  all  along  the  course  of  our  organic  history,  we 
may  rise  above  organic  conditions. 

Creation  and  Evolution  distinguished. 

What  I  have  described  under  the  name  of  creation 
is  to  be  understood  as  creation  strictly  in  contrast 
with  evolution,  which  is  what  philosophers  usually 
mean  when  they  use  the  word  "  creation."  I  mean 
by  it  the  absolute  causation  of  existence,  not  merely 
the  causation  of  a  new  mode  of  an  old  existence, 
which  is  evolution.  One  of  the  most  pious  and  nearly 
orthodox  of  our  recent  philosophers  is  Herman  Lotze; 
but  even  he  is  open  to  the  charge  of  describing  only 
evolution  under  the  name  of  creation,  when  he  says: 
"  Nor,  again,  is  it  out  of  nothing  that  the  soul  is  made 
or  created  by  the  Absolute;  but,  to  satisfy  the  imagi- 
nation, we  may  say  it  is  from  itself,  from  its  own  real 
nature,  that  the  Absolute  projects  the  soul "  (Meta- 
physics, p.  246).  This  may  satisfy  the  imagination ;  but 
it  does  not  satisfy  the  pure  intellect,  whose  satisfac- 
tion only  we  seek  in  metaphysics.  And  here  there 
is  no  sphere  for  the  imagination.  As  the  Absolute 
projects  the  soul  from  itself,  "and  so  adds  to  its  one 
activity — the  course  of  nature — that  other  which,  in 
the  ruling  plan  of  the  Absolute,  is  its  natural  comple- 
tion," there  is,  in  all  this,  no  addition  made  to  the 
sum  of  being,  nothing  but  a  modal  change  or  evolu- 
tion of  the  eternal.  This  is  panheisenism  very 
clearly,  whether  or  not  it  rise  to  the  dignity  of  pan- 
theism. On  the  other  hand,  I  advocate  a  theism  and 
creation,  proper  and  pure,  in  which  man  and  the 
universe  are  not  conceived  as  the  modes  of  God's 
being  and  action,  but  the  created  effects  thereof,  and 


214  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

absolutely  other  than  himself  in  mode  and  substance. 
If  we  are  a  projection  from  God,  we  are  either  one 
with  him — an  integral  element  of  deity — or  he  is 
diminished  by  our  projection  ;  and  neither  of  these 
presents  us  the  God  of  Christian  theism. 

Mail  an  Intrinsic  Force,  Individualistic. 

I  also  claim  that  this  creature,  whether  called 
nature  or  soul,  is  an  individual  power,  which,  being 
once  created,  can  run  its  course  without  extraneous 
aid  from  any  source  whatever.  It  is  an  intrinsic 
energy,  which  not  only  can  act,  but  must  act, 
according  to  the  nature  and  degree  or  extent  of  its 
energy.  Lotze  justly  argues  that  an  organism  is  also 
a  machine  ;  but  he  claims  that  God's  machine  will 
not  run  without  him,  as  a  man's  machine  will  run 
without  the  inventor,  because  the  human  inventor 
finds  the  forces  and  laws  of  nature  as  pre-existent  and 
independent,  relative  to  him  ;  while  God,  on  the 
contrary,  makes  the  forces  and  laws  of  his  machine, 
and  so  constitutes  their  constant  and  perpetual  opera- 
tor, the  very  agent  of  all  their  action,  the  real  essen- 
tial force  which  they  seem  to  exert,  the  only  and 
immanent  energy  of  all  the  universe,  of  all  existence. 

Now,  philosophy  ought  to  be  able  to  see  that  it  is  a 
higher  notion  of  God  to  see  in  him  a  power  which  can 
create  another  power  or  set  of  powers,  or  intrinsic 
and  essential  energies,  which,  from  their  very  nature 
and  from  the  moment  of  their  creation,  are  them- 
selves centres  and  sources  of  causation,  and  always 
operative,  without  any  further  agency  on  the  part 
of  God,  who  can,  however,  modify  their  action  at 
will  or  leave  it  unmodified,  and  without  any  further 
influence. 

Divine  Immanence  in  Nature* 

It  is  a  pity,  too,  that  so  good  a  thinker  as  Lotze, 
writing  at  so  recent  a  date,  was  not  able  to  discern 
and  remove  the  veil  which  incompetent  philosophy 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  215 

has  thrown  over  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  agency  in 
the  universe.  If  God  is  the  name  for  the  only  power 
and  agency,  if  he  is  the  immanent  sole  operator  of 
all  action  and  motion,  then  let  us,  if  possible,  hence- 
forth avoid  speaking  as  if  we  had  any  finite  individu- 
ality, because  this  is  false.  Our  force  or  quality  of 
every  kind  is  God  ;  and  so  we  are  God,  simply  modes 
of  the  infinite  agency.  Herein,  Spinoza  was  thor- 
ough ;  but  he  was  not  able  to  be  consistent.  He 
talks,  all  along,  as  if  he  were  not  God,  while  argu- 
ing that  he  is,  that  there  is  but  one  substance  and 
being,  whose  attributes  are  thought  and  extension. 
This  one  being  of  thought  and  extension  we  who 
are  thought  and  extension,  ought  to  worship,— wor- 
ship ourselves  as  "  not  ourselves." 

Philosophy  ought  not  to  overlook  the  meaning  of 
its  own  words.  What  is  the  universe  ?  In  its  fullest 
meaning,  it  denotes  both  the  conscious  and  the  un- 
conscious worlds.  In  this  sense,  God's  active  im- 
manence in  the  universe,  as  its  sole  operator,  excludes 
all  individuality  of  souls  or  spirits,  except  as  modes 
of  divine  action,  as  deity  so  and  so,  existing  and 
acting. 

If  the  word  "  universe  "  is  used  only  for  the  uncon- 
scious worlds,  and  if  the  absolute  immanence  and 
sole  agency  are  limited  to  this,  allowing  an  intrinsic 
individualistic  force  to  conscious  beings,  we  require 
a  reason  or  principle  in  justification  of  the  distinction. 
Why  should  God  be  identified  with  the  unconscious, 
and  not  with  the  conscious  ?  If  he  has  created  one 
form  of  quality  and  force  as  other  than  himself,  why 
should  he  not  create  another  ?  Having  thus  created 
the  greater,  why  not  also  the  less  ?  The  implication 
of  these  questions  is  indeed  allowed  by  philosophers, 
and  their  procedure  is  based  upon  it.  They  disavow 
or  ignore  this  distinction.  They  have  but  one  kind 
of  creation,  whether  of  the  conscious  or  the  uncon- 
scious,— the  projection  or  evolution  of  the  absolute 
or  eternal  power  into  that  form  or  those  forms  of 


216  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

existence  and  action.  No  distinction  of  the  nature 
of  the  creative  acts  has  ever  been  made  between 
the  conscious  and  unconscious  worlds.  They  are  the 
same  in  kind. 

Immanence  in  Nature  is  Immanence  in  the  Ego. 

It  is  high  time,  surely,  for  philosophers  to  see  the 
logical  connection  between  a  subjective  universe  and 
divine  immanence  in  that  universe,  which  is  imma- 
nence in  the  subject.  With  all  metaphysicians  of 
our  times,  Lotze  affirms  and  elaborately  argues  that 
all  the  known  world  is  a  subjective  state  ;  and,  of 
this  universe,  he,  with  others,  says  that  God  is  the 
immanent  and  exclusive  force.  This  makes  God  to 
be  immanent  in  me,  as  the  sole  and  direct  operator 
of  all  my  sensible  experiences.  In  that  case,  he 
cannot  be  discriminated  from  me.  At  the  best,  it 
leaves  me  only  a  forceless,  passive  puppet  of  infinity, 
abhorrent  alike  to  logic  and  sentiment  and  the  uni- 
versal consciousness. 

Creation  Instantaneous,  not  Continuous. 

I  hold  that  creation  is  instantaneous  and  final,  not 
continuous.  A  continuous  creation  is  a  self-contra- 
diction. The  continuous  is  unbroken  existence. 
Creation  is  the  causing  of  that  to  be  which  before 
had  no  existence,  and  a  continuous  creation  implies 
continuous  annihilation  as  its  condition.  For  how 
create  what  already  exists?  And  how  create  what 
is  continuously  annihilated  ?  for  that  never  begins  to 
be.  It  is  a  logical  self-annihilation  all  through.  Nat- 
ure is  not  a  mode  of  the  divine  agency,  but  a  created 
effect  thereof.  A  mode  of  God  is  God;  but  nature  is 
a  mode  of  me,  who  am  an  effect  or  creature  of  God, 
who  made  me  utterly  other  than  himself,  but  in  his 
image.  Continuous  agency  is  evolution.  Creative 
agency  is  instantaneous,  once  for  all. 

The  Soul  erolves  its  own  Organism. 

The  sensible  universe,  as  well  as  the  body,  has  an 
organic  as  well  as  a  dynamic  relation  to  the  spirits 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  217 

which  is  their  subject.  The  spirit  it  is  which  moulds 
the  universe,  and  then  moulds  its  own  special  organic 
form  of  the  human  body.  Against  Stahl,  who  as- 
serted that  the  soul  moulds  the  body  to  its  own  ends, 
Lotze  objects  that  "the  formation  of  the  body,  in  its 
most  essential  and  irreversible  features,"  is  fixed 
before  consciousness  is  attained,  or  when  it  does  not 
know  enough  for  this  (Metaphysics,  p.  230).  But  this  is 
inconsiderate,  as  our  exposition  shows.  We  have  no 
evidence  that  the  soul  is  ever  unconscious.  Ages 
indefinite  and  vast,  it  existed  as  a  conscious  being 
before  the  body  or  any  special  organism  was  evolved. 
According  to  the  laws  of  this  preorganic  being,  as 
seen  in  the  material  universe,  and  therefore  accord- 
ing to  its  own  ends,  it  evolved  at  length  the  special 
organism,  so  that  we  are,  in  every  case,  organically 
the  product  of  our  own  preorganic  agency,  of  our 
own  spirit,  which  is  always  acting  throughout  the 
universe,  which  is  itself,  This  universe,  our  spirit, 
molds  the  body. 

The  Soul's  Transcendence  of  the  material 
Universe. 

But  the  soul  transcends  the  material  universe,  since 
it  looks  upon  that  universe  as  only  its  lowest  modes, 
sensations,  in  humble  contrast  with  its  higher  intel- 
lections, emotions,  and  volitions,  instinct  with  the 
higher  life.  Hence,  philosophers  like  Lotze  and 
others  contradict  their  own  doctrine  of  universal 
subjectivity,  when  they  say,  "The  soul  is  confined 
within  the  limits  of  nature."  This  nature  or  universe 
is  contained  in  the  soul.  Their  views  are  very  small, 
as  well  as  inconsistent.  They  make  the  universe 
commensurate  with  God,  and  call  it  infinite.  I  make 
it  immeasurably  less  than  man,  the  lower  parts  of 
his  ways;  and  man  is  finite,  very. 


XVII. 

ETIOLOGY. 


THIS  subject,  after  being  for  ages  supposed  to  be 
forever  settled,  has  been  reduced  to  chaos,  which  is 
preliminary  to  a  new  evolution  in  a  higher  form. 

Designing  and  Uiidesigiiing  Causes. 

There  are  designing  and  undesigning  causes.  Ob- 
jective evolution  excludes  the  first  from  the  kosmos, 
while  subjective  evolution  proves  it,  and  thence 
proves  the  supreme  action  of  a  supernatural  power, 
God,  and  thence,  probably,  proves  creation.  I  have 
not  before  mentioned  the  argument  from  design,  be- 
cause it  was  needless  and  unavailable;  but  it  will 
hereafter  come  into  legitimate  operation  on  the  basis 
of  our  new  proof  of  Deity,  as  an  inference  from  it. 

Causes  in  Science  and  in  Philosophy. 

Cause  may  be  considered  relative  to  science  only, 
or  relative  to  philosophy.  In  science,  cause  denotes 
uniform  antecedent,  for  which  it  is  a  short  expres- 
sion. All  the  purposes  of  science  are  attained  when 
we  have  attained  the  lexical  connections  of  phenom- 
ena. This  is  the  positive  philosophy,  and  all  the  phi- 
losophy possible  in  the  estimation  of  many.  But  we 
cannot  be  content  with  that.  We  must  ask  whether 
there  is  any  force  in  these  phenomena  which  makes 
them  what  they  are  or  do  what  they  do,  or  whether 
they  are  forces  or  operated  by  forces  behind  them  ? 
These  are  questions  for  philosophy  proper;  and  the 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  210 

discussion  of  them  is  philosophical  etiology,  which  is 
our  present  subject. 

Etiology  relative  to  Matter  and   Force. 

Etiology  is  obstructed  by  a  prevailing  distinction 
between  matter  and  force,  because  this  makes  all 
matter  forceless  and  all  force  immaterial.  Though 
it  is  held  that  these  are  in  fact  inseparable,  yet  to 
suppose  them  distinguishable  involves  us  in  just  the 
same  logical  difficulty  as  if  they  were  also  separable. 
The  distinguishable  are  different,  however  united; 
and,  if  there  is  a  difference  between  force  and  mat- 
ter, neither  of  them  is  the  other,  so  far  as  the  differ- 
ence extends.  The  difference  is  qualitative;  and  they 
are,  at  least,  of  different  quality.  And  this  leads  us 
to  see  that  the  distinction  is  self-contradictory.  All 
force  is  quality,  and  all  quality  is  force,  so  that  the 
two  terras,  comprehensively  taken,  are  of  the  same 
meaning;  and  to  distinguish  between  force  and  mat- 
ter is  to  make  a  distinction  between  quality  and  the 
qualitiless,  an  intellectual  and  unconscious  blank, 
which  is  no  distinction  at  all.  Neither  matter  nor 
anything  else  can  be  distinguished  from  force,  be- 
cause it  is  only  force  or  quality  that  can  have  any 
mark  or  distinction,  either  internal  or  external. 
Nothing  is  manifestable  or  conceivable  except  as 
force.  Forces  or  qualities  we  can  distinguish  from 
each  other,  but  not  all  force  from  aught  else,  whether 
we  call  that  other  by  the  empty  term  matter  or  spirit. 

The  subtle  and  sceptical  intellect  of  David  Hume 
is  the  source  of  the  modern  metaphysical  confusion 
on  this  subject.  He  said  the  senses  give  us  only  suc- 
cessive and  coexistent  phenomena  or  impressions, 
and  that  ideas  are  only  faded  sensible  impressions,  so 
that  we  have  no  other  notion  of  force  or  cause.  Our 
modern  evolutionists  are,  on  one  side,  sensational- 
ists, and  so  are  disposed  to  deny  that  the  senses  re- 
veal force  or  cause,  or  that  matter  is  itself  force  or 
cause.  On  the  other  hand,  they  cannot  do  without 


220  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

force.  It  is  necessary  to  them  as  inseparably  con- 
nected with  matter,  else  the  theory  of  evolution  were 
impossible.  So  they  must  have  force  connected  with 
matter,  but  not  itself  matter,  not  material,  not  an 
object  of  sense,  but  an  inconceivable  thing  which  we 
are  obliged  to  infer  or  assume,  in  order  to  explain 
sensible  experience.  But  nothing  can  ever  explain 
how  our  senses  discern  and  discriminate  as  coexist- 
ent or  successive  the  qualitiless  or  forceless,  or  how 
none  of  all  the  qualitative  forms  and  motions  of  the 
material  universe  are  quality,  or  how  without  power 
they  are  powerful  to  act  as  symbols  of  an  unknown 
force.  According  to  this  theory,  we  know  the  force- 
less, but  can  neither  know  nor  conceive  the  forcible, 
— just  the  opposite  of  the  real  fact  and  the  logical 
necessity.  Make  all  phenomena  force,  and  all  diffi- 
culty is  removed. 

Alleged  Forcelessiiess  of  All  Creation. 

Theologians,  after  a  long  period  of  futile  endeavor 
to  refute  Hume's  sceptical  conclusion  on  cause, 
adopted  it  without  acknowledgment,  and  with  a 
little  twisting  have  turned  it  to  their  own  supposed 
advantage.  The  sensible  world  being  forceless,  they 
argue  that  there  must  be  a  supersensible  Power  who 
actuates  and  directs  it.  This  appears  to  be  equally 
acute  and  just.  The  world  cannot  act  without  force, 
intrinsic  or  extrinsic;  and,  as  it  has  no  intrinsic  force, 
it  must  be  operated  by  an  extrinsic  though  immanent 
force.  To  the  objection  that,  having  no  notion  of 
force,  their  argument  is  meaningless,  they  answer 
that  volition  gives  them  the  notion  of  force,  of  will 
force,  which  must  be  in  kind  that  of  the  Creator  and 
Operator  of  the  world. 

This  effort  to  flank  scepticism  is  a  failure.  There 
is  no  more  evidence  of  force  in  the  will  than  there 
is  in  the  external  world.  Volition  is  an  experience, 
and  conation  is  an  experience  with  relations  of  suc- 
cession and  coexistence,  just  like  all  sensible  expe- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  221 

riences;  and  on  the  point  in  question  there  is  noth- 
ing to  discriminate  the  two  classes  of  experiences. 

Further,  force  is  verified  only  by  its  overcoming 
opposing  force.  If  conation  meets  no  force  from 
without  which  it  overcomes  and  modifies,  it  is  not 
a  verified  force.  It  does  nothirg,  and  there  is  noth- 
ing it  can  do.  There  is  in  will  no  need  of  force,  and 
there  is  no  reason  for  asserting  its  existence.  Either 
sensible  phenomena  are  forces  or  volitional  phe- 
nomena are  not  forces,  or  at  least  not  proved  to  be 
forces. 

A  theistic  theory  that  God  has  created  a  forceless 
universe  defeats  itself.  It  makes  creation  a  nullity, 
because  utterly  useless  and  worthless,  since  only 
quality  or  force  can  be  of  any  use  anywhere.  To 
think  of  exalting  the  Creator  by  belittling  his  crea- 
tion is  a  strange  device.  The  opposite  course  is  the 
only  path  to  such  an  end.  The  mightier  and  more 
various  the  effect,  the  more  nobly  it  argues  for  its 
cause.  If  God  is  the  sole  power  and  worker,  he  has 
nothing  to  oppose  and  overcome,  except  within  him- 
self. If  there  is  anywhere  jar  and  confliction,  it  is  all 
within  himself  or  of  himself  ;  and  his  own  nature, 
and  nothing  else,  appears  to  be  a  boundless  range  of 
chaos,  anarchy,  and  war. 

I  hold  that  all  things,  sensible  or  supersensible, 
are  force  ;  that,  therefore,  all  things  are  causes  ;  that 
all  changes  spring  either  from  an  internal  cause  or 
an  external  cause  ;  that,  therefore,  if  anything  begins 
absolutely  to  be,  it  must  be  caused  by  some  power 
existing  before  it  and  numerically  different  from  it. 
This  is  intelligible  and  consistent,  and  I  believe  it  is 
ultimate  and  comprehensive  of  all  that  the  case 
logically  involves.  We  thus  dispense  with  all  as- 
sumptions and  postulates,  and  all  appeals  to  blind, 
inexplicable,  alleged  psychological  necessity.  We 
accept  the  notion  that  all  being  is  force,  because, 
otherwise,  self-contradiction  ensues,  and,  by  accept- 
ing it,  we  secure  consistency  of  procedure  and  result, 


222  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

and  the  use  of  an  [ultimate  principle  of  great  power 
and  universal  application  ;  and  we  have  "now  a 
philosophical  etiology,  which  we  are  entitled  and 
obliged  to  use  in  all  discussions  relative  to  changes 
and  their  origin,  whether  the  changes  be  substantial 
or  only  modal,  and  which,  therefore, 'must  be  in 
perpetual  use  in  the  ulterior  inquiries  of  philosophy 
and  rational  theology.  This  is  our  .'procedure  and 
underlying  principle  in  arguing  from  "the  known 
to  the  unknown,  from  the  empirical  to  the  metem- 
pirical,  from  the  natural  to  the  supernatural,  and 
from  the  universe  to  its  Cause,  and  exhibits  and 
iustifies  the  course  I  have  pursued  ^and  shall  pursue. 

Paralogising  of  the  Common  UJe  la  physical  Prin- 
ciple of  Causality. 

The  more  belauded  metaphysicians  of  Germany, 
France,  and  Great  Britain  have  ^contended  for  a 
principle  of  causality  as  a  primal  element,  necessary 
and  spontaneous,  of  our  constitution.  It  is  there- 
fore claimed  by  theists  to  speak  ;with  the^authority 
of  our  Maker, —  a  claim  which  is  true  and  indis- 
putable. But  the  question  is  inevitable,  Who  is  our 
Maker,  and jwhat  is  his  authority?  and  the  answers 
may  be  various.  If  we  assume  that  a  Being  of  in- 
finite perfection  has  createdtus,  then  its  authority  is 
supreme,  and  its  decisions  are  final  and  peremptory. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  with  those  who  hold  that  our 
Maker  is  nature-force,  which  has  finally  Devolved  it- 
self into  this  shape,  the  case  is  essentially  altered. 

Hence,  we  see  how  illogical  it  is  to  use  this  princi- 
ple, with  its  origin 'thus  explained,  in -proof  of,God 
and  creation,  because  it  is  of  authority  only  on  the 
assumption  of  the  divine  authorship  of  ]our  constitu- 
tion; while  the  argument  is  good  only  for  those  who 
admit  this  origin  of  it.  With  all  others,  it  is  without 
authority.  There  is  also  a  circular  motion  made  very 
widely,  with  this  law  of  causality  as  a  constitutional 
endowment.  It  is  first  adduced  in  proof  of  the  ex- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  223 

istence  of  God  as  the  great  First  Cause,  to  which  we 
argue  from  the  world  considered  as  an  effect.  Then, 
in  answer  to  those  who  question  whether  we  are 
justified  in  applying  it  beyond  the  limits  ot  experi- 
ence, we  prove  human  perfection  from  God's  per- 
fection. We  say  that  our  constitution  utters  the 
principle  as  absolutely  universal  and  limitless,  and 
that  thus  we  must  accept  it  or  charge  our  JMaker 
with  falsehood.  In  addition  to  this  manifest  circle, 
there  is  here  also  presented  the  absurdity  of  making 
an  appeal  to  the  godly  reverence  of  a  party  who  are 
in  the  very  act  of  questioning  the  divine  existence. 
It  must  therefore  be  quite  clear  to  the  reader  that 
an  examination  of  the  use  of  this  principle  and  its 
associated  principle  of  design  in  their  application  to 
the  world,  conceived  as  a  non-egoistic  object,  in  nu- 
merical contradistinction  from  the  conscious  subject, 
will  show  their  universal  futility  and  self-refutation  ; 
while,  on  the  basis  of  Philosophical  Realism,  as  al- 
ready expounded,  they  not  only  become  effective, 
but  show  the  power  and  wisdom  of  Deity  in  a  light 
so  strong  and  vivid  and  varied  as  entirely  to  eclipse 
all  previous  expositions  of  natural  theology,  besides 
leading  to  new  and  important  proofs  of  supernatural 
agency. 

There  is  force  which  is  known  and  a  force  which  is 
unknown.  The  known  force  is  the  whole  sensible 
universe  and  our  inner  or  supersensible  experiences. 
If  the  sensible  universe,  external  to  our  organism, 
were  non-ego,  it  would  be  all  the  force  we  could  ever 
know  or  would  logically  need  to  know  ;  and,  in  that 
case,  there  would  not  be,  in  a  large  tmeaning,  any 
unknown,  much  less  unknowable,  force.  If  the 
external  world  is  non-ego,  it  is  known  as  the  source 
of  our  organism  and  our  individual  and  conscious 
personality,  and  is,  apparently,  as  a  force,  indestruct- 
ible and  eternal,  though  mutable  as  to  its  forms,  in 
every  form  being  force  and  nothing  else,  and  always 
the  same  force.  Thus,  the  all-sufficing,  all-operating, 


224  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

and  all-explaining  force  of  all  things  is  familiarly 
known  to  us  all.  There  can  be  no  proof  of  anything 
else.  There  is  no  scientific  or  logical  need  of  any- 
thing else.  We  can  conjecture  that  the  sensible 
universe  had  a  beginning,  and  that,  therefore,  it  had 
a  cause  in  an  unknown  but  inferred  Power.  This  is 
the  conjecture  and  inference  of  many,  but  they  are 
purely  gratuitous. 

But  the  sensible  world  is  ego  ;  and  it  is,  I  think, 
quite  probable  that  the  ego,  with  all  its  universe,  had 
a  beginning,  and  therefore  had  a  beginning  in  the 
creative  action  of  an  unknown  but  inferred  Power 
of  vast,  if  not  infinite  excellence, — a  personal  Power 
it  must  be  conceived  (whether  it  is  so  or  not),  because 
a  being  of  self-conscious  intelligence  and  will  is  the 
highest  form  of  existence  known  to  us. 


XVIII. 

Etiology  and  Objective  Evolution, 


OBJECTIVE  evolution  rests  upon  the  unity  and  au- 
tonomy of  the  universe,  and  these  are  demonstrable; 
and  the  theory  is  true  all  through  and  scientifically 
unimpeachable,  if  the  universe  is  non-ego. 

Nature's  Panheisenism. 

The  unity  of  the  universe  is  growing  evermore  ap- 
parent. There  is  no  absolute  individuality  in  the 
world.  No  object  has  a  fixity  and  unity  which  is 
indissoluble  and  irresolvable  into  any  other.  Con- 
stant transformation  of  force  is  the  universal  fact. 
Every  form  is  continually  becoming  something  else, 
and  their  reciprocity  shows  their  substantial  unity 
or  unity  of  being  and  force.  All  in  one,  and  one  in 
all,  is  nature's  teaching.  Each  part  is  what  it  is  by 
virtue  of  antecedents;  and,  by  the  same  law,  it  will 
determine  others,  so  that  they  are  all  one  force  indis- 
solubly  connected,  always  different,  yet  the  same,— 
many,  yet  one.  This  is  true  of  pure  nature,  both 
inward  and  outward.  If  there  is  a  supernatural  will, 
this,  of  course,  does  not  belong  to  nature;  and  we 
are  here  speaking  of  nature,  real  and  proper,  as  indis- 
putably known  to  us. 

The  laws  of  space  and  time  point  in  the  same  way. 
To  the  eye,  all  colors  and  shades  join  on  to  each 
other  without  any  line  of  actual  separation;  nor  can 
the  mind  conceive  how  such  mark  of  separation  is 
possible,  because  the  supposed  mark  must  be  either 
joined  to  or  separated  from  the  objects  which  it  iso- 


226  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

lates.  If  it  is  joined,  it  appears  as  identified;  and,  if 
it  is  separated,  the  hiatus  must  be  filled  up  with  some 
shade  or  color,  and  thus  again  unite  it.  Everything 
in  nature  is  thus  joined  on  to  another;  and  they  are 
inseparable,  even  in  thought.  Both  mind  and  sense 
thus  unite  and  identify  all  things  immediately  know- 
able. 

If  space  is  an  objective  reality,  it  must,  as  was 
argued  by  Newton  and  Clarke,  as  well  as  Spinoza, 
be  identified  with  God,  because  it  is  self-existent, 
immutable,  and  eternal.  But,  as  all  sensible  phe- 
nomena are  spatial,  they  must  therefore  be  modes 
of  space,  and  be  identified  with  space,  and  so  with 
God.  It  will  thence  be  very  easy  to  demonstrate  that 
all  the  phenomena  of  mind  are  also  modes  of  the 
same  one  being.  (See  p.  92.) 

Here,  however,  we  are  met  by  a  new  species  of 
dualism,  which  denies  the  correlation  between 
thought  or  consciousness  and  material  phenomena. 
These  answer  to  each  other,  it  is  said,  only  by  a  law 
of  coincidence,  not  correlation.  Neither  of  them 
ever  becomes  transmuted  into  the  other.  Each  set 
of  phenomena  has  its  own  total  unity,  within  which 
only  the  law  of  correlation  holds;  but  each  set  oper- 
ates and  changes  with  perfect  regularity  in  corre- 
spondence with  the  other,  yet  without  either  having 
any  causal  action  on  the  other.  It  is  a  case  of  cause- 
less harmony,  if  not  pre-established  harmony,  pure 
and  simple. 

(1)  This  is  not  a  correct  statement  of  facts.    It  is 
very  certain  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  organic 
consciousness,  and  that  this  consciousness  is  gener- 
ated and  modified  in  and  by  the  transmutations  of 
inorganic    and    extra-organic   phenomena   into    the 
constituent  elements  of   our  organic  consciousness. 
Our  organic  life  is  a  conscious  agency  evolved  from 
the  external  world. 

(2)  The  distinction  between  thought  and  things  is 
superficial  and  fundamentally  false.    Every  phenom- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  227 

enon  is  equally  a  subjective  state,  a  mode  of  con- 
sciousness, so  that  the  alleged  duality  and  intervening 
hiatus  between  the  two  (thought  and  thing)  have  no 
existence. 

(3)  Hence,  we  find  a  fundamental  unity  in  the  com- 
mon subject  of  all  phenomena, — the  conscious  ego, — 
all  of  whose  modal  changes  occur  in  lexical  relation 
to  each  other. 

(4)  On  the  theory  of  the  duality  in  question  there 
is  no  law  or  principle  by  which  an  ultimate  unity 
is  attainable.    There  is  no  logical  consistency  in  the 
affirmation  that  the  alleged  duality  of  thought  and 
things  have  the  same  origin.    The  kosmic  or  syn- 
thetic theory  of  evolution  knows  of  no  force  apart 
from  the  kosmos,  apart  from  which  we  know  noth- 
ing, not  even  ourselves;  and  we  know  of  nothing  but 
the  kosmos  as  the  cause  of  ourselves  as  organic  or  as 
organically  related.    Therefore,  if  there  is,  as  is  al- 
leged, any  thought  or  thought  power  which  has  no 
such  origin  and  correlation,  we  not  only  do  not  know 
its  cause,  but  we  have  no  data  whatever  on  which 
to  affirm  it  or  describe  or  define  it,  except  that  it 
must    be    something    extra-mundane;    and    this    is 
neither  a  synthetic  nor  a  kosmic  philosophy.    Fur- 
ther, we  are  entirely  in  the  dark  as  to  the  method 
or  law  or  principle  of  the  operation  by  which  this 
super-kosmic    cause    produces    and    develops    these 
numerous  and  successive  thought  powers.    The  doc- 
trine is  vague  and  empty,  and  inconsistent  and  un- 
scientific, and  in  conflict  with  admitted  facts. 

Immutability  of  €3 rarity. 

Our  simpler  theory  is  rendered  still  more  probable 
from  our  ability  to  point  to  familiar  facts  which  re- 
veal to  us  a  force  and  law  in  accordance  with  which 
an  endless  series  of  kosmical  processes  maybe  pos- 
sible. One  of  the  most  conspicuous  and  potent  of 
these  facts  is  weight  or  gravity,  as  one  of  the  proper- 
ties of  all  tangible  bodies.  Of  this  property,  science 


228  PHILOSOPHICAL    HKALISM 

traced  the  law,  which  is  called  the  law  of  gravitation. 
Weight  never  wastes  or  diminishes  or  passes  over 
into  aught  else;  and  its  law  never  changes,  so  far  as 
we  know.  As  weight  has  a  power  of  producing  heat 
without  being  wasted  or  diminished  or  in  any  wise 
changed  in  the  process,  it  has  an  absolutely  exhaust- 
less  and  endless  power  of  producing  heat;  and  as 
heat  has  the  power  of  producing,  if  it  does  not  con- 
stitute, molecular  motion,  which  is  one  of  the  main 
conditions  of  all  kosmic  evolution,  we  seem  to  have 
here,  and  in  associated  facts,  all  that  is  necessary  to 
an  endless  succession  of  cycles  of  chaos  and  kosmos, 
without  the  aid  of  any  designing  or  any  extra-mun- 
dane force. 

Dissipation  and  Equilibration  of  Heat. 

The  argument  that  heat  always  tends  to  equilib- 
rium, that  in  equilibrium  it  is  powerless,  that  the 
equilibration  of  the  heat  of  the  whole  universe  must 
be  finally  attained,  and  that  then  the  wheels  of  the 
universe  must  forever  stop,  without  the  interposi- 
tion of  an  extra-mundane  power,  appears  conclusive 
merely  because  it  embodies  only  a  portion  of  the  facts 
of  the  case,  and  presents  them  in  a  confused  shape. 

In  this  discussion,  we  should  not  fail  to  note  dis- 
tinctly the  difference  between  the  dissipation  and 
equilibration  of  heat.  Equilibration  is  the  passing  of 
heat  from  hotter  to  colder  bodies,  till  they  are  all 
of  equal  temperature  in  every  part.  Dissipation  of 
energy  or  heat  is  the  passing  of  heat  from  all  sensible 
bodies  into  insensible  space.  Equilibrium,  univer- 
sally attained,  would  be  the  stopping  of  the  wheels  of 
the  universe. 

But  gravitation  renders  that  equilibrium  either 
impossible  or  exceedingly  improbable ;  and,  if  it 
were  even  attained,  gravitation,  which  always  re- 
mains unchanged,  operating  in  various  ways  (some  of 
which  we  are  able  to  conjecture),  would  be  very 
sure  always  to  generate  fresh  heat  and  fresh  ine- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  229 

qualities  of  heat.  Thus,  perpetual  kosmic  changes 
for  evolution  and  involution  are  clearly  possible,  not- 
withstanding the  acknowledged  law  of  equilibration, 
and  even  if  it  were,  at  length,  everywhere  fulfilled. 

But  the  law  of  "  dissipation  of  energy  "  forbids 
that  universal  equilibrium  should  ever  be  attained. 
Dissipation  goes  on  faster  than  equilibration,  which 
will  create  a  constant  inequality,  because  space  is 
generally  colder  than  bodies,  and  the  outside  space  is 
colder  than  that  between  bodies.  Hence,  the  ex- 
terior sides  of  the  universe  will  always  lose  their 
heat  faster  toward  empty  space  than  the  interior 
sides  can  lose  their  heat  either  toward  space  or  toward 
other  bodies  of  inferior  heat  ;  and  the  peripheries  of 
bodies  will  cool  faster  than  their  centres.  Equilib- 
rium, therefore,  can  never  be  attained  until  all  the 
heat  of  the  universe  is  drawn  off  into  space.  But 
this  appears  to  be  impossible,  because  friction  is 
a  constant  generator  of  heat,  and  the  constant  action 
of  gravitation  (and  other  forces)  necessitates  the 
constant  generation  of  friction  and  fresh  heat  ;  and, 
as  the  force  of  gravitation  never  wastes  nor  the 
weight  of  things  ever  diminishes  by  the  process,  it 
appears  to  follow  that  the  perpetual  generation  of 
fresh  heat,  not  equilibrated,  and  thence  kosmic  life, 
are  a  necessity. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  tendency  of  heat  toward 
equilibrium  is  only  a  part  of  the  law  of  heat.  Its 
converse  is  equally  true,  that,  in  comparative  equi- 
librium, it  tends  toward  inequality.  When  the 
smith  brings  his  iron,  white  hot,  out  of  the  fire,  it  is 
of  nearly  the  same  heat  in  all  parts,  only  perhaps  a 
little  hotter  at  the  surface  than  the  centre.  But  it 
will  cool  faster  at  the  surface,  and  so  will  soon  be 
much  colder  there  than  at  the  centre,  especially  if  it 
is  a  large  body.  So,  if  all  the  matter  of  the  universe 
were  brought  together  into  one  sphere,  of  equal 
temperature  throughout,  it  would  not  retain  that 
equilibrium.  The  surface  would  cool  enormously 


230  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

more  rapidly  than  the  interior.  Kinetic  energy  would 
at  once  be  generated,  which,  according  to  known 
laws  and  in  conjunction  with  known  forces,  would 
or  might  eventuate  in  all  the  known  kosmic  evo- 
lutions. 

If  the  exterior  cooled  and  hardened,  it  has  been 
asked  why  it  would  not,  as  fast  as  it  solidified,  sink 
through  the  more  fluid  body  toward  the  centre, 
instead  of  staying  there  for  a  while,  and  then,  at  a 
convenient  time,  flying  off  on  a  tangent?  To  this 
there  are  two  possible  answers,  which  are  entirely 
sufficient.  One  is  that  the  lighter  bodies  would 
naturally  be  at  the  surface,  and  would  float  on  the 
other,  so  that,  when  hardened,  they  might  not  be 
readily  able  to  penetrate  the  dense  mass  below.  An- 
other is  that,  as  films  float  on  liquids  and  as  sheets 
of  iron  (not  too  thick)  will  float  on  water  merely 
because  pressing  equally  an  extended  surface,  so 
would  the  cooling  film  float  on  the  surface  of  the 
globular  universe  ;  and,  further,  as  it  extends  all 
round,  it  forms  a  self-supporting  arch,  till  it  gets 
broken.  This  arch  becomes  gradually  isolated  from 
the  interior  matter,  which  prepares  it  for  tangential 
projection  into  separate  spheres  and  satellites  of  their 
original  source.  The  mere  possibility  and  conceiv- 
ability  of  this  are  enough  in  the  absence  of  positive 
proof  on  the  opposite  side. 

Autonomy  and  Eternity  of  Gravity. 

It  has  been  argued  that,  if  the  law  of  gravitation 
were  other  than  it  is, —  that  if  the  attractive  force 
had  varied  as  1  2  3  instead  of  varying  according 
to  the  squares  of  these  numbers,— the  kosmic  order 
would  be  impossible  ;  and,  because  the  law  of  gravi- 
tation is  the  one  which  admits,  if  it  does  not  ne- 
cessitate, this  order,  it  has  been  inferred  that  this  law 
is  imposed  upon  the  universe  solely  by  the  will  of 
God.  This  inference  is  unwarranted.  Before  this  is 
at  all  admissible,  we  must  know  that  there  is  a  God, 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  231 

who  has  a  will,  and  who  is  the  Creator  of  the  uni- 
verse. Then  we  shall  know  that  his  will  has  im- 
posed on  the  universe  its  laws.  At  present,  we  know 
only  the  universe  itself  as  a  congeries  of  forces,  and 
that,  of  these  forces,  gravity  appears  to  be  im- 
mutable and  the  ultimate  source  of  all  others,  so  far 
as  we  can  trace  their  origin  ;  while,  of  gravity  itself, 
we  only  know  that  it  exists.  We  have  no  evidence 
that  it,  and  the  simplest  quality  or  qualities  in  which 
it  operates,  ever  had  a  beginning.  We  as  yet  know 
nothing  to  show  that  gravity  is  not  an  eternal  force, 
which,  from  necessity  of  nature,  follows  in  its  opera- 
tion the  laws  which  science  has  ascertained  and 
defined.  This  is  the  view  which  is  favored  by  the 
facts,  as  far  as  they  are  yet  known  and  admitted. 
It  is  the  simplest  possible  construction  that  can  be 
put  on  these  facts,  and  for  this  reason  is  the  most 
philosophical.  This  dispenses  with  creation  and  a 
supra-mundane  Deity. 

That  the  law  of  gravitation  is  what  it  is,  and  not 
otherwise,  is  surely  no  proof  that  it  ever  was  other- 
wise or  was  not  always  what  it  is.  Of  course,  if  it 
were  such  as  to  render  the  kosmos  impossible,  there 
would  not  be  any  kosmos  ;  but  the  simple  fact  that  it 
is  compatible  with  kosmos  and  the  possible  generator 
of  the  kosmos  is  no  proof  that  it  is  not  eternal.  Such 
an  argument  would  disprove  the  eternity  of  its  in- 
ferred Creator.  If  he  were  possessed  of  certain  qual- 
ities instead  of  those  he  does  possess,  he  could  not 
create  the  world ;  and,  therefore,  the  existence  of 
those  creative  qualities  proves  that  they  had  a 
designing  Creator. 

"  These  truths  avowed,  all  nature  shines  at  once, 
Self-potent,  and  uninfluenced  by  the  gods." 

Doctrine  of  Chances. 

It  has  been  argued  from  the  law  of  chances  that 
they  are  almost  infinite  to  one  against  kosmos  result- 
ing from  chaos  by  natural  processes  alone.  That 


232  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

would  be  of  some  logical  authority,  if  we  were  agreed 
at  the  onset  concerning  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
kosmic  force  or  forces  ;  and  that  is  just  where  we 
are  not  agreed.  We  know  nothing  about  that,  ex- 
cept what  we  see.  We  see  that  kosmos  has  followed 
on  chaos  ;  and  I  think  that  was  inevitable  from  the 
nature  of  the  forces  in  action,  because  I  have  no 
evidence  to  the  contrary.  All  alleged  opposing  prob- 
abilities are  based  on  opposing  assumptions,  which, 
to  say  the  least,  are  no  better  than  mine,  and  are 
infinitely  greater. 


XIX. 

Etiology  and  Subjective  Evolution, 


Subjective  and  Objective  Autonomy  of  the 
Universe. 

THE  unity  and  autonomy  of  the  universe,  which 
have  been  exhibited  in  the  light  and  interest  of  objec- 
tive evolution,  are  at  least  equally  true  and  pertinent 
relative  to  subjective  evolution.  Indeed,  here  they 
are  more  strikingly  evident  and  important,—  are,  in 
fact,  a  logical  necessity,—  because  the  ego  is  certainly 
a  unity;  and,  if  all  the  universe  is  ego,  all  the  know- 
able  must  be  one  and  self-animated,  so  far  as  that 
is  true  of  the  ego,  —  and  that  is  supposed  to  be  true 
throughout.  This  unity  and  autonomy  are  therefore 
now  to  be  considered  as  settled  both  for  objective 
and  subjective  evolution,  more  emphatically  for  the 
latter,  which,  equally  with  the  former,  exhibits  an 
advancing  process  from  the  lowest  and  simplest  con- 
ditions of  existence  to  the  highest  known.  Objective 
evolution  shows  no  proof  or  need  of  any  supra-mun- 
dane agent,  and  thence  is  justified  in  denying  the 
right  of  any  one  to  affirm  it.  It  is  possible  there  may 
be  such  an  agent  ;  and,  therefore,  objective  evolution 
does  not  positively  say  there  is  not,  but  only  that  we 
have  no  reason  for  its  affirmation  or  that  its  affirma- 
tion is  irrational.  Thus,  it  excludes  all  miracles  and 
all  supernatural  interpositions  anywhere.  On  the 
basis  of  subjective  evolution,  all  this  is  radically 
changed.  Here  there  is  no  one  great  all-inclusive 
material  universe,  out  of  which  evolve  and  on  which 
subsist  all  living  things,  which  are  infinitesimal  in 


234  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

magnitude,  power,  and  duration,  compared  with  the 
universe,  their  parent  source.  Compared  with  it, 
they  are  like  shooting  stars  in  the  light  of  the  eternal 
and  illimitable  stellar  glories.  Subjective  evolution, 
on  the  other  hand,  exalts  each  individual  up  to  the 
height  and  grandeur  of  all  the  universe,  or  brings 
the  universe  down  to  his  level,  according  as  we  may 
choose  to  conceive  and  express  the  identification  of 
the  universe  and  the  ego.  As  it  will  doubtless  be 
conceded,  as  it  always  has  been,  that  the  ego  had  a 
beginning,  of  which  we  have  furnished  reasonable 
proof,  and  as  its  beginning  is  the  beginning  of  all 
nature,  its  cause  must  be  supernatural  ;  and  he  can 
never  more  be  confounded  with  nature  or  man. 
Still  more  obvious  is  supernatural  agency  relative 
to  the  intercourse  and  interaction  between  one  being 
and  another,  all  of  which  is  supernatural,  because 
each  man  comprises  in  himself  the  whole  natural 
universe  knowable  to  him,  so  that  there  is  no  natu- 
ral media  or  possibility  of  intercourse  or  interaction. 
A  good  probable,  not  to  say  necessary,  proof  of  a 
Supernatural  Being  having  been  once  attained,  this 
Being  becomes  the  great  mental  figure,  infinitely 
transcending  all  others,  personal  because  all  known 
beings  are  personal  (or  rather  the  only  one,  for  only 
one  we  directly  know);  and,  as  the  peculiar  and  dis- 
tinguishing excellence  and  glory  of  this  Being  is  his 
supernatural  quality,  all  'the  universe  and  all  uni- 
verses being  infinitely  beneath  him, — his  creatures 
aud  dependants, —  it  follows  that  this  supernatural 
quality  and  agency  should  be  made  conspicuous,  and 
as  conspicuous  as  possible,  consistent  with  the  relia- 
bility of  nature  and  the  moral  and  spiritual  needs  of 
man.  Henceforth,  instead  of  a  pre-exclusion  of 
supernatural  agency  along  the  route  of  the  world's 
movement  as  impossible  or  infinitely  improbable, 
the  logical  course  is  just  the  reverse.  We  must 
everywhere  expect  it,  and  the  effects  and  signs  of 
it,  because  it  is  always  and  everywhere  more  or  less 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  235 

probable  or  necessary.  If  it  is  good  to  know  nature 
(ourselves),  infinitely  better  must  it  be  to  know  God  , 
nature's  author  and  upholder  ;  and,  as  his  existence 
and  characteristic  quality  and  excellence  as  supra- 
mundane  could  be  known  only  by  supernatural  man- 
ifestation, that  quality  demands  perpetual  exercise 
and  perpetual  expression,  alike  from  the  necessity  of 
his  own  n'ature  and  the  need  of  his  creatures.  The 
old  probability  against  miracles  rightly  conceived 
and  all  supernatural  interpositions  is  now  turned  in 
their  favor. 

Relation  of  Science  to  Supernaturalism. 

The  only  legitimate  question  that  can  now  be 
raised  is,  "Where  and  when  and  what  are  the  signs 
of  this  supernatural  interposition  ?"  Here  science 
has  a  just  right  to  step  in  and  insist  upon  an  induc- 
tive investigation  that  conforms  to  its  best  and  most 
approved  principles  and  method.  Thus,  science  has 
its  place  and  right  and  duty  as  an  investigator  rela- 
tive to  the  supernatural  as  well  as  the  natural.  If  it 
can  tell  what  conforms  to  nature,  it  can  tell  what 
does  not  conform  to  nature,  and  is  therefore  super- 
natural. If  it  knows  what  is  a  natural  cause,  it 
knows  by  logical  necessity  what  is  not  a  natural 
cause.  Religion  and  science  are  therefore  neither 
opposed  to  nor  exclusive  of  each  other.  A  religion 
which  cannot  be  supported  by  science  is  irreligious. 
I  am  sorry  to  reflect  that  this  condemns  a  large  pro- 
portion of  even  modern  thinking  in  the  interests  of 
religion,  and  that  by  some  of  the  ablest  men  of  our 
age,  as,  for  instance,  Janfes  Martineau.  If  there  is  a 
"God  over  all  blessed  forever,"  there  must  be  a 
rational  unity  in  all  things;  and  true  science  can 
neither  be  opposed  nor  indifferent  nor  silent  relative 
to  him.  All  our  conclusions  must  be  based  on  facts 
scientifically  certified.  This  is  the  support  I  claim 
for  Philosophical  Realism. 


286  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

Unity  of  God. 

Philosophical  Realism  gives  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
unity  of  God,  as  disclosed  in  the  unity  of  his  works, 
far  higher  and  more  striking  illustrations  than  any 
which  it  has  had  heretofore.  In  the  past,  philoso- 
phers could  only  consider  this  unity  as  exemplified 
in  the  known  universe.  Now,  we  find  that  the  area 
and  objects  showing  this  unity  are  indefinitely  ex- 
panded and  multiplied  beyond  the  universe,  so  called, 
and  unexplored  regions  for  the  discovery  of  the  same 
are  now  open  to  us  ;  and,  in  our  exposition  of  sema- 
tology,  we  have  proved  as  a  whole  this  newly  con- 
ceived unity,  and  it  will  remain  for  future  laborers  to 
exhibit  it  in  detail. 

Unceasing  Creation. 

Jesus  said,  My  Father  worketh  hitherto.  Not  a 
"lazy  God"  was  his.  A.  God  inactive  were  inferior 
to  a  stone, —  no  God  at  all.  And  the  true  God  must 
be  active  in  his  peculiar  and  supreme  quality  and 
potency,  one  should  suppose.  Hence,  some  theists 
have  argued  that  God  is  always  creating  somewhere  ; 
while  others,  in  order  to  keep  him  in  adequate  and 
steady  employment,  have  given  him  all  to  do  directly, 
arguing  that  everything  else  is  and  must  be  power- 
less, and  therefore  unable  to  do  anything.  Philo- 
sophical Realism  shows  everything  to  be  intrinsically, 
essentially  forceful,  and  ever  active  and  effective  ; 
and,  at  the  same  time,  it  indirectly  shows  a  Deity  in 
constant  supreme  action,  since,  wherever  there  is  a 
birth,  there  is  implied,  as  its  precondition,  a  creation, 
although  the  creature  thus  symbolized  by  the  birth 
was  created  long  before,  and  in  a  far  lower  form  of 
existence. 

Importance  of  the  Supernatural. 

The  doctrine  of  the  supernaturalness  of  Deity  is 
of  prime,  of  supreme  importance.  Its  logical  implica-. 
tion  is  vital  and  pregnant  with  vast  logical  issues, 
of  paramount  practical  value  and  force.  It  involves 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  237 

an  all-comprehending  system  of  creature  privilege 
and  obligation  and  moral  prognostication.  It  is 
obvious  that,  if  there  is  a  Being  of  such  awful  reality 
as  to  be  eternal,  and  the  absolute  Creator  of  all 
worlds  and  all  their  forces  and  contents,  it  becomes 
at  once  an  inquiry  of  the  utmost  importance,  What  is 
the  actual  and  possible  relation  I  may  sustain  to  him, 
whether  I  have  under  his  supremacy  any  responsi- 
bility for  my  future,  and,  if  so,  what  ;  and  how  am  I 
to  secure  his  favor?  Thus,  a  knowledge  of  his  char- 
acter and  of  his  will  concerning  us  is  the  first  and 
great  pursuit  of  the  human  mind. 

There  are,  perhaps,  minds  so  thoroughly  secular 
that  they  would  reply  to  this  that  our  wisest  way 
is  for  every  man  to  proceed  in  a  steady  performance 
of  the  duties  of  his  station,  as  this  is  sure  to  meet  the 
approval  of  a  just  and  wise  Superior.  This  is  true,  if 
we  are  correct  in  our  judgment  as  to  what  are  the 
duties  of  our  station  or  lot  in  life.  But  that  is  the 
very  question  which  we  are  raising, —  a  question 
which  is  impregnated  with  an  awful  significance  by 
the  doctrine  of  the  existence  of  a  Creator.  There 
must  be  duties  and  responsibilities  growing  out  of 
our  relation  to  him,  and  we  ought  to  use  reasonable 
efforts  to  know  and  do  them. 

Importance  and  IVIoral  TVeetl  of  its  mani- 
festation. 

Hence,  we  see  the  importance  of  the  divine  mani- 
festation of  himself  as  supernatural.  The  super- 
natural being  his  great  distinctive  characteristic,  and 
the  ground  to  man  of  all  his  weightiest  responsi- 
bilities and  regnant  hopes,  this  characteristic  must 
be  made  conspicuous  in  God's  manifestation  of  him- 
self. As  God  exists,  he  should  be  known;  and  he 
can  be  best  seen  in  supernatural  phenomena.  Super- 
natural operation  is  hence  the  normal  method  of 
God's  manifestation  of  himself  to  his  creatures. 
Supernatural  revelation,  in  some  way  or  other,  is  a 


238  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

perpetual  necessity  of  the  divine  nature.  Of  the 
times,  forms,  and  degrees,  we  cannot  be  the  a  priori 
judges.  But  we  can  see  that,  on  the  foundation  on 
which  we  stand,  they  are  a  logical  necessity  ;  and  the 
only  question  to  he  raised  concerning  the  reality  of 
any  alleged  revelation  is  whether  its  claim  is  properly 
supported  by  evidence. 

As  nature  is  fixed  and  uniform  in  its  operation,  it 
involves  serious  and  innumerable  evils.  It  is  reck- 
less of  all  consequences.  It  never  turns  aside  to 
conserve  any  human  interest,  however  important,  or 
to  spare  a  pang  to  weakness,  innocence,  or  virtue. 

This,  without  qualification,  cannot  please  God. 
God,  being  supernatural,  cannot  be  represented  in 
his  works  by  nature  alone.  It  appears  reasonable 
that  he  should  have  supernatural  purposes  and,  in 
part  at  least,  follow  supernatural  methods.  And,  if 
his  purposes  are  wise  and  good,  he  must  thus  operate 
in  favor  of  virtue.  Hence,  all  religion  has,  in  the 
past,  believed  in  a  supernatural  Providence,  in  con- 
junction with  nature's  operations.  This  appears  to 
be  a  logical  necessity  from  theistic  notions.  When 
and  where  and  how*  and  how  far  this  Providence 
operates,  we  cannot  now  inquire,  much  less  answer. 

Nature,  within  us  as  well  as  without  us,  is  very 
often  forceful  for  evil  both  to  ourselves  and  others. 
This  evil  force  and  tendency  are  often  beyond  our 
control.  We  need  help,  and  men  are  often  power- 
less to  help  us.  We  need  supernatural  aid.  Here  is 
a  vast  and  important  field  for  the  exercise  of  the 
supernatural  grace  of  God.  A  supernatural  Deity,  if 
good  and  able,  must  meet  the  moral  demands  of  our 
inner  being.  Our  theism  therefore  renders  it  prob- 
able that  God  gives  supernatural  spiritual  help,  in 
answer  to  the  prayer  of  those  who  are  struggling 
against  temptation,  and  gives  it  variously,  according 
to  the  dictates  of  a  wise  spiritual  economy. 


XX. 

Teleology:  Its  Presuppositions, 


TELEOLOGY  is  the  most  discussed  subject  of  modern 
times,  if  not  of  all  times.  But,  because  of  its  impor- 
tance and  vitality,  it  can  never  become  trite;  and  it 
must  emerge  in  every  general  philosophical  discus- 
sion, till  its  proper  function  and  authority  are  agreed 
upon.  And  it  is  now  forced  upon  our  attention .  and 
consideration. 

Its  Relation  to  JEtioiogy 

Teleology  presupposes  etiology,  and  consequently 
its  validity  depends  on  the  validity  of  its  presup- 
posed base.  Both  teleology  and  etiology  have  been 
used  to  prove  a  personal  Deity.  Marks  of  design  in 
the  world  is  Paley's  great  argument  for  the  divine 
existence;  and  Mill  thinks  this  is  in  some  degree  a 
valid  line  of  argumentation,  and  the  only  valid  one. 
In  distinction  from  this,  etiology  can  have  no  object 
but  to  prove  a  Primal  Cause,  irrespective  of  design. 
As  soon  as  it  attempts  to  prove  anything  more,  it 
attempts  to  prove  a  Person;  and  a  person  is  a  de- 
signer. But  such  a  proof  may  be  attempted  on  the 
basis  of  other  phenomena  than  those  of  design, — from 
the  general  phenomena  of  personal  consciousness,  on 
the  supposition  that  a  conscious  effect  must  have 
a  conscious  Cause,  so  that  there  must  always  have 
been  at  least  one  personal  conscious  being. 

There  is  another  argument,  however,  which  now 
for  the  first  time  is  developed  under  the  tutelage  of 


240  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

Philosophical  Realism.  It  comes  under  the  doctrine 
(also  virtually  new)  of  sematology,  by  which,  while 
we  prove  the  existence  of  other  men,  we  also  at  the 
same  time  prove  a  supernatural,  personal,  and  pur- 
poseful agency,— not  from  phenomena  considered  as 
marks  of  design,  but  as  signs  of  a  vast  combination 
of  effects,  which  must  have  a  purposeful,  personal 
Cause  as  supernatural,  and  are  therefore  designed. 

Teleology  is  one  particular  form  or  species  of  etiol- 
ogy. It  argues  from  a  particular  class  of  phenom- 
ena as  effects  to  a  particular  kind  of  antecedent  as 
cause.  It  presupposes  a  doctrine  of  Causality,  which 
it  appropriates  and  uses  in  this  special  line,  to  the 
effect  that  a  certain  class  of  phenomena  must  have 
a  Designing  Cause. 

Design  proves  not'  Creation* 

This  argument  may  be  considered  under  two  or 
three  different  degrees  of  extension  and  comprehen- 
sion. It  may  be  considered  as  proving  that  the  De- 
signer is  the  Cause  of  only  those  forms  or  modes  of 
nature's  force  and  substance,  and  not  of  the  force 
or  substance  itself;  or  it  maybe  considered  as  prov- 
ing both.  The  proof  of  both  has  been  thus  sought; 
or,  rather,  it  appears  to  have  been  tacitly  assumed 
that  the  proof  of  the  former  carries  with  it  the  proof 
of  the  latter.  But  it  does  not.  Indeed,  some  of  the 
first  minds  of  the  world  in  all  ages  have  held  to  the 
eternity  of  matter,  and  that  God  is  only  its  former  or 
fashioner.  This  view  has  obtained  even  among  the- 
ists  and  Christians,  of  which  Milton  is  an  illustrious 
example  in  comparatively  recent  times.  Teleology, 
therefore,  can  never  prove  a  creator  of  the  world, 
even  if  it  is  allowed  that  the  world  bears  marks  of 
design,  which  prove  only  a  designer. 

Design  proves  not  Supernaturalism. 

Again,  supposing  there  is  a  designing  intelligence 
operating  in  nature,  this  can  appear  only  as  nature's 
own  force,  as  a  power  identical  with  nature,  nature's 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  241 

phenomena  being  its  modes  and  exhibitors.  In  this 
case,  not  only  have  we  no  proof  of  creation  (for  nat- 
ure cannot  be  its  own  creator),  but  we  have  only  nat- 
ure and  evolution,  naturalistic  evolution.  For  what- 
ever appears  in  the  course  of  nature  cannot  appear 
as  anything  else  than  nature;  and,  therefore,  signs 
of  design,  admitted  in  nature's  course,  only  prove 
something  concerning  nature.  And  what  is  thus 
proved  is  the  next  question.  It  does  not  take  us  a 
single  step  toward  supernaturalism.  It  only  elevates 
nature,  which  is  the  tendency  of  modern  science  and 
philosophy.  It  would  simply  endow  nature  with  a 
power  which  is  not  usually  attributed  to  it, —  con- 
scious, purposeful  agency. 

Design  not  manifest  in  Nature* 

But  the  great  subject  of  inquiry  and  debate  is 
whether  nature  shows  any  good  evidences  of  design. 
These  are  supposed  to  be  found  in  kosmic  and  psy- 
chological order  and  adaptations.  But  if  these  phe- 
nomena can  be  accounted  for  in  a  simpler  way,  in  a 
way  that  involves  no  assumptions,  or  the  least  pos- 
sible, the  telic  inference  is  scientifically  superseded. 
This  is  now  easily  done.  All  phenomena  are  forces, 
whose  degree  and  kind  are  known  by  the  uniformity 
of  their  subsequents,  whence  it  follows  that  all  kos- 
mic order  and  psychological  adaptations  are  the 
effects  of  precedent  phenomena.  We  are,  therefore, 
logically  precluded  from  going  beyond  nature  to  ac- 
count for  any  of  the  phenomena  of  nature. 

Besides,  it  is  conceded  on  all  hands  that  Nature 
cannot  be  anticipated,  and  that  we  can  assign  no  ulti- 
mate reason  for  her  combinations,  except  so  far  as 
she  herself  has  preintormed  and  enlightened  us,  so 
that  from  her  past  course  we  may  judge  of  her  future. 

Where  anticipations  are  raised  on  the  basis  of  what 
we  know  of  Nature,  she  often  disappoints  us.  Prof. 
Tyndall  has  well  said:  "Nature  is  full  of  anomalies 
which  no  foresight  could  predict  and  which  experi- 


242  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

ineut  alone  can  reveal.  From  the  deportment  of  a 
vast  number  of  bodies,  we  should  be  led  to  conclude 
that  beat  always  produces  expansion,  and  that  cold 
always  produces  contraction.  But  water  steps  in  and 
bismuth  steps  in,  to  qualify  this  conclusion."  If  it 
were  not  for  this  exception  in  the  case  of  water  to 
the  prevailing  law,  nearly  all  water  would  be  ice  ex- 
cept in  the  torrid  regions,  so  that  the  exception  is  a 
vast  and  manifest  advantage  to  living  things.  It  is 
hence  inferred  that  this  is  proof  of  design.  But  this 
would  prove  too  much.  It  would  prove  that  what- 
ever turns  out  to  vital  advantage,  and  nothing  else, 
was  designed  by  God,  which  is  more  than  doubtful. 
As  all  specific  natural  causes  of  this  or  that  are 
determined  only  by  the  uniformity  of  their  recur- 
rence as  antecedents,  we  have  no  power  to  anticipate 
them  a  priori.  We  have  no  foundation  on  which  to 
base  a  pre-judgment  of  the  nature  or  form  of  the 
cause  of  any  particular  effect.  If  the  effect  whose 
cause  we  seek  is  analogous  to  some  other  effects 
whose  cause  is  known,  we  may  form  a  conjecture 
based  on  this  analogy.  But  this  is  only  conjecture, 
not  knowledge  nor  a  final  judgment  of  science;  and 
it  is  of  value  only  as  a  guide  or  prompter  in  our  in- 
vestigations.  And,  even  in  this  aspect,  it  must  not  be 
much  relied  on,  else  it  may  lead  astray  or  prevent  the 
acquisition  of  the  truth.  Our  discovery  of  causes  is 
never  made  till  we  have  discovered  antecedents  that 
are  constant;  and,  when  this  is  attained,  it  should 
be  the  end  of  doubt  and  debate.  Where  an  antece- 
dent is  known,  but  not  certainly  known  to  be  uni- 
form, but  which  is  uniform  so  far  as  it  can  be  tested, 
the  cause  is  probable  in  proportion  to  the  extent  of 
our  knowledge  and  its  harmony  with  other  known 
and  analogous  phenomenal  connections.  But,  what- 
ever the  degree  of  probability,  whether  of  the  slen- 
derest kind  or  of  the  most  convincing  force,  we  are 
never  entitled  to  bring  any  objections  drawn  from 
the  supposed  or  required  intrinsic  nature  of  the  cause, 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  243 

because  of  this  we  know  nothing.  We  know,  a  pri- 
ori, that  all  phenomena  are  substance  and  force; 
but  what  is  the  force  of  each,  uniformity  of  connected 
experience  only  can  determine. 

Nature  a  Designless  Combining  Power. 

While  it  is  true  that  man  designs,  this  is  no  proof 
that  all  interacting  power  is  a  self-conscious  design- 
ing power  like  ourselves,  or  that  nature  may  not 
have  power  to  perform  complicated  operations  with- 
out design  or  consciousness,  and  without  being  di- 
rected and  controlled  toward  definite  ends  by  a  per- 
sonal Deity. 

Nature  will  necessarily  operate  in  accordance  with 
the  kind  and  degree  of  force  that  it  has  or  is,  what- 
ever that  may  be.  It  will  operate  always  the  same 
in  the  same  forms  and  combinations,  and  differently 
in  different  forms  and  combinations.  Thus,  for  in- 
stance, the  eye  is  the  means  of  vision  in  the  light, 
but  not  in  the  dark;  and,  if  always  kept  in  the  dark, 
the  eye,  without  any  supernatural  agency,  and  merely 
by  the  action  of  natural  force  and  law,  will  lose  all 
visual  power,  and  undergo  a  change  of  structural 
form  and  cease  to  be  an  eye  proper.  Hence  it  is  that 
we  find  eyeless  fishes  in  lightless  water  caverns  of 
the  earth. 

If  nature  is  admitted  to  be  of  any  force  at  all, — that 
is,  to  be  anything  at  all,  and  to  be  a  force  to  this 
extent, — where  shall  we  limit  its  force  and  by  what 
principle  shall  we  determine  its  limits  ?  If  it  can 
destroy  faculty  without  any  conscious  design,  why 
may  it  not  be  supposed  to  be  able  to  organize,  gen- 
erate, and  develop  any  faculty  without  any  con- 
sciousness and  design?  We  know  that  new  facul- 
ties are  generated  and  developed;  and  we  can  trace 
the  law  of  their  development,  and  thus  show  that 
they  take  place  according  to  natural  law,  and  so  give 
no  evidence  whatsoever  of  being  the  effect  of  any 
supernatural  power.  We  know  that  by  natural 


244  1MIILOSOIMIICAL    REALISM 

force,  because,  according  to  natural  law,  every  fac- 
ulty we  possess  is  developed  and  improved  by  exer- 
cise and  favorable  natural  circumstances.  We  also 
know  that  adults  have  certain  faculties  which  in- 
fants have  not,  and  which  are  developed  by  natural 
law  in  the  course  of  life.  We  can  even  trace  back 
our  organism  to  the  womb  and  its  inception  there, 
and  show  all  through  that  there  is  no  evidence  of 
aught  but  the  operation  of  natural  force,  because  all 
takes  place  according  to  natural  law.  Thus,  all  our 
faculties,  and  our  very  existence  as  organized  and 
conscious  beings,  seem  to  be  the  product  of  merely 
natural  force  without  design  or  consciousness;  and 
against  this  there  is  absolutely  nothing,  not  a  single 
supernatural  phenomenon  or  sign.  It  is  therefore  cer- 
tain and  indubitable  that  Nature  does  do  all  this. 
Whatever  be  the  source  of  her  power,  it  is  clear  that 
she  has  it,  and  uses  it  as  steadily  as  time. 

Designless. 

This  power  may  be  the  gift  of  God,  ordained  to 
these  ends;  and  so  nature  may  be  the  blind  instru- 
ment of  the  Divine  Designer.  This  is  the  proper 
theory  of  theism.  But,  before  we  can  know  its  truth, 
we  must  know  that  there  is  a  personal  Deity, — the 
Fashioner,  if  not  the  Creator,  of  the  universe;  and  of 
this,  therefore,  the  argument  from  teleology  itself  can 
furnish  no  proof.  The  argument  from  design  is  good 
to  show  the  divine  attributes,  assuming  the  divine  ex- 
istence. If  we  already  know  that  nature  is  a  creature, 
we  know  it  as  a  manifestation  of  the  character  of  the 
Creator,  who  must  act  according  to  his  nature  and 
character.  But,  if  we  do  not  otherwise  know  that 
the  universe  is  created,  no  study  of  its  natural  phe- 
nomena can  prove  anything  but  its  own  natural 
forces.  If  there  is  an  Infinite  Personality,  He  must 
have  a  design  respecting  all  things;  and  this  design 
may  be  proximately  collected  from  nature.  But 
there  may  be  no  such  Being,  and  Nature's  force 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  245 

may  be  absolutely  her  own  and  eternal;  and  this  we 
must  assume  till  it  is  disproved,  because  Nature  we 
know  immediately,  and  God  is  thus  unknown. 

Now  suppose  that  there  is  no  supra-mundane 
deity,  that  nature  is  an  eternal  force  of  indefinite 
magnitude  and  unknown  quality,  and  capable  of  un- 
folding itself  in  an  infinity  of  various  forms,  proc- 
esses, and  results,  in  an  inflexible  order  according  to 
its  nature,  we  should  then  have,  so  far  as  we  can  now 
see,  just  what  we  have  in  the  actual  kosmic  phenom- 
ena. Let  there  be  certain  unconscious  forces,  and 
they  must  operate  so  and  so.  They  may  have  affini- 
ties and  capabilities  for  certain  combinations,  and  in- 
capabilities for  certain  other  combinations;  and,  ac- 
cording to  all  these,  certain  results  will  follow,  and 
all  processes  will  move  steadily  toward  these  results. 
A  kosmos  of  a  certain  kind  thus  becomes  necessary, 
partly  in  spite  of  and  partly  by  the  aid  of  incessant 
and  countless  jarrings  and  antagonizing  complica- 
tions,— partial  chaos  everywhere  showing  itself  in 
the  midst  and  alongside  of  partial  kosmos.  It  is, 
therefore,  entirely  unnecessary  and  unreasonable  to 
affirm  that  these  phenomena  are  the  product  of  a 
personal  will  and  purpose,  or  to  affirm  anything  more 
than  what  we  know,— the  existence  of  a  vast  and 
mighty  complexus  of  natural  force,  unconscious  in 
some  of  its  forms  and  conscious  in  others,  all  forming 
one  great  and  mysterious  unity.  These  are  the  facts; 
and  they  form  their  own  explanation,  so  far  as  expla- 
nation is  possible  or  necessary. 

Variableness  of  Volition. 

The  alleged  marks  of  design  are  only  supposed  or 
inferred  to  be  such,  because  certain  phenomena  are 
regular  and  systematic  in  their  occurrence  and  recur- 
rence, and  have  observable  affinities  and  repulsions 
which  co-operate  to  achieve  or  oppose  certain  results. 
But  this  supposition  may  be  false;  and,  as  it  involves 
an  infinite  and  supernatural  inference  from  natural 


246  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

phenomena,  it  is  entirely  unwarranted.  Besides,  as 
Mill  observes,  it  is  improbable  from  the  very  regular- 
ity of  these  phenomena.  They  lack  one  of  the  chief 
characteristics  of  the  action  of  an  intelligent  will  as 
known  to  us,— variability  relative  to  given  ends  and 
circumstances.  The  human  will  is  perpetually  break- 
ing in  upon  outward  nature,  and  making  it  assume 
new  forms  and  enter  on  new  tracks  toward  results 
which  otherwise  would  not  be  attained.  It  seems 
so  strange  that  they  are  not  frequently  thus  deflected , 
if  there  is  a  good  and  wise  will  behind  them.  It  is 
by  this  very  variability  and  deflection  that  we  dis- 
tinguish a  living  thing  from  a  mere  unconscious  ob- 
ject of  nature.  It  is  true  that,  on  the  theory  of  the- 
ism, we  can  explain  all  this.  But  we  have  not 
proved  the  truth  of  theism,  but  are  considering  the 
logical  value  of  the  argument  from  design  as  an 
alleged  proof ;  and  wo  see  afresh  that  it  presup- 
poses, instead  of  proving,  theism,  while  the  inflexible 
method  in  which  the  alleged  design  is  carried  out 
is  an  argument  against  theism  and  against  the  as- 
sumption of  conscious  purpose  and  design. 

The  standing  arguments  for  design  and  a  great  De- 
signer can  seem  good  and  forceful  only  to  those 
whose  spiritual  faculty  obscures  the  logical  and  sci- 
entific. We  have  great  respect  for  the  disposition 
thus  evinced,  but  not  for  the  intelligence.  We  have 
no  doubt  of  an  infinite,  supernatural,  designing 
Agency,  whose  creative  purpose  works  from  original 
endowment  in  all  nature  ;  but  we  can  no  longer  posit 
our  faith  on  telic  phenomena.  Before  the  argument 
from  design  can  be  made  good,  we  must  prove  that 
nature  is  not  competent  to  do  what  is  attributed  to  de- 
sign. This  can  never  be  done  so  long  as  all  our  data 
are  natural  phenomena.  Archimedes  was  well  aware 
that  he  could  move  the  world  only  when  he  should 
have  a  fulcrum  for  his  lever  outside  of  the  world. 
Equally  necessary  are  supernatural  phenomena  to 
prove  an  agency  which  is  beyond  nature,  and  which 
predetermines  its  forms  and  operations  and  results. 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  247 

Adaptations,  Good  and  Evil. 

The  adaptations  of  nature  which  are  adduced  as 
proof  of  design  are  themselves  nothing  but  natural 
phenomena,  whose  laws  we  can  trace  with  more  or 
less  precision,  and  whose  powers  we  determine  by 
what  we  see  them  do.  They  do  not  themselves  fur- 
nish us  a  particle  of  evidence  that  what  they  effect 
in  their  various  combinations  is  not  done  solely  in 
virtue  of  their  intrinsic  nature  as  forces,  which,  be- 
cause they  are  such  forces,  are  ever  acting  and  thence 
evolving  by  necessary  law  new  phenomena  and  new 
combinations,  and  thence  necessarily  varying  their 
action  with  the  varied  combinations,  and  so  forever 
adapting  themselves  to  the  new  situations,  and  work- 
ing different  results  therefrom  or  the  same  results  in 
the  same  connections.  To  assert  that  there  is  here 
anything  but  nature,  either  as  cause  or  effect,  is  un- 
warranted by  the  data  on  which  the  assertion  is 
made,  since  these  very  data  are  confessedly  only 
nature. 

This  action  sometimes  results  in  good,  at  other 
times  in  evil;  sometimes  in  what  appears  to  be 
fraught  with  art  and  wisdom,  at  other  times  in  con- 
fusion and  chaos,  in  useless  or  even  injurious  prod- 
ucts of  various  forms,  misery,  ruin.  Allowing  that 
these  forces  may  not  be  blind,  they  certainly  do  not 
adapt  themselves  always  to  the  attainment  of  ends 
that  are  clearly  wise  and  good.  The  ends  which  are 
often  actually  attained  are  what  would  seem  diaboli- 
cal, if  perpetrated  by  design;  and,  hence,  divices 
have  often  introduced  the  devil  as  the  cause  of 
earthly  evil,  as  in  the  affliction  of  Job.  The  laws  of 
wealth  readily  tend  to  make  the  rich  ever  richer  and 
the  poor  poorer,  relatively.  The  tempest  is  adapted 
to  wreck  the  ship,  the  cold  to  freeze  the  poor  and 
needy,  marshes  to  create  malaria,  the  solar  rays  of 
the  tropics  to  produce  sunstroke  or  nervous  paralysis; 
while  gravitation  is  often  adapted  to  the  breaking 
of  bones  and  the  destruction  of  life.  All  of  nature's 


248  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

forces  are  in  various  connections  adapted  to  do  very 
great  evil;  and  they  do  it,  and  that  so  often  and 
extensively  that  a  high  authority  has  described  the 
world  as  at  times  full  of  lamentation  and  woe.  These 
evils  are  not  annihilated  by  asseverating  that  good 
preponderates  and  that  good  often  comes  out  of  evil; 
and,  besides,  as  J.  S.  Mill  observes,  evil  often  comes 
out  of  nature's  good  by  its  adaptations  to  pervert  and 
misdivert  the  good.  In  short,  the  end  attained, 
which  must  be  the  end  sought,  if  any,  very  frequently 
appears  absolutely  without  any  sign  of  goodness  or 
reason. 


XXI. 

TELEOLOGY-ITS  SPHEEE. 


Foundation  o£  Teleology. 

WE  have  expounded  causation  as  the  action  of  force 
or  power,  so  that  all  being  is  causative  according  to 
its  nature  and  connections.  This  is  not  the  dictum  of 
a  psychological  necessity  merely,  but  it  is  a  logical 
obligation  from  the  very  nature  and  rational  concep- 
tion of  being.  Causation  is  change  and  productive 
of  changes,  which  is  possible  only  to  force  or  power. 
Therefore,  whenever  we  see  change,  we  see  the  action 
of  power,  causation;  and  it  is  not  merely  by  some 
physical  or  mental  proclivity  inherited  as  a  mental 
instinct  or  bestowed  at  creation,  but  by  a  normal 
operation  and  fundamental  logical  law  of  rational, 
self-comprehending  intelligence  as  such  that  we  pro- 
nounce that  all  beginning  and  change  have  a  cause, 
whether  the  cause  be  internal  or  external.  We  need 
no  universal  postulate,  no  psychological  law,  no  as- 
sumption whatsoever,  to  enable  or  entitle  us  to  affirm 
this. 

On  this  ground,  we  have  affirmed  a  causation  in 
all  phenomena,  that  the  whole  universe  is  a  system 
of  causes  and  effects,  whose  parts  are  under  a  per- 
petual process  of  mutual  modification. 

And,  on  this  ground,  we  have  affirmed  that  the 
whole  universe  must  have  a  cause  if  it  have  a  begin- 
ning; and,  as  the  universe  is  ego,  which  is  inductively 
proved  to  have  had  a  beginning,  it  had  a  cause,  trans- 


250  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

phenomenal,  beyond  the  universe,  beyond  all  nature, 
supernatural,  a  Creator.  It  is  logically  possible  the 
world  never  had  a  beginning,  and  so  never  had  a 
cause.  The  fact  may  be  questioned  without  self-con- 
tradiction, but  not  so  the  principle.  Whatever  is,  is 
cause;  and  whatever  begins  to  be  has  an  extrinsic 
cause,— that  is  the  principle,  a  logical  necessity  from 
the  notion  of  being.  That  the  world  had  a  beginning 
is  the  alleged  fact,  which  may  not  be  true,  though 
I  think  it  is. 

Here  the  logic  of  Hume  is  blinking  greatly.  He 
does  not  discriminate  between  the  intuition  of  a  prin- 
ciple and  the  cognition  of  a  fact.  Because  actual 
specific  causes  of  this  .or  that  in  nature  are  sometimes 
known  only  by  repeated  sensible  experiments,  he  ar- 
gues that  the  notion  of  cause  itself  is  from  the  senses, 
so  far  as  we  have  any  such  notion,  and  not  from 
reason,  because  reason  is  perfect  at  first  utterance; 
and  he  concludes  that,  as  the  notion  of  cause  cannot 
be  derived  from  sense,  we  have  no  such  notion.  He 
says:  "From  causes  which  appear  similar,  we  expect 
similar  results.  This  is  the  sum  of  all  our  experi- 
mental conclusions.  Now,  it  seems  evident  that,  if 
this  conclusion  were  formed  by  reason,  it  would  be 
as  perfect  at  first  and  upon  one  instance  as  after 
ever  so  long  a  course  of  experience."  He  gives  as 
an  example  "eggs  varying  in  taste,  though  having  the 
same  appearance."  The  properties  of  an  egg  or  of 
any  other  substance  can  be  known  only  by  experience 
or  observation.  But  we  need  no  experience  to  tell  us 
that  all  natural  properties  must  operate  uniformly 
according  to  their  nature,  or  that  similar  causes  will 
produce  similar  results  in  similar  connections.  It  is 
impossible  to  learn  this  from  experience.  The  suppo- 
sition is  self-contradictory,  because  we  can  learn  their 
properties  or  similarity  of  cause  only  on  the  pre- 
assumption  that  they  operate  according  to  their  prop- 
erties or  nature.  This  is  a  general  principle,  and 
contains  no  assertion  of  particular  concrete  reality, 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  251 

but  only  a  law  for  all  natural  properties,— that  in 
like  connections  they  will  produce  like  effects,  be- 
cause they  will  always  operate  according  to  their 
nature. 

To  deny  that  the  principle  is  an  utterance  of  reason, 
because  many  experiments  are  necessary  to  discover 
some  exemplary  facts,  is  just  as  wise  as  to  deny  that 
the  idea  of  virtue  is  an  utterance  of  reason,  because 
we  cannot  always  tell  at  first  sight  an  honest  man 
from  a  thief.  It  is  to  say  that,  because  we  may  not 
be  able  to  tell  from  the  ruins  of  a  city  what  was 
the  cause  of  its  destruction,  we  know  not  that  its 
destruction  had  any  cause  at  all!  It  requires  years 
of  careful  scrutiny  to  discover  some  causes;  but  the 
very  investigation  and  every  experiment  assume  not 
only  the  notion  of  a  cause  of  known  phenomena,  but 
also  the  principle  that  all  natural  phenomena  have 
natural  causes  of  uniform  operation,  else  they  could 
not  be  determined  by  their  subsequents  and  their 
connections  in  space  and  time,  and  thence  all  search 
would  be  blind  and  useless. 

Teleology  Relative  to  Other  Iflcn  and  Animals. 

We  know  ourselves  by  consciousness,  and  other 
men  we  know  by  sematology;  and,  by  sematology,  we 
are  able  to  compare  their  actions  and  motives  with 
ours.  We  are  conscious  of  our  own  motives  and  of 
their  effect  on  our  action.  On  this  ground,  we  judge 
of  the  motives  of  others.  The  actions  which  we  see 
are  signs  of  the  motives  which  prompt  them.  As  we 
never  act  without  a  motive  and  end,  we  assume  the 
same  of  others.  The  signs  being  the  same  or  rela- 
tively different,  we  assume  that  the  motives  and 
objects  are  the  same  or  relatively  different.  By  the 
law  of  sematology,  we  also  extend  our  judgments  of 
this  kind  to  the  actions  of  brute  animals.  We  know 
not  only  what  certain  of  their  actions  tend  to,  but 
also  what  they  aim  at,  or  what  the  animal  designs  in 
many'cases. 


252  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

Teleology  Relative  to  Nature  and  Ood. 

The  unconscious  world  has  not  the  signs  which 
belong  to  or  spring  from  our  conscious  designing 
mind.  Nature  has  marvellous  method  ;  but  this 
method  may  be  merely  the  inevitable  effect  of  uncon- 
scious property,  and,  while  we  cannot  think  of  rela- 
tive change  without  thinking  of  relative  adaptation, 
yet  purposed  adaptation  is  an  act  of  consciousness, 
and,  if  nature  is  devoid  of  consciousness,  it  is  devoid 
of  purpose  and  plan.  But,  on  our  theory,  the  doc- 
trine of  final  causes  has  a  legitimate  place  and  force 
here,  since  we  know  that  nature  is  the  agent  or 
creature  of  a  Power  behind  it,  who  must  be  self- 
conscious,  and  have  an  object  and  method  in  creating. 

Now,  theism  need  no  longer  be  jealous  of  the  attri- 
bution of  force  to  matter  or  to  any  creature.  It  can- 
not now  be  supposed  to  affect  in  any  way  or  degree 
the  divine  dignity  and  prerogative.  The  kosmos 
being  known  to  be  his  creature,  its  attributes,  what- 
ever they  may  be,  are  a  tribute  to  him  and  a  reflection 
of  him;  and  its  limitations  are  determined  by  him. 
We  know  also  now  that  it  is  no  eternal,  immutable, 
self-sufficient  force,  capable  of  independent,  endless 
cycles  of  successive  evolution  and  involution.  Its 
duration  is  commensurate  only  with  our  sensitive 
consciousness,  and  no  doubt  had  a  beginning. 

Creation  is  the  opposite  pole  of  unconscious  evolu- 
tion. It  is  the  self-conscious  and  intentional  exercise 
of  volitional  power.  Indeed,  Philosophical  Realism 
knows  nothing  of  impersonal  and  unconscious  pow- 
ers or  things,  though  they  may  exist.  These  are  the 
fictions  of  pre-scientific  ignorance,  as  alleged  objects 
of  knowledge.  All  known  realities  are  personal,  of 
our  own  person  ;  and,  whatever  these  symbolize, 
beyond  them  is  some  living  thing  with  at  least  a 
power  for  conscious  development.  These  all  act 
from  or  develop  into  feeling ;  and,  the  higher  they 
rise  in  the  scale  of  being,  their  feelings  are  more 
developed  and,  perhaps,  differentiated,  till  in  man, 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  253 

the  highest  known,  and  really  the  only  known  being, 
we  find  distinct  self-reflection,  intention,  and  voli- 
tion, in  view  of  ends  desired  and  proposed.  Still 
more  emphatically  must  this  general  law  apply  to  a 
being  superior  to  man,  and  especially  so  much  su- 
perior as  our  Creator  must  be.  With  him,  the  self- 
analysis  must  be  forever  perfect ;  with  us,  imperfect. 
All  his  action  must  therefore  be  intentional,  voli- 
tional, and  absolutely  comprehensive  both  as  to  ends 
and  means.  Therefore,  design  must  run  through  all 
his  works,  and  there  be  made  manifest.  The  argu- 
ment from  design  is  therefore  now  validated  by  the 
demonstration  of  creation.  Before  this,  we  could 
not  surely  tell  whether,  prior  to  man's  action,  nature 
contained  any  design.  Now,  we  know  it  must  be 
there,  and  that  all  things  are  everywhere  the  effect 
and  expression  of  design  ;  and  all  that  has  ever  been 
done  in  tracing  the  marks  of  this  is  now  supplied 
with  a  philosophical  foundation. 

These  marks  of  design  are  exhibits  of  the  divine 
purposes  and  character,  of  which  they  are  the  off- 
spring and  expression.  Now,  the  heavens  declare 
his  glory,  and  the  earth  and  firmament  show  his 
hand-work,  and  all  the  things  which  are  made  indi- 
cate his  eternal  power  and  Godhead.  We  shall  need 
a  moral  and  scientific  discretion  in  our  researches  in 
God's  works  for  the  traces  of  his  intentions.  They 
are  not  always  easily  understood,  and  false  and 
superficial  conclusions  may  do  much  harm.  But, 
prosecuted  with  caution  and  reverence,  such  labor 
will  always  be  healthful  and  edifying. 

Exalted  Place  of  Design  in  Philosophical 
Realism. 

Myriads  of  times  indefinitely,  in  power  and  in 
variety  and  distinctness  of  impression,  is  the  proof 
of  design  augmented  by  our  exposition  of  Philosoph- 
ical Realism.  Design  and  adaptation  become  more 
striking  in  proportion  as  multiplicity  is  shown  to 


254  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

contribute  to  unity,  and  in  proportion  to  the  recon- 
diteness  of  the  parts,  and  the  ease  and  simplicity  and 
thoroughness  with  which  they  work  into  each  other 
and  conspire  toward  the  common  end.  Heretofore, 
phenomenal  adjustments  have  been  supposed  to  have 
a  boundless  spatial  region  beyond  the  ego.  Now, 
a  new  wonder  comes  in,  of  measureless  magnitude, 
by  the  discovery  that  all  possible  forms  and  opera- 
tions, and  all  directly  discoverable  footprints  of 
the  Creator  and  fabricator  of  all  things,  are  within 
the  compass  of  the  human  individuality.  What  a 
marvellous  exhibition  of  wisdom  and  power  is 
here  !  How  are  forces  so  many  and  so  mighty,  and 
all  their  known  multifarious  operations,  made  a  part 
of  our  own  selves?  By  what  forethought  and  de- 
tailed comprehensiveness  of  intelligence  are  they 
in  their  vastness  and  diversity  and  multitudinousness 
made  to  work  and  co-operate  and  develop  within  my 
own  sole  consciousness?  Tremendous  power,  com- 
bined with  my  weakness  and  constituting  an  in- 
tegral part  and  element  of  my  being !  Boundless 
magnitude,  combined  with  my  little  limitations  and 
the  modes  thereof  !  Infinite  multiplicity  an  element 
in  my  individual  simplicity  !  Here  are  ideas  unfold- 
ing fields  of  contemplation  sublimer  than  any  that 
man  has  ever  before  essayed  to  explore,  and  a  new 
method  of  research,  and  a  more  inspiring  prospect  to 
guide  and  stimulate  future  explorations  in  natural 
theology.  Heretofore,  adaptations  and  collocations 
and  adjustments  have  been  considered  only  in  refer- 
ence to  one  universe,  it  being  supposed  there  is  only 
one.  Now,  these  universes  are  found  to  be  as  nu- 
merous and  as  various  as  are  conscious  individuals. 
Directly,  we  know  only  one.  All  others  must  be 
phenomenally  to  us  an  eternal  blank.  We  have 
inferential  proofs  of  their  existence  and  of  their  inter- 
action with  our  universe.  Like  so  many  clocks,  they 
are  constructed  to  keep  time  with  each  other  and,  in 
certain  forms  and  degrees,  to  work  together,  and 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  255 

each,  and  the  parts  of  each,  to  be  indicators  for 
others.  Here,  the  complexity  is  again  indefinitely 
augmented,  combined  with  an  element  which  is 
awful  in  its  sublime  reconditeness,— the  transcen- 
dence of  our  action  and  influence  beyond  the  phenom- 
enal and  knowable  universe  into  universes  which 
are  beyond  all  times  and  all  spaces,  and  their  con- 
tents as  known  or  knowable  to  us.  Yet  all  these  are 
adjusted  to  each  other,  and  all  working  relative  to 
each  other,  while  yet  all  are  unknown  to  each  other ; 
and  so  occult  and  profound  is  the  great  plan  that 
the  most  general  conception  of  it  is  as  yet  above  the 
attainment  of  nearly  all  the  highest  minds  of  the 
human  race.  What  a  gulf  celestial  is  here  opened 
up  to  us  !  What  boundless  campaigns  for  intellectual 
racing,  treasure-filled  labyrinths,  with  clews  to  guide 
the  brave  and  bold  !  Henceforth,  let  the  phenomena 
of  our  life  be  investigated  not  merely  in  reference 
to  ourselves  and  our  universe,  but  also  relative  to 
other  universes,  as  indicators  of  adaptations  hereto- 
fore unconceived,  and  as  marks  of  a  wisdom  and 
design  as  great  as  they  are  at  this  day  novel. 

Limitations  of  Teleology. 

But,  while  we  know  that  there  is  a  design  in  all 
things,  we  may  not  be  able  to  ascertain  what  is  the 
particular  design  in  all  particular  events.  Our  knowl- 
edge here  is  always  only  probable,  and  often  the 
probability  is  of  the  very  faintest  degree.  In  this, 
however,  there  is  nothing  peculiar  to  one  class  of 
facts.  Concerning  the  proof  of  all  facts,  there  is  al- 
ways a  possibility  of  the  intrusion  of  error.  From 
this,  none  of  the  physical  sciences  are  exempt.  But 
telic  causes  behind  facts  are  more  difficult  usually 
to  determine  than  the  facts  themselves  from  which 
we  reason.  While  we  know  that  all  facts  have  a 
special  mission,  they  do  not  tell  us  what  it  is; 
and  by  no  skill  or  cunning  of  cross-examination 
can  we  always  extort  from  them  an  unequivocal 


256  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

utterance.  This  holds  equally  of  human  and  divine 
purposes,  and  neither  can  be  known  except  by  tele- 
ology. Even  human  language  and  gesture  are  signifi- 
cant only  when  considered  as  telic  phenomena;  and, 
as  we  often  need  much  care  to  interpret  aright  the 
purpose  of  human  language  and  action,  much  more 
must  it  be  so  concerning  the  action  of  God.  Sacred 
teleology  is  therefore  of  very  limited  scope  and  doubt- 
ful application,  beyond  a  few  broad  and  universal 
principles  of  supreme  importance,  which  we  may  be 
sure  are  acted  on  in  all  the  divine  operations. 


XXII. 

ASSIMILATION  OF  SCIENCE. 


Tests  of  a  True  Philosophy. 

A  TRUE  philosophy  will  be  consistent  with  itself  in 
every  part,  will  answer  every  self-consistent  and  sig- 
nificant question,— that  is,  every  real  question,— till  no 
more  can  be  raised ;  and  it  will  thoroughly  assimilate 
all  the  indisputable  facts  and  principles  of  science. 
This  is  the  threefold  power  and  characteristic  of 
a  real  and  genuine  philosophy.  By  these  must  be 
tested  all  claimants  for  recognition  as  the  true  system 
and  fundamental  exposition  of  all  things  real  or  pos- 
sible. Whatever  meets  this  test  is  true,  and  all  that 
fail  here  are  so  far  false;  and,  in  one  or  more  of  these 
three  points,  all  theories  have  hitherto  more  or  less 
failed.  I  now  propose  to  show  that  Philosophical 
Realism,  after  fulfilling  all  other  requisitions,  also  as- 
similates all  the  great  lines  of  phenomena  which 
constitute  physical  science. 

Assimilation  of  Kosntogeny. 

In  entering  on  this  subject,  let  us  remind  ourselves 
afresh  of  the  necessity  of  consistently  thinking  in  the 
light  of  the  egoistic  nature  of  all  the  knowable,  and 
also  in  the  light  of  the  law  of  sematology,  which 
is  the  primary  principle  of  all  inductive  inferences 
and  of  that  great  inference  from  self  to  various  altru- 
istic existences,  and  the  only  scientific  route  to  that 


258  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

goal,  though  most  people  go  by  another  and  forbidden 
track. 

It  has  always  been  conceived  that  our  kosmic  sys- 
tem began  with  chaos,  a  loose  mass  of  incandescent 
gas;  and,  in  more  recent  times,  we  have  conceived 
gravitation  as  generating  chemical  differences,  affin- 
ities, and  repulsions,  whence  ever-multiplying  forces 
advance  the  kosmic  condition  till  its  present  compar- 
ative perfection  is  attained.  To  all  this,  I  assent.  But 
it  requires  some  exposition.  Most  of  the  propounders 
and  advocates  of  this  theory  use  its  leading  terms, 
such  as  the  phrases  "planetary  systems"  and  "in- 
candescent gas,"  and  their  equivalents,  on  the  as- 
sumption that  these  describe  non-egoistic  phenomena. 
They  forget  that  all  the  planets  and  the  original 
nebulae,  and  all  the  processes  of  evolution,  whether 
in  our  planet  or  beyond  it,  are,  so  far  as  known,  only 
modes  of  self.  By  means  of  one  sensation  or  corn- 
plexus  of  sensations,  as  the  telescope,  we  generate 
others,  which  are  called  by  different  names,  to  desig- 
nate their  likeness  and  difference.  All  these,  as  vis- 
ible objects,  are  secondary  qualities,  so  that,  on  any 
theory  of  psychology  and  philosophy,  they  are  only 
sensations  or  modes  of  the  ego.  Here  all  are  agreed, 
when  contemplating  simply  the  psychological  facts. 
Hence,  the  only  real  ground  on  which  there  can  be 
any  difference  is  inferential.  The  objective  evolution- 
ist, in  stating  what  he  calls  his  theory,  ignores  all  this, 
•  and  goes  on  to  speak  of  these  phenomena  without 
any  misgiving,  as  if  they  were  non-egoistic.  The 
whole  theory  assumes  this,  in  contradiction  of  all  the 
admissions  of  its  advocates  and  the  plainest  and  most 
widely  recognized  facts  of  psychology.  Now,  we 
fully  admit  this  phenomenal  evolution.  About  this 
there  can  be  no  reasonable  dispute.  It  is  only  the 
self-contradictory  assumption  of  their  non-egoistic 
nature  which  we  dispute.  They  only  repeat  on  a 
false  assumption  what  we  have  already  agreed  to  on 
a  true  foundation.  In  other  words,  their  theory  con- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    KKALISM  250 

sists  in  saying,  on  the  basis  of  the  assumed  non-ego- 
istic nature  of  phenomena,  what  had  been  previously 
said  and  granted  on  the  opposite  assumption.  All 
the  kosmic  phenomena  are  so  related  to  each  other  as 
to  be  properly  described  as  an  evolution,  an  evolution 
of  the  later  from  the  earlier.  But  we  hold  fast  by 
what  we  have  already  proved,  and  which  has  been 
so  generally  though  reluctantly  confessed,  that  all 
these  kosmic  phenomena,  all  these  worlds  and  their 
changes,  are  nothing  but  various  sensations  or  modes 
of  self.  All  known  and  knowable  evolution,  there- 
fore, as  before  expounded,  is  an  evolution  of  self. 
On  any  theory,  this  must  be  recognized  as  a  regnant 
truth ;  and  whatever  else  is  said  must  bear  it  in  mind 
and  be  in  harmony  with  it. 

Now,  the  question  arises  whether  there  is  any 
other  evolution  than  this  of  self;  and  does  this  ego- 
istic evolution  indicate  for  us  anything  beyond  itself  ? 
To  this,  the  popular  or  objective  evolution  has  no 
answer,  because  it  has  no  place  for  aught  but  a 
sensible  world,  which  it  has  failed  steadily  and  per- 
sistently to  recognize  as  egoistic.  Our  answer,  based 
on  our  doctrine  of  sematology,  is  that  these  kosmic 
phenomena  are  symbols  of  facts  beyond  them,  and 
beyond  the  universe  of  our  present  personality  and 
knowledge.  They  show  man's  prehuman  and  sub- 
human conditions,  and  symbolize  an  order  of  succes- 
sive states  and  sets  of  experiences  before  organic 
man  was  developed.  Thus,  also,  the  known  universe, 
—ego,— by  the  law  of  sematology,  indicates  to  us  the 
existence  of  similar  universes  beyond  us  and  prior 
to  our  human  existence,  and  shows  that  these  uni- 
verses are  related  to  other  sentient  beings  as  our  uni- 
verse is  to  us. 

There  is  one  noticeable  point  of  similarity  in  the 
method  of  supporting  our  theory  and  that  of  objec- 
tive evolution.  That  theory  makes  the  known  phe- 
nomena to  be  signs  of  what  took  place  before  man 
existed.  These  phenomena,  however,— the  known 


260  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

heavens  and  earth,— being  only  sensations,  can  exist 
only  while  we  experience  them.  These  heavens  and 
earth,  therefore,  did  not  exist  before  man.  They 
begin  and  end  their  existence  with  our  experiences ; 
and,  with  these  experiences,  they  vary,  because  they 
are  nothing  else  than  these  experiences.  The  utmost, 
therefore,  that  the  objective  evolutionist  can  say  of 
them  consistently  is  just  what  we  say,  that  they  are 
signs  of  certain  forms  of  existence  anterior  to  man 
as  man  and  as  an  organism.  Thus,  when  he  sticks 
to  the  facts  of  psychology  and  the  egoistic  nature  of 
all  things  visible,  which  he  has  confessed  times  with- 
out number,  he  stands  just  where  we  stand;  and  the 
method  of  his  procedure  from  these  facts  is  the  same 
as  ours,  and  his  conclusion  is  necessarily  the  same. 
The  method  and  principle  are  the  same,  though  he 
inconsistently  starts  from  the  assumption  that  visi- 
ble phenomena  are  non-egoistic,  which  confuses  his 
conclusions.  It  is  still  a  procedure  from  the  known 
to  the  unknown  on  the  principle  of  sematology;  and, 
like  the  premise,  the  result  is  with  one  egoistic,  and 
with  the  other  it  is  non-egoistic. 

But  here  there  is  an  inevitable  ambiguity  in  some 
of  our  terms,  which  will  need  explanation.  The 
modern  psychologist,  while  confessing  that  all  phe- 
nomena are  ego,  sometimes  conjectures  (for  that  is 
the  true  descriptive  verb)  that  the  phenomena  exter- 
nal to  our  organism  are  effects  and  indices  of  a  ma- 
terial non-ego,  which  is  the  common  substratum  of 
the  universe  and  the  source  and  cause  of  all  sensi- 
ble phenomena,  according,  to  fixed  laws  ;  and,  by 
these  means,  it  affects  us  and  thus  we  affect  it,  and 
through  it  we  affect  each  other.  Hence,  the  kosmo- 
logical  phenomena  of  which  we  have  spoken,  while 
egoistic,  must  be  the  effects  of  material  transphe- 
nomenal  changes  in  that  common  non-egoistic  and 
non-sensible  matter.  This  is  the  consistent  logical 
statement  of  modern  objective  evolution  combined 
with  modern  psychology.  But  these  evolutionists 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  261 

often  overlook  this.  They  do  not  see  their  own  sys- 
tem on  all  sides  at  once,  and  are  blind  to  their  own 
inconsistencies  and  vacillations. 

Now  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  common  sup- 
position of  the  readers  and  abettors  of  evolutionary 
doctrines  is  that  the  evolution  spoken  of  belongs  to 
the  sensible  world  as  non-egoistic.  But  it  is  equally 
clear  that,  if  the  admitted  psychological  facts  are 
carried  out  logically  in  the  conception  and  develop- 
ment of  evolution,  these  phenomena  of  sense  are 
construed  as  only  egoistic  symbols  of  transphenome- 
nal  realities  and  processes.  But  this  is  precisely  the 
method  of  what  men  choose  to  call  idealism.  Evo- 
lution (objective)  infers  a  non-egoistic  matter  which 
is  unconscious,  and  forms  the  real  but  supersensible 
world,  which  is  the  common  sphere  and  source  of 
all  human  and  animal  life.  But,  besides  this,  it  has 
to  make  another  inference  which  it  has  never  thought 
of.  The  other  men  and  animals  of  which  it  speaks 
as  known  are  only  egoistic  phenomena;  and  these 
are  insignificant  or  false,  unless  they,  too,  are  sym- 
bols of  real  men  and  animals  which  are  transphe- 
nomenal  to  us.  Thus,  they  have  two  classes  of  the 
unknown  represented  by  the  known,  the  conscious 
and  the  unconscious.  So  far  as  they  are  consistent, 
they  are  idealists  precisely  in  the  same  sense  that  I 
am,  affirming  the  egoism  of  phenomena  and  that 
these  are  symbols  of  certain  transphenomenal  real- 
ities. They  differ  from  me  in  that  I  infer  only  one 
class  of  transphenomenal  realities.  If  this  smaller 
inference  will  meet  all  the  logical  demands  of  philos- 
ophy, then  it  is  to  be  preferred.  My  arguments  are 
that  my  theory  is  not  only  the  simplest,  but  that  it  is 
the  only  one  which  combines  phenomenal  complete- 
ness and  logical  consistency  and  ultimacy,  as  we 
have  before  shown.  My  own  inference,  however, 
includes  a  real  known  material  world  as  a  mode  of 
the  inferred  conscious  reality.  Every  such  being  of 
every  form  and  grade  is  the  subject  of  a  congeries  of 


262  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

coexistent  and  successive  experiences,  which  consti- 
tute its  organic  and  extra-organic  world,  as  symbol- 
ized by  the  phenomenal  organisms  known  to  me. 

A  similar  train  of  reflection  and  comparison  applies 
equally  to  the  mutability  of  the  hitherto  supposed 
immutable  ultimate  elements  of  matter.  It  has  long 
been  agreed  generally  that  there  are  such  elements; 
though  the  number  and  nature  of  these  have  never 
been  settled,  and  their  number  has  varied  from  the 
standard  four  of  the  old  pre-Socratic  times  to  the 
sixty  or  seventy  or  more  of  our  own  day,  in  which  it 
is  supposed  we  have  quite  well  determined  their 
nature  and  number  and  several  functions. 

But,  just  when  this  doctrine  seemed  to  be  quite  well 
established  in  the  light  of  modern  science,  it  began 
to  be  undermined.  Modern  evolution  and  the  nebular 
theory  raised  the  question  whether  these  elements 
have  not  been  thus  naturally  evolved.  Recently,  the 
spectroscope  has  begun  to  disclose  facts  which 
strongly  favor  an  answer  in  the  affirmative,  since 
we  thus  find  that  the  stellar  worlds  contain  some  of 
the  same  elements  contained  in  our  planet,  and  that 
the  number  of  these  elements  diminish  as  the  stars 
grow  more  nebulous.  The  notion,  therefore,  of  the 
fixity  of  these  elements,  is  giving  way  in  favor  of  the 
notion  that  their  number  varies  with  the  kosmic  con- 
dition of  the  world  where  they  are. 

A  true  psychology  is  prepared  for  this,  and  ours 
would  have  deduced  it  as  a  logical  necessity  from  in- 
disputable sensible  or  psychological  phenomena.  If 
all  sensible  objects  are  only  subjective  phenomena,  it 
follows  that  they  have  no  fixity  except  the  laws  of 
the  mind,  or  the  subject.  As  they  are  only  sensations, 
they  may  indefinitely  vary  with  lexical  regularity ; 
and  the  only  fixity  is  the  great  mysterious  force,  the 
cause  of  incalculable  effects,  the  ego. 

Objective  evolution  was  so  far  prepared  for  this  as 
to  anticipate  this  issue  of  elementary  unfixity  in  con- 
sequence of  its  reference  of  all  changes  and  all  rela- 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  263 

tive  fixedness  to  the  Absolute  and  immutable  Un- 
known, the  one  great  force  which  constitutes  the 
cause  of  all  phenomena,  the  immanent  and  constitu- 
tive essence  of  all  things.  This  we  are  obliged  to 
reject,  because,  contrary  to  the  admission  of  all  its 
advocates  and  of  all  psychologists,  it  assumes  that 
the  objects  of  the  senses  are  non-ego.  All  the  known 
is  ego.  This  we  consider  sufficiently  proved  and  con- 
ceded; and,  therefore,  if  the  unknown  is  identified 
with  the  known,  then  the  unknown  is  also  ego.  This 
conclusion  is  free  from  all  logical  embarrassment;  and 
it  coincides  with  Philosophical  Realism,  which  affirms 
that  the  ego  comprises  in  its  own  unity  all  the  force 
and  phenomena  of  the  universe. 

Assimilation  of  Philogeiiy. 

Philogeny  assumes  to  compare  the  earlier  and  lower 
organic  forms  with  the  later  and  the  superior,  and  to 
show  the  relation  of  the  latter  to  the  former.  There 
are  two  things  here,  the  alleged  facts  and  the  infer- 
ence from  them.  The  alleged  facts,  through  the  in- 
fluence of  a  superficial  psychology,  are  misconceived. 
We  really  never  compare  the  past  with  the  present, 
as  is  supposed  and  affirmed.  This  is  only  a  mode  of 
speech  based  on  inferences  or  acquired  perceptions. 
It  is  very  proper  and  convenient,  but  philosophy 
must  understand  itself;  though  the  common  mind 
will  forget  the  fact  of  the  inference,  and  proceed  to 
speak  on  the  assumption  that  we  know  what  we  have 
only  inferred  and  believed,  because  the  inference  is  so 
universal  and  so  spontaneous.  Whatever  we  know 
is  of  the  present  only.  We  can,  therefore,  directly 
compare  the  past  and  present  only  relative  to  our 
own  experiences  or  conscious  modes;  and,  further,  as 
a  condition  of  the  comparison,  the  earlier  modes  must 
remain  after  the  later  have  come  into  existence.  In 
other  words,  it  is  always  a  comparison  of  present 
modes  of  consciousness  only,  which  are  all  we  ever 
directly  know.  Hence,  whatever  comparison  we 


264  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

make  beyond  this  can  be  done  only  by  inference; 
and  all  such  inference  proceeds  on  the  principle  of 
sematology.  We  erect  certain  phenomena  into  signs 
of  earlier  and  non-egoistic  existences,  and  others  into 
signs  of  later  non-egoistic  existences.  This  is  the 
necessary  process  for  all :  no  other  is  possible. 

It  is  only  by  the  same  process  of  sematic  inference, 
also,  that  we  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  some  of 
these  inferred  organic  existences  are  relatively  infe- 
rior and  some  superior  to  others.  We  find  by  direct 
experience  and  intuition  the  relative  inferiority  and 
superiority  of  the  phenomenal  organisms,  which  are 
our  egoistic  modes;  but  it  is  only  an  inference,  and 
a  sematic  inference,  that  these  are  proofs  of  non-ego- 
istic organisms  of  corresponding  relative  dignities. 
As  we  know  neither  the  past  nor  the  non-ego,  we 
cannot  know  their  relative  organic  excellences.  The 
fossils,  of  which  some  perhaps  would  inconsiderately 
remind  us,  are  themselves  only  sensations,— sensa- 
tions chiefly  of  color  and  touch.  We  fully  allow 
with  all  science  and  all  philosophies  that  these,  on 
the  principle  of  sematology,  indicate  the  existence  in 
past  times  of  other  beings,  comparing  and  contrasting 
with  the  present  existences  as  the  fossil  with  the 
living  organisms.  On  this  basis  purely,  we  believe 
with  objective  evolutionists  that  there  has  been  a 
very  striking  and  wondrous  progress  from  the  lowest 
forms  of  existence  up  to  man's  present  condition. 

But  the  later  and  superior  forms  known  to  me  are 
not  evolved  out  of  the  earlier  and  inferior  forms, 
which  is  the  distinctive  doctrine  of  sensist  evolution. 
All  known  or  knowable  organisms,  living  or  fossil, 
from  my  own  sensitive  body  down  to  protoplasm  and 
the  primeval  gas,  are  myself.  I  cannot  be  evolved 
out  of  them.  They,  so  far  as  they  are  known,  are  all 
evolved  out  of  me.  T  cannot  have  been  evolved  out 
of  any  things  knowable,  because  they  are  me.  These 
phenomena,  living  and  fossil,  by  the  relation  which 
they  sustain  to  each  other,  are  made  the  ground  of 


FfllLOSOPfllCAL   REALISM  265 

a  sematic  induction  that  there  has  been  a  correspond- 
ing order  of  existences,  the  successive  states  of  each 
of  which  have  evolved  out  of  the  preceding  state,  ac- 
cording to  a  temporal  law  of  progress  thus  indicated. 
Let  it  be  further  observed  that  these  successive 
orders  of  beings  have  not  existed  in  our  world.  This 
is  implied  in  what  has  been  already  often  repeated,— 
that  all  we  know  is  self,  that  each  is  its  own  world. 
The  extreme  indisposition  and  apparent  inability  to 
get  and  hold  this  conception  make  detailed  and 
repeated  exposition  in  this  region  very  necessary. 
In  our  world,  because  it  is  self,  no  one  can  exist  but 
ourselves;  and  we  do  not  so  much  exist  in  it  as  that 
it  exists  in  us,  and  is  evolved  from  us.  All  being  is 
spirit  and  life,  though  of  different  forms;  and  every 
being  constitutes  its  own  world  and  its  own  knowa- 
ble  universe.  Hence,  the  beginning  of  any  new  ex- 
istence, however  humble,  is  the  beginning  of  a  new 
universe;  and,  as  all  known  or  knowable  natural 
causation  obtains  only  within  the  knowable  natural 
universe,  there  can  be  no  such  causation  between  one 
being  and  another,  so  that  no  one  can,  by  natural 
causation,  be  evolved  from  or  engendered  by  another. 
Each  engenders  its  own  successive  states,  which  is 
the  only  possible  evolution.  This  survey  shows  that 
our  philosophy  not  only  assimilates  philogeny,  but 
gives  to  it  a  more  comprehensive  and  ulterior  expla- 
nation beyond  all  other  philosophies. 

Assimilation  of  Ontogeny. 

A  similar  train  of  exposition  applies  with  equal 
force  to  ontogeny,  or  the  science  of  the  forms  of  exist- 
ing life.  The  successive  forms  of  the  human  embryo, 
corresponding  to  the  embryonic  forms  of  the  lower 
orders  of  animals,  presents  a  striking  coincidence 
with  philogeny.  It  is  not  without  reason,  on  the 
basis  of  sensism,  that  this  fact  is  considered  as  being 
a  strong  support  to  the  doctrine  of  organic  evolution 
from  lower  to  higher  existences.  Those  whose  intel- 


266  PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM 

lects  are  chiefly  of  the  sense  will  think  they  have 
ocular  proof  of  evolution  to  a  large  extent,  and  that 
the  laws  of  legitimate  Induction  will  carry  them 
much  farther.  They  will  be  ready  to  say  that  they 
know  that  we  are  evolved  from  our  parents,  they 
from  theirs,  and  so  on,  to  the  beginning  of  our  race, 
if  not  of  all  life.  So  subtle,  so  manifold  and  compre- 
hensive are  the  ultimate  facts  of  existence  that  it  is 
very  difficult  to  grasp  them  clearly  and  firmly,  hold 
to  them  consistently  and  undeviatingly.  This  ex- 
plains the  pertinacity  of  those  superficial  and  dis- 
located forms  and  habits  of  thought,  or  rather  of 
impression,  miscalled  philosophies,  dualism,  and  sens- 
ism.  Suppose  it  is  agreed  that  I  can  trace  the  evo- 
lution of  my  body  up  from  the  lowest  forms  of  life: 
what  have  I  done  ?  How  far  have  I  gone  ?  I  have 
not  travelled  beyond  myself;  and  I  have  done  nothing 
but  trace  out  certain  phenomenal  connections  within 
the  sphere  of  my  own  individuality,  since  all  these 
alleged  ancestors,  even  back  to  the  fire-mist,  are 
simply  modes  of  myself,  certain  modes  of  self  evolv- 
ing other  modes  all  through  the  whole,  all  these 
processes  working  and  unfolding  the  inherent  virtue 
or  force  which  constitutes  my  being.  The  same 
holds  true  of  what  we  see  of  the  evolution  of  other 
animals  or  men.  We  never  see  other  men  or  ani- 
mals at  all.  No  other  man  or  animal  sees  me.  What 
the  other  calls  me  is  himself,  and  all  the  evolution 
which  he  supposes  he  sees  is  but  a  successive  modi- 
fication of  his  own  conscious  self.  But  inarticu- 
lately, by  the  law  of  sematology,  he  makes  these 
subjective  states  the  signs  and  proofs  of  certain  cor- 
responding non-egoistic  realities;  and  this  inference 
has  become  so  established  and  rapid  as  to  take  on 
the  airs  of  a  sense-perception  and  to  pass  itself  off 
for  one,  and,  from  oft-repeated  assertions,  it  has  come 
to  believe  it  is  such. 

In  fine,  it  is  true  that  the  known  universe  is  a 
unity  of  force;  and,  within  its  whole  extent,  a  law  of 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  267 

evolution  obtains.  But  this  universe  is  ego,  and  only 
one  of  a  countless  host,  each  of  which  exemplifies 
the  same  powers  and  processes.  Thus,  we  grant 
to  evolution  all  it  can  intelligibly  claim;  and  then 
we  swallow  it  up  totally  and  as  a  whole,  just  as  the 
ocean  swallows  up  the  raindrop  and  unites  it  with 
its  own  vast  volume,  or  as  the  whale  swallows  and 
assimilates  the  small  mollusks  and  medusre  on  which 
it  subsists. 

Useless  Organs. 

Many  animals  have  useless  and  abortive  members, 
whence  it  is  inferred  that  no  designing  mind  of  infi- 
nite perfection  determined  their  structure.  Our  the- 
ory solves  the  difficulty  in  consonance  with  theism. 
It  admits  evolution  throughout  the  whole  known 
universe,  which  is  as  far  as  any  of  its  advocates  ever 
presumed  to  carry  it.  This  universe  evolves  its  own 
forms  according  to  laws  of  its  own  nature,  which 
laws  our  evolutionists  are  expounding  with  com- 
mendable zeal  and  skill.  But  this  universe  had, 
probably,  a  beginning,  and  so  was  created,  and  is 
only  one  of  very  many,  since  it  is  only  ego;  and  here 
is  our  difference  from  them.  By  the  law  of  sematol- 
ogy,  we  find  that  other  universes  have  an  appointed 
and  lexical  connection  with  ours,  so  that  one  being 
comes  into  existence  in  each  of  its  successive  modes 
or  conditions  according  to  a  law  of  action  and  change 
relative  to  other  beings  and  its  own  previous  states. 
One  animal  in  greatly  altered  circumstances  uses  cer- 
tain members  much  less  than  did  its  ancestors,  and 
consequently  that  member  is  in  a  measure  atrophied; 
and  it  is  still  more  so  in  its  subsequent  evolved  state 
called  its  offspring,  and  it  then  appears  purposeless. 
Let  us  recall  the  truth  that  an  animal's  known  off- 
spring is  the  animal  itself,  and  we  shall  then  be  able 
by  sematology  to  take  these  known  changes  as  indi- 
cators of  corresponding  transcendental  existences. 
And  there  is  a  purpose  in  such  correspondence,  as  it 
then  gives  the  true  "history  of  creation"  and  evolu- 


268  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

tion,  and  of  all  the  action  and  experiences  of  the 
creatures.  Such  a  purpose  is  wise  and  high  and 
moral. 

It  is  here  that  all  the  practical  energies,  as  well  as 
the  purely  intellectual,  prudence  and  moral  purpose, 
find  scope.  We  may  hence  foresee  in  a  measure  what 
will  be  the  consequences  to  ourselves  of  certain  lines 
of  action;  and,  by  the  aid  of  sematology,  we  may  see 
what  will  hence  follow  to  others  in  joy  or  suffering, 
and  we  may  therefore  govern  ourselves  accordingly. 
The  effect  which  follows  to  others  from  my  action  is 
a  supernatural  effect,  meaning  by  others  the  un- 
known symbolized  by  the  known,  which  is  ego. 
There  is  thus  disclosed  to  us  both  a  natural  and  a 
supernatural  causation  and  responsibility.  All  nat- 
ural causation  terminates  on  ourselves  the  known 
universe.  All  that  transcends  ourselves  is  supernat- 
ural, above  nature.  By  the  law  of  sematology,  we 
are  to  suppose  that  it  corresponds  with  the  natural. 
This  preserves  a  possible  unity  of  intelligence  and 
action  and  rational  anticipation  and  self-control. 
Without  this,  all  life  and  its  unfoldings  would  be 
chaotic,  Intelligence  would  be  confounded  and 
morals  impossible.  Thus,  our  theory  again  compre- 
hends all  that  is  true  in  sensist  evolution,  as  the 
greater  comprehends  the  less. 

Prefossil  Phenomena. 

As  animate  forms  are  symbols  of  living  realities,  it 
will  be  asked,  How  are  we  to  explain  the  geological 
record  of  a  world  before  life,  unless  this  was  the 
symbol  of  unconscious  matter?  The  present  world, 
so  called,  of  animated  forms  of  which  I  am  conscious 
is  a  symbol  of  the  conscious  modes  of  other  beings, 
which  are  transphenomenal  to  me.  The  fossil  geo- 
logical world  shows  what  other  living  beings  have 
been  in  the  past.  What,  then,  do  the  primeval  flora 
and  rocks  and  chaos  denote  before  there  were  any 
living  beings  ?  To  this  question,  as  it  stands,  there 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  269 

is  no  possible  answer.  But  it  is  a  sophism,  and  begs 
the  question.  It  unconsciously  couches  a  denial  of 
our  whole  philosophy.  It  assumes  phenomena  before 
consciousness,  and  that  there  was  a  form  of  existence 
before  there  was  any  living  being.  This  assumption 
is  found  in  the  last  two  words  of  the  question,  "be- 
fore life."  Of  course,  I  cannot  admit  this.  There 
could  be  no  plants  or  rocks  or  clouds  or  gas  before 
there  was  any  living  being;  for  these  are  the  phe- 
nomena, or  conscious  modes,  of  such,  and  they  must 
always  imply  such,  and  no  form  of  question  can  be 
permitted  which  contradicts  it,  whether  directly  or 
by  implication. 

But  the  geological  record  places  these  in  chronolog- 
ical order  before  fossil  animal  organisms,  it  will  be 
replied.  True.  That  could  not  be  otherwise.  It 
was  a  fact.  The  world  is  spirit;  and  so  the  spirit  of 
man,  before  it  evolves  the  organic  mode  of  man,  is 
commensurate,  both  in  time  and  space,  with  the 
universe,  because  they  are  one;  and,  in  process  of 
time,  this  spirit  world  evolves  vegetable  and  animal 
organisms. 

We  must  also  call  the  reader's  attention  to  an 
imperfect  analysis  of  the  external  world  in  relation 
to  living  beings  and  the  confusion  of  the  organisms 
with  the  living  beings.  The  world  contains  organ- 
isms, but  not  living  beings.  The  organisms  known  by 
any  one  are  but  modes  of  the  one  Living  Being  which 
knows  them.  Even  the  whole  material  universe 
knowable  by  any  one  is  but  one  series  of  the  modes 
of  that  one  living  being  which  is  not  contained  in 
the  universe,  but  contains  it,  being  larger  indefinitely. 
Hence,  while  the  organic  fossils  of  the  early  world 
are  found  as  contained  in  the  world,  the  living  things 
they  represent  are  not  so  contained.  They  have  all  a 
universe  of  their  own.  And  every  living  thing  itself 
transcends  its  own  organism  and  all  known  organ- 
isms and  all  the  world  in  which  they  are  contained. 
Strictly  speaking,  the  living  thing  itself  is  not  or- 


270  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

ganic,  much  less  a  mere  organism.  It  has  an  organ- 
ism, a  relatively  fixed  and  mutable  complex  mode 
so  named.  But,  then,  these  are  no  more  egoistic 
than  all  the  rest  of  the  universe;  and  it  is  only  a 
partial  and  misleading  designation  to  speak  of  the 
ego  as  organic,  unless  we  understand  the  term  par- 
titively.  It  is  organic;  but  it  is  also  celestial,  starry, 
nebulous,  inorganic.  Hence,  it  is  clear  that,  as  dif- 
ferent living  beings  vastly  differ  in  their  modes,  they 
may  differ  so  far  as  that  some  shall  be  without  the 
complex  mode  which  is  called  the  animal  or  bodily 
organism;  and  thus,  again,  the  prefossil  world,  hav- 
ing no  organisms,  may  represent  the  existence  of 
living  beings,  including  ourselves,  without  this  special 
organism,  but  who  have  had  perceptions  of  forms 
analogous  to  those  of  our  prefossil  world.  To  object 
to  this  because  we  have  no  direct  knowledge  of  such 
creatures  is  to  object  because  we  do  not  transcend 
the  laws  and  limitations  of  our  own  faculties.  The 
question  is  whether  known  facts  do  not  justify  the 
inference  that  there  are  probably  creatures  which 
have  no  such  modes  as  an  animal  organism,  and 
which,  therefore,  are  not  thus  represented  in  our 
material  economy,  and  in  that  sense  are  not  known 
to  us  by  the  senses;  for  we  must  not  forget  that, 
except  ourselves,  we  do  not  know  any  creature 
directly.  Some  are  inferred  from  the  phenomena  of 
animal  organisms.  This  is  admitted.  And  our  latest 
point  is  that  some  are  inferrible  from  material  forms 
without  animal  organisms,  and  that  these  forms 
point  to  creatures  without  animal  organisms,  but 
perhaps  with  a  faculty  of  material  perception. 

When  the  great  work  of  Copernicus  was  first 
published,  his  all-illuminating  doctrine  was  opposed, 
because  it  implied  that  Venus  must  have,  like  the 
moon,  changing  phases,  which  had  not  been  yet 
observed.  Copernicus,  however,  and  his  disciples 
were  confident  that  they  would  be  observed,  if,  by 
any  means,  the  visual  effects  of  distance  could  be 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  271 

overcome;  and,  sure  enough,  when  Galileo  directed 
his  eyes  to  the  umpire  planet  with  the  newly  in- 
vented telescope,  the  required  phases  became  mani- 
fest. Similar  temporary  difficulties  may  be  expected 
to  beset  and  oppose  the  inauguration  of  the  reign  of 
Philosophical  Realism  as  "the  true  intellectual  sys- 
tem of  the  universe."  But,  having  abundantly  dem- 
onstrated the  main  points,  we  may  be  sure  of  the 
subordinate  details.  The  Venuses  of  this  intellectual 
world  will  surely  confirm  the  doctrine  as  fast  as 
intellectual  vision  becomes  sufficiently  clear  and 
strong  to  discern  their  real  aspects  and  significance. 


XXIII. 

SUMMAET  AND  CONCLUSION. 


The  World  as  Sensation. 

OUR  primary  principle  in  this  volume,  the  one 
which  is  expounded  and  argued  in  the  earlier  chap- 
ters, is  the  common  ground  of  modern  psychology. 
It  is  the  affirmation  that  all  sensible  phenomena  are 
only  subjective  states,  only  a  congeries  and  series 
of  mortal  thoughts,  so  that  neither  our  body  nor  the 
world  beyond  has  any  existence,  except  as  sensible 
experience. 

All  the  rest  of  the  volume  is  simply  a  logical  exten- 
sion of  this  principle.  This  logical  consistency  is 
the  only  peculiarity  of  the  volume.  Science  should 
be  consistent ;  and  philosophy  should  go  where  the 
logic  of  facts  enjoins,  and  nowhere  else. 

This  shuts  every  man  up  within  the  environment 
of  his  own  individual  consciousness.  No  one  ever 
directly  sees  aught  but  himself;  for  what  each  person 
calls  other  people  is  not  other  people,  but  a  mortal 
mask  of  his  own  creation.  Each  of  us  creates  a 
world  of  his  own,  and  imagines  it  to  be  a  real  non- 
egoistic  world,  common  to  himself  and  all  other 
human  beings. 

How  this  comes  to  pass  is  a  question  demanding 
answer.  Is  there  something  outside  of  us  which  is 
the  cause  of  this,  or  is  the  cause  to  be  found  in  our- 
selves ? 

One  of  the  chief  reasons  for  inferring  an  external 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  273 

cause  is  that  we  cannot  think  an  internal  cause  is 
adequate  to  such  effects. 

But  that  is  an  argument  which  judges  of  causes 
a  priori,  which  is  contrary  to  the  principles  and  prac- 
tices of  modern  science.  This  science  declares  that 
we  know  the  nature  and  extent  of  causes  only  by 
their  effects,  which  are  determined  by  uniformity  of 
connection. 

Its  Cause  or  Origin. 

In  this  case,  however,  we  cannot  determine  the 
question  by  the  law  of  lexical  sequence,  because,  our 
quest  being  the  cause  of  all  sensible  phenomena,  it 
must  transcend  these  phenomena,  so  that  we  have 
to  infer  a  supersensible  cause.  What  shall  that  be  ? 
It  must  be  the  least  inference  possible.  We  must 
not  bring  in  the  infinite  for  a  finite  effect,  nor  a  plu- 
rality of  causes  where  a  unity  may  possibly  do,  nor 
a  thing  unknown  where  what  is  known  may  be  suffi- 
cient. 

For  all  these  reasons,  we  infer  that  the  sensible 
world  has  a  subjective  origin.  God  cannot  be  its 
immediate  cause.  Nor  can  we  infer  that  it  has  a 
cause  outside  of  mind,  because  we  do  not  know  any- 
thing outside  of  mind,  since  all  we  know  is  mind. 
To  infer  as  its  cause  what  we  do  not  know  and  can- 
not imagine  or  conceive  is  merely  a  blank  verbal 
process.  Therefore,  sensible  phenomenon,  or  mortal 
thought,  is  a  mode  and  effect  of  its  subject,  mortal 
mind. 

The  oft-repeated  assertion  that  we  know  mind  no 
better  than  matter,  and  that  we  know  it  only  in  the 
terms  of  matter,  is  erroneous.  We  know  matter 
only  as  sensations  or  modes  of  consciousness;  and 
consciousness  we  know  only  as  consciousness,  not 
as  matter  in  distinction  from  consciousness, 

Now,  these  subjective  states,  these  sensations,  are 
states  of  something,— states  of  their  own  subject; 
and  to  that  something  or  subject  we  give  the  name 
of  ego  or  I  myself.  This  subject  is  known  as  subject 


274  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

in  knowing  its  states  of  consciousness.  Here  phe- 
nomenon and  noumenon  are  one.  The  phenomena 
are  modes  or  states  of  the  noumenon  or  knowing 
subject. 

When,  therefore,  we  infer  that  the  source  of  the 
subjective  states  is  the  subject  itself,  we  make  an 
intelligent  inference,  and  the  least  possible  inference. 

Further,  this  inference  is  a  logical  necessity,  be- 
cause every  noumenon  is  the  admitted  source  of  its 
phenomena ;  and  it  is  only  in  this  light  that  the 
two  terms  have  any  correlated  significance. 

Further,  it  is  generally  agreed  that  there  are  un- 
conscious subjective  states  which  are  the  source  of 
conscious  states.  This  was  especially  elaborated  by 
Carpenter  in  his  doctrine  of  unconscious  cerebration, 
and  by  Hamilton  in  his  exposition  of  unconscious 
mental  action.  Hence,  it  is  quite  possible  that  this 
sub-conscious  region  is  the  source  of  sensible  phe- 
nomena. 

How  transcend  the  Ego. 

How,  then,  can  we  ever  get  beyond  ourselves? 
How  prove  that  there  is  aught  but  ourselves  ?  These 
questions  we  have  answered  in  our  exposition  of 
Sematology,  which  cannot  be  well  epitomized.  We 
must  be  content  to  say  that  the  sensible  phenomenon 
is  a  symbol  of  a  reality  beyond  the  sphere  of  sense; 
that,  as  I  have  an  organism  and  sensible  world  in  my 
consciousness,  an  organism  like  mine  symbolizes  a 
transphenomenal  being  like  myself,  with  a  sensible 
as  well,  as  supersensible  consciousness  like  mine; 
and  that  different  sensible  organisms  are  symbols 
of  different  transphenomenal  realities. 

Theistic  Conclusion. 

This  indicates  a  wonderful  and  harmonious  system 
of  correspondences  of  vast  extent  and  of  infinite  va. 
riety,— a  pre-established  harmony  to  which  nothing 
could  be  competent,  except  a  Being  of  infinite  wis- 
dom, power,  and  goodness,  or  love.  His  character, 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  275 

too,  must  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  highest 
thought  and  attainment  and  aspiration  of  man,  be- 
cause all  else  is  subservient  to  this.  (When  we  have 
spoken  of  God  as  a  Person,  we  have  meant  by  it  only 
this  trinity  of  qualities, — wisdom,  love,  and  power, — 
not  any  form  of  any  kind.) 

The  method  by  which  this  conclusion  is  justified 
is  peculiar,  and  in  contrast  with  the  prevailing  meth- 
ods. These  identify  God  with  the  world  force.  God 
is  the  immanent  agency  of  the  known  sensible  world. 
This  is  strenuously  elaborated  by  Lotze,  and  it  has 
been  recently  repeated  by  Fiske  in  his  Idea  of  God. 
This  immanent  Deity  is,  as  Fiske  insinuates,  Spen- 
cer's great  kosmic  Unknown.  Scientific  Theism,  as 
expounded  by  Dr.  Abbot,  teaches  the  same  doctrine, 
more  consistently,  on  a  basis  of  natural  realism- 
This  doctrine  has  the  merit  of  bringing  God  and  man 
close  together, — so  close,  indeed,  as  to  make  them 
one.  They  differ  only  as  whole  and  part,  or  as  nou- 
menon  and  phenomenon,  or  as  common  subject  and 
various  modality.  That  which  is  alleged  to  be  im- 
manent in  the  world  cannot  be  discriminated  from 
the  world  or  from  its  organisms  and  their  organic 
life.  The  author  of  Scientific  Theism  has  the  merit 
of  seeing  and  of  recognizing  this  fact  and  its  logical 
implication,  that  to  this  extent  theism  is  pantheism. 
He  also  sees  that  it  implies  natural  realism  as  its 
basis.  If  sensible  phenomena— that  is,  all  the  know- 
able  universe— are  only  a  series  of  my  subjective 
states,  then  God's  immanence  in  them  is  only  imma~ 
nence  in  me,  his  force  my  force,  and  indiscriminable 
from  myself  as  conscious  subject. 

The  method  of  Philosophical  Realism,  on  the  other 
hand,  scoops  an  infinite  gulf  between  God  and  man. 
It  appropriates  all  the  knowable  universe  to  man. 
This  theory  has  been  so  conceived  and  expounded 
that,  with  sufficient  truth  for  the  purposes  of  satire, 
it  has  been  described  as  teaching  that  "man  trundles 
his  universe  before  him  like  a  huge  goitre."  That 


276  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

identifies  man  with  his  organism.  But  the  organism, 
like  the  mountains,  stars,  and  milky  way,  is  but  a 
mode  of  the  man  who  is  the  common  subject  of  all. 
He  therefore  does  not  trundle  his  universe  about. 
He  only  changes  the  local  relation  of  the  several 
objects  of  the  universe,  including  the  organism.  The 
universe,  as  a  whole,  never  moves,  and  cannot  move. 
Nor  does  its  subject  and  cause,  the  true  and  real 
man,  ever  move.  He  is  always  everywhere  through- 
out the  whole  universe,  since  all  this  is  but  a  portion 
of  his  various  modes  or  subjective  states.  He  is  thus 
omnipresent  and  omniscient,  relative  to  this  universe. 
He  himself  constitutes  all  the  knowable,  and  how 
much  beyond  he  constitutes  of  what  is  unknowable 
we  know  not. 

But  we  have  perfect  proof  that  he  is  finite.  We 
have  abundant  evidence  that  there  is  a  vast  and  in- 
definite multitude  of  finite  beings.  The  evidence  is 
equally  good  that  these  finites  have  not  an  infinite 
duration,  though  they  may  and  doubtless  will  con- 
tinue forever.  They  had  a  beginning.  They  had, 
therefore,  an  antecedent  as  a  Cause.  This  Cause  must 
be  conceived  as  a  conscious  and  designing  Cause,  be- 
cause we  know  no  other  kind  of  cause,  since  we  know 
only  ourselves.  Much  of  what  we  know  we  do  not 
purpose,  we  allow;  but  we  do  not  know  that  these 
are  not  effects  of  a  designing  Cause.  That  is  the  ques- 
tion now  before  us.  No  other  than  a  designing  Cause 
is  conceivable  by  us,  because  utterly  alien  from  all 
the  analogies  of  human  experience.  Therefore,  no 
other  is  inferable  from  experience.  Our  Creator 
cannot  be  merged  in  the  blind  forces,  so  called,  of 
the  material  universe,  since  these,  so  far  as  known, 
are  modes  of  my  conscious  mind.  He  must  be  a  self- 
conscious  mind,  and  his  action  must  be  intelligent 
and  not  without  purpose  and  plan. 

The  moral  nature  or  quality  of  this  cause  also  must 
be  determined  from  the  effect.  This  effect  must  not 
be  contemplated  only  or  chiefly  in  its  lower  poten- 


PHILOSOPHICAL   REALISM  277 

cies,  but  in  its  higher  potencies  and  their  relation  to 
the  lower.  Now,  the  higher  potencies  are  seen  in  the 
noblest  action  of  the  intellectual  and  moral  faculties; 
and  to  these  all  things  else,  it  is  clear,  are  normally 
ancillary  and  subservient.  The  discoveries  of  modern 
science,  resulting  in  the"  doctrine  of  evolution,  unfold 
this  with  irresistible  force,  which  has  been  well  set 
forth  by  Mr.  John  Fiske.  All  that  is  best  in  the  pres- 
ent is  the  evolved  product  or  result  of  all  past  kos- 
mic  agency.  All  the  best  and  highest  now  attained, 
therefore,  stamps  with  its  own  dignity  and  intent  all 
the  prior  and  lower  agencies.  The  earlier  and  lower 
mean  the  later  and  higher.  They  are  all  of  one  piece. 
They  show  a  continuity  of  force  and  a  comprehend- 
ing plan.  Their  Maker  designed  them  all,  and  de- 
signed the  lower  as  having  their  end  in  the  higher, 
which  constitute  the  final  cause  of  the  creation. 

Further,  we  have  shown  that  the  lower  do  them- 
selves actually  become  higher.  The  evolution  is  a 
development  of  the  same  individuals  from  lower  to 
higher.  Each  of  us  was  once  in  the  lowest  rank  of 
existence,  and  from  the  first  it  was  designed  that  we 
should  undergo  these  successive  elevations.  This 
process  is  to  be  everlasting.  By  this  which  tempo- 
rally was  and  is  and  is  to  come,  we  must  judge  of 
Him  who  eternally  was  and  is  and  is  to  come. 

Prospective  Working  of  this  Theory. 

The  incompetent  will  deem  these  high  metaphysi- 
cal speculations  entirely  barren.  They  think  they 
are  justified  in  this  by  the  past  history  of  philosophy, 
because  philosophy  has  not  yet  yielded  all  we  have 
sought.  But  this  is  hasty  and  superficial.  A  perfect 
philosophy  in  detail  can  never  be  attained  by  a  finite 
mind,  because  it  cannot  comprehend  the  infinite.  It 
can  be  settled  in  the  acceptance  of  certain  clear  and 
indisputable  principles.  Under  these,  it  can  know 
some  things;  and  it  can  be  correct  and  consistent  so 
far  as  it  goes,  and  this  it  is  bound  to  be.  But  who 


278  PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM 

shall  say  how  much  we  ought  to  know  as  a  reward  for 
past  effort,  and  that  the  result  does  not  justify  that 
effort  or  any  further  labor  ?  Surely,  the  very  labor 
is  a  benefaction  of  the  highest  order;  and  its  bene- 
ficial influence  is  telling  upon  all  the  forms  of  life. 

This  is  especially  true  of  the  higher  philosophy  of 
idealism.  It  has  always  steadily  pointed  to  God.  Its 
logical  right  to  do  this,  and  its  proofs  that  it  points 
in  the  right  direction,  have  been  questioned ;  but  its 
spirit  and  intent  and  large  influence  on  the  subject 
are  beyond  dispute.  This  is  seen  in  the  old-time 
argument,  still  cherished  by  some,  for  an  infinitely 
perfect  being  from  the  idea  of  such  a  being.  By  the 
use  of  this  argument  and  its  result,  Descartes  recon- 
ciled psychological  idealism  with  natural  realism. 
God  was  thence  a  necessity  in  psychology  and  philoso- 
phy. The  doctrine  of  pre-established  harmony  pro- 
posed by  Leibnitz  presupposes  Deity.  According  to 
Malebranche,  God  is  the  subject  of  our  ideas,  the  real 
abiding,  sensible  forms  of  the  world,  so  that  we  see 
them  in  him.  With  Berkeley,  he  was  their  direct 
Cause,  if  not  their  subject.  While  Kant  based  the- 
ism on  our  moral  nature,  Hegel  finds  Deity  in  the  in- 
tellectual processes  as  an  absolutely  ideal  and,  there- 
fore, real  result.  Philosophical  Realism  is  equally 
theistic.  It  shows  that  the  proof  of  other  men  con- 
tains the  proof  of  God,  and  his  constant  supernat- 
ural agency. 

The  new  philosophy,  so  far  as  it  is  true,  will  levy 
tribute  from  all  things.  It  has  the  right  of  universal 
supremacy  and  domination.  It  is  heir  to  all  the  past, 
and  enters  at  once  on  its  inheritance  and  takes  full 
possession.  In  the  births  of  thought,  the  law  of  pri- 
mogeniture is  reversed.  The  last  becomes  first,  as 
the  heir  of  all  things.  This  was  ordained  from  the 
beginning.  It  is  evolution's  highest  law.  Nor  does 
this  imply  that  all  theories  must  be  transient.  The 
true  thought,  known  as  such,  can  never  be  super- 
seded. It  will  be  always  the  latest.  First  thought 


PHILOSOPHICAL    REALISM  279 

on  deep  matters  is  always  crude.  Science  and  philos- 
ophy are  ripeness  and  maturity.  The  intelligence 
which  attains  and  discerns  the  correct  theory  will 
always  see  that  it  is  not  to  be,  that  it  cannot  be,  phil- 
osophically superseded.  Being  true  and  ulterior,  it 
is  all-comprehending  and  immutable. 

Evolution  is  always  a  movement  of  matter  toward 
spirit  and  spirituality.  As  a  process  from  the  lower 
to  the  higher,  it  moves  from  the  inorganic  to  the 
organic,  from  the  apparently  unconscious  to  the  con- 
scious, then  to  the  self-conscious  or  the  reflective 
consciousness,  in  ever-growing  degrees  and  varieties 
of  supersensible  power.  It  then  rises  into  the  sphere 
of  abstract  thought  and  morals  and  philosophical  re- 
ligion. 

All  inventions  observe  the  same  law.  As  they  are 
the  product  of  thought,  they  aim  at  the  expression 
and  communication  of  thought.  They  bring  distant 
minds  near.  They  shorten  distances,  and  make  inter- 
course more  immediate,  speedy,  and  perfect.  Wit- 
ness articulate  speech,  writing,  printing,  steam,  the 
telescope  and  microscope,  the  telegraph  and  tele- 
phone. Spirit,  as  a  supersensible  conscious  power, 
is  thus  growingly  made  manifest  as  the  source  and 
end  of  all  things  called  material.  Idealism,  as  the 
true  Philosophical  Realism,  is  the  goal  toward  which 
all  thought  and  action  clearly  tend.  It  will,  there- 
fore, in  innumerable  ways  show  its  practical  power 
in  proportion  as  the  world's  intelligence  advances; 
and  this  doctrine  will  be  seen  to  be  the  very  soul  of 
all  theories  and  intellectual  forms,  so  far  as  they  have 
in  them  any  validity  and  truth. 

Hence,  it  has  recently  been  made  the  ground  of  a 
theory  of  metaphysical  healing  called  "Christian 
Science,"  which  is  rapidly  multiplying  disciples  of 
the  very  best  kind  of  people. 


EXCEPT  the  last  few  pages  and  some  late  interpolations, 
all  of  Philosophical  Realism  was  written  years  ago,  and 
much  of  it  printed  at  long  intervals  in  the  Index  of  Bos- 
ton, which  is  one  of  the  most  philosophical  weekly  journals 
in  the  world.  The  work,  therefore,  is  not  written  from  the 
stand-point  of  Christian  Science  ;  and  the  form  and  phrase- 
ology in  which  the  thought  is  put  are  such  as  may  possibly 
mislead  an  unwary  Christian  Scientist.  It  is  for  him  no 
guide.  Rightly  conceived,  it  is,  so  far  as  it  goes,  in  per- 
fect harmony  with  Christian  Science,  unless  it  be  possibly 
in  one  or  two  minor  details,  which  the  author  would  now 
modify.  Its  great  object  is  to  show  that  there  is  no  matter, 
except  mortal  thought,  and  that  Mind  is  all ;  and  thence 
to  unfold  some  logical  conclusions,  not  to  teach  Christian 
Science,  on  which  it  is  no  authority  whatever. 

Moreover,  it  may  be  well  in  closing  to  say  distinctly 
what  is  assumed  in  the  course  of  the  preceding  discussion, 
that  the  attribution  of  reality  to  sensible  things  applies  to 
them  only  as  sensible ;  that  is,  as  mortal  modes  of  mortal 
thought.  They  are  but  the  fashion  of  a  world  which  pass- 
eth  away,  and  perish  with  the  very  power  of  sensibility 
which  begot  them,  till  the  immutable  and  eternal  remains 
alone,—  the  Perfect  without  a  counterfeit. 


INDEX. 


ABBOT,  F.  E.,  29,  275.  Archimedes,  246. 

Abiogenesis,  154.  Ariel,  136. 

Absolute  and  Relative,  72-86.  Aristotle,  25,  189,  193. 

Absolute  Ego,  117-1-0.  Art,  developing  power,  185. 

Absolute:  the,  149;  creative,  213.  Assimilation:    of  science  (q.    v.), 

Academics,  25.  257-271 ;    of    kosmogeny,   257- 

Action  and  Reaction,  29.  263;  of  philogeny,  263-265;   of 

Action  :  involuntary,  35,  36  ;  sub-  ontogeny,  26&-267. 

jective  (q.  v.),  112.  Astronomy,    28      (See    Coperni- 

Acts,   as  subjective  and  objective  cus,  Jupiter,    Planetary   Sys- 

(q.  v.),  20.  tem,  Stars,  Sun,  Venus.) 

Adam,  166,  167.  Atomism,  59,  60,  99,  107-110. 

Adaptations,  247,  248,  253,  254.  Atoms,  76. 

Adjustment,  254  Autonomy  :  of  the  universe,  225  ; 

Affections,  organic  (q.  v.),  211.  of  gravity  (q.  v.),  230,  231 ;  ob- 

Agency,  supernatural,  246.  jective  and  subjective,  233-237. 

Agent,  supramundane,  233.  (See  Evolution.} 

Agnostic  Deism  (q.  v.),  175,  176.  Avalanche,  279. 
Agnosticism :    allusions,    12,    73, 

107,  108,  113  ;  rebuked,  196.  BABEL,  of  voices,  168. 

Altruism,  137,  138.  Barbarians,  145.     (See  Savages.) 

Ammonia,  77.  Barren  Metaphysics  (q.  v.),  277. 

Analogy,  170.  Being  :   as  force  (q.  v.),  84,  159, 

Analogy,  Butler's,  177.  221;   supernatural  and  natural, 

Analytical  Processes,  45.  179;  sum,  182;   awful  and  real, 

Anarchy,  221.  236.  237. 

Ancient  Mariner,  quoted,  124.  Berkeley,  Bishop,  3,  24,  73,  121, 

Angels:  rebellion  of,  199:  seeing  122,  141,  142,  168,  169,  205,  278. 

unformed  organisms,  205.  Bible,  and  metempsychosis  (q.  v.), 

Animals:  personality,  89;  two  in  167 

one,  128 ;  bodies,  146  :  dignity,  Birth,  67,  124,  156,  159,  199-204. 

160,   161 ;  world    of,    171,  206 ;  Bismuth,  242. 

teleology,  251 ;  origin   and  off-  Black  Hole,  33-46. 

spring,  265,  266.  Bluebeard,  15. 

Annihilation:    allusions,   55,  105,  Bodies:  as  dual  and  real,  10:  ani- 

185,  186;  of  self,  216.  mal,  146:  existence  of,  200 

Anomalies,  241,  242.  Body  and  External  World,  143. 

Antecedents,  84.  Body  and  Soul,  166. 

Anti-supernaturalist  Claims,  175,  Body  and  Will,  129,  130. 

176.  Bone,  as  an  index,  139. 

Appetites,  35.  Book,  illustration,  39. 

Appointment,   supernatural,    173,  Bossuet,  25. 

174.  Boulder,  22. 

Arch,  230  Brain  and  Consciousness,  129, 170. 


284 


Brain  and  Thought,  58,  59. 
Bridge,  from  the  ego,  169. 
Brothers,  168,  169. 
Brown's  Philosophy,  24. 
Buddhism,  155. 
Burns's  Tam  O'Shanter,  11. 
Butler's  Analogy,  177. 

CABBAGES,  130. 

Cassar,  5. 

Carpenter,  W.  B.,  274. 

Causality,  222-224,  239. 

Causation  :  unity  of,  61 ;  changes, 
148-150,  249. 

Cause :  of  existence,  200-203 ;  in 
science  and  philosophy,  218, 
219:  of  world  (q.  v.),  273,  274; 
confusion  as  to,  219,  220;  de- 
sign (q.  v.),  276. 

Causes,  designing  and  undesign- 
ing,  218. 

Cells,  67,  68.     (See  Germ.} 

Cerebration,  274. 

Chances,  doctrine  of,  231,  232. 

Change,  in  causation,  148-150. 

Chaos,  56,  153,  158,  221,  258, 
268. 

Character,  135,  274,  275. 

Chemical  Elements,  262. 

Chemical  Forces,  56. 

Chicago,  212. 

Chicken,  63,  64.     (See  Egg.) 

Children  :  ideas  of,  145 ;  hinh  of, 
(q.  v.),  199-203.  (See  Father- 
hood,  Parentage.} 

Christian  Fathers,  189,  190. 

Christianity:  importance  of,  177; 
theistic,  193. 

Christian  Science,  279. 

Christians,  view  of  matter  (q.  v.), 
240. 

Christian  Theism  (q.  v.),  214. 

Church  Opinions,  189. 

Chyle,  61. 

Circle,  223. 

Circumstantial  Evidence,  141. 

Civilization,  164,  165.  (See  Bar- 
barians.} 

Clairaudience,  212. 

Clairvoyance,  103,  104,  212. 

Clarke,  Samuel,  226 

Clifford,  Professor,  170. 

Clocks,  254. 

Cobwebs,  metaphysical,  179. 

Cold,  80,  81,  247. 

Coleridge,  S.  T.,  75,  124. 

Collateral  Testimony,  168-170. 

Collocations,  254. 


Colors,  56,  169,  192,  225,  226. 

Combining  Power,  243,  244. 

Comicality,  no  argument,  97,  98. 

Common  Sense.  71. 

Community,  126. 

Complexus,  189,  190,  258. 

Comte's  Philosophy,  44,45.  (See 
Positivism.} 

Conation,  221. 

Conception  :  of  creation,  179-198  ; 
of  deity  (q.  v.),  179-183. 

Conditioned,  Philosophy  of  the, 
113. 

Conditions  of  Intercourse  (q.  v.), 
170. 

Consciousness,  181,  182, 194. 

Consequents,  84. 

Constant  Ego  (q.  v.),  99,  100. 

Contemporary  Review,  80-83. 

Copernicus,  28,  29,  97,  270.  (See 
Astronomy.) 

Cosmic  States,  49-53,  56.  (See 
Kosmos.) 

Cousin's  Philosophy,  25,  26. 

Creation :  not  evolution,  20,  213, 
214;  forms,  55;  power  (q.  v.). 
176,185;  method  proven,  179- 
198;  conception,  183-193;  low- 
est condition,  204-208;  proof, 
208,  209;  pre-organic  state,  209- 
213;  instantaneous,  216 ;  force- 
lessness,  220-222 ;  unceasing, 
236 ;  no  proof,  240,  241 ;  history, 
267.  (See  Cause,  Evolution.) 

Creative  Power,  187. 

Creator,  as  force  (q.  v  ),  218,  220. 
(See  Deity,  God,  Infinite,  One.) 

Cross-examination,  255. 

DEATH,  103,  104,  156.  (See 
Birth.) 

Deism,  agnostic,  175,  176.  (See 
Theism.) 

Deity:  of  theism,  36;  proofs, 
59 ;  materialist  admissions,  175  ; 
mundane,  177;  conception  of, 
179-183;  denned,  180  :  kosmic, 
191;  proofs  of,  193-195,  218; 
immanent,  275.  (See  Creation , 
God,  Infinite,  Spirit.} 

Demands  for  God,  193-195. 

Descartes,  3,  20,  121,  132,  278. 

Designer,  240. 

Designing  Causes,  218,  276. 

Designless  Power,  243-245. 

Design :  marks,  239 ;  no  proof  of 
creation  (q.  v.),  240;  not  super- 
natural, 240,  241 ;  not  in  nature 


285 


(q.  v.),  241-243;  lacking,  243- 
245;  exalted  place,  253-255. 

Destiny  of  Man  (q.  v.),  135,  136. 

Deterioration,  208.     (See  Moral.} 

Dichotomy,  110-113. 

Dignity  of  Animals  (q.v.), 160, 161. 

Dissipation  of  Heat  (q.v.), 228-230. 

Divine  Immanence  (q.v  ), 214-216. 

Doctrine  of  Chances,  231,  232. 

Dragons,  15,  16. 

Dualism:  repellent,  1;  vacilla- 
tion, 16,  17;  of  Leibnitz,  99; 
personal,  111;  old,  123,  124; 
defence,  128 ;  soul  and  body, 
165,  166;  expounded,  168,  169. 

Dualists  :  demands,  19,  20 ;  de- 
mentation,  80-83. 

Duality,  10,  11 ;  of  things  and 
thought  (q.  v.),  227. 

Duns  Scotus,  26. 

Dynamic  Relations,  216,  217. 

EAR,  102.     (See  Sound,  Speech.} 

Earth  :  separate,  206;  life  of  the, 
211 ;  cooling,  230 ;  beginning, 
260.  (See  Matter,  Universe, 
World.} 

Education,  developing  power  of, 
185. 

Egg,  63,  64,  150,  250. 

Ego  :  in  general,  3,  6,  7,  13,  14, 
18,  30,  31,  33;  based  on  ex- 
perience, 8,  9 ;  opposed,  12 ; 
shut  in,  42-46;  inclusive,  43; 
stationary,  48;  modes,  49,  50; 
onenes*,  55,  56  ;  relation  to  or- 
ganism, 57,  58 :  independence, 
58;  essay,  87-98;  proot,  87- 
89;  two  conceptions,  91-93; 
permanence  and  simplicity,  99- 
116;  constant  and  perduring, 
99,  100  ;  immortality,  100-105 ; 
pure  unity,  114-116;  absolute, 
117-120;  local,  120-132;  de- 
fined, 120 ;  transphenomenal, 
120-122 ;  supersensible,  123- 
125;  organic,  125-131;  panhei- 
senist,  131,  132;  transcended, 
133-147,  274;  Fichte's  efforts, 
133-138;  sematic  relation,  143, 
144 ;  no  waif,  159  :  modes,  197  ; 
immanence  in,  216;  of  sensible 
world,  223,  224;  of  universe 
(q.  v.),  249;  of  all  phenomena 
(q.  v.),  260;  name,  273. 

Eleatic  Sceptics,  25. 

Electric  Energy,  53. 

Elias-,  167. 


Embryo,  265.     (See  Birth.'} 

Emerson,  R.  W.,  118. 

Emmanence,  189.  (See  Imma- 
nence.} 

Empiricism,  222. 

English  Literature,  Taine  on,  94, 
95. 

Environment :  references,  29,  57, 
58,  83 ;  of  ego,  96,  97,  272. 

Eocene,  138,  139. 

Epicurus,  99,  107. 

Epiperipheral  Feelings,  39. 

Equilibration  of  Heat  (q.  v.),  228- 
230. 

Eternity :  of  gravity,  230,  231 ;  of 
matter,  240. 

Ether,  on  the  eye,  17. 

Ethics  of  Spinoza,  182,  183,  196. 

Etiology:  in  general,  218-224; 
relative  to  matter  and  force 
(q.  v  ),  219,  220  ;  and  objective 
evolution,  225-232 ;  and  sub- 
jective evolution,  233-238;  and 
teleology  (q.  v  ),  237-240. 

Evil :  from  nature,  238  ;  adapta- 
tions for,  247,  248.  (See6Y«.) 

Evolution  and  Progress,  31. 

Evolutionists,  modern,  59,  60. 

Evolution  :  objective,  1-7,  42,  72; 
agnostic,  12,  13 ;  unlike  crea- 
tion (q.  v.),  20,  21,  213,  214; 
individual,  47-49;  complete, 
56  ;  and  spiritualism,  110  ;  sub- 
jective, 158,  162-167;  vast,  204; 
stages,  207 ;  new  form,  218, 
219;  and  philosophy  (q.  v.), 
259-262  ;  into  spirit  (q.  v.),  279. 

Excreta,  mental,  175. 

Existence:  of  God  (q.  v.),  176. 
177;  cause  of  (q.  v.),  199-203, 
(See  Creation.} 

Experiences,  70,  71. 

Experiential  Knowledge,  132, 140. 

Extension,  45,  46.     (See  Space.} 

External  Cause  (q.  v.),  272,  273. 

Extra-natural  Agent  (q.  v.),  188, 
189. 

Extra-organic  Ego  (q.  v.),  125- 
131. 

Extra-organicism  (q.  v.),  93-95. 

Extra-organic  World,  206. 

Eye,  63,  64,  77,  102,  143,  170, 
225,  243.  (See  Light,  Sight, 
Stars.} 

FACULTIES,  new,  243,  244. 
Fashioner,  244.     (See  Creator.} 
Fatherhood,  168, 169.  (See  Birth}. 


286 


INDEX 


Fauna,  49. 
Fenelon,  25. 

Fichte,  43,  73,  119,  120,  132-137. 
Fiery  Mist,  52. 

Final  Causes  (q.  v.),  80,  81,  252. 
Finite  Spirits  (q.  v.),  125. 
Fire,  146. 

First  Cause,  222,  223.     (See  God.} 
First  Principles,  Spencer's,  113. 
Fishes,  243.     (See  Animals.) 
Fiske,  John,  53,  59,  166,  275,  277. 
Fixity,  262. 
Flavor,  77. 
Flora,  49,  268. 
Foetus,  67. 
Fog,  75. 
Footprints,  254. 

Force :  egoistic,   14,  87,  101 ;   one 
(q.  v.),. 34, 157;  assimilated,  35; 
of  sentient  world,  53,  54 ;  known, 
55;  cognized,  68-70;  from  mat- 
ter, 192;    man  a,  214;   and  eti- 
ology (q.  v.),  219,  220;   verified, 
221 ;   all  things  are,  221 ;  every- 
where, 236;    and  nature  (q.  v.), 
243,244;  and  theism,  252. 
Forcelessness,  220-222. 
Forces :  the  humble,  32 ;  increased 
or  diminished,  185, 186, 189, 190 ; 
and  quality,  219;    unconscious, 
245 ;  blind,  247. 
Fossil  Metaphysics,  78-83. 
Fossil  World,  147. 
Fossils,  264,  268. 
Foundation  of  Teleology  (q.  v.), 

249-251. 

Fowler,  J.  H.,  62-71. 
Foxes,  illustration,  83. 
French  Metaphysics,  224. 
Friends,  168,  169. 
Frogs,  103. 
Fulcrum,  149. 
Future,  48,  49. 

Future  Existence,  165.  (See  Im- 
mortality.} 

GALILEO,  271. 

Gas,  49,  50.     (See  Incandescent.} 

Genii,  Oriental,  90. 

Genus,  23. 

Geology,  268. 

German  Metaphysics,  27.2. 

German  Philosophers,  5,  133. 

Germ-cells  (q.  v.),  127. 

Gnostics,  189. 

Qbd  :  forms  in,  24,  25;  nature, 
118;  existence,  176,  177;  left 
out,  187;  work,  188;  transcend- 


ing the  universe,  189  ;  degraded, 
190;  mode  of  action,  213,  214; 
exclusive  force,  216;  sole  power, 
221 ;  spiritual,  226  ;  gravity,  230, 
231;  known,  235,  237;  unity, 
236;  and  teleology  (q.  v.),  252, 
253;  action,  256;  immediate 
cause  (q.  v.),  273;  character, 
274,  275:  near  man,  275;  how 
judged^  277.  (See  Deity,  Infi- 
nite,  Supreme.} 

Godhead,  253. 

Goethe,  74. 

Goitre,  275. 

Good,  accidental,  159,  160. 

Good  Adaptations,  247,  248. 

Good  Samaritan,  127 

Grand  Totality,  119. 

Gravitation,  56,  227-231. 

Great  Britain,  its  metaphysical 
schools,  222. 

Great  Designer  (q.  v.),  246. 

Great  First  Cause  (q.  v.),  222,  223 
(See  God.} 

Great  Unknown,  36,  54,  55.  (See 
Deity.} 

Greek  Fathers,  189. 

Greek,  quotation  from,  212. 

Greeks  :  intellect,  24 ;  idea  of  per- 
son, 89  ;  early  philosophy,  193. 

Gulf:  between  all  minds,  173; 
bridged,  198;  celestial,  255;  be- 
tween God  and  man,  275. 

HAMILTON,  SIR  WILLIAM  :  ref- 
erences, 20,  24,  73,  74  ;  natural, 
41;  quoted,  113;  duality  (q.  v.), 
168,  169;  on  cerebration,  274. 

Harmony :  pre-established,  174, 
198,278;  causeless,  226. 

Health,  77. 

Heat,  65,  77, 228-230.     (See  Cold.} 

Hegel's  Philosophy,  73,  105,  183, 
278. 

Height,  185. 

Heir  of  All,  278. 

Heisenism,  193,  194.  (See  Pan- 
heisenism.} 

Helmholtz's  Philosophy,  64-66. 

Heterogeneity,  119. 

Hetiokgy,  False,  11-13. 

History  of  Creation  (q.  v.),  267. 

History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  26. 

Hobbes,  Thomas,  59. 

Holy  Spirit  (q.  v.),  167. 

Horses,  138. 

Human  Form,  152,  153. 

Human  Intercourse,  168-174. 


INDEX 


287 


Hume,  David :  references,  7,  25, 
73,  92  ;  metaphysical  confusion, 
219.  220,  250  ' 

Huxley's  Science,  20,  59,  170. 

ICE,  230. 

Idealism  :    opposing  evolution,  1  ; 

imperfect,  24;  double  form,  24; 

objections  false,  30 ;  Reid's,  168- 

174 ;  absolute,  279. 
Idealists,  demands  upon,  19. 
Idea  of  God,  Fiske's,  275. 
Ideas,  doctrine  of,  120,  121. 
Identity,  83,  84. 
Idol,  external  world,  34. 
Igdrasil  Tree,  157. 
Illusion,  8. 

I,  meaning  of  the  pronoun,  126. 
Immanence  :  divine,  189, 191,  214, 

215,  279;    egoistic,   216.      (See 

E  m  manence . ) 
Immortality :  of  the  ego,  100-105 ; 

personal,  157.     (See  Future.} 
Immutability,  of  gravity,  237,  238. 
Impassable  Gulf  (q.  v.),  173. 
Importance  :  of  Christianity,  177  ; 

of  supernaturalism,  236-238. 
Improbability,  intrinsic,  15. 
Incandescent  Gas  (q.  v.),  258. 
Inches.  113. 
Inconsistency,  13,  14. 
Index,  The,  20,  62. 
Individualism:    of   evolution,  47- 

49;  superficial,  156,  157. 
Individualistic  Force  (q.  v.),  214. 
Individuality      and       Personality 

(q.  v.),  89  90,  127. 
Individuality:    proved,  134;    sub- 
jective, 180;  not  finite,  215. 
Individual  Power  (q.  v  ),  214. 
Individuals,  created,  209. 
Induction,  wings  of,  198. 
Inductive  Basis,  138-141. 
Inductive  Method,  132-147. 
Infinite    Being    (q.    v ),  authority 

of,  222.     (See  Deity:) 
Infinite     Personality    (q.    v.),    90, 

179-183,  244. 
Infinite     Power,    181,    186,    187, 

(S-e  God.} 
Infinite,  the  :  notion  of,  182,  183; 

defined,  186. 

Infra-consciousness,  49-51. 
Intelligence  :  in  nature,  240,  241 ; 

confounded,  268. 
Intercourse,  human,  168-174. 
Intrinsic  Force  (q.  v.),  214. 
Inventions,  278. 


Involuntary  Action,  35,  36. 
Involution,'  207,  229. 
Iron,  230. 

jArK  AND  THE  BEANSTALKS,  108. 

Janet,  80-83. 

Jesus  Christ :  theism  of  (q. v.),193 ; 

quoted,  236. 
Jews,  167. 
Job,  247. 

John  the  Biptist,  167. 
Jupiter,  66.     (See  Astronomy.} 

KANT,  28,  29,  73,  78,  82, 100, 133, 
134,  278. 

Kinetic  Energy,  230-232. 

Knower,  the,  44. 

Knowledge  :  subjective,  2 ;  direct, 
79. 

Known  and  Unknown,  55,  56. 

Know  Thyself,  42,  66. 

Kosmic  Force  (q.  v.),  101,  227. 
(See  Cosmic.} 

Kosmic  Theism  (q.  v.),  190-192. 

Kosmogeny,  257-263. 

Kosmos:  allusions,  16,  30,  153; 
collapsing,  207,  208.  (See  Uni- 
verse, IV or  Id.} 

Kubla  Khan,  75. 

LABOR,  of  God,  207,  236. 

Labyrinth,  255. 

Lacunae;,  93. 

Lamp,  15.     (See  Eye,  Light.} 

Latin  Fathers,  189.     (See  Greek.} 

Law,  126,  127. 

Leibnitz  $  allusions,  25,   99;   mo- 

nadism,  105-107,  196;  doctrine 

of  harmony,  278. 
Lewes,  G.  H.,  20,  33. 
Life-events,  124. 
Life,  preceded  by  existence,  269. 
Light,  17,  65,  77,  185. 
Light,  a  magazine,  212. 
Limitations  of  Teleology,  255,  256. 
Lines,  blending,  225. 
Living  Being,  269. 
Local  Ego,  120-133. 
Locke,  John :  allusions,  3,  72,  73, 

121 ;  reasoned,  41. 
Logic,  140. 
Logical  Method,  with  Deity,  193- 

195. 

Logical  Points,  18-21. 
London,  212. 
Lotze's  Philosophy  :  allusions,  80- 

83,  118,  275;  quoted,  213-217. 
Lucretius,  99,  103. 


288 


INDEX 


MACHINE,  God's,  214. 

Maelstrom,  27. 

Malaria,  247. 

Malebranche,  24,  25,  278. 

Manifestation  of  Supernatural- 
inn,  237,  238. 

Mansel,  Dr.,  20. 

Man  :  sublime  representation,  56 ; 
walking,  83 ;  not  a  divine  mode, 
156 ;  developed  from  animals, 
161 ;  a  universe  (q.  v.),  171 :  or- 
igin, 199-207 ;  inclusive,  210  ; 
intrinsic  force,  214. 

Marriage,  124. 

Martineau,  James,  235. 

Materialist,  name,  21. 

Material  World,  nature  of,  4-7. 

Mathematics :  relations,  27  ;  pure, 
45. 

Matter :  supersensuous,  8-22  ;  be- 
lief in,  36 :  cognized,  68-70 ;  er- 
rors, 78-83;  Leibnitz's  view, 
106;  dead,  192;  force,  193; 
and  etiology,  219,  220;  eternal, 
240  ;  how  known,  273. 

Maturity,  279. 

Maudsley's  Philosophy,  107,  129, 
130. 

Me,  125. 

Mechanical  Constitution,  189. 

Medium  of  Intercourse,  171-174. 

Memory,  114-116,  200. 

Men,  and  teleology,  251. 

Mephistopheles,  72,  74. 

Messiah,  167. 

Metaphysical   Causality,  222-224. 

Metaphysical  Method,  how  super- 
seded, 195-198. 

Metaphysical  Principles,  8. 

Metaphysical  Theory,  6,  7. 

Metaphysics,  Lotze's,  213,  217. 

Metaphysics,  no  refuge  for  theol- 
ogy, 177,  178. 

Metempsychosis,  148,  150,  167. 

Meteor,  159.     (See  Astronomy.} 

Microscope,  127,  279. 

Milky  Way,  276.  (See  Astron- 
omy, Copernicus.) 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  88,  139,  140, 
239,  248. 

Milton,  John,  198,  199,  240. 

Mind:  a  force  (q.  v.),  68;  errors, 
78-83;  human,  168;  known  to 
itself,  170;  alone,  212;  as  un- 
known, 273. 

Mind-expression,  as  in  evolution, 
62-71. 

Mind  in  Nature,  212. 


Mind,  Review,  22. 

Minds,  separated,  173. 

Miracles,  235. 

Mohammed,  5. 

Molecular  Motion,  60. 

Monadism,  105-107. 

Monadology,  196. 

Monads,  10G. 

Monism,  spiritual,  107,  108,  118. 

Monists,  21. 

Monkey,  48,  153 

Monuments,  48. 

Moral  Economy,  157. 

Moral  Order,  158. 

Moral  Probation,  165. 

Moral  Qualities,  185. 

Morals,  made  impossible,  268. 

Morphism,  148-167. 

Mortalism,  167. 

Mortal  Mind,  273. 

Moss-trooper,  152. 

Motion,  106  ;  circular,  222. 

Mountains,  206,  276. 

Murder,  124. 

Mutation,  209. 

Mutual  Intercourse  (q.  v.),  170. 

Mystery,  a  last  privilege,  12. 

NATIONS,  126,  127. 

Natural  Realism  (q.  v.),  169. 

Nature  and  Supernatural,  222; 
known,  235. 

Nature:  as  force  (q.  v.),  139,  222  ; 
and  universe  (q.  v.),  194  ;  cause 
(q.  v.)  of  man,  203;  divine  im- 
manence (q.  v.),  214-216;  uni- 
formity, 238;  evil  in,  238;  lack 
of  design,  241-245;  and  teleol- 
ogy, 252,  253. 

Nature's  Panheisenism  (q.  v.), 
225-227. 

Nebulse,  258.     (See  Milky  Way.} 

Necessary  Belief,  36. 

Need  of  Supernaturalism  (q.  v.), 
237,238. 

Newton,  Sir  Isaac,  184,  226. 

Nimbus,  107. 

Nominalism,  22-26.  (See  Real- 
ism.} 

Non-ego  (q.  v.) :  allusions,  9,  10, 
16, 20,  26,  40,  41 ;  unproved,  37 ; 
admitted,  65;  two  kinds,  121, 
122;  sensible,  123-125;  extra- 
organic,  125-131. 

Non-egoistic  Matter,  172. 

Noumena,  73,  78. 

Noumenon,  274. 

Now,  49. 


289 


OBJECTIVE  AUTONOMY,  233-235. 

Objective  Evolution  (q.  v.):  ex- 
pounded, 1-7,  33;  broken,  51; 
its  exclusions,  218;  and  etiology 
(q.  v.),  225-232;  how  supported, 
259.  260. 

Objective  Reality,  62-71. 

Occam,  William,  26. 

Ocean,  206. 

Odor,  77. 

Omnipotence,  276. 

Omniscience,  66,  276. 

One  Being  (q.  v.),  88,  89,  119; 
modes,  226.  (See  Infinite.} 

One  Ego  (q.  v.),  43. 

One  Force  (q.  v.),  34. 

One  Only,  13,  156.     (See  God.} 

Ontogeny,  265-267. 

Optics,  130. 

Organic  Atomism,  107-110. 

Organic  Consciousness  (q.  v.),  226. 

Organic  Ego  (q.  v.),  125-131. 

Organicism,  91,  93-95. 

Organicists,  93. 

Organic  Phenomena,  59,  60. 

Organism  :  real  and  unknown,  9 ; 
relation  to  ego,  57,  58 ;  sematic, 
145-147;  of  deity  and  universe, 
187;  objective,  193,  205;  of  all 
phenomena,  205;  of  souls,  216, 
217;  traced  back,  244.  (See 
Se  matology . ) 

Organisms,  two,  10. 

Organs,  useless,  267,  268. 

Origin:  of  man  (q.  v.),  199-217; 
of  world  (q.  v.J,  273,  274. 

Orthodoxy,  195. 

Oysters,  63. 

PALEONTOLOGY,  48,  162. 

Palate,  102. 

Paley,  239. 

Panheisenism,  131,  132,  213,  225- 

227.     (See  Heisenism.} 
Pantheism,  118. 
Paralogisms,  222-224. 
Paralysis,  247. 
Parents,  200.     (See  Birth.} 
Pascal,  58. 
Past,  47-49. 
Paul,  theism  of,  193. 
Penumbral  Metaphysics,  177, 178. 
Pepper,  77. 
Perduring   Ego   (q.    v.),   99,   100, 

128. 

Perfection,  187. 
Permanence :  of  the  ego,  99-116 ; 

explained,  148-150. 


Personal  Deity  (q.  v.),  59,  240, 
243,  275. 

Personality  :  defined,  89-91 ;  lost, 
114-116;  organic,  127;  future, 
156;  of  God,  158,  179;  defined, 
180,  181;  human,  181-184. 

Person  :  defined,  89 ;  a  designer, 
239.  (See  God,  Infinite.} 

Phenomena:  subjective  (q.  v.), 
2-4;  nature,  6,7;  egoistic,  20, 
21,40;  defined,  23;  character, 
48 ;  organic,  59-61 ;  forceless, 
53,  54;  one  with  ego,  55,  56; 
ever  changing,  95,  96 ;  super- 
natural, 104,  105;  of  memory, 
114-116;  sensible,  123-125; 
modes,  191:  unity  of  all,  227. 

Philogeny,  263-265 

Philosophic  Realism :  unity  in, 
16,  114-116;  scope,  31;  defini- 
tion, 41;  self  in,  132;  logical, 
135;  basis,  223,  235;  divine 
unity,  236  ;  new  argument,  239, 
240;  knows  no  unconscious 
power,  252;  design,  253-255; 
assimilating  power,  256  ;  unity, 
263;  reign,  271;  method,  275; 
prospects,  277-279. 

Philosophic  Realists:  method, 
146;  assumptions,  169. 

Philosophy  and  Science  (q.  v.): 
rank,  12:  identity,  28-31. 

Philosophy:  scientific,  22-33;  im- 
plied by  theology,  175-178; 
cause  in,  218,  219;  true,  257. 

Physical  Science  (q.  v.),  124; 
errors,  255. 

Physiological  Ego  (q.  v.),  125- 
131. 

Planetary  System,  258.  (See  As- 
tronomy, Copernicus,  Jupiter . ) 

Plants,  269.     (See  Flora} 

Plato,  26,  120,  121,  193 

Platonizing  Christians,  189. 

Pluralism,  113,  114. 

Poison,  128. 

Porphyry,  25. 

Positive  Method,  195-198. 

Positivism,  45,  46,  50,  195-198. 

Possibility,  argument  from,  15, 16. 

Postulates,  8,  9,  36 ;  about  God, 
176,  177. 

Potential  Substratum,  119.  (See 
Tyndall.} 

Poverty,  237. 

Powder,  84,  85. 

Power:  above,  176;  inferred,  224; 
designing,  243-245. 


290 


INDEX 


Powers,  184,  185. 

Prayer,  238. 

Pre-animal  World  (q.  v.),  49-53. 

Pre-established  Harmony,  174. 

Pre-exclusion,  234. 

Pre-existence  (q.  v.),  150-153. 

Pre-fossil  World  (q.  v.),  47,  268- 

271. 

Pre-kosmic  Existence,  154. 
Pre-organic  Form,  204. 
Pre-organic  State,  209-213,  217. 
Pre-organic  World,  54. 
Presence,  infinite  (q.  v.),  191. 
Present,  47,  48. 
Pre-visible  Motion,  17. 
Primal  Cause  (q.  v.),  239. 
Princeton  Review,  64. 
Principle  of  Causality  (q.  v.),  222- 

224. 
Principles  of  Human  Knowledge, 

121,  122,  169. 
Printing,  279. 
Probation,  165. 
Progress,  184,  185. 
Proofs:   of  God  (q.  v.),  176,  177; 

of  creation  (q.  v.),  179-198,  208, 

209. 

Proserpine,  18. 
Protoplasm,  50,  67. 
Psalms,  quoted,  253. 
Psyche-morphism,  148-167. 
Psychological   Science,  and  God, 

191,  192. 

Psychologische  Optik,  64. 
Psychology:  of evolution,2;  mod- 
ern, 47,  260,272;  important,  141; 

facts,  258 
Ptolemaic    System,   7,   29.      (See 

A  stronomy>  Copernicus. ) 

QUALITIES:   as  forces,  219;  cre- 
ative, 231. 
Quality,  54,  195, 196. 

RAINDROPS,  267. 

Realism  :  ancient,  22 ;   dictum  of 

consciousness,    38;     word,    41. 

(See  Philosophic.) 
Resists  of  Middle  Ages,  25,  26. 

(See  Nominalism.) 
Realities,  all  personal,  252. 
Recheiche  de  la  Verite",  24. 
Reflections  on  the  Situation,  47- 

61. 
Refuge  for  Theology  (q.  v.),  177, 

178. 

Reid's  Philosophy,  24,  141,  169. 
Relation,  importance  of,  70,  71. 


Relationism,  22. 

Relations:    substitutes,    26,    27; 

subjective,  27;  various,  57-61. 
Relative  and  Absolute,  72-86, 149. 
Religio-Philosophical  Journal,212. 
Religious  Basis,  235. 
Responsibility,  126,  127. 
Ripeness,  279. 
Rivers,  206. 
Rocks,  268,  269. 
Romans,  idea  of  personality,  89. 

SAMSON,  190. 

Savages,  77.     (See  Barbarians.) 

Scepticism,  difficult  to  flank,  220, 
221. 

Schelling,  73,  105. 

Scholasticism,  22,  23,  78. 

Science  and  Philosophy :  rank, 
28-31,279;  scope,  31,  32;  mod- 
ern discoveries,  44. 

Science  and  Supernaturalism 
(q.  v.),  235. 

Science :  strict,  11 ;  conquests, 
12  ;  ignorance,  15  ;  developing 
power,  185;  cause  in,  218,  219; 
assimilation,  257-271. 

Scientific  Philosophy,  22-33. 

Scientific  Theism,  Abbot's  (q.  v.), 
275. 

Scotch  Philosophers,  24,  169. 

Seamen,  92. 

Seed,  150. 

Self-consciousness,  9. 

Self-knowledge,  170. 

Self-modes,  48,  211. 

Sematic  Inference,  264. 

Sematism  :  in  general,  138-141 ; 
between  senses,  142,  143;  of 
ego,  143 ;  of  organisms,  144, 
145 ;  what  it  proves,  180. 

Sematology  :  explained,  145,  171, 
172,  204,  240,  257 ;  law  of,  259, 
266,  268,  274. 

Sensations:  relative,  27,  78,  79; 
phenomena  (q.  v.)  resolved  into, 
193,  194;  alone  known,  273. 
(See  Subjective.) 

Sensation,  world  as,  272,  273. 

Sense-perception,  266. 

Senses,  Five,  25,  56,  102. 

Senses  :  as  twofold,  57 ;  error,  80, 
81 ;  the  sematism  of,  142,  143  ; 
knowledge,  169. 

Sensibility,  192. 

Sensible  Forms,  6,  7. 

Sensible  Matter,  173. 

Sensible  Phenomena,  123-125. 


INDEX 


291 


Sensism,  25,  91,  92,  113,  126,  128, 
194,266. 

Sensitive  Faculty,  limitations,  17. 

Sensitive  Variation,  84,  85. 

Sentience,  forms  of,  52. 

Sentient  Being:  a  force  (q.  v.), 
53,  54;  one  with  God  (q.  v.), 
54,55. 

Sentient  World,  49-53. 

Sentiments,  24,  25. 

Sex,  166. 

Shakespeare,  quoted,  109. 

Ship,  247. 

Siamese  Twins.  128. 

Sight,  80,  81, 146.  (See  Clairvoy- 
ance, Eye,  Light,  Telescope.} 

Sign-child,  201.     (See  Birth.) 

Similarity,  83,  84. 

Simplicity  of  the  Ego,  94-116. 

Sins,  plea  for,  178.     (See  Evil.) 

Skeleton,  139. 

Sky,  81. 

Small  Philosophy,  92,  93. 

Snail,  83. 

Snuff,  77. 

Society  for  Psychological  Re- 
search, 212. 

Solipsism  :  essay,  33-46 ;  defined, 
42,  43. 

Soul :  developed,  102 ;  and  body 
(q.  v.),  166;  how  created,  213; 
evolving  organism,  216,  217 ; 
transcends  universe,  217. 

Sound,  80,  81.     (See  Ear.) 

Source,  one,  42. 

Space:  allusions,  13,  56,  68-70, 
77,  79,  92,  106,  225,  226;  in- 
finite, 190. 

Spaces,  255. 

Spark,  84,  85. 

Spectroscope,  262. 

Speech,  279.     (See  Sound.) 

Spencer,  Herbert :  allusions,  2,  3, 
7,20,33,  36-40,  5i,  59,  73,  74, 
82 ;  quoted,  5,  77 ;  transfigured, 
41 ;  and  Fichte,  43 ;  errors,  62, 
63;  on  sensism  (q  v.),  92,  113; 
changes,  149,  166;  self-knowl- 
edge all,  170;  power,  176;  un- 
known God,  275. 

Sphere  of  Teleology  (q.  v.),  249- 
256. 

Spinoza,  118,  132,  149,  182,  183, 
196,  215,  226. 

Spirit :  as  ego,  128 :  the  power,  279. 

Spirits:  and  svmbols,  144.  145; 
intercourse,  180;  manifestations, 
212,  213 ;  moulding  body,  217. 


Spiritual  monism,  117,  118. 

Stahl's  Philosophy,  217. 

Stars,  102, 276.     (See  A  stronomy, 

Ptolemaic.) 
Steam,  279. 

Stewart,  Dugald,  24,  169. 
Stubble,  159. 
Subjective  Agent,  192. 
Subjective  Autonomy,  233-237. 
Subjective  Evolution  (q.  v.) :  real, 

161,    162;     universal,    162-167, 

233-238. 

Subjective  Relations,  27. 
Subjective  States,  205,  206. 
Subjective  World :  allusions,  8,  9 ; 

real,  40-42. 

Subjectivism,  Modern,  22-26. 
Subjectivity,  universal,  2-4, 210. 
Substance:  basis,  55;    alwavs  the 

same,  149 ;  and  quality,  195, 196. 
Summary,  272-279. 
Sun,  6,  66.     (See  Astronomy.) 
Sunstroke,  248. 
Supernatural  Appointments,  173, 

174. 


tance  (q.  v.),  236,  237. 
Super-organicism  (q.  v.),  93. 
Super-organic  Power  (q.  v.),  103, 

104. 

Super-scientific,  17. 
Super-sensible  matter  (q.  v.),  8-22. 
Super-sensible  Phenomena  (q.  v.), 

123-125. 
Super-sensible  Processes,  17. 


197 ;  universal,  203,  204. 
Symbo's  :  as  forces  (q.  v.),  53,  64 ; 

realities,  145,  268. 
Synthetic  Evolution  (q.  v.),  227. 

TAINE'S  ESSAYS,  quoted,  94,  95. 

Telegraph,  279. 

Teleology :  presuppositions,  239- 
248;  etiology  (q.  v.),  239  240; 
sphere ,  249-256 ;  form ,  249-251 ; 
relations,  251-253;  limitations, 
256,  257. 

Telephone,  279. 

Telescope,  271,  279.  (See  As- 
tronomy, Light,  Microscope, 
Venus) 

Tempest,  247. 

Testimony,  collateral,  168-170. 

Tests,  257. 


292 


Theism:    allusions,   175,  176;    of 

Jesus  (q.  v.)  and  apostles,  193; 

improved,  246;  and  force,  252. 
Theistic  Conclusions,  274-277. 
Theists :    allusion,   156;    view   of 

authority,  222;  and  matter,  240. 
Theolocv,     implies     philosophy, 

175-178 

Things,  226,  227. 
Thought  and  Brain,  58,  59. 
Thought  and  Things,  226,  227. 
Thunder,  56. 
Time,  56,  68-70,  79,  92,  106,  225. 

(See  Space.") 
Times,  255. 

Tongue,  102.     (See  Speech. } 
Touch,  102,  146,  169. 
Transcendence   of  the   Universe, 

217. 
Transcending  the  Ego  (q.  v.),  133- 

Transfigured  Realism,  37-40. 
Transmutation,  61,  163,  221. 
Transphenomenal  Being,  274. 
Transphenomenalism,  120-122. 
Trichotomy,  111. 
Trilemma,  185. 
Trinity,  275. 
Troglodyte,  185. 
True  Philosophy  (q.  v.),  257. 
Tyndall,  John,   52,   59,   109,  241, 
242. 

ULTIMATE  FACTS,  266. 

Unceasing  Creation  (q.  v.),  236. 

Unconscious  Cerebration,  274. 

Unconscious  Forces  (q.  v.),  245. 

Undesigned  Causes  (q.  v.),  218. 
(See  Design.} 

Uniformities,  60. 

Uniformity,  142. 

Unity:  of  philosophic  realism, 
114-116;  abiding,  120;  of  ego, 
130;  conscious,  191 ;  of  all  phe- 
nomena, 227;  of  God  (q.v.),236. 

Universality  of  Evolution,  162- 
167. 

Univer^als,  26,  27. 


Universe:  external  ensemble,  20; 

every   being    a,    171 ;    organic, 

187;     transcended,     189,     217; 

unity,   191,    204;    nature,   194; 

defined,    215;     forceless,    221; 

autonomy  (q.  v.  „  233-237;  ego, 

249 ;    unit  of  force,   266,   267  ; 

trundled    about   with   us,    274. 

(See   World.} 
Universes,  180. 

Unknowable  Absolute  (q.  v.),  86. 
Unknowable,  the,  119. 
Unknown  and  Known  (q.  v.),  55, 

56. 
Unseen    Universe,    quoted.    175, 

176. 
Useless  Organs  (q.  v.),  267,  268. 

VACILLATION,  16-19. 
Vanishing  Lines,  225. 
Variableness,  245,  246. 
Variation,  84,  85. 
Venus,  270.     (See  Astronomy.} 
Vitascripts,  48. 
Vocation  of  Man,  135. 
Volition,  245,  246.     (See  Will.} 

WAR,  124,  221. 

Water.  242. 

Wealth,  247. 

Wedding  Garment,  108. 

Weight,  185,  228. 

Western  Intellect,  148. 

Whale,  267. 

Will:  as  power,  185;  divine  force 

(q.  v.),  220 ;  of  God  (q.  v.),  230, 

231. 

Wisdom,  in  nature,  247. 
Words:  use,  72;  flood,  75. 
World:    material,   4-6;    different 

to  different  men,  9;    so-called, 

19;   sentient,  53-55;    term,  55; 

spiritual,  269;  as  sensation,  272, 

273 ;    each  man   his  own,  272 ; 

cause  or  origin,  273,  274.     (See 

Earth,  Universe.} 
Worms,  56. 
Writing,  279. 


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